1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core (at) openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112 #include <stdio.h> 113 #include <openssl/objects.h> 114 #include <openssl/evp.h> 115 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h> 117 #include "ssl_locl.h" 118 119 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 120 121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 122 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, 123 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 124 SSL_SESSION **psess); 125 #endif 126 127 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ 128 tls1_enc, 129 tls1_mac, 130 tls1_setup_key_block, 131 tls1_generate_master_secret, 132 tls1_change_cipher_state, 133 tls1_final_finish_mac, 134 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 135 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 136 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 137 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 138 tls1_alert_code, 139 }; 140 141 long tls1_default_timeout(void) 142 { 143 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec 144 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */ 145 return(60*60*2); 146 } 147 148 int tls1_new(SSL *s) 149 { 150 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0); 151 s->method->ssl_clear(s); 152 return(1); 153 } 154 155 void tls1_free(SSL *s) 156 { 157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 158 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) 159 { 160 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); 161 } 162 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ 163 ssl3_free(s); 164 } 165 166 void tls1_clear(SSL *s) 167 { 168 ssl3_clear(s); 169 s->version=TLS1_VERSION; 170 } 171 172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 173 static int nid_list[] = 174 { 175 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 176 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 177 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 178 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 179 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 180 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 181 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 182 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 183 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 184 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 185 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 186 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 187 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 188 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 189 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 190 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 191 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 192 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 193 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 194 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 195 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 196 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 197 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 198 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 199 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ 200 }; 201 202 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) 203 { 204 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ 205 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > 206 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))) 207 return 0; 208 return nid_list[curve_id-1]; 209 } 210 211 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) 212 { 213 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ 214 switch (nid) 215 { 216 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 217 return 1; 218 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 219 return 2; 220 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 221 return 3; 222 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 223 return 4; 224 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 225 return 5; 226 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 227 return 6; 228 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 229 return 7; 230 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 231 return 8; 232 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 233 return 9; 234 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 235 return 10; 236 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 237 return 11; 238 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 239 return 12; 240 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 241 return 13; 242 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 243 return 14; 244 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 245 return 15; 246 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 247 return 16; 248 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 249 return 17; 250 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 251 return 18; 252 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 253 return 19; 254 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 255 return 20; 256 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 257 return 21; 258 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 259 return 22; 260 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 261 return 23; 262 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 263 return 24; 264 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 265 return 25; 266 default: 267 return 0; 268 } 269 } 270 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 271 272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 273 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) 274 { 275 int extdatalen=0; 276 unsigned char *ret = p; 277 278 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ 279 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION 280 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 281 return p; 282 283 ret+=2; 284 285 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 286 287 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 288 { 289 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ 290 unsigned long size_str; 291 long lenmax; 292 293 /* check for enough space. 294 4 for the servername type and entension length 295 2 for servernamelist length 296 1 for the hostname type 297 2 for hostname length 298 + hostname length 299 */ 300 301 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 302 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 303 return NULL; 304 305 /* extension type and length */ 306 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 307 s2n(size_str+5,ret); 308 309 /* length of servername list */ 310 s2n(size_str+3,ret); 311 312 /* hostname type, length and hostname */ 313 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; 314 s2n(size_str,ret); 315 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); 316 ret+=size_str; 317 } 318 319 /* Add RI if renegotiating */ 320 if (s->new_session) 321 { 322 int el; 323 324 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 325 { 326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 327 return NULL; 328 } 329 330 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 331 332 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 333 s2n(el,ret); 334 335 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 336 { 337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 338 return NULL; 339 } 340 341 ret += el; 342 } 343 344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 345 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && 346 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 347 { 348 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ 349 long lenmax; 350 351 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 352 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 353 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) 354 { 355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 356 return NULL; 357 } 358 359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 360 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); 361 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 362 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 363 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 364 } 365 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL && 366 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 367 { 368 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ 369 long lenmax; 370 371 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; 372 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 373 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) 374 { 375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 376 return NULL; 377 } 378 379 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret); 380 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); 381 382 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for 383 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes. 384 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html 385 * resolves this to two bytes. 386 */ 387 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); 388 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 389 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 390 } 391 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 392 393 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 394 { 395 int ticklen; 396 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) 397 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; 398 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 399 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) 400 { 401 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; 402 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 403 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) 404 return NULL; 405 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, 406 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, 407 ticklen); 408 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; 409 } 410 else 411 ticklen = 0; 412 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 413 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) 414 goto skip_ext; 415 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len 416 * rest for ticket 417 */ 418 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL; 419 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 420 s2n(ticklen,ret); 421 if (ticklen) 422 { 423 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); 424 ret += ticklen; 425 } 426 } 427 skip_ext: 428 429 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 430 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 431 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 432 { 433 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; 434 435 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) 436 return NULL; 437 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 438 return NULL; 439 440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 441 s2n(col + 2, ret); 442 s2n(col, ret); 443 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); 444 ret += col; 445 } 446 #endif 447 448 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && 449 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 450 { 451 int i; 452 long extlen, idlen, itmp; 453 OCSP_RESPID *id; 454 455 idlen = 0; 456 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) 457 { 458 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 459 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); 460 if (itmp <= 0) 461 return NULL; 462 idlen += itmp + 2; 463 } 464 465 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) 466 { 467 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); 468 if (extlen < 0) 469 return NULL; 470 } 471 else 472 extlen = 0; 473 474 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL; 475 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 476 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) 477 return NULL; 478 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); 479 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; 480 s2n(idlen, ret); 481 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) 482 { 483 /* save position of id len */ 484 unsigned char *q = ret; 485 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 486 /* skip over id len */ 487 ret += 2; 488 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); 489 /* write id len */ 490 s2n(itmp, q); 491 } 492 s2n(extlen, ret); 493 if (extlen > 0) 494 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); 495 } 496 497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 498 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) 499 { 500 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its 501 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */ 502 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) 503 return NULL; 504 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); 505 s2n(0,ret); 506 } 507 #endif 508 509 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 510 return p; 511 512 s2n(extdatalen,p); 513 return ret; 514 } 515 516 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) 517 { 518 int extdatalen=0; 519 unsigned char *ret = p; 520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 521 int next_proto_neg_seen; 522 #endif 523 524 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ 525 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 526 return p; 527 528 ret+=2; 529 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 530 531 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 532 { 533 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 534 535 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 536 s2n(0,ret); 537 } 538 539 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding) 540 { 541 int el; 542 543 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 544 { 545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 546 return NULL; 547 } 548 549 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 550 551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 552 s2n(el,ret); 553 554 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 555 { 556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 557 return NULL; 558 } 559 560 ret += el; 561 } 562 563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 564 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && 565 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 566 { 567 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ 568 long lenmax; 569 570 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 571 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 572 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) 573 { 574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 575 return NULL; 576 } 577 578 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 579 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); 580 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 581 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 582 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 583 584 } 585 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */ 586 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 587 588 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected 589 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 590 { 591 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 592 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 593 s2n(0,ret); 594 } 595 596 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 597 { 598 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret); 600 s2n(0,ret); 601 } 602 603 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 604 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 605 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 606 { 607 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 608 609 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) 610 return NULL; 611 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 612 return NULL; 613 614 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 615 s2n(sol + 2, ret); 616 s2n(sol, ret); 617 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); 618 ret += sol; 619 } 620 #endif 621 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) 622 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) 623 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 624 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/ 625 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/ 626 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 627 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 628 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 629 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17}; 630 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL; 631 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36); 632 ret+=36; 633 634 } 635 636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 637 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; 638 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 639 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) 640 { 641 const unsigned char *npa; 642 unsigned int npalen; 643 int r; 644 645 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); 646 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) 647 { 648 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL; 649 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); 650 s2n(npalen,ret); 651 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); 652 ret += npalen; 653 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 654 } 655 } 656 #endif 657 658 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 659 return p; 660 661 s2n(extdatalen,p); 662 return ret; 663 } 664 665 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 666 { 667 unsigned short type; 668 unsigned short size; 669 unsigned short len; 670 unsigned char *data = *p; 671 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 672 673 s->servername_done = 0; 674 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 675 676 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 677 goto ri_check; 678 n2s(data,len); 679 680 if (data > (d+n-len)) 681 goto ri_check; 682 683 while (data <= (d+n-4)) 684 { 685 n2s(data,type); 686 n2s(data,size); 687 688 if (data+size > (d+n)) 689 goto ri_check; 690 #if 0 691 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size); 692 #endif 693 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 694 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, 695 s->tlsext_debug_arg); 696 /* The servername extension is treated as follows: 697 698 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 699 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 700 in which case an fatal alert is generated. 701 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 702 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 703 to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 704 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 705 it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 706 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 707 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 708 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 709 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 710 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 711 the value of the Host: field. 712 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 713 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, 714 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. 715 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 716 717 */ 718 719 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 720 { 721 unsigned char *sdata; 722 int servname_type; 723 int dsize; 724 725 if (size < 2) 726 { 727 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 728 return 0; 729 } 730 n2s(data,dsize); 731 size -= 2; 732 if (dsize > size ) 733 { 734 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 735 return 0; 736 } 737 738 sdata = data; 739 while (dsize > 3) 740 { 741 servname_type = *(sdata++); 742 n2s(sdata,len); 743 dsize -= 3; 744 745 if (len > dsize) 746 { 747 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 748 return 0; 749 } 750 if (s->servername_done == 0) 751 switch (servname_type) 752 { 753 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: 754 if (!s->hit) 755 { 756 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname) 757 { 758 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 759 return 0; 760 } 761 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) 762 { 763 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 764 return 0; 765 } 766 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) 767 { 768 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 769 return 0; 770 } 771 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); 772 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0'; 773 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { 774 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); 775 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 776 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 777 return 0; 778 } 779 s->servername_done = 1; 780 781 } 782 else 783 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname 784 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 785 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; 786 787 break; 788 789 default: 790 break; 791 } 792 793 dsize -= len; 794 } 795 if (dsize != 0) 796 { 797 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 798 return 0; 799 } 800 801 } 802 803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 804 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && 805 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 806 { 807 unsigned char *sdata = data; 808 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 809 810 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) 811 { 812 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 813 return 0; 814 } 815 if (!s->hit) 816 { 817 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) 818 { 819 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 820 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; 821 } 822 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 823 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) 824 { 825 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 826 return 0; 827 } 828 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; 829 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); 830 } 831 #if 0 832 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 833 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 834 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 835 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 836 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 837 #endif 838 } 839 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves && 840 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 841 { 842 unsigned char *sdata = data; 843 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); 844 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); 845 846 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2) 847 { 848 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 849 return 0; 850 } 851 if (!s->hit) 852 { 853 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) 854 { 855 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 856 return 0; 857 } 858 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 859 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) 860 { 861 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 862 return 0; 863 } 864 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; 865 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); 866 } 867 #if 0 868 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 869 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 870 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) 871 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 872 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 873 #endif 874 } 875 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 876 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 877 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 878 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 879 { 880 unsigned char *sdata = data; 881 882 if (size < 2) 883 { 884 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 885 return 0; 886 } 887 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 888 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) 889 { 890 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 891 return 0; 892 } 893 894 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 895 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 896 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 897 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 898 else 899 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 900 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 901 { 902 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 903 return 0; 904 } 905 } 906 #endif 907 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 908 { 909 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 910 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 911 { 912 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 913 return 0; 914 } 915 } 916 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 917 { 918 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 919 return 0; 920 renegotiate_seen = 1; 921 } 922 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 923 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 924 { 925 926 if (size < 5) 927 { 928 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 929 return 0; 930 } 931 932 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; 933 size--; 934 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) 935 { 936 const unsigned char *sdata; 937 int dsize; 938 /* Read in responder_id_list */ 939 n2s(data,dsize); 940 size -= 2; 941 if (dsize > size ) 942 { 943 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 944 return 0; 945 } 946 while (dsize > 0) 947 { 948 OCSP_RESPID *id; 949 int idsize; 950 if (dsize < 4) 951 { 952 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 953 return 0; 954 } 955 n2s(data, idsize); 956 dsize -= 2 + idsize; 957 size -= 2 + idsize; 958 if (dsize < 0) 959 { 960 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 961 return 0; 962 } 963 sdata = data; 964 data += idsize; 965 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, 966 &sdata, idsize); 967 if (!id) 968 { 969 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 970 return 0; 971 } 972 if (data != sdata) 973 { 974 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 975 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 976 return 0; 977 } 978 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids 979 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = 980 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) 981 { 982 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 983 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 984 return 0; 985 } 986 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push( 987 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) 988 { 989 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 990 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 991 return 0; 992 } 993 } 994 995 /* Read in request_extensions */ 996 if (size < 2) 997 { 998 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 999 return 0; 1000 } 1001 n2s(data,dsize); 1002 size -= 2; 1003 if (dsize != size) 1004 { 1005 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1006 return 0; 1007 } 1008 sdata = data; 1009 if (dsize > 0) 1010 { 1011 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = 1012 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, 1013 &sdata, dsize); 1014 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts 1015 || (data + dsize != sdata)) 1016 { 1017 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1018 return 0; 1019 } 1020 } 1021 } 1022 /* We don't know what to do with any other type 1023 * so ignore it. 1024 */ 1025 else 1026 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 1027 } 1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1029 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1030 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) 1031 { 1032 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a 1033 * renegotiation. 1034 * 1035 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we 1036 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on 1037 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when 1038 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an 1039 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing 1040 * anything like that, but this might change). 1041 1042 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake 1043 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > 1044 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen 1045 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new 1046 * Finished message could have been computed.) */ 1047 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1048 } 1049 #endif 1050 1051 /* session ticket processed earlier */ 1052 data+=size; 1053 } 1054 1055 *p = data; 1056 1057 ri_check: 1058 1059 /* Need RI if renegotiating */ 1060 1061 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session && 1062 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1063 { 1064 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1066 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1067 return 0; 1068 } 1069 1070 return 1; 1071 } 1072 1073 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1074 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No 1075 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill 1076 * the length of the block. */ 1077 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) 1078 { 1079 unsigned int off = 0; 1080 1081 while (off < len) 1082 { 1083 if (d[off] == 0) 1084 return 0; 1085 off += d[off]; 1086 off++; 1087 } 1088 1089 return off == len; 1090 } 1091 #endif 1092 1093 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 1094 { 1095 unsigned short length; 1096 unsigned short type; 1097 unsigned short size; 1098 unsigned char *data = *p; 1099 int tlsext_servername = 0; 1100 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 1101 1102 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 1103 goto ri_check; 1104 1105 n2s(data,length); 1106 if (data+length != d+n) 1107 { 1108 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1109 return 0; 1110 } 1111 1112 while(data <= (d+n-4)) 1113 { 1114 n2s(data,type); 1115 n2s(data,size); 1116 1117 if (data+size > (d+n)) 1118 goto ri_check; 1119 1120 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1121 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, 1122 s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1123 1124 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1125 { 1126 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) 1127 { 1128 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1129 return 0; 1130 } 1131 tlsext_servername = 1; 1132 } 1133 1134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1135 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && 1136 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1137 { 1138 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1139 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1140 1141 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) 1142 { 1143 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1144 return 0; 1145 } 1146 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1147 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1148 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) 1149 { 1150 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1151 return 0; 1152 } 1153 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; 1154 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); 1155 #if 0 1156 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); 1157 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1158 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1159 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1160 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1161 #endif 1162 } 1163 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1164 1165 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1166 { 1167 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1168 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1169 { 1170 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1171 return 0; 1172 } 1173 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 1174 || (size > 0)) 1175 { 1176 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1177 return 0; 1178 } 1179 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1180 } 1181 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1182 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1183 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1184 { 1185 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1186 1187 if (size < 2) 1188 { 1189 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1190 return 0; 1191 } 1192 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1193 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) 1194 { 1195 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1196 return 0; 1197 } 1198 1199 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1200 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1201 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1202 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1203 else 1204 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1205 1206 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1207 { 1208 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1209 return 0; 1210 } 1211 } 1212 #endif 1213 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1214 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1215 { 1216 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested 1217 * a status request message. 1218 */ 1219 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) 1220 { 1221 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1222 return 0; 1223 } 1224 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ 1225 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1226 } 1227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1228 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) 1229 { 1230 unsigned char *selected; 1231 unsigned char selected_len; 1232 1233 /* We must have requested it. */ 1234 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)) 1235 { 1236 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1237 return 0; 1238 } 1239 /* The data must be valid */ 1240 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) 1241 { 1242 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1243 return 0; 1244 } 1245 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) 1246 { 1247 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1248 return 0; 1249 } 1250 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 1251 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) 1252 { 1253 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1254 return 0; 1255 } 1256 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); 1257 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; 1258 } 1259 #endif 1260 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 1261 { 1262 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1263 return 0; 1264 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1265 } 1266 data+=size; 1267 } 1268 1269 if (data != d+n) 1270 { 1271 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1272 return 0; 1273 } 1274 1275 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) 1276 { 1277 if (s->tlsext_hostname) 1278 { 1279 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) 1280 { 1281 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); 1282 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) 1283 { 1284 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1285 return 0; 1286 } 1287 } 1288 else 1289 { 1290 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1291 return 0; 1292 } 1293 } 1294 } 1295 1296 *p = data; 1297 1298 ri_check: 1299 1300 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to 1301 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server 1302 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an 1303 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server 1304 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI 1305 * absence on initial connect only. 1306 */ 1307 if (!renegotiate_seen 1308 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) 1309 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1310 { 1311 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 1313 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1314 return 0; 1315 } 1316 1317 return 1; 1318 } 1319 1320 1321 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1322 { 1323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1324 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats 1325 * and elliptic curves we support. 1326 */ 1327 int using_ecc = 0; 1328 int i; 1329 unsigned char *j; 1330 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; 1331 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); 1332 1333 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) 1334 { 1335 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); 1336 1337 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; 1338 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; 1339 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 1340 { 1341 using_ecc = 1; 1342 break; 1343 } 1344 } 1345 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version == TLS1_VERSION); 1346 if (using_ecc) 1347 { 1348 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1349 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) 1350 { 1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1352 return -1; 1353 } 1354 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1355 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1356 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1357 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1358 1359 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */ 1360 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); 1361 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2; 1362 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) 1363 { 1364 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1366 return -1; 1367 } 1368 for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <= 1369 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++) 1370 s2n(i,j); 1371 } 1372 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1373 1374 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1375 { 1376 int r = 1; 1377 1378 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) 1379 { 1380 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1381 if (!r) 1382 return -1; 1383 } 1384 1385 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) 1386 { 1387 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1388 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1389 1390 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1391 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1392 else 1393 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1394 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1395 { 1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1397 return -1; 1398 } 1399 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1400 } 1401 1402 if (r == 2) 1403 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */ 1404 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1405 } 1406 #endif 1407 1408 return 1; 1409 } 1410 1411 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1412 { 1413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1414 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support 1415 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not 1416 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. 1417 */ 1418 1419 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1420 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1421 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); 1422 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); 1423 1424 if (using_ecc) 1425 { 1426 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1427 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) 1428 { 1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1430 return -1; 1431 } 1432 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1433 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1434 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1435 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1436 } 1437 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1438 1439 return 1; 1440 } 1441 1442 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1443 { 1444 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 1445 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1446 1447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1448 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in 1449 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1450 */ 1451 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in 1452 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1453 */ 1454 #endif 1455 1456 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1457 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1458 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1459 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1460 1461 /* If status request then ask callback what to do. 1462 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 1463 * the certificate has changed. 1464 */ 1465 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 1466 { 1467 int r; 1468 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 1469 switch (r) 1470 { 1471 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 1472 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1473 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1474 break; 1475 /* status request response should be sent */ 1476 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 1477 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 1478 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1479 else 1480 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1481 break; 1482 /* something bad happened */ 1483 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1484 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1485 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1486 goto err; 1487 } 1488 } 1489 else 1490 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1491 1492 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1493 { 1494 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), 1495 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, 1496 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */ 1497 1498 int r = 1; 1499 1500 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) 1501 { 1502 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1503 if (!r) 1504 { 1505 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1506 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1507 goto err; 1508 } 1509 } 1510 1511 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1512 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1513 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; 1514 1515 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) 1516 { 1517 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 1518 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) 1519 { 1520 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input 1521 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */ 1522 1523 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1524 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1525 else 1526 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1527 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1528 { 1529 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1530 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1531 goto err; 1532 } 1533 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1534 } 1535 } 1536 1537 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1538 { 1539 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, 1540 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; 1541 * abort the handshake. 1542 */ 1543 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1544 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1545 } 1546 } 1547 1548 #endif 1549 err: 1550 switch (ret) 1551 { 1552 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1553 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1554 return -1; 1555 1556 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 1557 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 1558 return 1; 1559 1560 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1561 s->servername_done=0; 1562 default: 1563 return 1; 1564 } 1565 } 1566 1567 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1568 { 1569 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 1570 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1571 1572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1573 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 1574 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension 1575 * it must contain uncompressed. 1576 */ 1577 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1578 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1579 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 1580 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 1581 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 1582 { 1583 /* we are using an ECC cipher */ 1584 size_t i; 1585 unsigned char *list; 1586 int found_uncompressed = 0; 1587 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1588 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1589 { 1590 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) 1591 { 1592 found_uncompressed = 1; 1593 break; 1594 } 1595 } 1596 if (!found_uncompressed) 1597 { 1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 1599 return -1; 1600 } 1601 } 1602 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 1603 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1604 1605 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1606 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1607 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1608 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1609 1610 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1611 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) 1612 { 1613 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs. 1614 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */ 1615 1616 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1617 { 1618 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1619 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1620 } 1621 1622 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check 1623 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */ 1624 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || 1625 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) 1626 { 1627 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1628 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1629 } 1630 } 1631 #endif 1632 1633 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one 1634 * tell the callback 1635 */ 1636 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) 1637 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 1638 { 1639 int r; 1640 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows 1641 * there is no response. 1642 */ 1643 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 1644 { 1645 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); 1646 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; 1647 } 1648 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; 1649 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 1650 if (r == 0) 1651 { 1652 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; 1653 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1654 } 1655 if (r < 0) 1656 { 1657 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1658 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1659 } 1660 } 1661 1662 switch (ret) 1663 { 1664 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1665 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1666 return -1; 1667 1668 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 1669 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 1670 return 1; 1671 1672 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1673 s->servername_done=0; 1674 default: 1675 return 1; 1676 } 1677 } 1678 1679 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client 1680 * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS 1681 * session ticket extension at the same time. 1682 */ 1683 1684 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, 1685 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) 1686 { 1687 /* Point after session ID in client hello */ 1688 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; 1689 unsigned short i; 1690 1691 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present 1692 * to permit stateful resumption. 1693 */ 1694 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 1695 return 1; 1696 1697 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) 1698 return 1; 1699 if (p >= limit) 1700 return -1; 1701 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ 1702 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 1703 { 1704 i = *(p++); 1705 p+= i; 1706 if (p >= limit) 1707 return -1; 1708 } 1709 /* Skip past cipher list */ 1710 n2s(p, i); 1711 p+= i; 1712 if (p >= limit) 1713 return -1; 1714 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ 1715 i = *(p++); 1716 p += i; 1717 if (p > limit) 1718 return -1; 1719 /* Now at start of extensions */ 1720 if ((p + 2) >= limit) 1721 return 1; 1722 n2s(p, i); 1723 while ((p + 4) <= limit) 1724 { 1725 unsigned short type, size; 1726 n2s(p, type); 1727 n2s(p, size); 1728 if (p + size > limit) 1729 return 1; 1730 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1731 { 1732 /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will 1733 * trigger a full handshake 1734 */ 1735 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 1736 return 1; 1737 /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket 1738 * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake 1739 */ 1740 if (size == 0) 1741 { 1742 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1743 return 0; /* Cache miss */ 1744 } 1745 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) 1746 { 1747 /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of 1748 * generating the session from ticket now, 1749 * trigger abbreviated handshake based on 1750 * external mechanism to calculate the master 1751 * secret later. */ 1752 return 0; 1753 } 1754 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, 1755 ret); 1756 } 1757 p += size; 1758 } 1759 return 1; 1760 } 1761 1762 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, 1763 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 1764 SSL_SESSION **psess) 1765 { 1766 SSL_SESSION *sess; 1767 unsigned char *sdec; 1768 const unsigned char *p; 1769 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; 1770 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 1771 HMAC_CTX hctx; 1772 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 1773 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 1774 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ 1775 if (eticklen < 48) 1776 goto tickerr; 1777 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ 1778 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 1779 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 1780 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 1781 { 1782 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; 1783 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, 1784 &ctx, &hctx, 0); 1785 if (rv < 0) 1786 return -1; 1787 if (rv == 0) 1788 goto tickerr; 1789 if (rv == 2) 1790 renew_ticket = 1; 1791 } 1792 else 1793 { 1794 /* Check key name matches */ 1795 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) 1796 goto tickerr; 1797 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 1798 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 1799 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 1800 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); 1801 } 1802 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and 1803 * integrity checks on ticket. 1804 */ 1805 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); 1806 if (mlen < 0) 1807 { 1808 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 1809 return -1; 1810 } 1811 eticklen -= mlen; 1812 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ 1813 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); 1814 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); 1815 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 1816 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) 1817 goto tickerr; 1818 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ 1819 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ 1820 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 1821 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 1822 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); 1823 if (!sdec) 1824 { 1825 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 1826 return -1; 1827 } 1828 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); 1829 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) 1830 goto tickerr; 1831 slen += mlen; 1832 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 1833 p = sdec; 1834 1835 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); 1836 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 1837 if (sess) 1838 { 1839 /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to 1840 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to 1841 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero 1842 * as required by standard. 1843 */ 1844 if (sesslen) 1845 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); 1846 sess->session_id_length = sesslen; 1847 *psess = sess; 1848 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket; 1849 return 1; 1850 } 1851 /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to 1852 * send a new ticket 1853 */ 1854 tickerr: 1855 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1856 return 0; 1857 } 1858 1859 #endif 1860
