1 /* 2 * EAP server/peer: EAP-pwd shared routines 3 * Copyright (c) 2010, Dan Harkins <dharkins (at) lounge.org> 4 * 5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license. 6 * See README for more details. 7 */ 8 9 #include "includes.h" 10 #include "common.h" 11 #include "crypto/sha256.h" 12 #include "crypto/crypto.h" 13 #include "eap_defs.h" 14 #include "eap_pwd_common.h" 15 16 /* The random function H(x) = HMAC-SHA256(0^32, x) */ 17 struct crypto_hash * eap_pwd_h_init(void) 18 { 19 u8 allzero[SHA256_MAC_LEN]; 20 os_memset(allzero, 0, SHA256_MAC_LEN); 21 return crypto_hash_init(CRYPTO_HASH_ALG_HMAC_SHA256, allzero, 22 SHA256_MAC_LEN); 23 } 24 25 26 void eap_pwd_h_update(struct crypto_hash *hash, const u8 *data, size_t len) 27 { 28 crypto_hash_update(hash, data, len); 29 } 30 31 32 void eap_pwd_h_final(struct crypto_hash *hash, u8 *digest) 33 { 34 size_t len = SHA256_MAC_LEN; 35 crypto_hash_finish(hash, digest, &len); 36 } 37 38 39 /* a counter-based KDF based on NIST SP800-108 */ 40 static int eap_pwd_kdf(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, const u8 *label, 41 size_t labellen, u8 *result, size_t resultbitlen) 42 { 43 struct crypto_hash *hash; 44 u8 digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN]; 45 u16 i, ctr, L; 46 size_t resultbytelen, len = 0, mdlen; 47 48 resultbytelen = (resultbitlen + 7) / 8; 49 ctr = 0; 50 L = htons(resultbitlen); 51 while (len < resultbytelen) { 52 ctr++; 53 i = htons(ctr); 54 hash = crypto_hash_init(CRYPTO_HASH_ALG_HMAC_SHA256, 55 key, keylen); 56 if (hash == NULL) 57 return -1; 58 if (ctr > 1) 59 crypto_hash_update(hash, digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN); 60 crypto_hash_update(hash, (u8 *) &i, sizeof(u16)); 61 crypto_hash_update(hash, label, labellen); 62 crypto_hash_update(hash, (u8 *) &L, sizeof(u16)); 63 mdlen = SHA256_MAC_LEN; 64 if (crypto_hash_finish(hash, digest, &mdlen) < 0) 65 return -1; 66 if ((len + mdlen) > resultbytelen) 67 os_memcpy(result + len, digest, resultbytelen - len); 68 else 69 os_memcpy(result + len, digest, mdlen); 70 len += mdlen; 71 } 72 73 /* since we're expanding to a bit length, mask off the excess */ 74 if (resultbitlen % 8) { 75 u8 mask = 0xff; 76 mask <<= (8 - (resultbitlen % 8)); 77 result[resultbytelen - 1] &= mask; 78 } 79 80 return 0; 81 } 82 83 84 /* 85 * compute a "random" secret point on an elliptic curve based 86 * on the password and identities. 87 */ 88 int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num, 89 u8 *password, int password_len, 90 u8 *id_server, int id_server_len, 91 u8 *id_peer, int id_peer_len, u8 *token) 92 { 93 BIGNUM *x_candidate = NULL, *rnd = NULL, *cofactor = NULL; 94 struct crypto_hash *hash; 95 unsigned char pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr; 96 int nid, is_odd, ret = 0; 97 size_t primebytelen, primebitlen; 98 99 switch (num) { /* from IANA registry for IKE D-H groups */ 100 case 19: 101 nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1; 102 break; 103 case 20: 104 nid = NID_secp384r1; 105 break; 106 case 21: 107 nid = NID_secp521r1; 108 break; 109 case 25: 110 nid = NID_X9_62_prime192v1; 111 break; 112 case 26: 113 nid = NID_secp224r1; 114 break; 115 default: 116 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unsupported group %d", num); 117 return -1; 118 } 119 120 grp->pwe = NULL; 121 grp->order = NULL; 122 grp->prime = NULL; 123 124 if ((grp->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL) { 125 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create EC_GROUP"); 126 goto fail; 127 } 128 129 if (((rnd = BN_new()) == NULL) || 130 ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) || 131 ((grp->pwe = EC_POINT_new(grp->group)) == NULL) || 132 ((grp->order = BN_new()) == NULL) || 133 ((grp->prime = BN_new()) == NULL) || 134 ((x_candidate = BN_new()) == NULL)) { 135 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create bignums"); 136 goto fail; 137 } 138 139 if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(grp->group, grp->prime, NULL, NULL, NULL)) 140 { 141 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to get prime for GFp " 142 "curve"); 143 goto fail; 144 } 145 if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(grp->group, grp->order, NULL)) { 146 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to get order for curve"); 147 goto fail; 148 } 149 if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(grp->group, cofactor, NULL)) { 150 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to get cofactor for " 151 "curve"); 152 goto fail; 153 } 154 primebitlen = BN_num_bits(grp->prime); 155 primebytelen = BN_num_bytes(grp->prime); 156 if ((prfbuf = os_malloc(primebytelen)) == NULL) { 157 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to malloc space for prf " 158 "buffer"); 159 goto fail; 160 } 161 os_memset(prfbuf, 0, primebytelen); 162 ctr = 0; 163 while (1) { 164 if (ctr > 30) { 165 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to find random " 166 "point on curve for group %d, something's " 167 "fishy", num); 168 goto fail; 169 } 170 ctr++; 171 172 /* 173 * compute counter-mode password value and stretch to prime 174 * pwd-seed = H(token | peer-id | server-id | password | 175 * counter) 176 */ 177 hash = eap_pwd_h_init(); 178 if (hash == NULL) 179 goto fail; 180 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, token, sizeof(u32)); 181 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, id_peer, id_peer_len); 182 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, id_server, id_server_len); 183 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, password, password_len); 184 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, &ctr, sizeof(ctr)); 185 eap_pwd_h_final(hash, pwe_digest); 186 187 BN_bin2bn(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN, rnd); 188 189 if (eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN, 190 (u8 *) "EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking", 191 os_strlen("EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking"), 192 prfbuf, primebitlen) < 0) 193 goto fail; 194 195 BN_bin2bn(prfbuf, primebytelen, x_candidate); 196 197 /* 198 * eap_pwd_kdf() returns a string of bits 0..primebitlen but 199 * BN_bin2bn will treat that string of bits as a big endian 200 * number. If the primebitlen is not an even multiple of 8 201 * then excessive bits-- those _after_ primebitlen-- so now 202 * we have to shift right the amount we masked off. 203 */ 204 if (primebitlen % 8) 205 BN_rshift(x_candidate, x_candidate, 206 (8 - (primebitlen % 8))); 207 208 if (BN_ucmp(x_candidate, grp->prime) >= 0) 209 continue; 210 211 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate", 212 prfbuf, primebytelen); 213 214 /* 215 * need to unambiguously identify the solution, if there is 216 * one... 217 */ 218 if (BN_is_odd(rnd)) 219 is_odd = 1; 220 else 221 is_odd = 0; 222 223 /* 224 * solve the quadratic equation, if it's not solvable then we 225 * don't have a point 226 */ 227 if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(grp->group, 228 grp->pwe, 229 x_candidate, 230 is_odd, NULL)) 231 continue; 232 /* 233 * If there's a solution to the equation then the point must be 234 * on the curve so why check again explicitly? OpenSSL code 235 * says this is required by X9.62. We're not X9.62 but it can't 236 * hurt just to be sure. 237 */ 238 if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(grp->group, grp->pwe, NULL)) { 239 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is not on curve"); 240 continue; 241 } 242 243 if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) { 244 /* make sure the point is not in a small sub-group */ 245 if (!EC_POINT_mul(grp->group, grp->pwe, NULL, grp->pwe, 246 cofactor, NULL)) { 247 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: cannot " 248 "multiply generator by order"); 249 continue; 250 } 251 if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(grp->group, grp->pwe)) { 252 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is at " 253 "infinity"); 254 continue; 255 } 256 } 257 /* if we got here then we have a new generator. */ 258 break; 259 } 260 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %d tries", ctr); 261 grp->group_num = num; 262 if (0) { 263 fail: 264 EC_GROUP_free(grp->group); 265 grp->group = NULL; 266 EC_POINT_free(grp->pwe); 267 grp->pwe = NULL; 268 BN_free(grp->order); 269 grp->order = NULL; 270 BN_free(grp->prime); 271 grp->prime = NULL; 272 ret = 1; 273 } 274 /* cleanliness and order.... */ 275 BN_free(cofactor); 276 BN_free(x_candidate); 277 BN_free(rnd); 278 os_free(prfbuf); 279 280 return ret; 281 } 282 283 284 int compute_keys(EAP_PWD_group *grp, BN_CTX *bnctx, BIGNUM *k, 285 BIGNUM *peer_scalar, BIGNUM *server_scalar, 286 u8 *confirm_peer, u8 *confirm_server, 287 u32 *ciphersuite, u8 *msk, u8 *emsk) 288 { 289 struct crypto_hash *hash; 290 u8 mk[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft; 291 u8 session_id[SHA256_MAC_LEN + 1]; 292 u8 msk_emsk[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN]; 293 int offset; 294 295 if ((cruft = os_malloc(BN_num_bytes(grp->prime))) == NULL) 296 return -1; 297 298 /* 299 * first compute the session-id = TypeCode | H(ciphersuite | scal_p | 300 * scal_s) 301 */ 302 session_id[0] = EAP_TYPE_PWD; 303 hash = eap_pwd_h_init(); 304 if (hash == NULL) { 305 os_free(cruft); 306 return -1; 307 } 308 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, (u8 *) ciphersuite, sizeof(u32)); 309 offset = BN_num_bytes(grp->order) - BN_num_bytes(peer_scalar); 310 os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime)); 311 BN_bn2bin(peer_scalar, cruft + offset); 312 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->order)); 313 offset = BN_num_bytes(grp->order) - BN_num_bytes(server_scalar); 314 os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime)); 315 BN_bn2bin(server_scalar, cruft + offset); 316 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->order)); 317 eap_pwd_h_final(hash, &session_id[1]); 318 319 /* then compute MK = H(k | confirm-peer | confirm-server) */ 320 hash = eap_pwd_h_init(); 321 if (hash == NULL) { 322 os_free(cruft); 323 return -1; 324 } 325 offset = BN_num_bytes(grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(k); 326 os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime)); 327 BN_bn2bin(k, cruft + offset); 328 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime)); 329 os_free(cruft); 330 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, confirm_peer, SHA256_MAC_LEN); 331 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, confirm_server, SHA256_MAC_LEN); 332 eap_pwd_h_final(hash, mk); 333 334 /* stretch the mk with the session-id to get MSK | EMSK */ 335 if (eap_pwd_kdf(mk, SHA256_MAC_LEN, 336 session_id, SHA256_MAC_LEN + 1, 337 msk_emsk, (EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN) * 8) < 0) { 338 return -1; 339 } 340 341 os_memcpy(msk, msk_emsk, EAP_MSK_LEN); 342 os_memcpy(emsk, msk_emsk + EAP_MSK_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN); 343 344 return 1; 345 } 346
