1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. 2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be 3 // found in the LICENSE file. 4 5 #include "content/common/sandbox_win.h" 6 7 #include <string> 8 9 #include "base/base_switches.h" 10 #include "base/command_line.h" 11 #include "base/debug/profiler.h" 12 #include "base/debug/trace_event.h" 13 #include "base/files/file_util.h" 14 #include "base/hash.h" 15 #include "base/metrics/field_trial.h" 16 #include "base/path_service.h" 17 #include "base/process/launch.h" 18 #include "base/strings/string_util.h" 19 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h" 20 #include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h" 21 #include "base/win/registry.h" 22 #include "base/win/scoped_handle.h" 23 #include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h" 24 #include "base/win/windows_version.h" 25 #include "content/public/common/content_client.h" 26 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h" 27 #include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h" 28 #include "content/public/common/sandboxed_process_launcher_delegate.h" 29 #include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h" 30 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h" 31 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h" 32 #include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h" 33 #include "ui/gfx/win/dpi.h" 34 35 static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL; 36 static sandbox::TargetServices* g_target_services = NULL; 37 38 namespace content { 39 namespace { 40 41 // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes 42 // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short 43 // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension. 44 // For more information about how this list is generated, and how to get off 45 // of it, see: 46 // https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/third-party-developers 47 const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = { 48 L"adialhk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. 49 L"acpiz.dll", // Unknown. 50 L"airfoilinject3.dll", // Airfoil. 51 L"akinsofthook32.dll", // Akinsoft Software Engineering. 52 L"assistant_x64.dll", // Unknown. 53 L"avcuf64.dll", // Bit Defender Internet Security x64. 54 L"avgrsstx.dll", // AVG 8. 55 L"babylonchromepi.dll", // Babylon translator. 56 L"btkeyind.dll", // Widcomm Bluetooth. 57 L"cmcsyshk.dll", // CMC Internet Security. 58 L"cmsetac.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware). 59 L"cooliris.dll", // CoolIris. 60 L"dockshellhook.dll", // Stardock Objectdock. 61 L"easyhook32.dll", // GDIPP and others. 62 L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll", // Google Desktop Search v5. 63 L"fwhook.dll", // PC Tools Firewall Plus. 64 L"hookprocesscreation.dll", // Blumentals Program protector. 65 L"hookterminateapis.dll", // Blumentals and Cyberprinter. 66 L"hookprintapis.dll", // Cyberprinter. 67 L"imon.dll", // NOD32 Antivirus. 68 L"ioloHL.dll", // Iolo (System Mechanic). 69 L"kloehk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. 70 L"lawenforcer.dll", // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro). 71 L"libdivx.dll", // DivX. 72 L"lvprcinj01.dll", // Logitech QuickCam. 73 L"madchook.dll", // Madshi (generic hooking library). 74 L"mdnsnsp.dll", // Bonjour. 75 L"moonsysh.dll", // Moon Secure Antivirus. 76 L"mpk.dll", // KGB Spy. 77 L"npdivx32.dll", // DivX. 78 L"npggNT.des", // GameGuard 2008. 79 L"npggNT.dll", // GameGuard (older). 80 L"oawatch.dll", // Online Armor. 81 L"pavhook.dll", // Panda Internet Security. 82 L"pavlsphook.dll", // Panda Antivirus. 83 L"pavshook.dll", // Panda Antivirus. 84 L"pavshookwow.dll", // Panda Antivirus. 85 L"pctavhook.dll", // PC Tools Antivirus. 86 L"pctgmhk.dll", // PC Tools Spyware Doctor. 87 L"prntrack.dll", // Pharos Systems. 88 L"protector.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware). 89 L"radhslib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter. 90 L"radprlib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter. 91 L"rapportnikko.dll", // Trustware Rapport. 92 L"rlhook.dll", // Trustware Bufferzone. 93 L"rooksdol.dll", // Trustware Rapport. 94 L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer. 95 L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer. 96 L"r3hook.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. 97 L"sahook.dll", // McAfee Site Advisor. 98 L"sbrige.dll", // Unknown. 99 L"sc2hook.dll", // Supercopier 2. 100 L"sdhook32.dll", // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection. 101 L"sguard.dll", // Iolo (System Guard). 102 L"smum32.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 6. 103 L"smumhook.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 5. 104 L"ssldivx.dll", // DivX. 105 L"syncor11.dll", // SynthCore Midi interface. 106 L"systools.dll", // Panda Antivirus. 107 L"tfwah.dll", // Threatfire (PC tools). 108 L"wblind.dll", // Stardock Object desktop. 109 L"wbhelp.dll", // Stardock Object desktop. 110 L"winstylerthemehelper.dll" // Tuneup utilities 2006. 111 }; 112 113 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|. 114 // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also 115 // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders. 116 bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children, 117 sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access, 118 sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { 119 base::FilePath directory; 120 if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory)) 121 return false; 122 123 if (sub_dir) 124 directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir)); 125 126 sandbox::ResultCode result; 127 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access, 128 directory.value().c_str()); 129 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) 130 return false; 131 132 std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\"; 133 if (children) 134 directory_str += L"*"; 135 // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator. 136 137 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access, 138 directory_str.c_str()); 139 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) 140 return false; 141 142 return true; 143 } 144 145 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\* with the semantic |access|. 146 // We need to add the wildcard rules to also apply the rule to the subkeys. 147 bool AddKeyAndSubkeys(std::wstring key, 148 sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access, 149 sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { 150 sandbox::ResultCode result; 151 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access, 152 key.c_str()); 153 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) 154 return false; 155 156 key += L"\\*"; 157 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access, 158 key.c_str()); 159 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) 160 return false; 161 162 return true; 163 } 164 165 // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|. 166 bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) { 167 wchar_t path[MAX_PATH]; 168 DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path)); 169 if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) { 170 // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway. 171 return false; 172 } 173 if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path))) 174 return false; 175 base::FilePath fname(path); 176 return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name); 177 } 178 179 // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist. 180 // If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll 181 // is also loaded in this process. 182 void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name, 183 bool check_in_browser, 184 sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { 185 HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL; 186 if (!module) { 187 // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check 188 // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes 189 // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'. 190 std::wstring name(module_name); 191 size_t period = name.rfind(L'.'); 192 DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period); 193 DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period)); 194 if (period <= 8) 195 return; 196 for (int ix = 0; ix < 3; ++ix) { 197 const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ('1' + ix), 0}; 198 std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix; 199 alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size()); 200 if (check_in_browser) { 201 module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str()); 202 if (!module) 203 return; 204 // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we 205 // want to make sure it is the right one. 206 if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name)) 207 return; 208 } 209 // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy. 210 policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str()); 211 } 212 } 213 policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name); 214 DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name; 215 return; 216 } 217 218 // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash. 219 // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module 220 // does not get a chance to execute any code. 221 void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { 222 for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix) 223 BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy); 224 } 225 226 // Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session. 227 base::string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const base::char16* object) { 228 // Cache this because it can't change after process creation. 229 static uintptr_t s_session_id = 0; 230 if (s_session_id == 0) { 231 HANDLE token; 232 DWORD session_id_length; 233 DWORD session_id = 0; 234 235 CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token)); 236 CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id, 237 sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length)); 238 CloseHandle(token); 239 if (session_id) 240 s_session_id = session_id; 241 } 242 243 return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%d%ls", s_session_id, object); 244 } 245 246 // Checks if the sandbox should be let to run without a job object assigned. 247 bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line) { 248 if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) 249 return true; 250 251 // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other 252 // job. 253 if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8) 254 return true; 255 256 BOOL in_job = true; 257 // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job, 258 if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job)) 259 NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError(); 260 if (!in_job) 261 return true; 262 263 // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set. 264 JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {0}; 265 if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL, 266 JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info, 267 sizeof(job_info), NULL)) { 268 NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError(); 269 return true; 270 } 271 if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK) 272 return true; 273 274 return false; 275 } 276 277 // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy. 278 bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { 279 sandbox::ResultCode result; 280 281 // Renderers need to copy sections for plugin DIBs and GPU. 282 // GPU needs to copy sections to renderers. 283 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES, 284 sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY, 285 L"Section"); 286 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) 287 return false; 288 289 // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file 290 // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with 291 // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services. 292 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, 293 sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, 294 L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*"); 295 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) 296 return false; 297 298 // Add the policy for the server side of nacl pipe. It is just a file 299 // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with 300 // "chrome.nacl" so the sandboxed process cannot connect to 301 // system services. 302 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, 303 sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, 304 L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*"); 305 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) 306 return false; 307 308 // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have 309 // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix. 310 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, 311 sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, 312 L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*"); 313 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) 314 return false; 315 316 // Add the policy for debug message only in debug 317 #ifndef NDEBUG 318 base::FilePath app_dir; 319 if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir)) 320 return false; 321 322 wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH]; 323 DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(), 324 long_path_buf, 325 MAX_PATH); 326 if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH) 327 return false; 328 329 base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf); 330 debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe"); 331 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS, 332 sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC, 333 debug_message.value().c_str()); 334 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) 335 return false; 336 #endif // NDEBUG 337 338 AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy); 339 return true; 340 } 341 342 bool AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { 343 sandbox::ResultCode result; 344 // Renderers need to share events with plugins. 345 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES, 346 sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY, 347 L"Event"); 348 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) 349 return false; 350 351 // Win8+ adds a device DeviceApi that we don't need. 352 if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_WIN7) 353 result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"File", L"\\Device\\DeviceApi"); 354 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) 355 return false; 356 357 // Close the proxy settings on XP. 358 if (base::win::GetVersion() <= base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003) 359 result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Key", 360 L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\" \ 361 L"CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings"); 362 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) 363 return false; 364 365 366 sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED; 367 if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) { 368 // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main 369 // token is restricted. 370 initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS; 371 } 372 373 policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN); 374 // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes. 375 policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED); 376 policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW); 377 378 if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != policy->SetAlternateDesktop(true)) { 379 DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer"; 380 } 381 382 return true; 383 } 384 385 // Updates the command line arguments with debug-related flags. If debug flags 386 // have been used with this process, they will be filtered and added to 387 // command_line as needed. 388 void ProcessDebugFlags(base::CommandLine* command_line) { 389 const base::CommandLine& current_cmd_line = 390 *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(); 391 std::string type = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType); 392 if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) { 393 // Look to pass-on the kWaitForDebugger flag. 394 std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII( 395 switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren); 396 if (value.empty() || value == type) { 397 command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger); 398 } 399 command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren, value); 400 } 401 } 402 403 // This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of 404 // DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes. 405 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD 406 base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle; 407 408 typedef BOOL (WINAPI *DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr)(HANDLE source_process_handle, 409 HANDLE source_handle, 410 HANDLE target_process_handle, 411 LPHANDLE target_handle, 412 DWORD desired_access, 413 BOOL inherit_handle, 414 DWORD options); 415 416 DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle; 417 418 NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL; 419 420 static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning = 421 "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed" 422 " process.\n Please use the sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle API or" 423 " contact security (at) chromium.org for assistance."; 424 425 void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) { 426 // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14). 427 BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)]; 428 OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info = 429 reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer); 430 ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t); 431 NTSTATUS error; 432 error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size); 433 CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error)); 434 type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0'; 435 436 // Get the object basic information. 437 OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info; 438 size = sizeof(basic_info); 439 error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size, 440 &size); 441 CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error)); 442 443 CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) << 444 kDuplicateHandleWarning; 445 446 if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) { 447 const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask = 448 ~static_cast<DWORD>(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | SYNCHRONIZE); 449 CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) << 450 kDuplicateHandleWarning; 451 } 452 } 453 454 BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle, 455 HANDLE source_handle, 456 HANDLE target_process_handle, 457 LPHANDLE target_handle, 458 DWORD desired_access, 459 BOOL inherit_handle, 460 DWORD options) { 461 // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask. 462 if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle, 463 target_process_handle, target_handle, 464 desired_access, inherit_handle, options)) 465 return FALSE; 466 467 // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries. 468 if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle || 469 target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess()) 470 return TRUE; 471 472 // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them. 473 BOOL is_in_job = FALSE; 474 if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) { 475 // We need a handle with permission to check the job object. 476 if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) { 477 HANDLE temp_handle; 478 CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(), 479 target_process_handle, 480 ::GetCurrentProcess(), 481 &temp_handle, 482 PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, 483 FALSE, 0)); 484 base::win::ScopedHandle process(temp_handle); 485 CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process.Get(), NULL, &is_in_job)); 486 } 487 } 488 489 if (is_in_job) { 490 // We never allow inheritable child handles. 491 CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning; 492 493 // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions. 494 HANDLE temp_handle; 495 CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle, 496 ::GetCurrentProcess(), &temp_handle, 497 0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)); 498 base::win::ScopedHandle handle(temp_handle); 499 500 // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack. 501 CheckDuplicateHandle(handle.Get()); 502 } 503 504 return TRUE; 505 } 506 #endif 507 508 } // namespace 509 510 void SetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line, 511 sandbox::JobLevel job_level, 512 uint32 ui_exceptions, 513 sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { 514 if (ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line)) { 515 #ifdef _WIN64 516 policy->SetJobMemoryLimit(4ULL * 1024 * 1024 * 1024); 517 #endif 518 policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions); 519 } else { 520 policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0); 521 } 522 } 523 524 // TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper. 525 // Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first. 526 void AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { 527 // TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy. 528 base::string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath( 529 L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters"); 530 policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data()); 531 } 532 533 bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) { 534 // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread()); 535 // See <http://b/1287166>. 536 DCHECK(broker_services); 537 DCHECK(!g_broker_services); 538 sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init(); 539 g_broker_services = broker_services; 540 541 // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle. 542 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD 543 BOOL is_in_job = FALSE; 544 CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job)); 545 // In a Syzygy-profiled binary, instrumented for import profiling, this 546 // patch will end in infinite recursion on the attempted delegation to the 547 // original function. 548 if (!base::debug::IsBinaryInstrumented() && 549 !is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) { 550 HMODULE module = NULL; 551 wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH]; 552 CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS, 553 reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices), 554 &module)); 555 DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH); 556 if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) { 557 ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject); 558 result = g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch( 559 module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle", 560 DuplicateHandlePatch); 561 CHECK(result == 0); 562 g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle = 563 reinterpret_cast<DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr>( 564 g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.original_function()); 565 } 566 } 567 #endif 568 569 return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result; 570 } 571 572 bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) { 573 DCHECK(target_services); 574 DCHECK(!g_target_services); 575 sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init(); 576 g_target_services = target_services; 577 return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result; 578 } 579 580 bool ShouldUseDirectWrite() { 581 // If the flag is currently on, and we're on Win7 or above, we enable 582 // DirectWrite. Skia does not require the additions to DirectWrite in QFE 583 // 2670838, but a simple 'better than XP' check is not enough. 584 if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN7) 585 return false; 586 587 base::win::OSInfo::VersionNumber os_version = 588 base::win::OSInfo::GetInstance()->version_number(); 589 if ((os_version.major == 6) && (os_version.minor == 1)) { 590 // We can't use DirectWrite for pre-release versions of Windows 7. 591 if (os_version.build < 7600) 592 return false; 593 } 594 595 // If forced off, don't use it. 596 const base::CommandLine& command_line = 597 *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(); 598 if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableDirectWrite)) 599 return false; 600 601 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64) 602 // Can't use GDI on HiDPI. 603 if (gfx::GetDPIScale() > 1.0f) 604 return true; 605 #endif 606 607 // We have logic in renderer_font_platform_win.cc for falling back to safe 608 // font list if machine has more than 1750 fonts installed. Users have 609 // complained about this as safe font list is usually not sufficient. 610 // We now disable direct write (gdi) if we encounter more number 611 // of fonts than a threshold (currently 1750). 612 // Refer: crbug.com/421305 613 const wchar_t kWindowsFontsRegistryKey[] = 614 L"SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Fonts"; 615 base::win::RegistryValueIterator reg_iterator(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, 616 kWindowsFontsRegistryKey); 617 const DWORD kMaxAllowedFontsBeforeFallbackToGDI = 1750; 618 if (reg_iterator.ValueCount() >= kMaxAllowedFontsBeforeFallbackToGDI) 619 return false; 620 621 // Otherwise, check the field trial. 622 const std::string group_name = 623 base::FieldTrialList::FindFullName("DirectWrite"); 624 return group_name != "Disabled"; 625 } 626 627 base::ProcessHandle StartSandboxedProcess( 628 SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate* delegate, 629 base::CommandLine* cmd_line) { 630 const base::CommandLine& browser_command_line = 631 *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(); 632 std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType); 633 634 TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str); 635 636 // Propagate the --allow-no-job flag if present. 637 if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob) && 638 !cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) { 639 cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob); 640 } 641 642 ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line); 643 644 // Prefetch hints on windows: 645 // Using a different prefetch profile per process type will allow Windows 646 // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc. 647 cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", base::Hash(type_str))); 648 649 if ((delegate && !delegate->ShouldSandbox()) || 650 browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) || 651 cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) { 652 base::ProcessHandle process = 0; 653 base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions(), &process); 654 g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(process); 655 return process; 656 } 657 658 sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy(); 659 660 sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE | 661 sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR | 662 sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP | 663 sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK | 664 sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP; 665 666 if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8 && 667 type_str == switches::kRendererProcess && 668 browser_command_line.HasSwitch( 669 switches::kEnableWin32kRendererLockDown)) { 670 if (policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN, 671 sandbox::TargetPolicy::FAKE_USER_GDI_INIT, 672 NULL) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) { 673 return 0; 674 } 675 mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE; 676 } 677 678 if (policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) 679 return 0; 680 681 mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS | 682 sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER; 683 684 if (policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) 685 return 0; 686 687 SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy); 688 689 bool disable_default_policy = false; 690 base::FilePath exposed_dir; 691 if (delegate) 692 delegate->PreSandbox(&disable_default_policy, &exposed_dir); 693 694 if (!disable_default_policy && !AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy)) 695 return 0; 696 697 if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) { 698 if (ShouldUseDirectWrite()) { 699 AddDirectory(base::DIR_WINDOWS_FONTS, 700 NULL, 701 true, 702 sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, 703 policy); 704 } 705 } else { 706 // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into 707 // this subprocess. See 708 // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580 709 cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer "); 710 } 711 712 sandbox::ResultCode result; 713 if (!exposed_dir.empty()) { 714 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, 715 sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, 716 exposed_dir.value().c_str()); 717 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) 718 return 0; 719 720 base::FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*"); 721 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, 722 sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, 723 exposed_files.value().c_str()); 724 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) 725 return 0; 726 } 727 728 if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) { 729 NOTREACHED(); 730 return 0; 731 } 732 733 if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLogging)) { 734 // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will 735 // have no effect. 736 policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE)); 737 policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE)); 738 } 739 740 if (delegate) { 741 bool success = true; 742 delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy, &success); 743 if (!success) 744 return 0; 745 } 746 747 TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0); 748 749 PROCESS_INFORMATION temp_process_info = {}; 750 result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget( 751 cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(), 752 cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(), 753 policy, &temp_process_info); 754 policy->Release(); 755 base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target(temp_process_info); 756 757 TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0); 758 759 if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) { 760 if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC) 761 DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process"; 762 else 763 DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result; 764 return 0; 765 } 766 767 if (delegate) 768 delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle()); 769 770 ResumeThread(target.thread_handle()); 771 TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str); 772 return target.TakeProcessHandle(); 773 } 774 775 bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle, 776 DWORD target_process_id, 777 HANDLE* target_handle, 778 DWORD desired_access, 779 DWORD options) { 780 // If our process is the target just duplicate the handle. 781 if (::GetCurrentProcessId() == target_process_id) { 782 return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle, 783 ::GetCurrentProcess(), target_handle, 784 desired_access, FALSE, options); 785 786 } 787 788 // Try the broker next 789 if (g_target_services && 790 g_target_services->DuplicateHandle(source_handle, target_process_id, 791 target_handle, desired_access, 792 options) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) { 793 return true; 794 } 795 796 // Finally, see if we already have access to the process. 797 base::win::ScopedHandle target_process; 798 target_process.Set(::OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE, 799 target_process_id)); 800 if (target_process.IsValid()) { 801 return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle, 802 target_process.Get(), target_handle, 803 desired_access, FALSE, options); 804 } 805 806 return false; 807 } 808 809 bool BrokerAddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) { 810 return g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(peer_process) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK; 811 } 812 813 } // namespace content 814
