1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core (at) openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112 #include <stdio.h> 113 #include <openssl/objects.h> 114 #include <openssl/evp.h> 115 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h> 117 #include <openssl/rand.h> 118 #include "ssl_locl.h" 119 120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 121 122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, 124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 125 SSL_SESSION **psess); 126 #endif 127 128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ 129 tls1_enc, 130 tls1_mac, 131 tls1_setup_key_block, 132 tls1_generate_master_secret, 133 tls1_change_cipher_state, 134 tls1_final_finish_mac, 135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 136 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 139 tls1_alert_code, 140 tls1_export_keying_material, 141 }; 142 143 long tls1_default_timeout(void) 144 { 145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec 146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */ 147 return(60*60*2); 148 } 149 150 int tls1_new(SSL *s) 151 { 152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0); 153 s->method->ssl_clear(s); 154 return(1); 155 } 156 157 void tls1_free(SSL *s) 158 { 159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) 161 { 162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); 163 } 164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ 165 ssl3_free(s); 166 } 167 168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s) 169 { 170 ssl3_clear(s); 171 s->version = s->method->version; 172 } 173 174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 175 176 static int nid_list[] = 177 { 178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ 203 }; 204 205 static int pref_list[] = 206 { 207 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 208 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 209 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 210 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 211 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 212 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 213 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 214 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 215 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 216 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 217 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 220 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 221 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 222 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 223 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 224 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 225 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 229 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 230 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 231 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 232 }; 233 234 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) 235 { 236 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ 237 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > 238 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))) 239 return 0; 240 return nid_list[curve_id-1]; 241 } 242 243 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) 244 { 245 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ 246 switch (nid) 247 { 248 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 249 return 1; 250 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 251 return 2; 252 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 253 return 3; 254 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 255 return 4; 256 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 257 return 5; 258 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 259 return 6; 260 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 261 return 7; 262 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 263 return 8; 264 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 265 return 9; 266 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 267 return 10; 268 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 269 return 11; 270 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 271 return 12; 272 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 273 return 13; 274 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 275 return 14; 276 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 277 return 15; 278 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 279 return 16; 280 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 281 return 17; 282 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 283 return 18; 284 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 285 return 19; 286 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 287 return 20; 288 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 289 return 21; 290 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 291 return 22; 292 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 293 return 23; 294 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 295 return 24; 296 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 297 return 25; 298 default: 299 return 0; 300 } 301 } 302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 303 304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 305 306 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this 307 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. 308 */ 309 310 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 311 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ 312 #else 313 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, 314 #endif 315 316 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 317 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ 318 #else 319 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, 320 #endif 321 322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 323 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */ 324 #else 325 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, 326 #endif 327 328 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ 329 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ 330 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ 331 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 332 333 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { 334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) 336 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 337 #endif 338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 340 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) 341 #endif 342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) 344 #endif 345 }; 346 347 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) 348 { 349 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 350 if (p) 351 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen); 352 return (int)slen; 353 } 354 355 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit) 356 { 357 int extdatalen=0; 358 unsigned char *orig = buf; 359 unsigned char *ret = buf; 360 361 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ 362 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION 363 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 364 return orig; 365 366 ret+=2; 367 368 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 369 370 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 371 { 372 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ 373 unsigned long size_str; 374 long lenmax; 375 376 /* check for enough space. 377 4 for the servername type and entension length 378 2 for servernamelist length 379 1 for the hostname type 380 2 for hostname length 381 + hostname length 382 */ 383 384 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 385 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 386 return NULL; 387 388 /* extension type and length */ 389 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 390 s2n(size_str+5,ret); 391 392 /* length of servername list */ 393 s2n(size_str+3,ret); 394 395 /* hostname type, length and hostname */ 396 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; 397 s2n(size_str,ret); 398 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); 399 ret+=size_str; 400 } 401 402 /* Add RI if renegotiating */ 403 if (s->renegotiate) 404 { 405 int el; 406 407 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 408 { 409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 410 return NULL; 411 } 412 413 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 414 415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 416 s2n(el,ret); 417 418 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 419 { 420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 421 return NULL; 422 } 423 424 ret += el; 425 } 426 427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 428 /* Add SRP username if there is one */ 429 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 430 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */ 431 432 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); 433 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) 434 { 435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 436 return NULL; 437 } 438 439 /* check for enough space. 440 4 for the srp type type and entension length 441 1 for the srp user identity 442 + srp user identity length 443 */ 444 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL; 445 446 /* fill in the extension */ 447 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret); 448 s2n(login_len+1,ret); 449 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len; 450 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); 451 ret+=login_len; 452 } 453 #endif 454 455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 456 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 457 { 458 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ 459 long lenmax; 460 461 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 462 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 463 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) 464 { 465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 466 return NULL; 467 } 468 469 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 470 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); 471 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 472 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 473 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 474 } 475 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) 476 { 477 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ 478 long lenmax; 479 480 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; 481 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 482 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) 483 { 484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 485 return NULL; 486 } 487 488 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret); 489 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); 490 491 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for 492 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes. 493 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html 494 * resolves this to two bytes. 495 */ 496 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); 497 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 498 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 499 } 500 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 501 502 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 503 { 504 int ticklen; 505 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) 506 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; 507 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 508 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) 509 { 510 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; 511 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 512 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) 513 return NULL; 514 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, 515 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, 516 ticklen); 517 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; 518 } 519 else 520 ticklen = 0; 521 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 522 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) 523 goto skip_ext; 524 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len 525 * rest for ticket 526 */ 527 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL; 528 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 529 s2n(ticklen,ret); 530 if (ticklen) 531 { 532 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); 533 ret += ticklen; 534 } 535 } 536 skip_ext: 537 538 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 539 { 540 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6) 541 return NULL; 542 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret); 543 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret); 544 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret); 545 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs)); 546 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 547 } 548 549 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 550 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 551 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 552 { 553 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; 554 555 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) 556 return NULL; 557 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 558 return NULL; 559 560 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 561 s2n(col + 2, ret); 562 s2n(col, ret); 563 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); 564 ret += col; 565 } 566 #endif 567 568 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && 569 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 570 { 571 int i; 572 long extlen, idlen, itmp; 573 OCSP_RESPID *id; 574 575 idlen = 0; 576 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) 577 { 578 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 579 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); 580 if (itmp <= 0) 581 return NULL; 582 idlen += itmp + 2; 583 } 584 585 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) 586 { 587 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); 588 if (extlen < 0) 589 return NULL; 590 } 591 else 592 extlen = 0; 593 594 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL; 595 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 596 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) 597 return NULL; 598 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); 599 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; 600 s2n(idlen, ret); 601 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) 602 { 603 /* save position of id len */ 604 unsigned char *q = ret; 605 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 606 /* skip over id len */ 607 ret += 2; 608 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); 609 /* write id len */ 610 s2n(itmp, q); 611 } 612 s2n(extlen, ret); 613 if (extlen > 0) 614 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); 615 } 616 617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 618 /* Add Heartbeat extension */ 619 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) 620 return NULL; 621 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); 622 s2n(1,ret); 623 /* Set mode: 624 * 1: peer may send requests 625 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 626 */ 627 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 628 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 629 else 630 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 631 #endif 632 633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 634 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) 635 { 636 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its 637 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */ 638 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) 639 return NULL; 640 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); 641 s2n(0,ret); 642 } 643 #endif 644 645 if (s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled) 646 { 647 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its 648 * support for Channel ID. */ 649 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) 650 return NULL; 651 if (s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new) 652 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new,ret); 653 else 654 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret); 655 s2n(0,ret); 656 } 657 658 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) 659 { 660 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len) 661 return NULL; 662 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret); 663 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret); 664 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret); 665 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, 666 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len); 667 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len; 668 } 669 670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 671 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) 672 { 673 int el; 674 675 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 676 677 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 678 679 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); 680 s2n(el,ret); 681 682 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 683 { 684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 685 return NULL; 686 } 687 ret += el; 688 } 689 #endif 690 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. 691 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 692 * 693 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing 694 * extensions it MUST always appear last. 695 */ 696 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) 697 { 698 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 699 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages 700 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while 701 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not. 702 */ 703 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) 704 hlen -= 5; 705 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) 706 { 707 hlen = 0x200 - hlen; 708 if (hlen >= 4) 709 hlen -= 4; 710 else 711 hlen = 0; 712 713 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); 714 s2n(hlen, ret); 715 memset(ret, 0, hlen); 716 ret += hlen; 717 } 718 } 719 720 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0) 721 return orig; 722 723 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 724 return ret; 725 } 726 727 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit) 728 { 729 int extdatalen=0; 730 unsigned char *orig = buf; 731 unsigned char *ret = buf; 732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 733 int next_proto_neg_seen; 734 #endif 735 736 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ 737 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 738 return orig; 739 740 ret+=2; 741 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 742 743 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 744 { 745 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 746 747 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 748 s2n(0,ret); 749 } 750 751 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding) 752 { 753 int el; 754 755 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 756 { 757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 758 return NULL; 759 } 760 761 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 762 763 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 764 s2n(el,ret); 765 766 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 767 { 768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 769 return NULL; 770 } 771 772 ret += el; 773 } 774 775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 776 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 777 { 778 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ 779 long lenmax; 780 781 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 782 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 783 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) 784 { 785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 786 return NULL; 787 } 788 789 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 790 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); 791 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 792 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 793 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 794 795 } 796 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */ 797 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 798 799 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected 800 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 801 { 802 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 803 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 804 s2n(0,ret); 805 } 806 807 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 808 { 809 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 810 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret); 811 s2n(0,ret); 812 } 813 814 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 815 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 816 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 817 { 818 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 819 820 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) 821 return NULL; 822 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 823 return NULL; 824 825 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 826 s2n(sol + 2, ret); 827 s2n(sol, ret); 828 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); 829 ret += sol; 830 } 831 #endif 832 833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 834 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) 835 { 836 int el; 837 838 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 839 840 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 841 842 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); 843 s2n(el,ret); 844 845 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 846 { 847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 848 return NULL; 849 } 850 ret+=el; 851 } 852 #endif 853 854 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) 855 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) 856 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 857 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/ 858 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/ 859 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 860 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 861 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 862 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17}; 863 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL; 864 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36); 865 ret+=36; 866 867 } 868 869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 870 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ 871 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) 872 { 873 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) 874 return NULL; 875 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); 876 s2n(1,ret); 877 /* Set mode: 878 * 1: peer may send requests 879 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 880 */ 881 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 882 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 883 else 884 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 885 886 } 887 #endif 888 889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 890 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; 891 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 892 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) 893 { 894 const unsigned char *npa; 895 unsigned int npalen; 896 int r; 897 898 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); 899 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) 900 { 901 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL; 902 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); 903 s2n(npalen,ret); 904 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); 905 ret += npalen; 906 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 907 } 908 } 909 #endif 910 911 /* If the client advertised support for Channel ID, and we have it 912 * enabled, then we want to echo it back. */ 913 if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) 914 { 915 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) 916 return NULL; 917 if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) 918 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new,ret); 919 else 920 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret); 921 s2n(0,ret); 922 } 923 924 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) 925 { 926 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected; 927 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; 928 929 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0) 930 return NULL; 931 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret); 932 s2n(3 + len,ret); 933 s2n(1 + len,ret); 934 *ret++ = len; 935 memcpy(ret, selected, len); 936 ret += len; 937 } 938 939 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0) 940 return orig; 941 942 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 943 return ret; 944 } 945 946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 947 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X 948 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. 949 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: 950 * SNI, 951 * elliptic_curves 952 * ec_point_formats 953 * 954 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, 955 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. 956 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from 957 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). 958 */ 959 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) { 960 unsigned short type, size; 961 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 962 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 963 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ 964 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ 965 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ 966 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ 967 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ 968 969 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ 970 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 971 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 972 0x00, /* uncompressed */ 973 }; 974 975 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 976 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { 977 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 978 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 979 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ 980 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ 981 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ 982 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ 983 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ 984 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ 985 }; 986 987 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 988 return; 989 data += 2; 990 991 if (data > (d+n-4)) 992 return; 993 n2s(data,type); 994 n2s(data,size); 995 996 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 997 return; 998 999 if (data+size > d+n) 1000 return; 1001 data += size; 1002 1003 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 1004 { 1005 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 1006 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); 1007 1008 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n) 1009 return; 1010 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) 1011 return; 1012 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) 1013 return; 1014 } 1015 else 1016 { 1017 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 1018 1019 if (data + len != d+n) 1020 return; 1021 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) 1022 return; 1023 } 1024 1025 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; 1026 } 1027 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1028 1029 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a 1030 * ClientHello. 1031 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length. 1032 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data| 1033 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero 1034 * return. 1035 * 1036 * returns: 0 on success. */ 1037 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 1038 unsigned data_len, int *al) 1039 { 1040 unsigned i; 1041 unsigned proto_len; 1042 const unsigned char *selected; 1043 unsigned char selected_len; 1044 int r; 1045 1046 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL) 1047 return 0; 1048 1049 if (data_len < 2) 1050 goto parse_error; 1051 1052 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit, 1053 * length-prefixed strings. */ 1054 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 | 1055 ((unsigned) data[1]); 1056 data_len -= 2; 1057 data += 2; 1058 if (data_len != i) 1059 goto parse_error; 1060 1061 if (data_len < 2) 1062 goto parse_error; 1063 1064 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) 1065 { 1066 proto_len = data[i]; 1067 i++; 1068 1069 if (proto_len == 0) 1070 goto parse_error; 1071 1072 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len) 1073 goto parse_error; 1074 1075 i += proto_len; 1076 } 1077 1078 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len, 1079 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); 1080 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 1081 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) 1082 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 1083 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 1084 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) 1085 { 1086 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1087 return -1; 1088 } 1089 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len); 1090 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; 1091 } 1092 return 0; 1093 1094 parse_error: 1095 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1096 return -1; 1097 } 1098 1099 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 1100 { 1101 unsigned short type; 1102 unsigned short size; 1103 unsigned short len; 1104 unsigned char *data = *p; 1105 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 1106 int sigalg_seen = 0; 1107 1108 s->servername_done = 0; 1109 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 1110 1111 /* Reset TLS 1.2 digest functions to defaults because they don't carry 1112 * over to a renegotiation. */ 1113 s->s3->digest_rsa = NULL; 1114 s->s3->digest_dsa = NULL; 1115 s->s3->digest_ecdsa = NULL; 1116 1117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1118 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1119 #endif 1120 1121 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) 1122 { 1123 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 1124 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; 1125 } 1126 1127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1128 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 1129 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 1130 #endif 1131 1132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1133 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) 1134 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n); 1135 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1136 1137 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 1138 goto ri_check; 1139 n2s(data,len); 1140 1141 if (data > (d+n-len)) 1142 goto ri_check; 1143 1144 while (data <= (d+n-4)) 1145 { 1146 n2s(data,type); 1147 n2s(data,size); 1148 1149 if (data+size > (d+n)) 1150 goto ri_check; 1151 #if 0 1152 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size); 1153 #endif 1154 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1155 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, 1156 s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1157 /* The servername extension is treated as follows: 1158 1159 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 1160 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 1161 in which case an fatal alert is generated. 1162 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 1163 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 1164 to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 1165 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 1166 it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 1167 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 1168 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 1169 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 1170 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 1171 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 1172 the value of the Host: field. 1173 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 1174 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, 1175 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. 1176 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 1177 1178 */ 1179 1180 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1181 { 1182 unsigned char *sdata; 1183 int servname_type; 1184 int dsize; 1185 1186 if (size < 2) 1187 { 1188 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1189 return 0; 1190 } 1191 n2s(data,dsize); 1192 size -= 2; 1193 if (dsize > size ) 1194 { 1195 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1196 return 0; 1197 } 1198 1199 sdata = data; 1200 while (dsize > 3) 1201 { 1202 servname_type = *(sdata++); 1203 n2s(sdata,len); 1204 dsize -= 3; 1205 1206 if (len > dsize) 1207 { 1208 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1209 return 0; 1210 } 1211 if (s->servername_done == 0) 1212 switch (servname_type) 1213 { 1214 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: 1215 if (!s->hit) 1216 { 1217 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname) 1218 { 1219 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1220 return 0; 1221 } 1222 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) 1223 { 1224 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1225 return 0; 1226 } 1227 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) 1228 { 1229 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1230 return 0; 1231 } 1232 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); 1233 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0'; 1234 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { 1235 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); 1236 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 1237 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1238 return 0; 1239 } 1240 s->servername_done = 1; 1241 1242 } 1243 else 1244 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname 1245 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 1246 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; 1247 1248 break; 1249 1250 default: 1251 break; 1252 } 1253 1254 dsize -= len; 1255 } 1256 if (dsize != 0) 1257 { 1258 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1259 return 0; 1260 } 1261 1262 } 1263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1264 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) 1265 { 1266 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1)) 1267 { 1268 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1269 return 0; 1270 } 1271 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 1272 { 1273 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1274 return 0; 1275 } 1276 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) 1277 return -1; 1278 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); 1279 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0'; 1280 1281 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) 1282 { 1283 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1284 return 0; 1285 } 1286 } 1287 #endif 1288 1289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1290 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) 1291 { 1292 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1293 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1294 1295 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) 1296 { 1297 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1298 return 0; 1299 } 1300 if (!s->hit) 1301 { 1302 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) 1303 { 1304 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1305 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; 1306 } 1307 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1308 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) 1309 { 1310 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1311 return 0; 1312 } 1313 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; 1314 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); 1315 } 1316 #if 0 1317 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 1318 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1319 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1320 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1321 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1322 #endif 1323 } 1324 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) 1325 { 1326 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1327 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); 1328 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); 1329 1330 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || 1331 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1) 1332 { 1333 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1334 return 0; 1335 } 1336 if (!s->hit) 1337 { 1338 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) 1339 { 1340 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1341 return 0; 1342 } 1343 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1344 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) 1345 { 1346 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1347 return 0; 1348 } 1349 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; 1350 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); 1351 } 1352 #if 0 1353 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 1354 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 1355 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) 1356 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1357 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1358 #endif 1359 } 1360 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1361 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1362 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1363 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1364 { 1365 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1366 1367 if (size < 2) 1368 { 1369 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1370 return 0; 1371 } 1372 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 1373 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) 1374 { 1375 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1376 return 0; 1377 } 1378 1379 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1380 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1381 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1382 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1383 else 1384 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 1385 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1386 { 1387 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1388 return 0; 1389 } 1390 } 1391 #endif 1392 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1393 { 1394 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1395 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1396 { 1397 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1398 return 0; 1399 } 1400 } 1401 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 1402 { 1403 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1404 return 0; 1405 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1406 } 1407 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) 1408 { 1409 int dsize; 1410 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) 1411 { 1412 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1413 return 0; 1414 } 1415 sigalg_seen = 1; 1416 n2s(data,dsize); 1417 size -= 2; 1418 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) 1419 { 1420 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1421 return 0; 1422 } 1423 tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize); 1424 } 1425 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1426 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1427 { 1428 1429 if (size < 5) 1430 { 1431 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1432 return 0; 1433 } 1434 1435 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; 1436 size--; 1437 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) 1438 { 1439 const unsigned char *sdata; 1440 int dsize; 1441 /* Read in responder_id_list */ 1442 n2s(data,dsize); 1443 size -= 2; 1444 if (dsize > size ) 1445 { 1446 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1447 return 0; 1448 } 1449 while (dsize > 0) 1450 { 1451 OCSP_RESPID *id; 1452 int idsize; 1453 if (dsize < 4) 1454 { 1455 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1456 return 0; 1457 } 1458 n2s(data, idsize); 1459 dsize -= 2 + idsize; 1460 size -= 2 + idsize; 1461 if (dsize < 0) 1462 { 1463 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1464 return 0; 1465 } 1466 sdata = data; 1467 data += idsize; 1468 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, 1469 &sdata, idsize); 1470 if (!id) 1471 { 1472 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1473 return 0; 1474 } 1475 if (data != sdata) 1476 { 1477 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1478 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1479 return 0; 1480 } 1481 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids 1482 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = 1483 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) 1484 { 1485 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1486 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1487 return 0; 1488 } 1489 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push( 1490 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) 1491 { 1492 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1493 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1494 return 0; 1495 } 1496 } 1497 1498 /* Read in request_extensions */ 1499 if (size < 2) 1500 { 1501 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1502 return 0; 1503 } 1504 n2s(data,dsize); 1505 size -= 2; 1506 if (dsize != size) 1507 { 1508 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1509 return 0; 1510 } 1511 sdata = data; 1512 if (dsize > 0) 1513 { 1514 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) 1515 { 1516 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, 1517 X509_EXTENSION_free); 1518 } 1519 1520 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = 1521 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, 1522 &sdata, dsize); 1523 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts 1524 || (data + dsize != sdata)) 1525 { 1526 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1527 return 0; 1528 } 1529 } 1530 } 1531 /* We don't know what to do with any other type 1532 * so ignore it. 1533 */ 1534 else 1535 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 1536 } 1537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1538 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) 1539 { 1540 switch(data[0]) 1541 { 1542 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ 1543 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1544 break; 1545 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ 1546 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1547 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1548 break; 1549 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1550 return 0; 1551 } 1552 } 1553 #endif 1554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1555 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1556 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 && 1557 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) 1558 { 1559 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a 1560 * renegotiation. 1561 * 1562 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we 1563 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on 1564 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when 1565 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an 1566 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing 1567 * anything like that, but this might change). 1568 1569 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake 1570 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > 1571 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen 1572 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new 1573 * Finished message could have been computed.) */ 1574 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1575 } 1576 #endif 1577 1578 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id && s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled) 1579 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1; 1580 1581 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new && 1582 s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled) 1583 { 1584 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1; 1585 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1; 1586 } 1587 1588 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation && 1589 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && 1590 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) 1591 { 1592 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0) 1593 return 0; 1594 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ 1595 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1596 } 1597 1598 /* session ticket processed earlier */ 1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1600 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) 1601 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) 1602 { 1603 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, 1604 al)) 1605 return 0; 1606 } 1607 #endif 1608 1609 data+=size; 1610 } 1611 1612 *p = data; 1613 1614 ri_check: 1615 1616 /* Need RI if renegotiating */ 1617 1618 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && 1619 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1620 { 1621 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1623 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1624 return 0; 1625 } 1626 1627 return 1; 1628 } 1629 1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1631 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No 1632 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill 1633 * the length of the block. */ 1634 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) 1635 { 1636 unsigned int off = 0; 1637 1638 while (off < len) 1639 { 1640 if (d[off] == 0) 1641 return 0; 1642 off += d[off]; 1643 off++; 1644 } 1645 1646 return off == len; 1647 } 1648 #endif 1649 1650 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 1651 { 1652 unsigned short length; 1653 unsigned short type; 1654 unsigned short size; 1655 unsigned char *data = *p; 1656 int tlsext_servername = 0; 1657 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 1658 1659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1660 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1661 #endif 1662 1663 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) 1664 { 1665 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 1666 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; 1667 } 1668 1669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1670 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 1671 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 1672 #endif 1673 1674 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 1675 goto ri_check; 1676 1677 n2s(data,length); 1678 if (data+length != d+n) 1679 { 1680 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1681 return 0; 1682 } 1683 1684 while(data <= (d+n-4)) 1685 { 1686 n2s(data,type); 1687 n2s(data,size); 1688 1689 if (data+size > (d+n)) 1690 goto ri_check; 1691 1692 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1693 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, 1694 s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1695 1696 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1697 { 1698 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) 1699 { 1700 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1701 return 0; 1702 } 1703 tlsext_servername = 1; 1704 } 1705 1706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1707 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) 1708 { 1709 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1710 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1711 1712 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 1713 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) 1714 { 1715 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1716 return 0; 1717 } 1718 if (!s->hit) 1719 { 1720 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1721 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1722 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) 1723 { 1724 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1725 return 0; 1726 } 1727 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; 1728 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); 1729 } 1730 #if 0 1731 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); 1732 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1733 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1734 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1735 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1736 #endif 1737 } 1738 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1739 1740 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1741 { 1742 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1743 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1744 { 1745 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1746 return 0; 1747 } 1748 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 1749 || (size > 0)) 1750 { 1751 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1752 return 0; 1753 } 1754 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1755 } 1756 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1757 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1758 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1759 { 1760 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1761 1762 if (size < 2) 1763 { 1764 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1765 return 0; 1766 } 1767 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1768 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) 1769 { 1770 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1771 return 0; 1772 } 1773 1774 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1775 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1776 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1777 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1778 else 1779 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1780 1781 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1782 { 1783 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1784 return 0; 1785 } 1786 } 1787 #endif 1788 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1789 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1790 { 1791 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested 1792 * a status request message. 1793 */ 1794 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) 1795 { 1796 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1797 return 0; 1798 } 1799 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ 1800 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1801 } 1802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1803 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1804 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) 1805 { 1806 unsigned char *selected; 1807 unsigned char selected_len; 1808 1809 /* We must have requested it. */ 1810 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) 1811 { 1812 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1813 return 0; 1814 } 1815 /* The data must be valid */ 1816 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) 1817 { 1818 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1819 return 0; 1820 } 1821 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) 1822 { 1823 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1824 return 0; 1825 } 1826 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 1827 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) 1828 { 1829 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1830 return 0; 1831 } 1832 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); 1833 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; 1834 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1835 } 1836 #endif 1837 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) 1838 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1; 1839 1840 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new) 1841 { 1842 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1; 1843 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1; 1844 } 1845 1846 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) 1847 { 1848 unsigned len; 1849 1850 /* We must have requested it. */ 1851 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) 1852 { 1853 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1854 return 0; 1855 } 1856 if (size < 4) 1857 { 1858 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1859 return 0; 1860 } 1861 /* The extension data consists of: 1862 * uint16 list_length 1863 * uint8 proto_length; 1864 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */ 1865 len = data[0]; 1866 len <<= 8; 1867 len |= data[1]; 1868 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2) 1869 { 1870 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1871 return 0; 1872 } 1873 len = data[2]; 1874 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3) 1875 { 1876 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1877 return 0; 1878 } 1879 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) 1880 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 1881 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len); 1882 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) 1883 { 1884 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1885 return 0; 1886 } 1887 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len); 1888 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; 1889 } 1890 1891 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 1892 { 1893 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1894 return 0; 1895 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1896 } 1897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1898 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) 1899 { 1900 switch(data[0]) 1901 { 1902 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ 1903 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1904 break; 1905 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ 1906 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1907 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1908 break; 1909 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1910 return 0; 1911 } 1912 } 1913 #endif 1914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1915 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) 1916 { 1917 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, 1918 al)) 1919 return 0; 1920 } 1921 #endif 1922 1923 data+=size; 1924 } 1925 1926 if (data != d+n) 1927 { 1928 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1929 return 0; 1930 } 1931 1932 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) 1933 { 1934 if (s->tlsext_hostname) 1935 { 1936 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) 1937 { 1938 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); 1939 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) 1940 { 1941 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1942 return 0; 1943 } 1944 } 1945 else 1946 { 1947 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1948 return 0; 1949 } 1950 } 1951 } 1952 1953 *p = data; 1954 1955 ri_check: 1956 1957 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to 1958 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server 1959 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an 1960 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server 1961 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI 1962 * absence on initial connect only. 1963 */ 1964 if (!renegotiate_seen 1965 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) 1966 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1967 { 1968 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 1970 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1971 return 0; 1972 } 1973 1974 return 1; 1975 } 1976 1977 1978 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1979 { 1980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1981 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats 1982 * and elliptic curves we support. 1983 */ 1984 int using_ecc = 0; 1985 int i; 1986 unsigned char *j; 1987 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; 1988 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); 1989 1990 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) 1991 { 1992 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); 1993 1994 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; 1995 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; 1996 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 1997 { 1998 using_ecc = 1; 1999 break; 2000 } 2001 } 2002 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION); 2003 if (using_ecc) 2004 { 2005 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 2006 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) 2007 { 2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2009 return -1; 2010 } 2011 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 2012 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 2013 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 2014 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 2015 2016 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */ 2017 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); 2018 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2; 2019 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) 2020 { 2021 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 2022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2023 return -1; 2024 } 2025 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i < 2026 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) 2027 { 2028 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]); 2029 s2n(id,j); 2030 } 2031 } 2032 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2033 2034 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2035 { 2036 int r = 1; 2037 2038 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) 2039 { 2040 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 2041 if (!r) 2042 return -1; 2043 } 2044 2045 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) 2046 { 2047 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 2048 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 2049 2050 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 2051 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2052 else 2053 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 2054 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 2055 { 2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2057 return -1; 2058 } 2059 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 2060 } 2061 2062 if (r == 2) 2063 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */ 2064 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 2065 } 2066 #endif 2067 2068 return 1; 2069 } 2070 2071 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 2072 { 2073 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2074 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support 2075 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not 2076 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. 2077 */ 2078 2079 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2080 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2081 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); 2082 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); 2083 2084 if (using_ecc) 2085 { 2086 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 2087 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) 2088 { 2089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2090 return -1; 2091 } 2092 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 2093 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 2094 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 2095 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 2096 } 2097 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2098 2099 return 1; 2100 } 2101 2102 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) 2103 { 2104 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 2105 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2106 2107 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2108 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in 2109 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 2110 */ 2111 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in 2112 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 2113 */ 2114 #endif 2115 2116 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2117 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2118 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2119 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2120 2121 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2122 { 2123 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), 2124 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, 2125 * so this has to happen here in 2126 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */ 2127 2128 int r = 1; 2129 2130 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) 2131 { 2132 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 2133 if (!r) 2134 { 2135 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2136 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2137 goto err; 2138 } 2139 } 2140 2141 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 2142 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 2143 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; 2144 2145 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) 2146 { 2147 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 2148 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) 2149 { 2150 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input 2151 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */ 2152 2153 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 2154 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2155 else 2156 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 2157 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 2158 { 2159 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2160 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2161 goto err; 2162 } 2163 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 2164 } 2165 } 2166 2167 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 2168 { 2169 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, 2170 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; 2171 * abort the handshake. 2172 */ 2173 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2174 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2175 } 2176 } 2177 2178 err: 2179 #endif 2180 switch (ret) 2181 { 2182 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2183 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2184 return -1; 2185 2186 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 2187 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 2188 return 1; 2189 2190 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2191 s->servername_done=0; 2192 default: 2193 return 1; 2194 } 2195 } 2196 2197 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) 2198 { 2199 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 2200 int al; 2201 2202 /* If status request then ask callback what to do. 2203 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 2204 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher 2205 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent 2206 */ 2207 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 2208 { 2209 int r; 2210 CERT_PKEY *certpkey; 2211 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); 2212 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ 2213 if (certpkey == NULL) 2214 { 2215 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 2216 return 1; 2217 } 2218 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so 2219 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up. 2220 */ 2221 s->cert->key = certpkey; 2222 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 2223 switch (r) 2224 { 2225 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 2226 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2227 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 2228 break; 2229 /* status request response should be sent */ 2230 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 2231 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 2232 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 2233 else 2234 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 2235 break; 2236 /* something bad happened */ 2237 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2238 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2239 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2240 goto err; 2241 } 2242 } 2243 else 2244 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 2245 2246 err: 2247 switch (ret) 2248 { 2249 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2250 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2251 return -1; 2252 2253 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 2254 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 2255 return 1; 2256 2257 default: 2258 return 1; 2259 } 2260 } 2261 2262 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 2263 { 2264 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 2265 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2266 2267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2268 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 2269 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension 2270 * it must contain uncompressed. 2271 */ 2272 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2273 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2274 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 2275 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 2276 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 2277 { 2278 /* we are using an ECC cipher */ 2279 size_t i; 2280 unsigned char *list; 2281 int found_uncompressed = 0; 2282 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 2283 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 2284 { 2285 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) 2286 { 2287 found_uncompressed = 1; 2288 break; 2289 } 2290 } 2291 if (!found_uncompressed) 2292 { 2293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 2294 return -1; 2295 } 2296 } 2297 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 2298 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2299 2300 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2301 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2302 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2303 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2304 2305 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2306 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) 2307 { 2308 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs. 2309 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */ 2310 2311 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 2312 { 2313 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2314 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2315 } 2316 2317 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check 2318 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */ 2319 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || 2320 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) 2321 { 2322 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2323 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2324 } 2325 } 2326 #endif 2327 2328 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one 2329 * tell the callback 2330 */ 2331 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) 2332 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 2333 { 2334 int r; 2335 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows 2336 * there is no response. 2337 */ 2338 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 2339 { 2340 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); 2341 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; 2342 } 2343 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; 2344 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 2345 if (r == 0) 2346 { 2347 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; 2348 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2349 } 2350 if (r < 0) 2351 { 2352 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2353 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2354 } 2355 } 2356 2357 switch (ret) 2358 { 2359 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2360 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2361 return -1; 2362 2363 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 2364 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 2365 return 1; 2366 2367 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2368 s->servername_done=0; 2369 default: 2370 return 1; 2371 } 2372 } 2373 2374 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the 2375 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle 2376 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. 2377 * 2378 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will 2379 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket 2380 * extension, if any. 2381 * len: the length of the session ID. 2382 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. 2383 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2384 * point to the resulting session. 2385 * 2386 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key 2387 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will 2388 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. 2389 * 2390 * Returns: 2391 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2392 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). 2393 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports 2394 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. 2395 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but 2396 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. 2397 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. 2398 * 2399 * Side effects: 2400 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue 2401 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support 2402 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have 2403 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if 2404 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. 2405 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. 2406 */ 2407 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, 2408 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) 2409 { 2410 /* Point after session ID in client hello */ 2411 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; 2412 unsigned short i; 2413 2414 *ret = NULL; 2415 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 2416 2417 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present 2418 * to permit stateful resumption. 2419 */ 2420 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 2421 return 0; 2422 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) 2423 return 0; 2424 if (p >= limit) 2425 return -1; 2426 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ 2427 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 2428 { 2429 i = *(p++); 2430 p+= i; 2431 if (p >= limit) 2432 return -1; 2433 } 2434 /* Skip past cipher list */ 2435 n2s(p, i); 2436 p+= i; 2437 if (p >= limit) 2438 return -1; 2439 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ 2440 i = *(p++); 2441 p += i; 2442 if (p > limit) 2443 return -1; 2444 /* Now at start of extensions */ 2445 if ((p + 2) >= limit) 2446 return 0; 2447 n2s(p, i); 2448 while ((p + 4) <= limit) 2449 { 2450 unsigned short type, size; 2451 n2s(p, type); 2452 n2s(p, size); 2453 if (p + size > limit) 2454 return 0; 2455 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 2456 { 2457 int r; 2458 if (size == 0) 2459 { 2460 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't 2461 * currently have one. */ 2462 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2463 return 1; 2464 } 2465 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) 2466 { 2467 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be 2468 * decrypted rather than generating the session 2469 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated 2470 * handshake based on external mechanism to 2471 * calculate the master secret later. */ 2472 return 2; 2473 } 2474 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); 2475 switch (r) 2476 { 2477 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ 2478 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2479 return 2; 2480 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ 2481 return r; 2482 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ 2483 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2484 return 3; 2485 default: /* fatal error */ 2486 return -1; 2487 } 2488 } 2489 p += size; 2490 } 2491 return 0; 2492 } 2493 2494 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. 2495 * 2496 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. 2497 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. 2498 * sess_id: points at the session ID. 2499 * sesslen: the length of the session ID. 2500 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2501 * point to the resulting session. 2502 * 2503 * Returns: 2504 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2505 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. 2506 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. 2507 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. 2508 */ 2509 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, 2510 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 2511 SSL_SESSION **psess) 2512 { 2513 SSL_SESSION *sess; 2514 unsigned char *sdec; 2515 const unsigned char *p; 2516 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; 2517 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 2518 HMAC_CTX hctx; 2519 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 2520 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 2521 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ 2522 if (eticklen < 48) 2523 return 2; 2524 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ 2525 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 2526 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 2527 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 2528 { 2529 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; 2530 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, 2531 &ctx, &hctx, 0); 2532 if (rv < 0) 2533 return -1; 2534 if (rv == 0) 2535 return 2; 2536 if (rv == 2) 2537 renew_ticket = 1; 2538 } 2539 else 2540 { 2541 /* Check key name matches */ 2542 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) 2543 return 2; 2544 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 2545 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 2546 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 2547 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); 2548 } 2549 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and 2550 * integrity checks on ticket. 2551 */ 2552 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); 2553 if (mlen < 0) 2554 { 2555 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2556 return -1; 2557 } 2558 eticklen -= mlen; 2559 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ 2560 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); 2561 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); 2562 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2563 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) 2564 { 2565 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2566 return 2; 2567 } 2568 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ 2569 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ 2570 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2571 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2572 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); 2573 if (!sdec) 2574 { 2575 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2576 return -1; 2577 } 2578 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); 2579 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) 2580 { 2581 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2582 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 2583 return 2; 2584 } 2585 slen += mlen; 2586 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2587 p = sdec; 2588 2589 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); 2590 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 2591 if (sess) 2592 { 2593 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to 2594 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to 2595 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero 2596 * as required by standard. 2597 */ 2598 if (sesslen) 2599 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); 2600 sess->session_id_length = sesslen; 2601 *psess = sess; 2602 if (renew_ticket) 2603 return 4; 2604 else 2605 return 3; 2606 } 2607 ERR_clear_error(); 2608 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new 2609 * ticket. */ 2610 return 2; 2611 } 2612 2613 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ 2614 2615 typedef struct 2616 { 2617 int nid; 2618 int id; 2619 } tls12_lookup; 2620 2621 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { 2622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 2623 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, 2624 #endif 2625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 2626 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, 2627 #endif 2628 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 2629 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, 2630 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, 2631 #endif 2632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 2633 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, 2634 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} 2635 #endif 2636 }; 2637 2638 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { 2639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2640 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, 2641 #endif 2642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2643 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, 2644 #endif 2645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2646 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} 2647 #endif 2648 }; 2649 2650 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2651 { 2652 size_t i; 2653 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) 2654 { 2655 if (table[i].nid == nid) 2656 return table[i].id; 2657 } 2658 return -1; 2659 } 2660 2661 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) 2662 { 2663 int sig_id, md_id; 2664 if (!md) 2665 return 0; 2666 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, 2667 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2668 if (md_id == -1) 2669 return 0; 2670 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); 2671 if (sig_id == -1) 2672 return 0; 2673 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; 2674 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; 2675 return 1; 2676 } 2677 2678 /* tls12_get_sigid returns the TLS 1.2 SignatureAlgorithm value corresponding 2679 * to the given public key, or -1 if not known. */ 2680 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) 2681 { 2682 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, 2683 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2684 } 2685 2686 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) 2687 { 2688 switch(hash_alg) 2689 { 2690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 2691 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: 2692 return EVP_sha1(); 2693 #endif 2694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 2695 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: 2696 return EVP_sha224(); 2697 2698 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: 2699 return EVP_sha256(); 2700 #endif 2701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 2702 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: 2703 return EVP_sha384(); 2704 2705 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: 2706 return EVP_sha512(); 2707 #endif 2708 default: 2709 return NULL; 2710 2711 } 2712 } 2713 2714 /* tls1_process_sigalgs processes a signature_algorithms extension and sets the 2715 * digest functions accordingly for each key type. 2716 * 2717 * See RFC 5246, section 7.4.1.4.1. 2718 * 2719 * data: points to the content of the extension, not including type and length 2720 * headers. 2721 * dsize: the number of bytes of |data|. Must be even. 2722 */ 2723 void tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) 2724 { 2725 int i; 2726 const EVP_MD *md, **digest_ptr; 2727 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */ 2728 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) 2729 return; 2730 2731 s->s3->digest_rsa = NULL; 2732 s->s3->digest_dsa = NULL; 2733 s->s3->digest_ecdsa = NULL; 2734 2735 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) 2736 { 2737 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1]; 2738 2739 switch(sig_alg) 2740 { 2741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2742 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 2743 digest_ptr = &s->s3->digest_rsa; 2744 break; 2745 #endif 2746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2747 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 2748 digest_ptr = &s->s3->digest_dsa; 2749 break; 2750 #endif 2751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2752 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 2753 digest_ptr = &s->s3->digest_ecdsa; 2754 break; 2755 #endif 2756 default: 2757 continue; 2758 } 2759 2760 if (*digest_ptr == NULL) 2761 { 2762 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg); 2763 if (md) 2764 *digest_ptr = md; 2765 } 2766 2767 } 2768 } 2769 2770 #endif 2771 2772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2773 int 2774 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) 2775 { 2776 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; 2777 unsigned short hbtype; 2778 unsigned int payload; 2779 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 2780 2781 if (s->msg_callback) 2782 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2783 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, 2784 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2785 2786 /* Read type and payload length first */ 2787 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 2788 return 0; /* silently discard */ 2789 hbtype = *p++; 2790 n2s(p, payload); 2791 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 2792 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ 2793 pl = p; 2794 2795 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) 2796 { 2797 unsigned char *buffer, *bp; 2798 int r; 2799 2800 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes 2801 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus 2802 * payload, plus padding 2803 */ 2804 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 2805 bp = buffer; 2806 2807 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ 2808 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; 2809 s2n(payload, bp); 2810 memcpy(bp, pl, payload); 2811 bp += payload; 2812 /* Random padding */ 2813 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding); 2814 2815 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding); 2816 2817 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) 2818 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2819 buffer, 3 + payload + padding, 2820 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2821 2822 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 2823 2824 if (r < 0) 2825 return r; 2826 } 2827 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) 2828 { 2829 unsigned int seq; 2830 2831 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), 2832 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the 2833 * sequence number */ 2834 n2s(pl, seq); 2835 2836 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) 2837 { 2838 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 2839 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 2840 } 2841 } 2842 2843 return 0; 2844 } 2845 2846 int 2847 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) 2848 { 2849 unsigned char *buf, *p; 2850 int ret; 2851 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ 2852 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 2853 2854 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ 2855 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || 2856 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) 2857 { 2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); 2859 return -1; 2860 } 2861 2862 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ 2863 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) 2864 { 2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); 2866 return -1; 2867 } 2868 2869 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ 2870 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) 2871 { 2872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 2873 return -1; 2874 } 2875 2876 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding 2877 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. 2878 */ 2879 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); 2880 2881 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number 2882 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add 2883 * some random stuff. 2884 * - Message Type, 1 byte 2885 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) 2886 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) 2887 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) 2888 * - Padding 2889 */ 2890 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 2891 p = buf; 2892 /* Message Type */ 2893 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; 2894 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ 2895 s2n(payload, p); 2896 /* Sequence number */ 2897 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); 2898 /* 16 random bytes */ 2899 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16); 2900 p += 16; 2901 /* Random padding */ 2902 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding); 2903 2904 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); 2905 if (ret >= 0) 2906 { 2907 if (s->msg_callback) 2908 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2909 buf, 3 + payload + padding, 2910 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2911 2912 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; 2913 } 2914 2915 OPENSSL_free(buf); 2916 2917 return ret; 2918 } 2919 #endif 2920 2921 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) 2922 /* tls1_channel_id_hash calculates the signed data for a Channel ID on the given 2923 * SSL connection and writes it to |md|. 2924 */ 2925 int 2926 tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *md, SSL *s) 2927 { 2928 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 2929 unsigned char temp_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 2930 unsigned temp_digest_len; 2931 int i; 2932 static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature"; 2933 2934 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 2935 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 2936 return 0; 2937 2938 EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic)); 2939 2940 if (s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) 2941 { 2942 static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption"; 2943 EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kResumptionMagic, 2944 sizeof(kResumptionMagic)); 2945 if (s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) 2946 return 0; 2947 EVP_DigestUpdate(md, s->session->original_handshake_hash, 2948 s->session->original_handshake_hash_len); 2949 } 2950 2951 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 2952 for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) 2953 { 2954 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL) 2955 continue; 2956 EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]); 2957 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, temp_digest, &temp_digest_len); 2958 EVP_DigestUpdate(md, temp_digest, temp_digest_len); 2959 } 2960 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2961 2962 return 1; 2963 } 2964 #endif 2965 2966 /* tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake 2967 * hashes in |s->session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that data. */ 2968 int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s) 2969 { 2970 int digest_len; 2971 /* This function should never be called for a resumed session because 2972 * the handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original, 2973 * full handshake. */ 2974 if (s->hit) 2975 return -1; 2976 /* It only makes sense to call this function if Channel IDs have been 2977 * negotiated. */ 2978 if (!s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) 2979 return -1; 2980 2981 digest_len = tls1_handshake_digest( 2982 s, s->session->original_handshake_hash, 2983 sizeof(s->session->original_handshake_hash)); 2984 if (digest_len < 0) 2985 return -1; 2986 2987 s->session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len; 2988 2989 return 1; 2990 } 2991
