1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core (at) openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112 #include <stdio.h> 113 #include <errno.h> 114 #define USE_SOCKETS 115 #include "ssl_locl.h" 116 #include <openssl/evp.h> 117 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 118 119 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); 121 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); 122 123 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) 124 { 125 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase 126 * packet by another n bytes. 127 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified 128 * by s->packet and s->packet_length. 129 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf 130 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) 131 */ 132 int i,len,left; 133 long align=0; 134 unsigned char *pkt; 135 SSL3_BUFFER *rb; 136 137 if (n <= 0) return n; 138 139 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf); 140 if (rb->buf == NULL) 141 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) 142 return -1; 143 144 left = rb->left; 145 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 146 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 147 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); 148 #endif 149 150 if (!extend) 151 { 152 /* start with empty packet ... */ 153 if (left == 0) 154 rb->offset = align; 155 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) 156 { 157 /* check if next packet length is large 158 * enough to justify payload alignment... */ 159 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; 160 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA 161 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128) 162 { 163 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted 164 * and its length field is insane, we can 165 * only be led to wrong decision about 166 * whether memmove will occur or not. 167 * Header values has no effect on memmove 168 * arguments and therefore no buffer 169 * overrun can be triggered. */ 170 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left); 171 rb->offset = align; 172 } 173 } 174 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; 175 s->packet_length = 0; 176 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ 177 } 178 179 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets 180 * because the read operation returns the whole packet 181 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */ 182 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 183 { 184 if (left > 0 && n > left) 185 n = left; 186 } 187 188 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ 189 if (left >= n) 190 { 191 s->packet_length+=n; 192 rb->left=left-n; 193 rb->offset+=n; 194 return(n); 195 } 196 197 /* else we need to read more data */ 198 199 len = s->packet_length; 200 pkt = rb->buf+align; 201 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 202 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet', 203 * 'left' extra ones at the end */ 204 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */ 205 { 206 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left); 207 s->packet = pkt; 208 rb->offset = len + align; 209 } 210 211 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */ 212 { 213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 214 return -1; 215 } 216 217 if (!s->read_ahead) 218 /* ignore max parameter */ 219 max = n; 220 else 221 { 222 if (max < n) 223 max = n; 224 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) 225 max = rb->len - rb->offset; 226 } 227 228 while (left < n) 229 { 230 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf 231 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to 232 * len+max if possible) */ 233 234 clear_sys_error(); 235 if (s->rbio != NULL) 236 { 237 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 238 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left); 239 } 240 else 241 { 242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); 243 i = -1; 244 } 245 246 if (i <= 0) 247 { 248 rb->left = left; 249 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && 250 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 251 if (len+left == 0) 252 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 253 return(i); 254 } 255 left+=i; 256 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because 257 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed 258 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */ 259 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 260 { 261 if (n > left) 262 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ 263 } 264 } 265 266 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ 267 rb->offset += n; 268 rb->left = left - n; 269 s->packet_length += n; 270 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 271 return(n); 272 } 273 274 /* Call this to get a new input record. 275 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error 276 * or non-blocking IO. 277 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in 278 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record 279 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data 280 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes 281 */ 282 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ 283 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) 284 { 285 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al; 286 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1; 287 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 288 SSL_SESSION *sess; 289 unsigned char *p; 290 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 291 short version; 292 int mac_size; 293 int clear=0; 294 size_t extra; 295 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0; 296 unsigned char *mac = NULL; 297 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 298 long align=SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD; 299 #else 300 long align=0; 301 #endif 302 303 rr= &(s->s3->rrec); 304 sess=s->session; 305 306 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) 307 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; 308 else 309 extra=0; 310 if (!(SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS) && 311 extra && !s->s3->init_extra) 312 { 313 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 314 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */ 315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 316 return -1; 317 } 318 319 again: 320 /* check if we have the header */ 321 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || 322 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) 323 { 324 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); 325 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */ 326 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY; 327 328 p=s->packet; 329 330 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ 331 rr->type= *(p++); 332 ssl_major= *(p++); 333 ssl_minor= *(p++); 334 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor; 335 n2s(p,rr->length); 336 #if 0 337 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); 338 #endif 339 340 /* Lets check version */ 341 if (!s->first_packet) 342 { 343 if (version != s->version) 344 { 345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 346 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)) 347 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ 348 s->version = (unsigned short)version; 349 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 350 goto f_err; 351 } 352 } 353 354 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) 355 { 356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 357 goto err; 358 } 359 360 /* If we receive a valid record larger than the current buffer size, 361 * allocate some memory for it. 362 */ 363 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - align) 364 { 365 if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->rbuf.buf, rr->length + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + align))==NULL) 366 { 367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 368 goto err; 369 } 370 s->s3->rbuf.buf=p; 371 s->s3->rbuf.len=rr->length + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + align; 372 s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]); 373 } 374 375 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) 376 { 377 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 379 goto f_err; 380 } 381 382 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ 383 } 384 385 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ 386 387 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) 388 { 389 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ 390 i=rr->length; 391 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1); 392 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */ 393 /* now n == rr->length, 394 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ 395 } 396 397 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ 398 399 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, 400 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet 401 */ 402 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); 403 404 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' 405 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which 406 * need to be copied into rr->data by either 407 * the decryption or by the decompression 408 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer, 409 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ 410 411 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] 412 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ 413 414 /* check is not needed I believe */ 415 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra) 416 { 417 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 419 goto f_err; 420 } 421 422 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ 423 rr->data=rr->input; 424 425 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); 426 if (enc_err <= 0) 427 { 428 if (enc_err == 0) 429 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */ 430 goto err; 431 432 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding 433 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case). 434 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform 435 * the MAC computation anyway. */ 436 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; 437 } 438 439 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG 440 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length); 441 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } 442 printf("\n"); 443 #endif 444 445 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ 446 if ( (sess == NULL) || 447 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) || 448 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL)) 449 clear=1; 450 451 if (!clear) 452 { 453 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ 454 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 455 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0); 456 457 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size) 458 { 459 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */ 460 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 462 goto f_err; 463 #else 464 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; 465 #endif 466 } 467 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */ 468 if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size) 469 { 470 rr->length -= mac_size; 471 mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; 472 } 473 else 474 { 475 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */ 476 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */ 477 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 479 goto f_err; 480 #else 481 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; 482 rr->length = 0; 483 #endif 484 } 485 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0); 486 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) 487 { 488 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; 489 } 490 } 491 492 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac) 493 { 494 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, 495 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption 496 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, 497 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this 498 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ 499 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; 500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); 501 goto f_err; 502 } 503 504 /* r->length is now just compressed */ 505 if (s->expand != NULL) 506 { 507 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra) 508 { 509 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 511 goto f_err; 512 } 513 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) 514 { 515 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; 516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); 517 goto f_err; 518 } 519 } 520 521 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra) 522 { 523 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 525 goto f_err; 526 } 527 528 rr->off=0; 529 /* So at this point the following is true 530 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record 531 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record 532 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte 533 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment 534 * after use :-). 535 */ 536 537 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ 538 s->packet_length=0; 539 540 /* just read a 0 length packet */ 541 if (rr->length == 0) goto again; 542 543 #if 0 544 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); 545 #endif 546 547 return(1); 548 549 f_err: 550 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 551 err: 552 return(ret); 553 } 554 555 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) 556 { 557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 558 int i; 559 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 560 561 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec); 562 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp, 563 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length); 564 if (i < 0) 565 return(0); 566 else 567 rr->length=i; 568 rr->data=rr->comp; 569 #endif 570 return(1); 571 } 572 573 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) 574 { 575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 576 int i; 577 SSL3_RECORD *wr; 578 579 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec); 580 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data, 581 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, 582 wr->input,(int)wr->length); 583 if (i < 0) 584 return(0); 585 else 586 wr->length=i; 587 588 wr->input=wr->data; 589 #endif 590 return(1); 591 } 592 593 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' 594 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. 595 */ 596 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) 597 { 598 const unsigned char *buf=buf_; 599 unsigned int tot,n,nw; 600 int i; 601 unsigned int max_plain_length; 602 603 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 604 tot=s->s3->wnum; 605 s->s3->wnum=0; 606 607 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) 608 { 609 i=s->handshake_func(s); 610 if (i < 0) return(i); 611 if (i == 0) 612 { 613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 614 return -1; 615 } 616 } 617 618 n=(len-tot); 619 for (;;) 620 { 621 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS)) 622 max_plain_length = SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PLAIN_LENGTH; 623 else 624 max_plain_length = s->max_send_fragment; 625 626 if (n > max_plain_length) 627 nw = max_plain_length; 628 else 629 nw=n; 630 631 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); 632 if (i <= 0) 633 { 634 s->s3->wnum=tot; 635 return i; 636 } 637 638 if ((i == (int)n) || 639 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 640 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) 641 { 642 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment 643 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */ 644 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; 645 646 return tot+i; 647 } 648 649 n-=i; 650 tot+=i; 651 } 652 } 653 654 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 655 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) 656 { 657 unsigned char *p,*plen; 658 int i,mac_size,clear=0; 659 int prefix_len=0; 660 long align=0; 661 SSL3_RECORD *wr; 662 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); 663 SSL_SESSION *sess; 664 665 if (wb->buf == NULL) 666 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) 667 return -1; 668 669 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written 670 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ 671 if (wb->left != 0) 672 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len)); 673 674 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ 675 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) 676 { 677 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 678 if (i <= 0) 679 return(i); 680 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ 681 } 682 683 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) 684 return 0; 685 686 wr= &(s->s3->wrec); 687 sess=s->session; 688 689 if ( (sess == NULL) || 690 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || 691 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) 692 clear=1; 693 694 if (clear) 695 mac_size=0; 696 else 697 { 698 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); 699 if (mac_size < 0) 700 goto err; 701 } 702 703 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ 704 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) 705 { 706 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites 707 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ 708 709 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 710 { 711 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; 712 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment 713 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later 714 * together with the actual payload) */ 715 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); 716 if (prefix_len <= 0) 717 goto err; 718 719 if (prefix_len > 720 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) 721 { 722 /* insufficient space */ 723 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 724 goto err; 725 } 726 } 727 728 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; 729 } 730 731 /* resize if necessary to hold the data. */ 732 if (len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD > wb->len) 733 { 734 if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(wb->buf, len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD))==NULL) 735 { 736 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 737 goto err; 738 } 739 wb->buf = p; 740 wb->len = len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD; 741 } 742 743 if (create_empty_fragment) 744 { 745 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 746 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, 747 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so 748 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can 749 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */ 750 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 751 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); 752 #endif 753 p = wb->buf + align; 754 wb->offset = align; 755 } 756 else if (prefix_len) 757 { 758 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len; 759 } 760 else 761 { 762 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 763 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 764 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); 765 #endif 766 p = wb->buf + align; 767 wb->offset = align; 768 } 769 770 /* write the header */ 771 772 *(p++)=type&0xff; 773 wr->type=type; 774 775 *(p++)=(s->version>>8); 776 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; 777 778 /* field where we are to write out packet length */ 779 plen=p; 780 p+=2; 781 782 /* lets setup the record stuff. */ 783 wr->data=p; 784 wr->length=(int)len; 785 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf; 786 787 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into 788 * wr->data */ 789 790 /* first we compress */ 791 if (s->compress != NULL) 792 { 793 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) 794 { 795 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); 796 goto err; 797 } 798 } 799 else 800 { 801 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length); 802 wr->input=wr->data; 803 } 804 805 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input 806 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length. 807 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */ 808 809 if (mac_size != 0) 810 { 811 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1) < 0) 812 goto err; 813 wr->length+=mac_size; 814 wr->input=p; 815 wr->data=p; 816 } 817 818 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ 819 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1); 820 821 /* record length after mac and block padding */ 822 s2n(wr->length,plen); 823 824 /* we should now have 825 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is 826 * wr->length long */ 827 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ 828 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 829 830 if (create_empty_fragment) 831 { 832 /* we are in a recursive call; 833 * just return the length, don't write out anything here 834 */ 835 return wr->length; 836 } 837 838 /* now let's set up wb */ 839 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; 840 841 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */ 842 s->s3->wpend_tot=len; 843 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf; 844 s->s3->wpend_type=type; 845 s->s3->wpend_ret=len; 846 847 /* we now just need to write the buffer */ 848 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len); 849 err: 850 return -1; 851 } 852 853 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ 854 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 855 unsigned int len) 856 { 857 int i; 858 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); 859 860 /* XXXX */ 861 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) 862 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && 863 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) 864 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) 865 { 866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); 867 return(-1); 868 } 869 870 for (;;) 871 { 872 clear_sys_error(); 873 if (s->wbio != NULL) 874 { 875 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; 876 i=BIO_write(s->wbio, 877 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), 878 (unsigned int)wb->left); 879 } 880 else 881 { 882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); 883 i= -1; 884 } 885 if (i == wb->left) 886 { 887 wb->left=0; 888 wb->offset+=i; 889 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && 890 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 891 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 892 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 893 return(s->s3->wpend_ret); 894 } 895 else if (i <= 0) { 896 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || 897 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 898 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole 899 point in using a datagram service */ 900 wb->left = 0; 901 } 902 return(i); 903 } 904 wb->offset+=i; 905 wb->left-=i; 906 } 907 } 908 909 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. 910 * 'type' is one of the following: 911 * 912 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) 913 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) 914 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) 915 * 916 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first 917 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). 918 * 919 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as 920 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really 921 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. 922 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store 923 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol 924 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): 925 * Change cipher spec protocol 926 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored 927 * Alert protocol 928 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) 929 * Handshake protocol 930 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have 931 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages 932 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers 933 * Application data protocol 934 * none of our business 935 */ 936 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) 937 { 938 int al,i,j,ret; 939 unsigned int n; 940 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 941 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL; 942 943 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ 944 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) 945 return(-1); 946 947 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) || 948 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) 949 { 950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 951 return -1; 952 } 953 954 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 955 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ 956 { 957 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; 958 unsigned char *dst = buf; 959 unsigned int k; 960 961 /* peek == 0 */ 962 n = 0; 963 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 964 { 965 *dst++ = *src++; 966 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; 967 n++; 968 } 969 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ 970 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) 971 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; 972 return n; 973 } 974 975 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ 976 977 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) 978 { 979 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ 980 i=s->handshake_func(s); 981 if (i < 0) return(i); 982 if (i == 0) 983 { 984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 985 return(-1); 986 } 987 } 988 start: 989 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 990 991 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record 992 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data 993 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read 994 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ 995 rr = &(s->s3->rrec); 996 997 /* get new packet if necessary */ 998 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) 999 { 1000 ret=ssl3_get_record(s); 1001 if (ret <= 0) return(ret); 1002 } 1003 1004 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ 1005 1006 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, 1007 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ 1008 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) 1009 { 1010 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); 1012 goto f_err; 1013 } 1014 1015 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away 1016 * (even in 'peek' mode) */ 1017 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) 1018 { 1019 rr->length=0; 1020 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 1021 return(0); 1022 } 1023 1024 1025 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ 1026 { 1027 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we 1028 * are doing a handshake for the first time */ 1029 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && 1030 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) 1031 { 1032 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); 1034 goto f_err; 1035 } 1036 1037 if (len <= 0) return(len); 1038 1039 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) 1040 n = rr->length; 1041 else 1042 n = (unsigned int)len; 1043 1044 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n); 1045 if (!peek) 1046 { 1047 rr->length-=n; 1048 rr->off+=n; 1049 if (rr->length == 0) 1050 { 1051 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 1052 rr->off=0; 1053 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) 1054 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 1055 } 1056 } 1057 return(n); 1058 } 1059 1060 1061 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake 1062 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ 1063 1064 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, 1065 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. 1066 */ 1067 { 1068 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; 1069 unsigned char *dest = NULL; 1070 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; 1071 1072 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) 1073 { 1074 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; 1075 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; 1076 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; 1077 } 1078 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) 1079 { 1080 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; 1081 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; 1082 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; 1083 } 1084 1085 if (dest_maxlen > 0) 1086 { 1087 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ 1088 if (rr->length < n) 1089 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ 1090 1091 /* now move 'n' bytes: */ 1092 while (n-- > 0) 1093 { 1094 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; 1095 rr->length--; 1096 } 1097 1098 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) 1099 goto start; /* fragment was too small */ 1100 } 1101 } 1102 1103 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1104 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. 1105 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ 1106 1107 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ 1108 if ((!s->server) && 1109 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && 1110 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && 1111 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) 1112 { 1113 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; 1114 1115 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || 1116 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || 1117 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) 1118 { 1119 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); 1121 goto f_err; 1122 } 1123 1124 if (s->msg_callback) 1125 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1126 1127 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && 1128 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && 1129 !s->s3->renegotiate) 1130 { 1131 ssl3_renegotiate(s); 1132 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) 1133 { 1134 i=s->handshake_func(s); 1135 if (i < 0) return(i); 1136 if (i == 0) 1137 { 1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1139 return(-1); 1140 } 1141 1142 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) 1143 { 1144 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ 1145 { 1146 BIO *bio; 1147 /* In the case where we try to read application data, 1148 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with 1149 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may 1150 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ 1151 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 1152 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); 1153 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1154 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1155 return(-1); 1156 } 1157 } 1158 } 1159 } 1160 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, 1161 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ 1162 goto start; 1163 } 1164 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't 1165 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. 1166 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) 1167 */ 1168 if (s->server && 1169 SSL_is_init_finished(s) && 1170 !s->s3->send_connection_binding && 1171 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && 1172 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && 1173 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && 1174 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && 1175 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1176 1177 { 1178 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/ 1179 rr->length = 0; 1180 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1181 goto start; 1182 } 1183 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) 1184 { 1185 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; 1186 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; 1187 1188 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; 1189 1190 if (s->msg_callback) 1191 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1192 1193 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1194 cb=s->info_callback; 1195 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1196 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 1197 1198 if (cb != NULL) 1199 { 1200 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; 1201 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); 1202 } 1203 1204 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */ 1205 { 1206 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; 1207 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) 1208 { 1209 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1210 return(0); 1211 } 1212 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested 1213 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with 1214 * a fatal alert because if application tried to 1215 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and 1216 * expects it to succeed. 1217 * 1218 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we 1219 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on. 1220 */ 1221 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) 1222 { 1223 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1225 goto f_err; 1226 } 1227 } 1228 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ 1229 { 1230 char tmp[16]; 1231 1232 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 1233 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; 1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); 1235 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr); 1236 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp); 1237 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1238 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); 1239 return(0); 1240 } 1241 else 1242 { 1243 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); 1245 goto f_err; 1246 } 1247 1248 goto start; 1249 } 1250 1251 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */ 1252 { 1253 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 1254 rr->length=0; 1255 return(0); 1256 } 1257 1258 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) 1259 { 1260 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know 1261 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ 1262 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || 1263 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) 1264 { 1265 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); 1267 goto f_err; 1268 } 1269 1270 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ 1271 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) 1272 { 1273 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1275 goto f_err; 1276 } 1277 1278 rr->length=0; 1279 1280 if (s->msg_callback) 1281 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1282 1283 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1; 1284 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) 1285 goto err; 1286 else 1287 goto start; 1288 } 1289 1290 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ 1291 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) 1292 { 1293 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && 1294 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) 1295 { 1296 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and 1297 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting 1298 * protocol violations): */ 1299 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server) 1300 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT 1301 :SSL_ST_CONNECT; 1302 #else 1303 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; 1304 #endif 1305 s->new_session=1; 1306 } 1307 i=s->handshake_func(s); 1308 if (i < 0) return(i); 1309 if (i == 0) 1310 { 1311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1312 return(-1); 1313 } 1314 1315 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) 1316 { 1317 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ 1318 { 1319 BIO *bio; 1320 /* In the case where we try to read application data, 1321 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with 1322 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may 1323 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ 1324 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 1325 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); 1326 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1327 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1328 return(-1); 1329 } 1330 } 1331 goto start; 1332 } 1333 1334 switch (rr->type) 1335 { 1336 default: 1337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS 1338 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ 1339 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) 1340 { 1341 rr->length = 0; 1342 goto start; 1343 } 1344 #endif 1345 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1347 goto f_err; 1348 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: 1349 case SSL3_RT_ALERT: 1350 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: 1351 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception 1352 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that 1353 * should not happen when type != rr->type */ 1354 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1356 goto f_err; 1357 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: 1358 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, 1359 * but have application data. If the library was 1360 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data 1361 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data 1362 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), 1363 * we will indulge it. 1364 */ 1365 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && 1366 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && 1367 (( 1368 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && 1369 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && 1370 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1371 ) || ( 1372 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && 1373 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && 1374 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) 1375 ) 1376 )) 1377 { 1378 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; 1379 return(-1); 1380 } 1381 else 1382 { 1383 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1385 goto f_err; 1386 } 1387 } 1388 /* not reached */ 1389 1390 f_err: 1391 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1392 err: 1393 return(-1); 1394 } 1395 1396 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) 1397 { 1398 int i; 1399 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1400 const char *sender; 1401 int slen; 1402 #endif 1403 1404 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) 1405 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; 1406 else 1407 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; 1408 1409 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) 1410 { 1411 if (s->session == NULL) 1412 { 1413 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ 1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1415 return (0); 1416 } 1417 1418 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 1419 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0); 1420 } 1421 1422 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i)) 1423 return(0); 1424 1425 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1426 /* we have to record the message digest at 1427 * this point so we can get it before we read 1428 * the finished message */ 1429 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) 1430 { 1431 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; 1432 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; 1433 } 1434 else 1435 { 1436 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; 1437 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; 1438 } 1439 1440 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, 1441 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); 1442 #endif 1443 1444 return(1); 1445 } 1446 1447 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) 1448 { 1449 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ 1450 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); 1451 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) 1452 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */ 1453 if (desc < 0) return -1; 1454 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ 1455 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) 1456 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); 1457 1458 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; 1459 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level; 1460 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc; 1461 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ 1462 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 1463 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written 1464 * some time in the future */ 1465 return -1; 1466 } 1467 1468 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) 1469 { 1470 int i,j; 1471 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; 1472 1473 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0; 1474 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); 1475 if (i <= 0) 1476 { 1477 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; 1478 } 1479 else 1480 { 1481 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. 1482 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, 1483 * we will not worry too much. */ 1484 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) 1485 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); 1486 1487 if (s->msg_callback) 1488 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1489 1490 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1491 cb=s->info_callback; 1492 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1493 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 1494 1495 if (cb != NULL) 1496 { 1497 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1]; 1498 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j); 1499 } 1500 } 1501 return(i); 1502 } 1503
