1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. 2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be 3 // found in the LICENSE file. 4 5 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc.h" 6 7 #include "base/metrics/histogram.h" 8 #include "base/sha1.h" 9 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h" 10 #include "build/build_config.h" 11 #include "net/base/net_errors.h" 12 #include "net/base/net_util.h" 13 #include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h" 14 #include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h" 15 #include "net/cert/cert_verifier.h" 16 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h" 17 #include "net/cert/crl_set.h" 18 #include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h" 19 #include "url/url_canon.h" 20 21 #if defined(USE_NSS) || defined(OS_IOS) 22 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_nss.h" 23 #elif defined(USE_OPENSSL) && !defined(OS_ANDROID) 24 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_openssl.h" 25 #elif defined(OS_ANDROID) 26 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_android.h" 27 #elif defined(OS_MACOSX) 28 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_mac.h" 29 #elif defined(OS_WIN) 30 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_win.h" 31 #else 32 #error Implement certificate verification. 33 #endif 34 35 36 namespace net { 37 38 namespace { 39 40 // Constants used to build histogram names 41 const char kLeafCert[] = "Leaf"; 42 const char kIntermediateCert[] = "Intermediate"; 43 const char kRootCert[] = "Root"; 44 // Matches the order of X509Certificate::PublicKeyType 45 const char* const kCertTypeStrings[] = { 46 "Unknown", 47 "RSA", 48 "DSA", 49 "ECDSA", 50 "DH", 51 "ECDH" 52 }; 53 // Histogram buckets for RSA/DSA/DH key sizes. 54 const int kRsaDsaKeySizes[] = {512, 768, 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096, 8192, 55 16384}; 56 // Histogram buckets for ECDSA/ECDH key sizes. The list is based upon the FIPS 57 // 186-4 approved curves. 58 const int kEccKeySizes[] = {163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 384, 409, 521, 571}; 59 60 const char* CertTypeToString(int cert_type) { 61 if (cert_type < 0 || 62 static_cast<size_t>(cert_type) >= arraysize(kCertTypeStrings)) { 63 return "Unsupported"; 64 } 65 return kCertTypeStrings[cert_type]; 66 } 67 68 void RecordPublicKeyHistogram(const char* chain_position, 69 bool baseline_keysize_applies, 70 size_t size_bits, 71 X509Certificate::PublicKeyType cert_type) { 72 std::string histogram_name = 73 base::StringPrintf("CertificateType2.%s.%s.%s", 74 baseline_keysize_applies ? "BR" : "NonBR", 75 chain_position, 76 CertTypeToString(cert_type)); 77 // Do not use UMA_HISTOGRAM_... macros here, as it caches the Histogram 78 // instance and thus only works if |histogram_name| is constant. 79 base::HistogramBase* counter = NULL; 80 81 // Histogram buckets are contingent upon the underlying algorithm being used. 82 if (cert_type == X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeECDH || 83 cert_type == X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeECDSA) { 84 // Typical key sizes match SECP/FIPS 186-3 recommendations for prime and 85 // binary curves - which range from 163 bits to 571 bits. 86 counter = base::CustomHistogram::FactoryGet( 87 histogram_name, 88 base::CustomHistogram::ArrayToCustomRanges(kEccKeySizes, 89 arraysize(kEccKeySizes)), 90 base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag); 91 } else { 92 // Key sizes < 1024 bits should cause errors, while key sizes > 16K are not 93 // uniformly supported by the underlying cryptographic libraries. 94 counter = base::CustomHistogram::FactoryGet( 95 histogram_name, 96 base::CustomHistogram::ArrayToCustomRanges(kRsaDsaKeySizes, 97 arraysize(kRsaDsaKeySizes)), 98 base::HistogramBase::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag); 99 } 100 counter->Add(size_bits); 101 } 102 103 // Returns true if |type| is |kPublicKeyTypeRSA| or |kPublicKeyTypeDSA|, and 104 // if |size_bits| is < 1024. Note that this means there may be false 105 // negatives: keys for other algorithms and which are weak will pass this 106 // test. 107 bool IsWeakKey(X509Certificate::PublicKeyType type, size_t size_bits) { 108 switch (type) { 109 case X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeRSA: 110 case X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeDSA: 111 return size_bits < 1024; 112 default: 113 return false; 114 } 115 } 116 117 // Returns true if |cert| contains a known-weak key. Additionally, histograms 118 // the observed keys for future tightening of the definition of what 119 // constitutes a weak key. 120 bool ExaminePublicKeys(const scoped_refptr<X509Certificate>& cert, 121 bool should_histogram) { 122 // The effective date of the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements - 123 // 2012-07-01 00:00:00 UTC. 124 const base::Time kBaselineEffectiveDate = 125 base::Time::FromInternalValue(GG_INT64_C(12985574400000000)); 126 // The effective date of the key size requirements from Appendix A, v1.1.5 127 // 2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC. 128 const base::Time kBaselineKeysizeEffectiveDate = 129 base::Time::FromInternalValue(GG_INT64_C(13033008000000000)); 130 131 size_t size_bits = 0; 132 X509Certificate::PublicKeyType type = X509Certificate::kPublicKeyTypeUnknown; 133 bool weak_key = false; 134 bool baseline_keysize_applies = 135 cert->valid_start() >= kBaselineEffectiveDate && 136 cert->valid_expiry() >= kBaselineKeysizeEffectiveDate; 137 138 X509Certificate::GetPublicKeyInfo(cert->os_cert_handle(), &size_bits, &type); 139 if (should_histogram) { 140 RecordPublicKeyHistogram(kLeafCert, baseline_keysize_applies, size_bits, 141 type); 142 } 143 if (IsWeakKey(type, size_bits)) 144 weak_key = true; 145 146 const X509Certificate::OSCertHandles& intermediates = 147 cert->GetIntermediateCertificates(); 148 for (size_t i = 0; i < intermediates.size(); ++i) { 149 X509Certificate::GetPublicKeyInfo(intermediates[i], &size_bits, &type); 150 if (should_histogram) { 151 RecordPublicKeyHistogram( 152 (i < intermediates.size() - 1) ? kIntermediateCert : kRootCert, 153 baseline_keysize_applies, 154 size_bits, 155 type); 156 } 157 if (!weak_key && IsWeakKey(type, size_bits)) 158 weak_key = true; 159 } 160 161 return weak_key; 162 } 163 164 } // namespace 165 166 // static 167 CertVerifyProc* CertVerifyProc::CreateDefault() { 168 #if defined(USE_NSS) || defined(OS_IOS) 169 return new CertVerifyProcNSS(); 170 #elif defined(USE_OPENSSL) && !defined(OS_ANDROID) 171 return new CertVerifyProcOpenSSL(); 172 #elif defined(OS_ANDROID) 173 return new CertVerifyProcAndroid(); 174 #elif defined(OS_MACOSX) 175 return new CertVerifyProcMac(); 176 #elif defined(OS_WIN) 177 return new CertVerifyProcWin(); 178 #else 179 return NULL; 180 #endif 181 } 182 183 CertVerifyProc::CertVerifyProc() {} 184 185 CertVerifyProc::~CertVerifyProc() {} 186 187 int CertVerifyProc::Verify(X509Certificate* cert, 188 const std::string& hostname, 189 int flags, 190 CRLSet* crl_set, 191 const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors, 192 CertVerifyResult* verify_result) { 193 verify_result->Reset(); 194 verify_result->verified_cert = cert; 195 196 if (IsBlacklisted(cert)) { 197 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED; 198 return ERR_CERT_REVOKED; 199 } 200 201 // We do online revocation checking for EV certificates that aren't covered 202 // by a fresh CRLSet. 203 // TODO(rsleevi): http://crbug.com/142974 - Allow preferences to fully 204 // disable revocation checking. 205 if (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT) 206 flags |= CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY; 207 208 int rv = VerifyInternal(cert, hostname, flags, crl_set, 209 additional_trust_anchors, verify_result); 210 211 UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Net.CertCommonNameFallback", 212 verify_result->common_name_fallback_used); 213 if (!verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root) { 214 UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Net.CertCommonNameFallbackPrivateCA", 215 verify_result->common_name_fallback_used); 216 } 217 218 // This check is done after VerifyInternal so that VerifyInternal can fill 219 // in the list of public key hashes. 220 if (IsPublicKeyBlacklisted(verify_result->public_key_hashes)) { 221 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED; 222 rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); 223 } 224 225 std::vector<std::string> dns_names, ip_addrs; 226 cert->GetSubjectAltName(&dns_names, &ip_addrs); 227 if (HasNameConstraintsViolation(verify_result->public_key_hashes, 228 cert->subject().common_name, 229 dns_names, 230 ip_addrs)) { 231 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NAME_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION; 232 rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); 233 } 234 235 // Check for weak keys in the entire verified chain. 236 bool weak_key = ExaminePublicKeys(verify_result->verified_cert, 237 verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root); 238 239 if (weak_key) { 240 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY; 241 // Avoid replacing a more serious error, such as an OS/library failure, 242 // by ensuring that if verification failed, it failed with a certificate 243 // error. 244 if (rv == OK || IsCertificateError(rv)) 245 rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); 246 } 247 248 // Treat certificates signed using broken signature algorithms as invalid. 249 if (verify_result->has_md2 || verify_result->has_md4) { 250 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; 251 rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); 252 } 253 254 // Flag certificates using weak signature algorithms. 255 if (verify_result->has_md5) { 256 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; 257 // Avoid replacing a more serious error, such as an OS/library failure, 258 // by ensuring that if verification failed, it failed with a certificate 259 // error. 260 if (rv == OK || IsCertificateError(rv)) 261 rv = MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); 262 } 263 264 #if !defined(OS_ANDROID) 265 // Flag certificates from publicly-trusted CAs that are issued to intranet 266 // hosts. While the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements (v1.1) permit 267 // these to be issued until 1 November 2015, they represent a real risk for 268 // the deployment of gTLDs and are being phased out ahead of the hard 269 // deadline. 270 // 271 // TODO(ppi): is_issued_by_known_root is incorrect on Android. Once this is 272 // fixed, re-enable this check for Android. crbug.com/116838 273 if (verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root && IsHostnameNonUnique(hostname)) { 274 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME; 275 } 276 #endif 277 278 return rv; 279 } 280 281 // static 282 bool CertVerifyProc::IsBlacklisted(X509Certificate* cert) { 283 static const unsigned kComodoSerialBytes = 16; 284 static const uint8 kComodoSerials[][kComodoSerialBytes] = { 285 // Not a real certificate. For testing only. 286 {0x07,0x7a,0x59,0xbc,0xd5,0x34,0x59,0x60,0x1c,0xa6,0x90,0x72,0x67,0xa6,0xdd,0x1c}, 287 288 // The next nine certificates all expire on Fri Mar 14 23:59:59 2014. 289 // Some serial numbers actually have a leading 0x00 byte required to 290 // encode a positive integer in DER if the most significant bit is 0. 291 // We omit the leading 0x00 bytes to make all serial numbers 16 bytes. 292 293 // Subject: CN=mail.google.com 294 // subjectAltName dNSName: mail.google.com, www.mail.google.com 295 {0x04,0x7e,0xcb,0xe9,0xfc,0xa5,0x5f,0x7b,0xd0,0x9e,0xae,0x36,0xe1,0x0c,0xae,0x1e}, 296 // Subject: CN=global trustee 297 // subjectAltName dNSName: global trustee 298 // Note: not a CA certificate. 299 {0xd8,0xf3,0x5f,0x4e,0xb7,0x87,0x2b,0x2d,0xab,0x06,0x92,0xe3,0x15,0x38,0x2f,0xb0}, 300 // Subject: CN=login.live.com 301 // subjectAltName dNSName: login.live.com, www.login.live.com 302 {0xb0,0xb7,0x13,0x3e,0xd0,0x96,0xf9,0xb5,0x6f,0xae,0x91,0xc8,0x74,0xbd,0x3a,0xc0}, 303 // Subject: CN=addons.mozilla.org 304 // subjectAltName dNSName: addons.mozilla.org, www.addons.mozilla.org 305 {0x92,0x39,0xd5,0x34,0x8f,0x40,0xd1,0x69,0x5a,0x74,0x54,0x70,0xe1,0xf2,0x3f,0x43}, 306 // Subject: CN=login.skype.com 307 // subjectAltName dNSName: login.skype.com, www.login.skype.com 308 {0xe9,0x02,0x8b,0x95,0x78,0xe4,0x15,0xdc,0x1a,0x71,0x0a,0x2b,0x88,0x15,0x44,0x47}, 309 // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com 310 // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com, www.login.yahoo.com 311 {0xd7,0x55,0x8f,0xda,0xf5,0xf1,0x10,0x5b,0xb2,0x13,0x28,0x2b,0x70,0x77,0x29,0xa3}, 312 // Subject: CN=www.google.com 313 // subjectAltName dNSName: www.google.com, google.com 314 {0xf5,0xc8,0x6a,0xf3,0x61,0x62,0xf1,0x3a,0x64,0xf5,0x4f,0x6d,0xc9,0x58,0x7c,0x06}, 315 // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com 316 // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com 317 {0x39,0x2a,0x43,0x4f,0x0e,0x07,0xdf,0x1f,0x8a,0xa3,0x05,0xde,0x34,0xe0,0xc2,0x29}, 318 // Subject: CN=login.yahoo.com 319 // subjectAltName dNSName: login.yahoo.com 320 {0x3e,0x75,0xce,0xd4,0x6b,0x69,0x30,0x21,0x21,0x88,0x30,0xae,0x86,0xa8,0x2a,0x71}, 321 }; 322 323 const std::string& serial_number = cert->serial_number(); 324 if (!serial_number.empty() && (serial_number[0] & 0x80) != 0) { 325 // This is a negative serial number, which isn't technically allowed but 326 // which probably happens. In order to avoid confusing a negative serial 327 // number with a positive one once the leading zeros have been removed, we 328 // disregard it. 329 return false; 330 } 331 332 base::StringPiece serial(serial_number); 333 // Remove leading zeros. 334 while (serial.size() > 1 && serial[0] == 0) 335 serial.remove_prefix(1); 336 337 if (serial.size() == kComodoSerialBytes) { 338 for (unsigned i = 0; i < arraysize(kComodoSerials); i++) { 339 if (memcmp(kComodoSerials[i], serial.data(), kComodoSerialBytes) == 0) { 340 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.SSLCertBlacklisted", i, 341 arraysize(kComodoSerials) + 1); 342 return true; 343 } 344 } 345 } 346 347 return false; 348 } 349 350 // static 351 // NOTE: This implementation assumes and enforces that the hashes are SHA1. 352 bool CertVerifyProc::IsPublicKeyBlacklisted( 353 const HashValueVector& public_key_hashes) { 354 static const unsigned kNumHashes = 11; 355 static const uint8 kHashes[kNumHashes][base::kSHA1Length] = { 356 // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Root CA 357 // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net x2 and self-signed 358 {0x41, 0x0f, 0x36, 0x36, 0x32, 0x58, 0xf3, 0x0b, 0x34, 0x7d, 359 0x12, 0xce, 0x48, 0x63, 0xe4, 0x33, 0x43, 0x78, 0x06, 0xa8}, 360 // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Cyber CA 361 // Issuer: CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root 362 {0xc4, 0xf9, 0x66, 0x37, 0x16, 0xcd, 0x5e, 0x71, 0xd6, 0x95, 363 0x0b, 0x5f, 0x33, 0xce, 0x04, 0x1c, 0x95, 0xb4, 0x35, 0xd1}, 364 // Subject: CN=DigiNotar Services 1024 CA 365 // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net 366 {0xe2, 0x3b, 0x8d, 0x10, 0x5f, 0x87, 0x71, 0x0a, 0x68, 0xd9, 367 0x24, 0x80, 0x50, 0xeb, 0xef, 0xc6, 0x27, 0xbe, 0x4c, 0xa6}, 368 // Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2 369 // Issuer: CN=Staat der Nederlanden Organisatie CA - G2 370 {0x7b, 0x2e, 0x16, 0xbc, 0x39, 0xbc, 0xd7, 0x2b, 0x45, 0x6e, 371 0x9f, 0x05, 0x5d, 0x1d, 0xe6, 0x15, 0xb7, 0x49, 0x45, 0xdb}, 372 // Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Overheid en Bedrijven 373 // Issuer: CN=Staat der Nederlanden Overheid CA 374 {0xe8, 0xf9, 0x12, 0x00, 0xc6, 0x5c, 0xee, 0x16, 0xe0, 0x39, 375 0xb9, 0xf8, 0x83, 0x84, 0x16, 0x61, 0x63, 0x5f, 0x81, 0xc5}, 376 // Subject: O=Digicert Sdn. Bhd. 377 // Issuer: CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root 378 // Expires: Jul 17 15:16:54 2012 GMT 379 {0x01, 0x29, 0xbc, 0xd5, 0xb4, 0x48, 0xae, 0x8d, 0x24, 0x96, 380 0xd1, 0xc3, 0xe1, 0x97, 0x23, 0x91, 0x90, 0x88, 0xe1, 0x52}, 381 // Subject: O=Digicert Sdn. Bhd. 382 // Issuer: CN=Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048) 383 // Expires: Jul 16 17:53:37 2015 GMT 384 {0xd3, 0x3c, 0x5b, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x5c, 0xc4, 0xb3, 0xbe, 0x9a, 385 0xd6, 0x95, 0x2c, 0x4e, 0xcc, 0x25, 0x28, 0x03, 0x29, 0x81}, 386 // Issuer: CN=Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2 387 // Covers two certificates, the latter of which expires Apr 15 21:09:30 388 // 2021 GMT. 389 {0xe1, 0x2d, 0x89, 0xf5, 0x6d, 0x22, 0x76, 0xf8, 0x30, 0xe6, 390 0xce, 0xaf, 0xa6, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x5c, 0x0b, 0x41, 0xa9, 0x32}, 391 // Cyberoam CA certificate. Private key leaked, but this certificate would 392 // only have been installed by Cyberoam customers. The certificate expires 393 // in 2036, but we can probably remove in a couple of years (2014). 394 {0xd9, 0xf5, 0xc6, 0xce, 0x57, 0xff, 0xaa, 0x39, 0xcc, 0x7e, 395 0xd1, 0x72, 0xbd, 0x53, 0xe0, 0xd3, 0x07, 0x83, 0x4b, 0xd1}, 396 // Win32/Sirefef.gen!C generates fake certificates with this public key. 397 {0xa4, 0xf5, 0x6e, 0x9e, 0x1d, 0x9a, 0x3b, 0x7b, 0x1a, 0xc3, 398 0x31, 0xcf, 0x64, 0xfc, 0x76, 0x2c, 0xd0, 0x51, 0xfb, 0xa4}, 399 // ANSSI certificate under which a MITM proxy was mistakenly operated. 400 // Expires: Jul 18 10:05:28 2014 GMT 401 {0x3e, 0xcf, 0x4b, 0xbb, 0xe4, 0x60, 0x96, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xbb, 402 0x53, 0x9b, 0xb9, 0x13, 0xd7, 0x7a, 0xa4, 0xef, 0x31, 0xbf}, 403 }; 404 405 for (unsigned i = 0; i < kNumHashes; i++) { 406 for (HashValueVector::const_iterator j = public_key_hashes.begin(); 407 j != public_key_hashes.end(); ++j) { 408 if (j->tag == HASH_VALUE_SHA1 && 409 memcmp(j->data(), kHashes[i], base::kSHA1Length) == 0) { 410 return true; 411 } 412 } 413 } 414 415 return false; 416 } 417 418 static const size_t kMaxTLDLength = 4; 419 420 // CheckNameConstraints verifies that every name in |dns_names| is in one of 421 // the domains specified by |tlds|. The |tlds| array is terminated by an empty 422 // string. 423 static bool CheckNameConstraints(const std::vector<std::string>& dns_names, 424 const char tlds[][kMaxTLDLength]) { 425 for (std::vector<std::string>::const_iterator i = dns_names.begin(); 426 i != dns_names.end(); ++i) { 427 bool ok = false; 428 url_canon::CanonHostInfo host_info; 429 const std::string dns_name = CanonicalizeHost(*i, &host_info); 430 if (host_info.IsIPAddress()) 431 continue; 432 433 const size_t registry_len = registry_controlled_domains::GetRegistryLength( 434 dns_name, 435 registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES, 436 registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES); 437 // If the name is not in a known TLD, ignore it. This permits internal 438 // names. 439 if (registry_len == 0) 440 continue; 441 442 for (size_t j = 0; tlds[j][0]; ++j) { 443 const size_t tld_length = strlen(tlds[j]); 444 // The DNS name must have "." + tlds[j] as a suffix. 445 if (i->size() <= (1 /* period before TLD */ + tld_length)) 446 continue; 447 448 const char* suffix = &dns_name[i->size() - tld_length - 1]; 449 if (suffix[0] != '.') 450 continue; 451 if (memcmp(&suffix[1], tlds[j], tld_length) != 0) 452 continue; 453 ok = true; 454 break; 455 } 456 457 if (!ok) 458 return false; 459 } 460 461 return true; 462 } 463 464 // PublicKeyTLDLimitation contains a SHA1, SPKI hash and a pointer to an array 465 // of fixed-length strings that contain the TLDs that the SPKI is allowed to 466 // issue for. 467 struct PublicKeyTLDLimitation { 468 uint8 public_key[base::kSHA1Length]; 469 const char (*tlds)[kMaxTLDLength]; 470 }; 471 472 // static 473 bool CertVerifyProc::HasNameConstraintsViolation( 474 const HashValueVector& public_key_hashes, 475 const std::string& common_name, 476 const std::vector<std::string>& dns_names, 477 const std::vector<std::string>& ip_addrs) { 478 static const char kTLDsANSSI[][kMaxTLDLength] = { 479 "fr", // France 480 "gp", // Guadeloupe 481 "gf", // Guyane 482 "mq", // Martinique 483 "re", // Runion 484 "yt", // Mayotte 485 "pm", // Saint-Pierre et Miquelon 486 "bl", // Saint Barthlemy 487 "mf", // Saint Martin 488 "wf", // Wallis et Futuna 489 "pf", // Polynsie franaise 490 "nc", // Nouvelle Caldonie 491 "tf", // Terres australes et antarctiques franaises 492 "", 493 }; 494 495 static const char kTLDsTest[][kMaxTLDLength] = { 496 "com", 497 "", 498 }; 499 500 static const PublicKeyTLDLimitation kLimits[] = { 501 // C=FR, ST=France, L=Paris, O=PM/SGDN, OU=DCSSI, 502 // CN=IGC/A/emailAddress=igca (at) sgdn.pm.gouv.fr 503 { 504 {0x79, 0x23, 0xd5, 0x8d, 0x0f, 0xe0, 0x3c, 0xe6, 0xab, 0xad, 505 0xae, 0x27, 0x1a, 0x6d, 0x94, 0xf4, 0x14, 0xd1, 0xa8, 0x73}, 506 kTLDsANSSI, 507 }, 508 // Not a real certificate - just for testing. This is the SPKI hash of 509 // the keys used in net/data/ssl/certificates/name_constraint_*.crt. 510 { 511 {0x15, 0x45, 0xd7, 0x3b, 0x58, 0x6b, 0x47, 0xcf, 0xc1, 0x44, 512 0xa2, 0xc9, 0xaa, 0xab, 0x98, 0x3d, 0x21, 0xcc, 0x42, 0xde}, 513 kTLDsTest, 514 }, 515 }; 516 517 for (unsigned i = 0; i < arraysize(kLimits); ++i) { 518 for (HashValueVector::const_iterator j = public_key_hashes.begin(); 519 j != public_key_hashes.end(); ++j) { 520 if (j->tag == HASH_VALUE_SHA1 && 521 memcmp(j->data(), kLimits[i].public_key, base::kSHA1Length) == 0) { 522 if (dns_names.empty() && ip_addrs.empty()) { 523 std::vector<std::string> dns_names; 524 dns_names.push_back(common_name); 525 if (!CheckNameConstraints(dns_names, kLimits[i].tlds)) 526 return true; 527 } else { 528 if (!CheckNameConstraints(dns_names, kLimits[i].tlds)) 529 return true; 530 } 531 } 532 } 533 } 534 535 return false; 536 } 537 538 } // namespace net 539
