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      1 /* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.94 2011/05/23 03:33:38 djm Exp $ */
      2 /*
      3  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
      4  *
      5  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
      6  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
      7  * are met:
      8  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
      9  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
     10  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
     11  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
     12  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
     13  *
     14  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
     15  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
     16  * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
     17  * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
     18  * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
     19  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
     20  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
     21  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
     22  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
     23  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
     24  */
     25 
     26 #include "includes.h"
     27 
     28 #include <sys/types.h>
     29 #include <sys/stat.h>
     30 #include <sys/param.h>
     31 
     32 #include <netinet/in.h>
     33 
     34 #include <errno.h>
     35 #include <fcntl.h>
     36 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
     37 # include <paths.h>
     38 #endif
     39 #include <pwd.h>
     40 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
     41 #include <login.h>
     42 #endif
     43 #ifdef USE_SHADOW
     44 #include <shadow.h>
     45 #endif
     46 #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
     47 #include <libgen.h>
     48 #endif
     49 #include <stdarg.h>
     50 #include <stdio.h>
     51 #include <string.h>
     52 #include <unistd.h>
     53 
     54 #include "xmalloc.h"
     55 #include "match.h"
     56 #include "groupaccess.h"
     57 #include "log.h"
     58 #include "buffer.h"
     59 #include "servconf.h"
     60 #include "key.h"
     61 #include "hostfile.h"
     62 #include "auth.h"
     63 #include "auth-options.h"
     64 #include "canohost.h"
     65 #include "uidswap.h"
     66 #include "misc.h"
     67 #include "packet.h"
     68 #include "loginrec.h"
     69 #ifdef GSSAPI
     70 #include "ssh-gss.h"
     71 #endif
     72 #include "authfile.h"
     73 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
     74 
     75 /* import */
     76 extern ServerOptions options;
     77 extern int use_privsep;
     78 extern Buffer loginmsg;
     79 extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
     80 
     81 /* Debugging messages */
     82 Buffer auth_debug;
     83 int auth_debug_init;
     84 
     85 /*
     86  * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
     87  * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
     88  * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
     89  * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
     90  * listed there, false will be returned.
     91  * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
     92  * Otherwise true is returned.
     93  */
     94 int
     95 allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
     96 {
     97 	struct stat st;
     98 	const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
     99 	u_int i;
    100 #ifdef USE_SHADOW
    101 	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
    102 #endif
    103 
    104 	/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
    105 	if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
    106 		return 0;
    107 
    108 #ifdef USE_SHADOW
    109 	if (!options.use_pam)
    110 		spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
    111 #ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
    112 	if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
    113 		return 0;
    114 #endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
    115 #endif /* USE_SHADOW */
    116 
    117 	/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
    118 	passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
    119 #ifdef USE_SHADOW
    120 	if (spw != NULL)
    121 #ifdef USE_LIBIAF
    122 		passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
    123 #else
    124 		passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
    125 #endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
    126 #endif
    127 
    128 	/* check for locked account */
    129 	if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
    130 		int locked = 0;
    131 
    132 #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
    133 		if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
    134 			 locked = 1;
    135 #endif
    136 #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
    137 		if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
    138 		    strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
    139 			 locked = 1;
    140 #endif
    141 #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
    142 		if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
    143 			locked = 1;
    144 #endif
    145 #ifdef USE_LIBIAF
    146 		free((void *) passwd);
    147 #endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
    148 		if (locked) {
    149 			logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
    150 			    pw->pw_name);
    151 			return 0;
    152 		}
    153 	}
    154 
    155 	/*
    156 	 * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we
    157 	 * are chrooting.
    158 	 */
    159 	if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
    160 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
    161 		char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
    162 		    _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */
    163 
    164 		if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
    165 			logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
    166 			    "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell);
    167 			xfree(shell);
    168 			return 0;
    169 		}
    170 		if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
    171 		    (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
    172 			logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
    173 			    "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell);
    174 			xfree(shell);
    175 			return 0;
    176 		}
    177 		xfree(shell);
    178 	}
    179 
    180 	if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
    181 	    options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
    182 		hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
    183 		ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
    184 	}
    185 
    186 	/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
    187 	if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
    188 		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
    189 			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
    190 			    options.deny_users[i])) {
    191 				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
    192 				    "because listed in DenyUsers",
    193 				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
    194 				return 0;
    195 			}
    196 	}
    197 	/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
    198 	if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
    199 		for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
    200 			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
    201 			    options.allow_users[i]))
    202 				break;
    203 		/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
    204 		if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
    205 			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
    206 			    "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
    207 			return 0;
    208 		}
    209 	}
    210 	if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
    211 		/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
    212 		if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
    213 			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
    214 			    "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
    215 			return 0;
    216 		}
    217 
    218 		/* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
    219 		if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
    220 			if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
    221 			    options.num_deny_groups)) {
    222 				ga_free();
    223 				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
    224 				    "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
    225 				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
    226 				return 0;
    227 			}
    228 		/*
    229 		 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
    230 		 * isn't listed there
    231 		 */
    232 		if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
    233 			if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
    234 			    options.num_allow_groups)) {
    235 				ga_free();
    236 				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
    237 				    "because none of user's groups are listed "
    238 				    "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
    239 				return 0;
    240 			}
    241 		ga_free();
    242 	}
    243 
    244 #ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
    245 	if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg))
    246 		return 0;
    247 #endif
    248 
    249 	/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
    250 	return 1;
    251 }
    252 
    253 void
    254 auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
    255 {
    256 	void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
    257 	char *authmsg;
    258 
    259 	if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
    260 		return;
    261 
    262 	/* Raise logging level */
    263 	if (authenticated == 1 ||
    264 	    !authctxt->valid ||
    265 	    authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
    266 	    strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
    267 		authlog = logit;
    268 
    269 	if (authctxt->postponed)
    270 		authmsg = "Postponed";
    271 	else
    272 		authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
    273 
    274 	authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
    275 	    authmsg,
    276 	    method,
    277 	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
    278 	    authctxt->user,
    279 	    get_remote_ipaddr(),
    280 	    get_remote_port(),
    281 	    info);
    282 
    283 #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
    284 	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
    285 	    (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
    286 	    strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
    287 	    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
    288 		record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
    289 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
    290 # ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
    291 	if (authenticated)
    292 		sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
    293 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg);
    294 # endif
    295 #endif
    296 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
    297 	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
    298 		audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
    299 #endif
    300 }
    301 
    302 /*
    303  * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
    304  */
    305 int
    306 auth_root_allowed(char *method)
    307 {
    308 	switch (options.permit_root_login) {
    309 	case PERMIT_YES:
    310 		return 1;
    311 	case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
    312 		if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
    313 			return 1;
    314 		break;
    315 	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
    316 		if (forced_command) {
    317 			logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
    318 			return 1;
    319 		}
    320 		break;
    321 	}
    322 	logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
    323 	return 0;
    324 }
    325 
    326 
    327 /*
    328  * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
    329  * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
    330  * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
    331  *
    332  * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
    333  */
    334 char *
    335 expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
    336 {
    337 	char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
    338 	int i;
    339 
    340 	file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
    341 	    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
    342 
    343 	/*
    344 	 * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
    345 	 * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
    346 	 */
    347 	if (*file == '/')
    348 		return (file);
    349 
    350 	i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
    351 	if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
    352 		fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
    353 	xfree(file);
    354 	return (xstrdup(ret));
    355 }
    356 
    357 char *
    358 authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
    359 {
    360 	if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL)
    361 		return NULL;
    362 	return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
    363 }
    364 
    365 /* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
    366 HostStatus
    367 check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
    368     const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
    369 {
    370 	char *user_hostfile;
    371 	struct stat st;
    372 	HostStatus host_status;
    373 	struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
    374 	const struct hostkey_entry *found;
    375 
    376 	hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
    377 	load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile);
    378 	if (userfile != NULL) {
    379 		user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
    380 		if (options.strict_modes &&
    381 		    (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
    382 		    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
    383 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
    384 			logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
    385 			    "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
    386 			    pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
    387 			auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
    388 			    user_hostfile);
    389 		} else {
    390 			temporarily_use_uid(pw);
    391 			load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile);
    392 			restore_uid();
    393 		}
    394 		xfree(user_hostfile);
    395 	}
    396 	host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found);
    397 	if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED)
    398 		error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication",
    399 		    found->host);
    400 	else if (host_status == HOST_OK)
    401 		debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__,
    402 		    found->host, found->file, found->line);
    403 	else
    404 		debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host);
    405 
    406 	free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
    407 
    408 	return host_status;
    409 }
    410 
    411 
    412 /*
    413  * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
    414  * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
    415  * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
    416  *
    417  * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
    418  *
    419  * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
    420  * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
    421  *
    422  * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
    423  */
    424 static int
    425 secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
    426     char *err, size_t errlen)
    427 {
    428 	uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
    429 	char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
    430 	char *cp;
    431 	int comparehome = 0;
    432 	struct stat st;
    433 
    434 	if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
    435 		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
    436 		    strerror(errno));
    437 		return -1;
    438 	}
    439 	if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
    440 		comparehome = 1;
    441 
    442 	/* check the open file to avoid races */
    443 	if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
    444 	    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
    445 	    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
    446 #ifdef ANDROID
    447 		/* needed to allow root login on android */
    448 		if (getuid() != 0)
    449 #endif
    450 	    {
    451 			snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
    452 				buf);
    453 			return -1;
    454 		}
    455 	}
    456 
    457 	/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
    458 	for (;;) {
    459 		if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
    460 			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
    461 			return -1;
    462 		}
    463 		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
    464 
    465 #ifndef ANDROID
    466 	    /* /data is owned by system user, which causes this check to fail */
    467 		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
    468 		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
    469 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
    470 			snprintf(err, errlen,
    471 			    "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
    472 			return -1;
    473 		}
    474 #endif
    475 		/* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
    476 		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
    477 			break;
    478 
    479 		/*
    480 		 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
    481 		 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
    482 		 */
    483 		if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
    484 			break;
    485 	}
    486 	return 0;
    487 }
    488 
    489 static FILE *
    490 auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
    491     int log_missing, char *file_type)
    492 {
    493 	char line[1024];
    494 	struct stat st;
    495 	int fd;
    496 	FILE *f;
    497 
    498 	if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
    499 		if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT)
    500 			debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file,
    501 			   strerror(errno));
    502 		return NULL;
    503 	}
    504 
    505 	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
    506 		close(fd);
    507 		return NULL;
    508 	}
    509 	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
    510 		logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file",
    511 		    pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
    512 		close(fd);
    513 		return NULL;
    514 	}
    515 	unset_nonblock(fd);
    516 	if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
    517 		close(fd);
    518 		return NULL;
    519 	}
    520 	if (strict_modes &&
    521 	    secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
    522 		fclose(f);
    523 		logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
    524 		auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
    525 		return NULL;
    526 	}
    527 
    528 	return f;
    529 }
    530 
    531 
    532 FILE *
    533 auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
    534 {
    535 	return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
    536 }
    537 
    538 FILE *
    539 auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
    540 {
    541 	return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
    542 	    "authorized principals");
    543 }
    544 
    545 struct passwd *
    546 getpwnamallow(const char *user)
    547 {
    548 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
    549 	extern login_cap_t *lc;
    550 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
    551 	auth_session_t *as;
    552 #endif
    553 #endif
    554 	struct passwd *pw;
    555 
    556 	parse_server_match_config(&options, user,
    557 	    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), get_remote_ipaddr());
    558 
    559 #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
    560 	aix_setauthdb(user);
    561 #endif
    562 
    563 	pw = getpwnam(user);
    564 
    565 #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
    566 	aix_restoreauthdb();
    567 #endif
    568 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
    569 	/*
    570 	 * Windows usernames are case-insensitive.  To avoid later problems
    571 	 * when trying to match the username, the user is only allowed to
    572 	 * login if the username is given in the same case as stored in the
    573 	 * user database.
    574 	 */
    575 	if (pw != NULL && strcmp(user, pw->pw_name) != 0) {
    576 		logit("Login name %.100s does not match stored username %.100s",
    577 		    user, pw->pw_name);
    578 		pw = NULL;
    579 	}
    580 #endif
    581 	if (pw == NULL) {
    582 		logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
    583 		    user, get_remote_ipaddr());
    584 #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
    585 		record_failed_login(user,
    586 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
    587 #endif
    588 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
    589 		audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
    590 #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
    591 		return (NULL);
    592 	}
    593 	if (!allowed_user(pw))
    594 		return (NULL);
    595 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
    596 	if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
    597 		debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
    598 		return (NULL);
    599 	}
    600 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
    601 	if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
    602 	    auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
    603 		debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
    604 		pw = NULL;
    605 	}
    606 	if (as != NULL)
    607 		auth_close(as);
    608 #endif
    609 #endif
    610 	if (pw != NULL)
    611 		return (pwcopy(pw));
    612 	return (NULL);
    613 }
    614 
    615 /* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
    616 int
    617 auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
    618 {
    619 	char *key_fp;
    620 
    621 	if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
    622 		return 0;
    623 
    624 	switch (key_in_file(key, options.revoked_keys_file, 0)) {
    625 	case 0:
    626 		/* key not revoked */
    627 		return 0;
    628 	case -1:
    629 		/* Error opening revoked_keys_file: refuse all keys */
    630 		error("Revoked keys file is unreadable: refusing public key "
    631 		    "authentication");
    632 		return 1;
    633 	case 1:
    634 		/* Key revoked */
    635 		key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
    636 		error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
    637 		    "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
    638 		xfree(key_fp);
    639 		return 1;
    640 	}
    641 	fatal("key_in_file returned junk");
    642 }
    643 
    644 void
    645 auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
    646 {
    647 	char buf[1024];
    648 	va_list args;
    649 
    650 	if (!auth_debug_init)
    651 		return;
    652 
    653 	va_start(args, fmt);
    654 	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
    655 	va_end(args);
    656 	buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
    657 }
    658 
    659 void
    660 auth_debug_send(void)
    661 {
    662 	char *msg;
    663 
    664 	if (!auth_debug_init)
    665 		return;
    666 	while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
    667 		msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
    668 		packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
    669 		xfree(msg);
    670 	}
    671 }
    672 
    673 void
    674 auth_debug_reset(void)
    675 {
    676 	if (auth_debug_init)
    677 		buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
    678 	else {
    679 		buffer_init(&auth_debug);
    680 		auth_debug_init = 1;
    681 	}
    682 }
    683 
    684 struct passwd *
    685 fakepw(void)
    686 {
    687 	static struct passwd fake;
    688 
    689 	memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
    690 	fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
    691 	fake.pw_passwd =
    692 	    "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
    693 #ifdef HAVE_PW_GECOS_IN_PASSWD
    694 	fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
    695 #endif
    696 	fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid;
    697 	fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid;
    698 #ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
    699 	fake.pw_class = "";
    700 #endif
    701 	fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
    702 	fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
    703 
    704 	return (&fake);
    705 }
    706