1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 59 #include <stdio.h> 60 #include <time.h> 61 #include <errno.h> 62 63 #include "cryptlib.h" 64 #include <openssl/crypto.h> 65 #include <openssl/lhash.h> 66 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 67 #include <openssl/evp.h> 68 #include <openssl/asn1.h> 69 #include <openssl/x509.h> 70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h> 71 #include <openssl/objects.h> 72 73 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); 74 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); 75 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); 76 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 77 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 78 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 79 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 80 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 81 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 82 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 83 84 85 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) 86 { 87 return ok; 88 } 89 90 #if 0 91 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) 92 { 93 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b); 94 } 95 #endif 96 97 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 98 { 99 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; 100 X509_NAME *xn; 101 int bad_chain = 0; 102 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; 103 int depth,i,ok=0; 104 int num; 105 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 106 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL; 107 if (ctx->cert == NULL) 108 { 109 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); 110 return -1; 111 } 112 113 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 114 115 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is 116 * present and that the first entry is in place */ 117 if (ctx->chain == NULL) 118 { 119 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || 120 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert))) 121 { 122 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 123 goto end; 124 } 125 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 126 ctx->last_untrusted=1; 127 } 128 129 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ 130 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL 131 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) 132 { 133 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 134 goto end; 135 } 136 137 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 138 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); 139 depth=param->depth; 140 141 142 for (;;) 143 { 144 /* If we have enough, we break */ 145 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take 146 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the 147 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error 148 * code later. 149 */ 150 151 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 152 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); 153 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break; 154 155 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ 156 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) 157 { 158 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x); 159 if (xtmp != NULL) 160 { 161 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp)) 162 { 163 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 164 goto end; 165 } 166 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 167 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); 168 ctx->last_untrusted++; 169 x=xtmp; 170 num++; 171 /* reparse the full chain for 172 * the next one */ 173 continue; 174 } 175 } 176 break; 177 } 178 179 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted 180 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, 181 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ 182 183 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it 184 * is self signed. 185 */ 186 187 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 188 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1); 189 xn = X509_get_subject_name(x); 190 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) 191 { 192 /* we have a self signed certificate */ 193 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) 194 { 195 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if 196 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact 197 * match to avoid possible impersonation. 198 */ 199 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 200 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 201 { 202 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; 203 ctx->current_cert=x; 204 ctx->error_depth=i-1; 205 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); 206 bad_chain = 1; 207 ok=cb(0,ctx); 208 if (!ok) goto end; 209 } 210 else 211 { 212 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version 213 * so we get any trust settings. 214 */ 215 X509_free(x); 216 x = xtmp; 217 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); 218 ctx->last_untrusted=0; 219 } 220 } 221 else 222 { 223 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ 224 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); 225 ctx->last_untrusted--; 226 num--; 227 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); 228 } 229 } 230 231 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ 232 for (;;) 233 { 234 /* If we have enough, we break */ 235 if (depth < num) break; 236 237 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 238 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); 239 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break; 240 241 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 242 243 if (ok < 0) return ok; 244 if (ok == 0) break; 245 246 x = xtmp; 247 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x)) 248 { 249 X509_free(xtmp); 250 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 251 return 0; 252 } 253 num++; 254 } 255 256 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ 257 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); 258 259 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ 260 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) 261 { 262 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) 263 { 264 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) 265 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; 266 else 267 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; 268 ctx->current_cert=x; 269 } 270 else 271 { 272 273 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss); 274 num++; 275 ctx->last_untrusted=num; 276 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; 277 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; 278 chain_ss=NULL; 279 } 280 281 ctx->error_depth=num-1; 282 bad_chain = 1; 283 ok=cb(0,ctx); 284 if (!ok) goto end; 285 } 286 287 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ 288 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); 289 290 if (!ok) goto end; 291 292 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ 293 294 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); 295 296 if (!ok) goto end; 297 298 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ 299 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); 300 301 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters 302 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification. 303 */ 304 305 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); 306 if(!ok) goto end; 307 308 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ 309 if (ctx->verify != NULL) 310 ok=ctx->verify(ctx); 311 else 312 ok=internal_verify(ctx); 313 if(!ok) goto end; 314 315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 316 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ 317 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); 318 if (!ok) goto end; 319 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); 320 if (!ok) goto end; 321 #endif 322 323 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ 324 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) 325 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); 326 if(!ok) goto end; 327 if (0) 328 { 329 end: 330 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); 331 } 332 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); 333 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); 334 return ok; 335 } 336 337 338 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) 339 */ 340 341 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) 342 { 343 int i; 344 X509 *issuer; 345 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) 346 { 347 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 348 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) 349 return issuer; 350 } 351 return NULL; 352 } 353 354 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ 355 356 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) 357 { 358 int ret; 359 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); 360 if (ret == X509_V_OK) 361 return 1; 362 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ 363 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) 364 return 0; 365 366 ctx->error = ret; 367 ctx->current_cert = x; 368 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 369 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 370 return 0; 371 } 372 373 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ 374 375 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 376 { 377 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); 378 if (*issuer) 379 { 380 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 381 return 1; 382 } 383 else 384 return 0; 385 } 386 387 388 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency 389 * with the supplied purpose 390 */ 391 392 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 393 { 394 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 395 return 1; 396 #else 397 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; 398 X509 *x; 399 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 400 int proxy_path_length = 0; 401 int allow_proxy_certs = 402 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); 403 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 404 405 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: 406 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct 407 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). 408 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not 409 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. 410 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for 411 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. 412 */ 413 must_be_ca = -1; 414 415 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software 416 happy */ 417 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) 418 allow_proxy_certs = 1; 419 420 /* Check all untrusted certificates */ 421 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) 422 { 423 int ret; 424 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 425 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 426 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 427 { 428 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; 429 ctx->error_depth = i; 430 ctx->current_cert = x; 431 ok=cb(0,ctx); 432 if (!ok) goto end; 433 } 434 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) 435 { 436 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; 437 ctx->error_depth = i; 438 ctx->current_cert = x; 439 ok=cb(0,ctx); 440 if (!ok) goto end; 441 } 442 ret = X509_check_ca(x); 443 switch(must_be_ca) 444 { 445 case -1: 446 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 447 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) 448 { 449 ret = 0; 450 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 451 } 452 else 453 ret = 1; 454 break; 455 case 0: 456 if (ret != 0) 457 { 458 ret = 0; 459 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; 460 } 461 else 462 ret = 1; 463 break; 464 default: 465 if ((ret == 0) 466 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 467 && (ret != 1))) 468 { 469 ret = 0; 470 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 471 } 472 else 473 ret = 1; 474 break; 475 } 476 if (ret == 0) 477 { 478 ctx->error_depth = i; 479 ctx->current_cert = x; 480 ok=cb(0,ctx); 481 if (!ok) goto end; 482 } 483 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) 484 { 485 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose, 486 must_be_ca > 0); 487 if ((ret == 0) 488 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 489 && (ret != 1))) 490 { 491 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; 492 ctx->error_depth = i; 493 ctx->current_cert = x; 494 ok=cb(0,ctx); 495 if (!ok) goto end; 496 } 497 } 498 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ 499 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) 500 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) 501 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) 502 { 503 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 504 ctx->error_depth = i; 505 ctx->current_cert = x; 506 ok=cb(0,ctx); 507 if (!ok) goto end; 508 } 509 /* Increment path length if not self issued */ 510 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 511 plen++; 512 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next 513 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE 514 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a 515 CA certificate. */ 516 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) 517 { 518 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) 519 { 520 ctx->error = 521 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 522 ctx->error_depth = i; 523 ctx->current_cert = x; 524 ok=cb(0,ctx); 525 if (!ok) goto end; 526 } 527 proxy_path_length++; 528 must_be_ca = 0; 529 } 530 else 531 must_be_ca = 1; 532 } 533 ok = 1; 534 end: 535 return ok; 536 #endif 537 } 538 539 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 540 { 541 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 542 return 1; 543 #else 544 int i, ok; 545 X509 *x; 546 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 547 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 548 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ 549 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 550 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 551 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); 552 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) 553 return 1; 554 ctx->error_depth = i; 555 ctx->current_cert = x; 556 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) 557 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; 558 else 559 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; 560 ok = cb(0, ctx); 561 return ok; 562 #endif 563 } 564 565 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 566 { 567 int i, last, ok; 568 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) 569 return 1; 570 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) 571 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 572 else 573 last = 0; 574 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++) 575 { 576 ctx->error_depth = i; 577 ok = check_cert(ctx); 578 if (!ok) return ok; 579 } 580 return 1; 581 } 582 583 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 584 { 585 X509_CRL *crl = NULL; 586 X509 *x; 587 int ok, cnum; 588 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 589 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); 590 ctx->current_cert = x; 591 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ 592 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); 593 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except 594 * notify callback 595 */ 596 if(!ok) 597 { 598 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 599 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 600 goto err; 601 } 602 ctx->current_crl = crl; 603 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); 604 if (!ok) goto err; 605 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); 606 err: 607 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 608 X509_CRL_free(crl); 609 return ok; 610 611 } 612 613 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ 614 615 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) 616 { 617 time_t *ptime; 618 int i; 619 ctx->current_crl = crl; 620 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 621 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 622 else 623 ptime = NULL; 624 625 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); 626 if (i == 0) 627 { 628 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; 629 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 630 return 0; 631 } 632 633 if (i > 0) 634 { 635 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; 636 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 637 return 0; 638 } 639 640 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) 641 { 642 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); 643 644 if (i == 0) 645 { 646 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; 647 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 648 return 0; 649 } 650 651 if (i < 0) 652 { 653 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; 654 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 655 return 0; 656 } 657 } 658 659 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 660 661 return 1; 662 } 663 664 /* Lookup CRLs from the supplied list. Look for matching isser name 665 * and validity. If we can't find a valid CRL return the last one 666 * with matching name. This gives more meaningful error codes. Otherwise 667 * we'd get a CRL not found error if a CRL existed with matching name but 668 * was invalid. 669 */ 670 671 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, 672 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 673 { 674 int i; 675 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; 676 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) 677 { 678 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 679 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) 680 continue; 681 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) 682 { 683 *pcrl = crl; 684 CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 685 return 1; 686 } 687 best_crl = crl; 688 } 689 if (best_crl) 690 { 691 *pcrl = best_crl; 692 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 693 } 694 695 return 0; 696 } 697 698 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a 699 * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later... 700 */ 701 static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x) 702 { 703 int ok; 704 X509_CRL *crl = NULL; 705 X509_OBJECT xobj; 706 X509_NAME *nm; 707 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 708 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls); 709 if (ok) 710 { 711 *pcrl = crl; 712 return 1; 713 } 714 715 ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &xobj); 716 717 if (!ok) 718 { 719 /* If we got a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ 720 if (crl) 721 { 722 *pcrl = crl; 723 return 1; 724 } 725 return 0; 726 } 727 728 *pcrl = xobj.data.crl; 729 if (crl) 730 X509_CRL_free(crl); 731 return 1; 732 } 733 734 /* Check CRL validity */ 735 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) 736 { 737 X509 *issuer = NULL; 738 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; 739 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; 740 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 741 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 742 /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer 743 * is next certificate in chain. 744 */ 745 if(cnum < chnum) 746 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); 747 else 748 { 749 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); 750 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ 751 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) 752 { 753 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; 754 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 755 if(!ok) goto err; 756 } 757 } 758 759 if(issuer) 760 { 761 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ 762 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && 763 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) 764 { 765 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; 766 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 767 if(!ok) goto err; 768 } 769 770 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ 771 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); 772 773 if(!ikey) 774 { 775 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 776 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 777 if (!ok) goto err; 778 } 779 else 780 { 781 /* Verify CRL signature */ 782 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) 783 { 784 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 785 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 786 if (!ok) goto err; 787 } 788 } 789 } 790 791 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); 792 if (!ok) 793 goto err; 794 795 ok = 1; 796 797 err: 798 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); 799 return ok; 800 } 801 802 /* Check certificate against CRL */ 803 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 804 { 805 int idx, ok; 806 X509_REVOKED rtmp; 807 STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts; 808 X509_EXTENSION *ext; 809 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */ 810 rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x); 811 /* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted. 812 * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition. 813 */ 814 if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked)) 815 { 816 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 817 sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked); 818 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 819 } 820 idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp); 821 /* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than 822 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs. 823 */ 824 if(idx >= 0) 825 { 826 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; 827 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 828 if (!ok) return 0; 829 } 830 831 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 832 return 1; 833 834 /* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we 835 * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be 836 * rejected. 837 * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications 838 * shouldn't do this. 839 */ 840 841 exts = crl->crl->extensions; 842 843 for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++) 844 { 845 ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx); 846 if (ext->critical > 0) 847 { 848 ctx->error = 849 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; 850 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 851 if(!ok) return 0; 852 break; 853 } 854 } 855 return 1; 856 } 857 858 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 859 { 860 int ret; 861 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, 862 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); 863 if (ret == 0) 864 { 865 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 866 return 0; 867 } 868 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ 869 if (ret == -1) 870 { 871 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify 872 * callback. 873 */ 874 X509 *x; 875 int i; 876 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) 877 { 878 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 879 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) 880 continue; 881 ctx->current_cert = x; 882 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; 883 ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 884 } 885 return 1; 886 } 887 if (ret == -2) 888 { 889 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 890 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; 891 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 892 } 893 894 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) 895 { 896 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 897 ctx->error = X509_V_OK; 898 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) 899 return 0; 900 } 901 902 return 1; 903 } 904 905 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 906 { 907 time_t *ptime; 908 int i; 909 910 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 911 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 912 else 913 ptime = NULL; 914 915 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); 916 if (i == 0) 917 { 918 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; 919 ctx->current_cert=x; 920 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 921 return 0; 922 } 923 924 if (i > 0) 925 { 926 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; 927 ctx->current_cert=x; 928 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 929 return 0; 930 } 931 932 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); 933 if (i == 0) 934 { 935 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; 936 ctx->current_cert=x; 937 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 938 return 0; 939 } 940 941 if (i < 0) 942 { 943 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; 944 ctx->current_cert=x; 945 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 946 return 0; 947 } 948 949 return 1; 950 } 951 952 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 953 { 954 int ok=0,n; 955 X509 *xs,*xi; 956 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 957 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 958 959 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 960 961 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 962 ctx->error_depth=n-1; 963 n--; 964 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 965 966 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) 967 xs=xi; 968 else 969 { 970 if (n <= 0) 971 { 972 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; 973 ctx->current_cert=xi; 974 ok=cb(0,ctx); 975 goto end; 976 } 977 else 978 { 979 n--; 980 ctx->error_depth=n; 981 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 982 } 983 } 984 985 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ 986 while (n >= 0) 987 { 988 ctx->error_depth=n; 989 990 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless 991 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and 992 * just wastes time. 993 */ 994 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) 995 { 996 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) 997 { 998 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 999 ctx->current_cert=xi; 1000 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); 1001 if (!ok) goto end; 1002 } 1003 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) 1004 { 1005 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1006 ctx->current_cert=xs; 1007 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); 1008 if (!ok) 1009 { 1010 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1011 goto end; 1012 } 1013 } 1014 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1015 pkey=NULL; 1016 } 1017 1018 xs->valid = 1; 1019 1020 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); 1021 if (!ok) 1022 goto end; 1023 1024 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ 1025 ctx->current_issuer=xi; 1026 ctx->current_cert=xs; 1027 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); 1028 if (!ok) goto end; 1029 1030 n--; 1031 if (n >= 0) 1032 { 1033 xi=xs; 1034 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 1035 } 1036 } 1037 ok=1; 1038 end: 1039 return ok; 1040 } 1041 1042 int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm) 1043 { 1044 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); 1045 } 1046 1047 int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) 1048 { 1049 char *str; 1050 ASN1_TIME atm; 1051 long offset; 1052 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; 1053 int i,j; 1054 1055 p=buff1; 1056 i=ctm->length; 1057 str=(char *)ctm->data; 1058 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1059 { 1060 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0; 1061 memcpy(p,str,10); 1062 p+=10; 1063 str+=10; 1064 } 1065 else 1066 { 1067 if (i < 13) return 0; 1068 memcpy(p,str,12); 1069 p+=12; 1070 str+=12; 1071 } 1072 1073 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) 1074 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } 1075 else 1076 { 1077 *(p++)= *(str++); 1078 *(p++)= *(str++); 1079 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ 1080 if (*str == '.') 1081 { 1082 str++; 1083 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++; 1084 } 1085 1086 } 1087 *(p++)='Z'; 1088 *(p++)='\0'; 1089 1090 if (*str == 'Z') 1091 offset=0; 1092 else 1093 { 1094 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) 1095 return 0; 1096 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; 1097 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); 1098 if (*str == '-') 1099 offset= -offset; 1100 } 1101 atm.type=ctm->type; 1102 atm.length=sizeof(buff2); 1103 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; 1104 1105 if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL) 1106 return 0; 1107 1108 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1109 { 1110 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); 1111 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ 1112 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); 1113 if (j < 50) j+=100; 1114 1115 if (i < j) return -1; 1116 if (i > j) return 1; 1117 } 1118 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); 1119 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ 1120 return -1; 1121 else 1122 return i; 1123 } 1124 1125 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) 1126 { 1127 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); 1128 } 1129 1130 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm) 1131 { 1132 time_t t; 1133 int type = -1; 1134 1135 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; 1136 else time(&t); 1137 1138 t+=adj; 1139 if (s) type = s->type; 1140 if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t); 1141 if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t); 1142 return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t); 1143 } 1144 1145 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 1146 { 1147 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2; 1148 int i,j; 1149 1150 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; 1151 1152 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 1153 { 1154 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i)); 1155 if (ktmp == NULL) 1156 { 1157 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); 1158 return 0; 1159 } 1160 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) 1161 break; 1162 else 1163 { 1164 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1165 ktmp=NULL; 1166 } 1167 } 1168 if (ktmp == NULL) 1169 { 1170 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); 1171 return 0; 1172 } 1173 1174 /* first, populate the other certs */ 1175 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--) 1176 { 1177 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j)); 1178 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp); 1179 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); 1180 } 1181 1182 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp); 1183 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1184 return 1; 1185 } 1186 1187 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, 1188 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) 1189 { 1190 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by 1191 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */ 1192 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, 1193 new_func, dup_func, free_func); 1194 } 1195 1196 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) 1197 { 1198 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data); 1199 } 1200 1201 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) 1202 { 1203 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx); 1204 } 1205 1206 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1207 { 1208 return ctx->error; 1209 } 1210 1211 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) 1212 { 1213 ctx->error=err; 1214 } 1215 1216 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1217 { 1218 return ctx->error_depth; 1219 } 1220 1221 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1222 { 1223 return ctx->current_cert; 1224 } 1225 1226 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1227 { 1228 return ctx->chain; 1229 } 1230 1231 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1232 { 1233 int i; 1234 X509 *x; 1235 STACK_OF(X509) *chain; 1236 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL; 1237 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 1238 { 1239 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 1240 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 1241 } 1242 return chain; 1243 } 1244 1245 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1246 { 1247 ctx->cert=x; 1248 } 1249 1250 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 1251 { 1252 ctx->untrusted=sk; 1253 } 1254 1255 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) 1256 { 1257 ctx->crls=sk; 1258 } 1259 1260 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) 1261 { 1262 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); 1263 } 1264 1265 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) 1266 { 1267 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); 1268 } 1269 1270 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust 1271 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its 1272 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by 1273 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default 1274 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value. 1275 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own 1276 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they 1277 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server. 1278 */ 1279 1280 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, 1281 int purpose, int trust) 1282 { 1283 int idx; 1284 /* If purpose not set use default */ 1285 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; 1286 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ 1287 if (purpose) 1288 { 1289 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; 1290 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); 1291 if (idx == -1) 1292 { 1293 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1294 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 1295 return 0; 1296 } 1297 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 1298 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) 1299 { 1300 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); 1301 if (idx == -1) 1302 { 1303 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1304 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 1305 return 0; 1306 } 1307 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 1308 } 1309 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ 1310 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; 1311 } 1312 if (trust) 1313 { 1314 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); 1315 if (idx == -1) 1316 { 1317 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1318 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); 1319 return 0; 1320 } 1321 } 1322 1323 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose; 1324 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust; 1325 return 1; 1326 } 1327 1328 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) 1329 { 1330 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; 1331 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 1332 if (!ctx) 1333 { 1334 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1335 return NULL; 1336 } 1337 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 1338 return ctx; 1339 } 1340 1341 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1342 { 1343 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); 1344 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 1345 } 1346 1347 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, 1348 STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 1349 { 1350 int ret = 1; 1351 ctx->ctx=store; 1352 ctx->current_method=0; 1353 ctx->cert=x509; 1354 ctx->untrusted=chain; 1355 ctx->crls = NULL; 1356 ctx->last_untrusted=0; 1357 ctx->other_ctx=NULL; 1358 ctx->valid=0; 1359 ctx->chain=NULL; 1360 ctx->error=0; 1361 ctx->explicit_policy=0; 1362 ctx->error_depth=0; 1363 ctx->current_cert=NULL; 1364 ctx->current_issuer=NULL; 1365 ctx->tree = NULL; 1366 1367 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); 1368 1369 if (!ctx->param) 1370 { 1371 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1372 return 0; 1373 } 1374 1375 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set 1376 * use defaults. 1377 */ 1378 1379 1380 if (store) 1381 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); 1382 else 1383 ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; 1384 1385 if (store) 1386 { 1387 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 1388 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; 1389 } 1390 else 1391 ctx->cleanup = 0; 1392 1393 if (ret) 1394 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, 1395 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); 1396 1397 if (ret == 0) 1398 { 1399 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1400 return 0; 1401 } 1402 1403 if (store && store->check_issued) 1404 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; 1405 else 1406 ctx->check_issued = check_issued; 1407 1408 if (store && store->get_issuer) 1409 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; 1410 else 1411 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; 1412 1413 if (store && store->verify_cb) 1414 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 1415 else 1416 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; 1417 1418 if (store && store->verify) 1419 ctx->verify = store->verify; 1420 else 1421 ctx->verify = internal_verify; 1422 1423 if (store && store->check_revocation) 1424 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; 1425 else 1426 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; 1427 1428 if (store && store->get_crl) 1429 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; 1430 else 1431 ctx->get_crl = get_crl; 1432 1433 if (store && store->check_crl) 1434 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; 1435 else 1436 ctx->check_crl = check_crl; 1437 1438 if (store && store->cert_crl) 1439 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; 1440 else 1441 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; 1442 1443 ctx->check_policy = check_policy; 1444 1445 1446 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As 1447 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a 1448 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */ 1449 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ 1450 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, 1451 &(ctx->ex_data))) 1452 { 1453 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 1454 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1455 return 0; 1456 } 1457 return 1; 1458 } 1459 1460 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. 1461 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. 1462 */ 1463 1464 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 1465 { 1466 ctx->other_ctx = sk; 1467 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; 1468 } 1469 1470 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1471 { 1472 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx); 1473 if (ctx->param != NULL) 1474 { 1475 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 1476 ctx->param=NULL; 1477 } 1478 if (ctx->tree != NULL) 1479 { 1480 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); 1481 ctx->tree=NULL; 1482 } 1483 if (ctx->chain != NULL) 1484 { 1485 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free); 1486 ctx->chain=NULL; 1487 } 1488 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); 1489 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); 1490 } 1491 1492 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) 1493 { 1494 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); 1495 } 1496 1497 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) 1498 { 1499 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); 1500 } 1501 1502 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t) 1503 { 1504 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); 1505 } 1506 1507 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1508 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) 1509 { 1510 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb; 1511 } 1512 1513 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1514 { 1515 return ctx->tree; 1516 } 1517 1518 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1519 { 1520 return ctx->explicit_policy; 1521 } 1522 1523 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) 1524 { 1525 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; 1526 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); 1527 if (!param) 1528 return 0; 1529 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); 1530 } 1531 1532 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1533 { 1534 return ctx->param; 1535 } 1536 1537 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) 1538 { 1539 if (ctx->param) 1540 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 1541 ctx->param = param; 1542 } 1543 1544 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) 1545 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) 1546 1547 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) 1548 1549 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 1550 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 1551
