1 // Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. 2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be 3 // found in the LICENSE file. 4 5 #include "sandbox/linux/services/credentials.h" 6 7 #include <dirent.h> 8 #include <errno.h> 9 #include <fcntl.h> 10 #include <signal.h> 11 #include <stdio.h> 12 #include <sys/capability.h> 13 #include <sys/stat.h> 14 #include <sys/syscall.h> 15 #include <sys/types.h> 16 #include <sys/wait.h> 17 #include <unistd.h> 18 19 #include "base/basictypes.h" 20 #include "base/bind.h" 21 #include "base/logging.h" 22 #include "base/posix/eintr_wrapper.h" 23 #include "base/strings/string_number_conversions.h" 24 #include "base/template_util.h" 25 #include "base/third_party/valgrind/valgrind.h" 26 #include "base/threading/thread.h" 27 28 namespace { 29 30 bool IsRunningOnValgrind() { return RUNNING_ON_VALGRIND; } 31 32 struct CapFreeDeleter { 33 inline void operator()(cap_t cap) const { 34 int ret = cap_free(cap); 35 CHECK_EQ(0, ret); 36 } 37 }; 38 39 // Wrapper to manage libcap2's cap_t type. 40 typedef scoped_ptr<typeof(*((cap_t)0)), CapFreeDeleter> ScopedCap; 41 42 struct CapTextFreeDeleter { 43 inline void operator()(char* cap_text) const { 44 int ret = cap_free(cap_text); 45 CHECK_EQ(0, ret); 46 } 47 }; 48 49 // Wrapper to manage the result from libcap2's cap_from_text(). 50 typedef scoped_ptr<char, CapTextFreeDeleter> ScopedCapText; 51 52 struct FILECloser { 53 inline void operator()(FILE* f) const { 54 DCHECK(f); 55 PCHECK(0 == fclose(f)); 56 } 57 }; 58 59 // Don't use ScopedFILE in base since it doesn't check fclose(). 60 // TODO(jln): fix base/. 61 typedef scoped_ptr<FILE, FILECloser> ScopedFILE; 62 63 struct DIRCloser { 64 void operator()(DIR* d) const { 65 DCHECK(d); 66 PCHECK(0 == closedir(d)); 67 } 68 }; 69 70 typedef scoped_ptr<DIR, DIRCloser> ScopedDIR; 71 72 COMPILE_ASSERT((base::is_same<uid_t, gid_t>::value), UidAndGidAreSameType); 73 // generic_id_t can be used for either uid_t or gid_t. 74 typedef uid_t generic_id_t; 75 76 // Write a uid or gid mapping from |id| to |id| in |map_file|. 77 bool WriteToIdMapFile(const char* map_file, generic_id_t id) { 78 ScopedFILE f(fopen(map_file, "w")); 79 PCHECK(f); 80 const uid_t inside_id = id; 81 const uid_t outside_id = id; 82 int num = fprintf(f.get(), "%d %d 1\n", inside_id, outside_id); 83 if (num < 0) return false; 84 // Manually call fflush() to catch permission failures. 85 int ret = fflush(f.get()); 86 if (ret) { 87 VLOG(1) << "Could not write to id map file"; 88 return false; 89 } 90 return true; 91 } 92 93 // Checks that the set of RES-uids and the set of RES-gids have 94 // one element each and return that element in |resuid| and |resgid| 95 // respectively. It's ok to pass NULL as one or both of the ids. 96 bool GetRESIds(uid_t* resuid, gid_t* resgid) { 97 uid_t ruid, euid, suid; 98 gid_t rgid, egid, sgid; 99 PCHECK(getresuid(&ruid, &euid, &suid) == 0); 100 PCHECK(getresgid(&rgid, &egid, &sgid) == 0); 101 const bool uids_are_equal = (ruid == euid) && (ruid == suid); 102 const bool gids_are_equal = (rgid == egid) && (rgid == sgid); 103 if (!uids_are_equal || !gids_are_equal) return false; 104 if (resuid) *resuid = euid; 105 if (resgid) *resgid = egid; 106 return true; 107 } 108 109 // chroot() and chdir() to /proc/<tid>/fdinfo. 110 void ChrootToThreadFdInfo(base::PlatformThreadId tid, bool* result) { 111 DCHECK(result); 112 *result = false; 113 114 COMPILE_ASSERT((base::is_same<base::PlatformThreadId, int>::value), 115 TidIsAnInt); 116 const std::string current_thread_fdinfo = "/proc/" + 117 base::IntToString(tid) + "/fdinfo/"; 118 119 // Make extra sure that /proc/<tid>/fdinfo is unique to the thread. 120 CHECK(0 == unshare(CLONE_FILES)); 121 int chroot_ret = chroot(current_thread_fdinfo.c_str()); 122 if (chroot_ret) { 123 PLOG(ERROR) << "Could not chroot"; 124 return; 125 } 126 127 // CWD is essentially an implicit file descriptor, so be careful to not leave 128 // it behind. 129 PCHECK(0 == chdir("/")); 130 131 *result = true; 132 return; 133 } 134 135 // chroot() to an empty dir that is "safe". To be safe, it must not contain 136 // any subdirectory (chroot-ing there would allow a chroot escape) and it must 137 // be impossible to create an empty directory there. 138 // We achieve this by doing the following: 139 // 1. We create a new thread, which will create a new /proc/<tid>/ directory 140 // 2. We chroot to /proc/<tid>/fdinfo/ 141 // This is already "safe", since fdinfo/ does not contain another directory and 142 // one cannot create another directory there. 143 // 3. The thread dies 144 // After (3) happens, the directory is not available anymore in /proc. 145 bool ChrootToSafeEmptyDir() { 146 base::Thread chrooter("sandbox_chrooter"); 147 if (!chrooter.Start()) return false; 148 bool is_chrooted = false; 149 chrooter.message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, 150 base::Bind(&ChrootToThreadFdInfo, chrooter.thread_id(), &is_chrooted)); 151 // Make sure our task has run before committing the return value. 152 chrooter.Stop(); 153 return is_chrooted; 154 } 155 156 // CHECK() that an attempt to move to a new user namespace raised an expected 157 // errno. 158 void CheckCloneNewUserErrno(int error) { 159 // EPERM can happen if already in a chroot. EUSERS if too many nested 160 // namespaces are used. EINVAL for kernels that don't support the feature. 161 // Valgrind will ENOSYS unshare(). 162 PCHECK(error == EPERM || error == EUSERS || error == EINVAL || 163 error == ENOSYS); 164 } 165 166 } // namespace. 167 168 namespace sandbox { 169 170 Credentials::Credentials() { 171 } 172 173 Credentials::~Credentials() { 174 } 175 176 int Credentials::CountOpenFds(int proc_fd) { 177 DCHECK_LE(0, proc_fd); 178 int proc_self_fd = openat(proc_fd, "self/fd", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY); 179 PCHECK(0 <= proc_self_fd); 180 181 // Ownership of proc_self_fd is transferred here, it must not be closed 182 // or modified afterwards except via dir. 183 ScopedDIR dir(fdopendir(proc_self_fd)); 184 CHECK(dir); 185 186 int count = 0; 187 struct dirent e; 188 struct dirent* de; 189 while (!readdir_r(dir.get(), &e, &de) && de) { 190 if (strcmp(e.d_name, ".") == 0 || strcmp(e.d_name, "..") == 0) { 191 continue; 192 } 193 194 int fd_num; 195 CHECK(base::StringToInt(e.d_name, &fd_num)); 196 if (fd_num == proc_fd || fd_num == proc_self_fd) { 197 continue; 198 } 199 200 ++count; 201 } 202 return count; 203 } 204 205 bool Credentials::HasOpenDirectory(int proc_fd) { 206 int proc_self_fd = -1; 207 if (proc_fd >= 0) { 208 proc_self_fd = openat(proc_fd, "self/fd", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY); 209 } else { 210 proc_self_fd = openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/self/fd", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY); 211 if (proc_self_fd < 0) { 212 // If this process has been chrooted (eg into /proc/self/fdinfo) then 213 // the new root dir will not have directory listing permissions for us 214 // (hence EACCES). And if we do have this permission, then /proc won't 215 // exist anyway (hence ENOENT). 216 DPCHECK(errno == EACCES || errno == ENOENT) 217 << "Unexpected failure when trying to open /proc/self/fd: (" 218 << errno << ") " << strerror(errno); 219 220 // If not available, guess false. 221 return false; 222 } 223 } 224 PCHECK(0 <= proc_self_fd); 225 226 // Ownership of proc_self_fd is transferred here, it must not be closed 227 // or modified afterwards except via dir. 228 ScopedDIR dir(fdopendir(proc_self_fd)); 229 CHECK(dir); 230 231 struct dirent e; 232 struct dirent* de; 233 while (!readdir_r(dir.get(), &e, &de) && de) { 234 if (strcmp(e.d_name, ".") == 0 || strcmp(e.d_name, "..") == 0) { 235 continue; 236 } 237 238 int fd_num; 239 CHECK(base::StringToInt(e.d_name, &fd_num)); 240 if (fd_num == proc_fd || fd_num == proc_self_fd) { 241 continue; 242 } 243 244 struct stat s; 245 // It's OK to use proc_self_fd here, fstatat won't modify it. 246 CHECK(fstatat(proc_self_fd, e.d_name, &s, 0) == 0); 247 if (S_ISDIR(s.st_mode)) { 248 return true; 249 } 250 } 251 252 // No open unmanaged directories found. 253 return false; 254 } 255 256 bool Credentials::DropAllCapabilities() { 257 ScopedCap cap(cap_init()); 258 CHECK(cap); 259 PCHECK(0 == cap_set_proc(cap.get())); 260 // We never let this function fail. 261 return true; 262 } 263 264 bool Credentials::HasAnyCapability() const { 265 ScopedCap current_cap(cap_get_proc()); 266 CHECK(current_cap); 267 ScopedCap empty_cap(cap_init()); 268 CHECK(empty_cap); 269 return cap_compare(current_cap.get(), empty_cap.get()) != 0; 270 } 271 272 scoped_ptr<std::string> Credentials::GetCurrentCapString() const { 273 ScopedCap current_cap(cap_get_proc()); 274 CHECK(current_cap); 275 ScopedCapText cap_text(cap_to_text(current_cap.get(), NULL)); 276 CHECK(cap_text); 277 return scoped_ptr<std::string> (new std::string(cap_text.get())); 278 } 279 280 // static 281 bool Credentials::SupportsNewUserNS() { 282 // Valgrind will let clone(2) pass-through, but doesn't support unshare(), 283 // so always consider UserNS unsupported there. 284 if (IsRunningOnValgrind()) { 285 return false; 286 } 287 288 // This is roughly a fork(). 289 const pid_t pid = syscall(__NR_clone, CLONE_NEWUSER | SIGCHLD, 0, 0, 0); 290 291 if (pid == -1) { 292 CheckCloneNewUserErrno(errno); 293 return false; 294 } 295 296 // The parent process could have had threads. In the child, these threads 297 // have disappeared. Make sure to not do anything in the child, as this is a 298 // fragile execution environment. 299 if (pid == 0) { 300 _exit(0); 301 } 302 303 // Always reap the child. 304 siginfo_t infop; 305 PCHECK(0 == HANDLE_EINTR(waitid(P_PID, pid, &infop, WEXITED))); 306 307 // clone(2) succeeded, we can use CLONE_NEWUSER. 308 return true; 309 } 310 311 bool Credentials::MoveToNewUserNS() { 312 uid_t uid; 313 gid_t gid; 314 if (!GetRESIds(&uid, &gid)) { 315 // If all the uids (or gids) are not equal to each other, the security 316 // model will most likely confuse the caller, abort. 317 DVLOG(1) << "uids or gids differ!"; 318 return false; 319 } 320 int ret = unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER); 321 if (ret) { 322 const int unshare_errno = errno; 323 VLOG(1) << "Looks like unprivileged CLONE_NEWUSER may not be available " 324 << "on this kernel."; 325 CheckCloneNewUserErrno(unshare_errno); 326 return false; 327 } 328 329 // The current {r,e,s}{u,g}id is now an overflow id (c.f. 330 // /proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid). Setup the uid and gid maps. 331 DCHECK(GetRESIds(NULL, NULL)); 332 const char kGidMapFile[] = "/proc/self/gid_map"; 333 const char kUidMapFile[] = "/proc/self/uid_map"; 334 CHECK(WriteToIdMapFile(kGidMapFile, gid)); 335 CHECK(WriteToIdMapFile(kUidMapFile, uid)); 336 DCHECK(GetRESIds(NULL, NULL)); 337 return true; 338 } 339 340 bool Credentials::DropFileSystemAccess() { 341 // Chrooting to a safe empty dir will only be safe if no directory file 342 // descriptor is available to the process. 343 DCHECK(!HasOpenDirectory(-1)); 344 return ChrootToSafeEmptyDir(); 345 } 346 347 } // namespace sandbox. 348