1 /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ 57 58 #include <openssl/asn1.h> 59 #include <openssl/buf.h> 60 #include <openssl/digest.h> 61 #include <openssl/err.h> 62 #include <openssl/mem.h> 63 #include <openssl/obj.h> 64 #include <openssl/stack.h> 65 #include <openssl/x509.h> 66 #include <openssl/x509v3.h> 67 68 69 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 70 { 71 int i; 72 X509_CINF *ai,*bi; 73 74 ai=a->cert_info; 75 bi=b->cert_info; 76 i=M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber,bi->serialNumber); 77 if (i) return(i); 78 return(X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer,bi->issuer)); 79 } 80 81 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) 82 { 83 unsigned long ret=0; 84 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 85 unsigned char md[16]; 86 char *f; 87 88 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 89 f=X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,NULL,0); 90 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) 91 goto err; 92 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)f,strlen(f))) 93 goto err; 94 OPENSSL_free(f); 95 if(!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data, 96 (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length)) 97 goto err; 98 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,&(md[0]),NULL)) 99 goto err; 100 ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)| 101 ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L) 102 )&0xffffffffL; 103 err: 104 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 105 return(ret); 106 } 107 108 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 109 { 110 return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer,b->cert_info->issuer)); 111 } 112 113 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 114 { 115 return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject,b->cert_info->subject)); 116 } 117 118 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) 119 { 120 return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer,b->crl->issuer)); 121 } 122 123 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) 124 { 125 return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); 126 } 127 128 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a) 129 { 130 return(a->cert_info->issuer); 131 } 132 133 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) 134 { 135 return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer)); 136 } 137 138 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) 139 { 140 return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); 141 } 142 143 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a) 144 { 145 return(a->cert_info->subject); 146 } 147 148 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) 149 { 150 return(a->cert_info->serialNumber); 151 } 152 153 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) 154 { 155 return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject)); 156 } 157 158 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) 159 { 160 return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject)); 161 } 162 163 /* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for 164 * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally 165 * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in 166 * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may 167 * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring 168 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point 169 * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt 170 * with an evil cast. 171 */ 172 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 173 { 174 int rv; 175 /* ensure hash is valid */ 176 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); 177 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); 178 179 rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); 180 if (rv) 181 return rv; 182 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ 183 if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) 184 { 185 rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len); 186 if (rv) 187 return rv; 188 return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc, 189 a->cert_info->enc.len); 190 } 191 return rv; 192 } 193 194 195 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) 196 { 197 int ret; 198 199 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ 200 201 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) 202 { 203 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); 204 if (ret < 0) 205 return -2; 206 } 207 208 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) 209 { 210 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); 211 if (ret < 0) 212 return -2; 213 } 214 215 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; 216 217 if (ret) 218 return ret; 219 220 return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); 221 222 } 223 224 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) 225 { 226 unsigned long ret=0; 227 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 228 229 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ 230 i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL); 231 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), 232 NULL)) 233 return 0; 234 235 ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)| 236 ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L) 237 )&0xffffffffL; 238 return(ret); 239 } 240 241 242 /* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, 243 * this is reasonably efficient. */ 244 245 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) 246 { 247 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 248 unsigned long ret=0; 249 unsigned char md[16]; 250 251 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ 252 i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL); 253 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 254 /* EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); */ 255 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) 256 && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) 257 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,md,NULL)) 258 ret=(((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)| 259 ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L) 260 )&0xffffffffL; 261 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 262 263 return(ret); 264 } 265 266 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ 267 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, 268 ASN1_INTEGER *serial) 269 { 270 size_t i; 271 X509_CINF cinf; 272 X509 x,*x509=NULL; 273 274 if(!sk) return NULL; 275 276 x.cert_info= &cinf; 277 cinf.serialNumber=serial; 278 cinf.issuer=name; 279 280 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++) 281 { 282 x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i); 283 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509,&x) == 0) 284 return(x509); 285 } 286 return(NULL); 287 } 288 289 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) 290 { 291 X509 *x509; 292 size_t i; 293 294 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++) 295 { 296 x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i); 297 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509),name) == 0) 298 return(x509); 299 } 300 return(NULL); 301 } 302 303 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) 304 { 305 if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL)) 306 return(NULL); 307 return(X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); 308 } 309 310 ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) 311 { 312 if(!x) return NULL; 313 return x->cert_info->key->public_key; 314 } 315 316 317 int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) 318 { 319 EVP_PKEY *xk; 320 int ret; 321 322 xk=X509_get_pubkey(x); 323 324 if (xk) 325 ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); 326 else 327 ret = -2; 328 329 switch (ret) 330 { 331 case 1: 332 break; 333 case 0: 334 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_check_private_key, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); 335 break; 336 case -1: 337 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_check_private_key, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); 338 break; 339 case -2: 340 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_check_private_key, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); 341 } 342 if (xk) 343 EVP_PKEY_free(xk); 344 if (ret > 0) 345 return 1; 346 return 0; 347 } 348 349 /* Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and 350 * the NID of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is 351 * a pointer to a flags field which must contain the suite B verification 352 * flags. 353 */ 354 355 356 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) 357 { 358 const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; 359 int curve_nid; 360 if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 361 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec); 362 if (!grp) 363 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; 364 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); 365 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ 366 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) /* P-384 */ 367 { 368 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with 369 * curve. 370 */ 371 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) 372 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; 373 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) 374 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; 375 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ 376 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; 377 } 378 else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) /* P-256 */ 379 { 380 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) 381 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; 382 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) 383 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; 384 } 385 else 386 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; 387 388 return X509_V_OK; 389 } 390 391 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, 392 unsigned long flags) 393 { 394 int rv, sign_nid; 395 size_t i; 396 EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; 397 unsigned long tflags; 398 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) 399 return X509_V_OK; 400 tflags = flags; 401 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ 402 if (x == NULL) 403 { 404 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); 405 i = 1; 406 } 407 else 408 i = 0; 409 410 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) 411 { 412 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; 413 /* Correct error depth */ 414 i = 0; 415 goto end; 416 } 417 418 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); 419 /* Check EE key only */ 420 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); 421 if (rv != X509_V_OK) 422 { 423 /* Correct error depth */ 424 i = 0; 425 goto end; 426 } 427 for(; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 428 { 429 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); 430 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 431 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) 432 { 433 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; 434 goto end; 435 } 436 EVP_PKEY_free(pk); 437 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); 438 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); 439 if (rv != X509_V_OK) 440 goto end; 441 } 442 443 /* Final check: root CA signature */ 444 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); 445 end: 446 if (pk) 447 EVP_PKEY_free(pk); 448 if (rv != X509_V_OK) 449 { 450 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ 451 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM 452 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) 453 i--; 454 /* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing 455 * P-384 with P-256. Use more meaninggul error. 456 */ 457 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) 458 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; 459 if (perror_depth) 460 *perror_depth = i; 461 } 462 return rv; 463 } 464 465 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) 466 { 467 int sign_nid; 468 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) 469 return X509_V_OK; 470 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm); 471 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); 472 } 473 474 /* Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference 475 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref 476 * of each X509 structure. 477 */ 478 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 479 { 480 STACK_OF(X509) *ret; 481 size_t i; 482 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); 483 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) 484 { 485 X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i)); 486 } 487 return ret; 488 } 489
