1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 59 #include <stdio.h> 60 #include <time.h> 61 #include <errno.h> 62 63 #include "cryptlib.h" 64 #include <openssl/crypto.h> 65 #include <openssl/lhash.h> 66 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 67 #include <openssl/evp.h> 68 #include <openssl/asn1.h> 69 #include <openssl/x509.h> 70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h> 71 #include <openssl/objects.h> 72 73 /* CRL score values */ 74 75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */ 76 77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 78 79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */ 80 81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 82 83 /* CRL times valid */ 84 85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 86 87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */ 88 89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 90 91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ 92 93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) 94 95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ 96 97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 98 99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ 100 101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 102 103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ 104 105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 106 107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ 108 109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 110 111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); 112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); 113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); 114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 116 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 117 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 118 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 119 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 120 121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 122 unsigned int *preasons, 123 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); 124 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 125 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); 126 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score, 127 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); 128 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, 129 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score); 130 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 131 unsigned int *preasons); 132 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); 133 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 134 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 135 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); 136 137 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 138 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 139 140 141 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) 142 { 143 return ok; 144 } 145 146 #if 0 147 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) 148 { 149 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b); 150 } 151 #endif 152 153 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 154 { 155 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; 156 X509_NAME *xn; 157 int bad_chain = 0; 158 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; 159 int depth,i,ok=0; 160 int num; 161 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 162 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL; 163 if (ctx->cert == NULL) 164 { 165 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); 166 return -1; 167 } 168 169 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 170 171 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is 172 * present and that the first entry is in place */ 173 if (ctx->chain == NULL) 174 { 175 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || 176 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert))) 177 { 178 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 179 goto end; 180 } 181 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 182 ctx->last_untrusted=1; 183 } 184 185 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ 186 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL 187 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) 188 { 189 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 190 goto end; 191 } 192 193 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 194 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); 195 depth=param->depth; 196 197 198 for (;;) 199 { 200 /* If we have enough, we break */ 201 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take 202 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the 203 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error 204 * code later. 205 */ 206 207 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 208 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); 209 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break; 210 211 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ 212 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) 213 { 214 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x); 215 if (xtmp != NULL) 216 { 217 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp)) 218 { 219 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 220 goto end; 221 } 222 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 223 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); 224 ctx->last_untrusted++; 225 x=xtmp; 226 num++; 227 /* reparse the full chain for 228 * the next one */ 229 continue; 230 } 231 } 232 break; 233 } 234 235 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted 236 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, 237 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ 238 239 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it 240 * is self signed. 241 */ 242 243 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 244 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1); 245 xn = X509_get_subject_name(x); 246 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) 247 { 248 /* we have a self signed certificate */ 249 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) 250 { 251 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if 252 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact 253 * match to avoid possible impersonation. 254 */ 255 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 256 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 257 { 258 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; 259 ctx->current_cert=x; 260 ctx->error_depth=i-1; 261 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); 262 bad_chain = 1; 263 ok=cb(0,ctx); 264 if (!ok) goto end; 265 } 266 else 267 { 268 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version 269 * so we get any trust settings. 270 */ 271 X509_free(x); 272 x = xtmp; 273 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); 274 ctx->last_untrusted=0; 275 } 276 } 277 else 278 { 279 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ 280 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); 281 ctx->last_untrusted--; 282 num--; 283 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); 284 } 285 } 286 287 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ 288 for (;;) 289 { 290 /* If we have enough, we break */ 291 if (depth < num) break; 292 293 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 294 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); 295 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break; 296 297 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 298 299 if (ok < 0) return ok; 300 if (ok == 0) break; 301 302 x = xtmp; 303 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x)) 304 { 305 X509_free(xtmp); 306 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 307 return 0; 308 } 309 num++; 310 } 311 312 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ 313 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); 314 315 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ 316 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) 317 { 318 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) 319 { 320 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) 321 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; 322 else 323 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; 324 ctx->current_cert=x; 325 } 326 else 327 { 328 329 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss); 330 num++; 331 ctx->last_untrusted=num; 332 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; 333 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; 334 chain_ss=NULL; 335 } 336 337 ctx->error_depth=num-1; 338 bad_chain = 1; 339 ok=cb(0,ctx); 340 if (!ok) goto end; 341 } 342 343 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ 344 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); 345 346 if (!ok) goto end; 347 348 /* Check name constraints */ 349 350 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); 351 352 if (!ok) goto end; 353 354 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ 355 356 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); 357 358 if (!ok) goto end; 359 360 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ 361 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); 362 363 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters 364 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification. 365 */ 366 367 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); 368 if(!ok) goto end; 369 370 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ 371 if (ctx->verify != NULL) 372 ok=ctx->verify(ctx); 373 else 374 ok=internal_verify(ctx); 375 if(!ok) goto end; 376 377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 378 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ 379 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); 380 if (!ok) goto end; 381 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); 382 if (!ok) goto end; 383 #endif 384 385 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ 386 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) 387 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); 388 if(!ok) goto end; 389 if (0) 390 { 391 end: 392 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); 393 } 394 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); 395 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); 396 return ok; 397 } 398 399 400 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) 401 */ 402 403 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) 404 { 405 int i; 406 X509 *issuer; 407 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) 408 { 409 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 410 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) 411 return issuer; 412 } 413 return NULL; 414 } 415 416 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ 417 418 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) 419 { 420 int ret; 421 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); 422 if (ret == X509_V_OK) 423 return 1; 424 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ 425 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) 426 return 0; 427 428 ctx->error = ret; 429 ctx->current_cert = x; 430 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 431 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 432 return 0; 433 } 434 435 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ 436 437 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 438 { 439 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); 440 if (*issuer) 441 { 442 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 443 return 1; 444 } 445 else 446 return 0; 447 } 448 449 450 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency 451 * with the supplied purpose 452 */ 453 454 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 455 { 456 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 457 return 1; 458 #else 459 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; 460 X509 *x; 461 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 462 int proxy_path_length = 0; 463 int purpose; 464 int allow_proxy_certs; 465 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 466 467 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: 468 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct 469 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). 470 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not 471 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. 472 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for 473 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. 474 */ 475 must_be_ca = -1; 476 477 /* CRL path validation */ 478 if (ctx->parent) 479 { 480 allow_proxy_certs = 0; 481 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; 482 } 483 else 484 { 485 allow_proxy_certs = 486 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); 487 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their 488 software happy */ 489 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) 490 allow_proxy_certs = 1; 491 purpose = ctx->param->purpose; 492 } 493 494 /* Check all untrusted certificates */ 495 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) 496 { 497 int ret; 498 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 499 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 500 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 501 { 502 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; 503 ctx->error_depth = i; 504 ctx->current_cert = x; 505 ok=cb(0,ctx); 506 if (!ok) goto end; 507 } 508 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) 509 { 510 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; 511 ctx->error_depth = i; 512 ctx->current_cert = x; 513 ok=cb(0,ctx); 514 if (!ok) goto end; 515 } 516 ret = X509_check_ca(x); 517 switch(must_be_ca) 518 { 519 case -1: 520 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 521 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) 522 { 523 ret = 0; 524 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 525 } 526 else 527 ret = 1; 528 break; 529 case 0: 530 if (ret != 0) 531 { 532 ret = 0; 533 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; 534 } 535 else 536 ret = 1; 537 break; 538 default: 539 if ((ret == 0) 540 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 541 && (ret != 1))) 542 { 543 ret = 0; 544 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 545 } 546 else 547 ret = 1; 548 break; 549 } 550 if (ret == 0) 551 { 552 ctx->error_depth = i; 553 ctx->current_cert = x; 554 ok=cb(0,ctx); 555 if (!ok) goto end; 556 } 557 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) 558 { 559 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); 560 if ((ret == 0) 561 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 562 && (ret != 1))) 563 { 564 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; 565 ctx->error_depth = i; 566 ctx->current_cert = x; 567 ok=cb(0,ctx); 568 if (!ok) goto end; 569 } 570 } 571 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ 572 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) 573 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) 574 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) 575 { 576 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 577 ctx->error_depth = i; 578 ctx->current_cert = x; 579 ok=cb(0,ctx); 580 if (!ok) goto end; 581 } 582 /* Increment path length if not self issued */ 583 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 584 plen++; 585 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next 586 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE 587 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a 588 CA certificate. */ 589 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) 590 { 591 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) 592 { 593 ctx->error = 594 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 595 ctx->error_depth = i; 596 ctx->current_cert = x; 597 ok=cb(0,ctx); 598 if (!ok) goto end; 599 } 600 proxy_path_length++; 601 must_be_ca = 0; 602 } 603 else 604 must_be_ca = 1; 605 } 606 ok = 1; 607 end: 608 return ok; 609 #endif 610 } 611 612 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 613 { 614 X509 *x; 615 int i, j, rv; 616 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ 617 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) 618 { 619 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 620 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ 621 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 622 continue; 623 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in 624 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly 625 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be 626 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed. 627 */ 628 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) 629 { 630 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; 631 if (nc) 632 { 633 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); 634 if (rv != X509_V_OK) 635 { 636 ctx->error = rv; 637 ctx->error_depth = i; 638 ctx->current_cert = x; 639 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx)) 640 return 0; 641 } 642 } 643 } 644 } 645 return 1; 646 } 647 648 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 649 { 650 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 651 return 1; 652 #else 653 int i, ok; 654 X509 *x; 655 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 656 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 657 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ 658 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 659 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 660 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); 661 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) 662 return 1; 663 ctx->error_depth = i; 664 ctx->current_cert = x; 665 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) 666 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; 667 else 668 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; 669 ok = cb(0, ctx); 670 return ok; 671 #endif 672 } 673 674 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 675 { 676 int i, last, ok; 677 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) 678 return 1; 679 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) 680 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 681 else 682 { 683 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ 684 if (ctx->parent) 685 return 1; 686 last = 0; 687 } 688 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++) 689 { 690 ctx->error_depth = i; 691 ok = check_cert(ctx); 692 if (!ok) return ok; 693 } 694 return 1; 695 } 696 697 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 698 { 699 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 700 X509 *x; 701 int ok, cnum; 702 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 703 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); 704 ctx->current_cert = x; 705 ctx->current_issuer = NULL; 706 ctx->current_reasons = 0; 707 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) 708 { 709 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ 710 if (ctx->get_crl) 711 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); 712 else 713 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); 714 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except 715 * notify callback 716 */ 717 if(!ok) 718 { 719 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 720 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 721 goto err; 722 } 723 ctx->current_crl = crl; 724 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); 725 if (!ok) 726 goto err; 727 728 if (dcrl) 729 { 730 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); 731 if (!ok) 732 goto err; 733 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); 734 if (!ok) 735 goto err; 736 } 737 else 738 ok = 1; 739 740 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ 741 if (ok != 2) 742 { 743 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); 744 if (!ok) 745 goto err; 746 } 747 748 X509_CRL_free(crl); 749 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 750 crl = NULL; 751 dcrl = NULL; 752 } 753 err: 754 X509_CRL_free(crl); 755 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 756 757 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 758 return ok; 759 760 } 761 762 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ 763 764 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) 765 { 766 time_t *ptime; 767 int i; 768 if (notify) 769 ctx->current_crl = crl; 770 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 771 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 772 else 773 ptime = NULL; 774 775 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); 776 if (i == 0) 777 { 778 if (!notify) 779 return 0; 780 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; 781 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 782 return 0; 783 } 784 785 if (i > 0) 786 { 787 if (!notify) 788 return 0; 789 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; 790 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 791 return 0; 792 } 793 794 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) 795 { 796 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); 797 798 if (i == 0) 799 { 800 if (!notify) 801 return 0; 802 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; 803 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 804 return 0; 805 } 806 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ 807 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) 808 { 809 if (!notify) 810 return 0; 811 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; 812 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 813 return 0; 814 } 815 } 816 817 if (notify) 818 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 819 820 return 1; 821 } 822 823 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, 824 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, 825 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 826 { 827 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; 828 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; 829 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; 830 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; 831 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; 832 833 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) 834 { 835 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 836 reasons = *preasons; 837 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); 838 839 if (crl_score > best_score) 840 { 841 best_crl = crl; 842 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; 843 best_score = crl_score; 844 best_reasons = reasons; 845 } 846 } 847 848 if (best_crl) 849 { 850 if (*pcrl) 851 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); 852 *pcrl = best_crl; 853 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; 854 *pscore = best_score; 855 *preasons = best_reasons; 856 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 857 if (*pdcrl) 858 { 859 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); 860 *pdcrl = NULL; 861 } 862 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); 863 } 864 865 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) 866 return 1; 867 868 return 0; 869 } 870 871 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be 872 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. 873 */ 874 875 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) 876 { 877 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; 878 int i; 879 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0); 880 if (i >= 0) 881 { 882 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ 883 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) 884 return 0; 885 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); 886 } 887 else 888 exta = NULL; 889 890 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0); 891 892 if (i >= 0) 893 { 894 895 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) 896 return 0; 897 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); 898 } 899 else 900 extb = NULL; 901 902 if (!exta && !extb) 903 return 1; 904 905 if (!exta || !extb) 906 return 0; 907 908 909 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) 910 return 0; 911 912 return 1; 913 } 914 915 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ 916 917 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) 918 { 919 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ 920 if (!delta->base_crl_number) 921 return 0; 922 /* Base must have a CRL number */ 923 if (!base->crl_number) 924 return 0; 925 /* Issuer names must match */ 926 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), 927 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) 928 return 0; 929 /* AKID and IDP must match */ 930 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) 931 return 0; 932 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) 933 return 0; 934 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ 935 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 936 return 0; 937 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ 938 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 939 return 1; 940 return 0; 941 } 942 943 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring 944 * or retrieve a chain of deltas... 945 */ 946 947 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, 948 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 949 { 950 X509_CRL *delta; 951 int i; 952 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) 953 return; 954 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) 955 return; 956 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) 957 { 958 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 959 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) 960 { 961 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) 962 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; 963 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 964 *dcrl = delta; 965 return; 966 } 967 } 968 *dcrl = NULL; 969 } 970 971 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'. 972 * The return value is a mask of several criteria. 973 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. 974 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if 975 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. 976 */ 977 978 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 979 unsigned int *preasons, 980 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 981 { 982 983 int crl_score = 0; 984 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; 985 986 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ 987 988 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ 989 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) 990 return 0; 991 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ 992 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) 993 { 994 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) 995 return 0; 996 } 997 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) 998 { 999 /* If no new reasons reject */ 1000 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 1001 return 0; 1002 } 1003 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ 1004 else if (crl->base_crl_number) 1005 return 0; 1006 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ 1007 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) 1008 { 1009 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) 1010 return 0; 1011 } 1012 else 1013 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; 1014 1015 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 1016 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; 1017 1018 /* Check expiry */ 1019 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) 1020 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; 1021 1022 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ 1023 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); 1024 1025 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ 1026 1027 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) 1028 return 0; 1029 1030 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ 1031 1032 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) 1033 { 1034 /* If no new reasons reject */ 1035 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 1036 return 0; 1037 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; 1038 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; 1039 } 1040 1041 *preasons = tmp_reasons; 1042 1043 return crl_score; 1044 1045 } 1046 1047 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, 1048 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) 1049 { 1050 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; 1051 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1052 int cidx = ctx->error_depth; 1053 int i; 1054 1055 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) 1056 cidx++; 1057 1058 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1059 1060 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) 1061 { 1062 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) 1063 { 1064 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; 1065 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1066 return; 1067 } 1068 } 1069 1070 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) 1071 { 1072 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1073 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1074 continue; 1075 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) 1076 { 1077 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; 1078 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1079 return; 1080 } 1081 } 1082 1083 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ 1084 1085 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) 1086 return; 1087 1088 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the 1089 * set of untrusted certificates. 1090 */ 1091 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) 1092 { 1093 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); 1094 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1095 continue; 1096 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) 1097 { 1098 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1099 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; 1100 return; 1101 } 1102 } 1103 } 1104 1105 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new 1106 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the 1107 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking 1108 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in 1109 * practice. 1110 */ 1111 1112 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1113 { 1114 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; 1115 int ret; 1116 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ 1117 if (ctx->parent) 1118 return 0; 1119 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) 1120 return -1; 1121 1122 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; 1123 /* Copy verify params across */ 1124 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); 1125 1126 crl_ctx.parent = ctx; 1127 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; 1128 1129 /* Verify CRL issuer */ 1130 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); 1131 1132 if (ret <= 0) 1133 goto err; 1134 1135 /* Check chain is acceptable */ 1136 1137 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); 1138 err: 1139 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); 1140 return ret; 1141 } 1142 1143 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path 1144 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a 1145 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised 1146 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must 1147 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain... 1148 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version 1149 */ 1150 1151 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1152 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 1153 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) 1154 { 1155 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; 1156 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); 1157 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); 1158 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) 1159 return 1; 1160 return 0; 1161 } 1162 1163 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1164 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 1165 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 1166 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 1167 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. 1168 */ 1169 1170 1171 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) 1172 { 1173 X509_NAME *nm = NULL; 1174 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; 1175 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; 1176 int i, j; 1177 if (!a || !b) 1178 return 1; 1179 if (a->type == 1) 1180 { 1181 if (!a->dpname) 1182 return 0; 1183 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ 1184 if (b->type == 1) 1185 { 1186 if (!b->dpname) 1187 return 0; 1188 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) 1189 return 1; 1190 else 1191 return 0; 1192 } 1193 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1194 nm = a->dpname; 1195 gens = b->name.fullname; 1196 } 1197 else if (b->type == 1) 1198 { 1199 if (!b->dpname) 1200 return 0; 1201 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1202 gens = a->name.fullname; 1203 nm = b->dpname; 1204 } 1205 1206 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ 1207 if (nm) 1208 { 1209 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) 1210 { 1211 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); 1212 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1213 continue; 1214 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) 1215 return 1; 1216 } 1217 return 0; 1218 } 1219 1220 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ 1221 1222 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) 1223 { 1224 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); 1225 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) 1226 { 1227 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); 1228 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) 1229 return 1; 1230 } 1231 } 1232 1233 return 0; 1234 1235 } 1236 1237 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) 1238 { 1239 int i; 1240 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1241 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ 1242 if (!dp->CRLissuer) 1243 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); 1244 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) 1245 { 1246 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); 1247 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1248 continue; 1249 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) 1250 return 1; 1251 } 1252 return 0; 1253 } 1254 1255 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ 1256 1257 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 1258 unsigned int *preasons) 1259 { 1260 int i; 1261 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) 1262 return 0; 1263 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) 1264 { 1265 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) 1266 return 0; 1267 } 1268 else 1269 { 1270 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) 1271 return 0; 1272 } 1273 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; 1274 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) 1275 { 1276 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); 1277 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) 1278 { 1279 if (!crl->idp || 1280 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) 1281 { 1282 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; 1283 return 1; 1284 } 1285 } 1286 } 1287 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) 1288 return 1; 1289 return 0; 1290 } 1291 1292 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. 1293 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too 1294 */ 1295 1296 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1297 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) 1298 { 1299 int ok; 1300 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1301 int crl_score = 0; 1302 unsigned int reasons; 1303 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 1304 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; 1305 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 1306 reasons = ctx->current_reasons; 1307 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 1308 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); 1309 1310 if (ok) 1311 goto done; 1312 1313 /* Lookup CRLs from store */ 1314 1315 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); 1316 1317 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ 1318 if (!skcrl && crl) 1319 goto done; 1320 1321 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); 1322 1323 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); 1324 1325 done: 1326 1327 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ 1328 if (crl) 1329 { 1330 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 1331 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; 1332 ctx->current_reasons = reasons; 1333 *pcrl = crl; 1334 *pdcrl = dcrl; 1335 return 1; 1336 } 1337 1338 return 0; 1339 } 1340 1341 /* Check CRL validity */ 1342 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) 1343 { 1344 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1345 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; 1346 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; 1347 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 1348 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 1349 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ 1350 if (ctx->current_issuer) 1351 issuer = ctx->current_issuer; 1352 1353 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer 1354 * is next certificate in chain. 1355 */ 1356 else if (cnum < chnum) 1357 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); 1358 else 1359 { 1360 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); 1361 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ 1362 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) 1363 { 1364 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; 1365 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1366 if(!ok) goto err; 1367 } 1368 } 1369 1370 if(issuer) 1371 { 1372 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already 1373 * been done 1374 */ 1375 if (!crl->base_crl_number) 1376 { 1377 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ 1378 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && 1379 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) 1380 { 1381 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; 1382 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1383 if(!ok) goto err; 1384 } 1385 1386 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) 1387 { 1388 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; 1389 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1390 if(!ok) goto err; 1391 } 1392 1393 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) 1394 { 1395 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) 1396 { 1397 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; 1398 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1399 if(!ok) goto err; 1400 } 1401 } 1402 1403 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) 1404 { 1405 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; 1406 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1407 if(!ok) goto err; 1408 } 1409 1410 1411 } 1412 1413 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) 1414 { 1415 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); 1416 if (!ok) 1417 goto err; 1418 } 1419 1420 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ 1421 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); 1422 1423 if(!ikey) 1424 { 1425 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1426 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1427 if (!ok) goto err; 1428 } 1429 else 1430 { 1431 /* Verify CRL signature */ 1432 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) 1433 { 1434 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1435 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1436 if (!ok) goto err; 1437 } 1438 } 1439 } 1440 1441 ok = 1; 1442 1443 err: 1444 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); 1445 return ok; 1446 } 1447 1448 /* Check certificate against CRL */ 1449 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 1450 { 1451 int ok; 1452 X509_REVOKED *rev; 1453 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained 1454 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate 1455 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since 1456 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries. 1457 */ 1458 if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) 1459 { 1460 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 1461 return 1; 1462 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; 1463 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1464 if(!ok) 1465 return 0; 1466 } 1467 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL 1468 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL. 1469 */ 1470 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) 1471 { 1472 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) 1473 return 2; 1474 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; 1475 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1476 if (!ok) 1477 return 0; 1478 } 1479 1480 return 1; 1481 } 1482 1483 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1484 { 1485 int ret; 1486 if (ctx->parent) 1487 return 1; 1488 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, 1489 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); 1490 if (ret == 0) 1491 { 1492 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1493 return 0; 1494 } 1495 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ 1496 if (ret == -1) 1497 { 1498 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify 1499 * callback. 1500 */ 1501 X509 *x; 1502 int i; 1503 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) 1504 { 1505 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 1506 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) 1507 continue; 1508 ctx->current_cert = x; 1509 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; 1510 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1511 return 0; 1512 } 1513 return 1; 1514 } 1515 if (ret == -2) 1516 { 1517 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1518 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; 1519 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1520 } 1521 1522 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) 1523 { 1524 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1525 ctx->error = X509_V_OK; 1526 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) 1527 return 0; 1528 } 1529 1530 return 1; 1531 } 1532 1533 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1534 { 1535 time_t *ptime; 1536 int i; 1537 1538 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 1539 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 1540 else 1541 ptime = NULL; 1542 1543 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); 1544 if (i == 0) 1545 { 1546 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; 1547 ctx->current_cert=x; 1548 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1549 return 0; 1550 } 1551 1552 if (i > 0) 1553 { 1554 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; 1555 ctx->current_cert=x; 1556 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1557 return 0; 1558 } 1559 1560 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); 1561 if (i == 0) 1562 { 1563 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; 1564 ctx->current_cert=x; 1565 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1566 return 0; 1567 } 1568 1569 if (i < 0) 1570 { 1571 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; 1572 ctx->current_cert=x; 1573 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1574 return 0; 1575 } 1576 1577 return 1; 1578 } 1579 1580 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1581 { 1582 int ok=0,n; 1583 X509 *xs,*xi; 1584 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 1585 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 1586 1587 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 1588 1589 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 1590 ctx->error_depth=n-1; 1591 n--; 1592 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 1593 1594 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) 1595 xs=xi; 1596 else 1597 { 1598 if (n <= 0) 1599 { 1600 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; 1601 ctx->current_cert=xi; 1602 ok=cb(0,ctx); 1603 goto end; 1604 } 1605 else 1606 { 1607 n--; 1608 ctx->error_depth=n; 1609 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 1610 } 1611 } 1612 1613 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ 1614 while (n >= 0) 1615 { 1616 ctx->error_depth=n; 1617 1618 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless 1619 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and 1620 * just wastes time. 1621 */ 1622 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) 1623 { 1624 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) 1625 { 1626 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1627 ctx->current_cert=xi; 1628 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); 1629 if (!ok) goto end; 1630 } 1631 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) 1632 { 1633 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1634 ctx->current_cert=xs; 1635 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); 1636 if (!ok) 1637 { 1638 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1639 goto end; 1640 } 1641 } 1642 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1643 pkey=NULL; 1644 } 1645 1646 xs->valid = 1; 1647 1648 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); 1649 if (!ok) 1650 goto end; 1651 1652 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ 1653 ctx->current_issuer=xi; 1654 ctx->current_cert=xs; 1655 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); 1656 if (!ok) goto end; 1657 1658 n--; 1659 if (n >= 0) 1660 { 1661 xi=xs; 1662 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 1663 } 1664 } 1665 ok=1; 1666 end: 1667 return ok; 1668 } 1669 1670 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) 1671 { 1672 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); 1673 } 1674 1675 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) 1676 { 1677 char *str; 1678 ASN1_TIME atm; 1679 long offset; 1680 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; 1681 int i,j; 1682 1683 p=buff1; 1684 i=ctm->length; 1685 str=(char *)ctm->data; 1686 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1687 { 1688 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0; 1689 memcpy(p,str,10); 1690 p+=10; 1691 str+=10; 1692 } 1693 else 1694 { 1695 if (i < 13) return 0; 1696 memcpy(p,str,12); 1697 p+=12; 1698 str+=12; 1699 } 1700 1701 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) 1702 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } 1703 else 1704 { 1705 *(p++)= *(str++); 1706 *(p++)= *(str++); 1707 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ 1708 if (*str == '.') 1709 { 1710 str++; 1711 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++; 1712 } 1713 1714 } 1715 *(p++)='Z'; 1716 *(p++)='\0'; 1717 1718 if (*str == 'Z') 1719 offset=0; 1720 else 1721 { 1722 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) 1723 return 0; 1724 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; 1725 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); 1726 if (*str == '-') 1727 offset= -offset; 1728 } 1729 atm.type=ctm->type; 1730 atm.flags = 0; 1731 atm.length=sizeof(buff2); 1732 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; 1733 1734 if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL) 1735 return 0; 1736 1737 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1738 { 1739 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); 1740 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ 1741 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); 1742 if (j < 50) j+=100; 1743 1744 if (i < j) return -1; 1745 if (i > j) return 1; 1746 } 1747 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); 1748 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ 1749 return -1; 1750 else 1751 return i; 1752 } 1753 1754 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) 1755 { 1756 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); 1757 } 1758 1759 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1760 { 1761 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); 1762 } 1763 1764 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, 1765 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1766 { 1767 time_t t; 1768 1769 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; 1770 else time(&t); 1771 1772 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) 1773 { 1774 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1775 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1776 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) 1777 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, 1778 offset_sec); 1779 } 1780 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1781 } 1782 1783 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 1784 { 1785 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2; 1786 int i,j; 1787 1788 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; 1789 1790 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 1791 { 1792 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i)); 1793 if (ktmp == NULL) 1794 { 1795 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); 1796 return 0; 1797 } 1798 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) 1799 break; 1800 else 1801 { 1802 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1803 ktmp=NULL; 1804 } 1805 } 1806 if (ktmp == NULL) 1807 { 1808 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); 1809 return 0; 1810 } 1811 1812 /* first, populate the other certs */ 1813 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--) 1814 { 1815 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j)); 1816 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp); 1817 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); 1818 } 1819 1820 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp); 1821 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1822 return 1; 1823 } 1824 1825 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, 1826 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) 1827 { 1828 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by 1829 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */ 1830 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, 1831 new_func, dup_func, free_func); 1832 } 1833 1834 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) 1835 { 1836 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data); 1837 } 1838 1839 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) 1840 { 1841 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx); 1842 } 1843 1844 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1845 { 1846 return ctx->error; 1847 } 1848 1849 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) 1850 { 1851 ctx->error=err; 1852 } 1853 1854 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1855 { 1856 return ctx->error_depth; 1857 } 1858 1859 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1860 { 1861 return ctx->current_cert; 1862 } 1863 1864 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1865 { 1866 return ctx->chain; 1867 } 1868 1869 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1870 { 1871 int i; 1872 X509 *x; 1873 STACK_OF(X509) *chain; 1874 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL; 1875 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 1876 { 1877 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 1878 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 1879 } 1880 return chain; 1881 } 1882 1883 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1884 { 1885 return ctx->current_issuer; 1886 } 1887 1888 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1889 { 1890 return ctx->current_crl; 1891 } 1892 1893 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1894 { 1895 return ctx->parent; 1896 } 1897 1898 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1899 { 1900 ctx->cert=x; 1901 } 1902 1903 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 1904 { 1905 ctx->untrusted=sk; 1906 } 1907 1908 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) 1909 { 1910 ctx->crls=sk; 1911 } 1912 1913 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) 1914 { 1915 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); 1916 } 1917 1918 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) 1919 { 1920 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); 1921 } 1922 1923 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust 1924 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its 1925 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by 1926 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default 1927 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value. 1928 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own 1929 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they 1930 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server. 1931 */ 1932 1933 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, 1934 int purpose, int trust) 1935 { 1936 int idx; 1937 /* If purpose not set use default */ 1938 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; 1939 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ 1940 if (purpose) 1941 { 1942 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; 1943 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); 1944 if (idx == -1) 1945 { 1946 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1947 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 1948 return 0; 1949 } 1950 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 1951 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) 1952 { 1953 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); 1954 if (idx == -1) 1955 { 1956 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1957 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 1958 return 0; 1959 } 1960 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 1961 } 1962 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ 1963 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; 1964 } 1965 if (trust) 1966 { 1967 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); 1968 if (idx == -1) 1969 { 1970 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1971 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); 1972 return 0; 1973 } 1974 } 1975 1976 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose; 1977 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust; 1978 return 1; 1979 } 1980 1981 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) 1982 { 1983 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; 1984 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 1985 if (!ctx) 1986 { 1987 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1988 return NULL; 1989 } 1990 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 1991 return ctx; 1992 } 1993 1994 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1995 { 1996 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); 1997 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 1998 } 1999 2000 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, 2001 STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 2002 { 2003 int ret = 1; 2004 ctx->ctx=store; 2005 ctx->current_method=0; 2006 ctx->cert=x509; 2007 ctx->untrusted=chain; 2008 ctx->crls = NULL; 2009 ctx->last_untrusted=0; 2010 ctx->other_ctx=NULL; 2011 ctx->valid=0; 2012 ctx->chain=NULL; 2013 ctx->error=0; 2014 ctx->explicit_policy=0; 2015 ctx->error_depth=0; 2016 ctx->current_cert=NULL; 2017 ctx->current_issuer=NULL; 2018 ctx->tree = NULL; 2019 ctx->parent = NULL; 2020 2021 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); 2022 2023 if (!ctx->param) 2024 { 2025 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2026 return 0; 2027 } 2028 2029 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set 2030 * use defaults. 2031 */ 2032 2033 2034 if (store) 2035 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); 2036 else 2037 ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; 2038 2039 if (store) 2040 { 2041 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 2042 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; 2043 } 2044 else 2045 ctx->cleanup = 0; 2046 2047 if (ret) 2048 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, 2049 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); 2050 2051 if (ret == 0) 2052 { 2053 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2054 return 0; 2055 } 2056 2057 if (store && store->check_issued) 2058 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; 2059 else 2060 ctx->check_issued = check_issued; 2061 2062 if (store && store->get_issuer) 2063 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; 2064 else 2065 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; 2066 2067 if (store && store->verify_cb) 2068 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 2069 else 2070 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; 2071 2072 if (store && store->verify) 2073 ctx->verify = store->verify; 2074 else 2075 ctx->verify = internal_verify; 2076 2077 if (store && store->check_revocation) 2078 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; 2079 else 2080 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; 2081 2082 if (store && store->get_crl) 2083 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; 2084 else 2085 ctx->get_crl = NULL; 2086 2087 if (store && store->check_crl) 2088 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; 2089 else 2090 ctx->check_crl = check_crl; 2091 2092 if (store && store->cert_crl) 2093 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; 2094 else 2095 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; 2096 2097 if (store && store->lookup_certs) 2098 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; 2099 else 2100 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; 2101 2102 if (store && store->lookup_crls) 2103 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; 2104 else 2105 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; 2106 2107 ctx->check_policy = check_policy; 2108 2109 2110 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As 2111 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a 2112 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */ 2113 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ 2114 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, 2115 &(ctx->ex_data))) 2116 { 2117 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 2118 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2119 return 0; 2120 } 2121 return 1; 2122 } 2123 2124 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. 2125 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. 2126 */ 2127 2128 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 2129 { 2130 ctx->other_ctx = sk; 2131 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; 2132 } 2133 2134 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2135 { 2136 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx); 2137 if (ctx->param != NULL) 2138 { 2139 if (ctx->parent == NULL) 2140 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2141 ctx->param=NULL; 2142 } 2143 if (ctx->tree != NULL) 2144 { 2145 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); 2146 ctx->tree=NULL; 2147 } 2148 if (ctx->chain != NULL) 2149 { 2150 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free); 2151 ctx->chain=NULL; 2152 } 2153 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); 2154 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); 2155 } 2156 2157 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) 2158 { 2159 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); 2160 } 2161 2162 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) 2163 { 2164 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); 2165 } 2166 2167 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t) 2168 { 2169 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); 2170 } 2171 2172 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 2173 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) 2174 { 2175 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb; 2176 } 2177 2178 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2179 { 2180 return ctx->tree; 2181 } 2182 2183 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2184 { 2185 return ctx->explicit_policy; 2186 } 2187 2188 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) 2189 { 2190 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; 2191 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); 2192 if (!param) 2193 return 0; 2194 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); 2195 } 2196 2197 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2198 { 2199 return ctx->param; 2200 } 2201 2202 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) 2203 { 2204 if (ctx->param) 2205 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2206 ctx->param = param; 2207 } 2208 2209 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) 2210 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) 2211 2212 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) 2213 2214 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 2215 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 2216
