1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 2 * All rights reserved. 3 * 4 * This package is an SSL implementation written 5 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 7 * 8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 14 * 15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 16 * the code are not to be removed. 17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 18 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 21 * 22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 24 * are met: 25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 31 * must display the following acknowledgement: 32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 33 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 39 * 40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 50 * SUCH DAMAGE. 51 * 52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 54 * copied and put under another distribution licence 55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ 56 57 #include <string.h> 58 #include <time.h> 59 60 #include <openssl/asn1.h> 61 #include <openssl/buf.h> 62 #include <openssl/err.h> 63 #include <openssl/evp.h> 64 #include <openssl/lhash.h> 65 #include <openssl/mem.h> 66 #include <openssl/obj.h> 67 #include <openssl/thread.h> 68 #include <openssl/x509.h> 69 #include <openssl/x509v3.h> 70 71 #include "vpm_int.h" 72 #include "../internal.h" 73 74 75 static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = 76 CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA; 77 78 /* CRL score values */ 79 80 /* No unhandled critical extensions */ 81 82 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 83 84 /* certificate is within CRL scope */ 85 86 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 87 88 /* CRL times valid */ 89 90 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 91 92 /* Issuer name matches certificate */ 93 94 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 95 96 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ 97 98 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) 99 100 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ 101 102 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 103 104 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ 105 106 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 107 108 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ 109 110 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 111 112 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ 113 114 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 115 116 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); 117 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); 118 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); 119 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 120 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 121 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 122 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 123 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 124 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 125 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 126 127 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 128 unsigned int *preasons, 129 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); 130 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 131 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); 132 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score, 133 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); 134 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, 135 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score); 136 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 137 unsigned int *preasons); 138 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); 139 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 140 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 141 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); 142 143 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 144 145 146 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) 147 { 148 return ok; 149 } 150 151 #if 0 152 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) 153 { 154 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b); 155 } 156 #endif 157 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */ 158 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x) 159 { 160 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); 161 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) 162 return 1; 163 else 164 return 0; 165 } 166 167 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ 168 169 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 170 { 171 STACK_OF(X509) *certs; 172 X509 *xtmp = NULL; 173 size_t i; 174 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ 175 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); 176 if (certs == NULL) 177 return NULL; 178 /* Look for exact match */ 179 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) 180 { 181 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); 182 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) 183 break; 184 } 185 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) 186 X509_up_ref(xtmp); 187 else 188 xtmp = NULL; 189 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); 190 return xtmp; 191 } 192 193 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 194 { 195 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; 196 int bad_chain = 0; 197 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; 198 int depth,i,ok=0; 199 int num; 200 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 201 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL; 202 if (ctx->cert == NULL) 203 { 204 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); 205 return -1; 206 } 207 if (ctx->chain != NULL) 208 { 209 /* This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a 210 * cert. We cannot do another one. */ 211 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); 212 return -1; 213 } 214 215 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 216 217 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is 218 * present and that the first entry is in place */ 219 ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null(); 220 if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) 221 { 222 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 223 goto end; 224 } 225 X509_up_ref(ctx->cert); 226 ctx->last_untrusted = 1; 227 228 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ 229 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL 230 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) 231 { 232 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 233 goto end; 234 } 235 236 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 237 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); 238 depth=param->depth; 239 240 241 for (;;) 242 { 243 /* If we have enough, we break */ 244 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take 245 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the 246 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error 247 * code later. 248 */ 249 250 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 251 if (cert_self_signed(x)) 252 break; 253 /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */ 254 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) 255 { 256 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 257 if (ok < 0) 258 goto end; 259 /* If successful for now free up cert so it 260 * will be picked up again later. 261 */ 262 if (ok > 0) 263 { 264 X509_free(xtmp); 265 break; 266 } 267 } 268 269 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ 270 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) 271 { 272 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x); 273 if (xtmp != NULL) 274 { 275 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp)) 276 { 277 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 278 goto end; 279 } 280 X509_up_ref(xtmp); 281 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); 282 ctx->last_untrusted++; 283 x=xtmp; 284 num++; 285 /* reparse the full chain for 286 * the next one */ 287 continue; 288 } 289 } 290 break; 291 } 292 293 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted 294 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, 295 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ 296 297 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it 298 * is self signed. 299 */ 300 301 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 302 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1); 303 if (cert_self_signed(x)) 304 { 305 /* we have a self signed certificate */ 306 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) 307 { 308 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if 309 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact 310 * match to avoid possible impersonation. 311 */ 312 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 313 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 314 { 315 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; 316 ctx->current_cert=x; 317 ctx->error_depth=i-1; 318 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); 319 bad_chain = 1; 320 ok=cb(0,ctx); 321 if (!ok) goto end; 322 } 323 else 324 { 325 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version 326 * so we get any trust settings. 327 */ 328 X509_free(x); 329 x = xtmp; 330 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); 331 ctx->last_untrusted=0; 332 } 333 } 334 else 335 { 336 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ 337 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); 338 ctx->last_untrusted--; 339 num--; 340 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); 341 } 342 } 343 344 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ 345 for (;;) 346 { 347 /* If we have enough, we break */ 348 if (depth < num) break; 349 350 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 351 if (cert_self_signed(x)) 352 break; 353 354 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 355 356 if (ok < 0) goto end; 357 if (ok == 0) break; 358 359 x = xtmp; 360 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x)) 361 { 362 X509_free(xtmp); 363 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 364 ok = 0; 365 goto end; 366 } 367 num++; 368 } 369 370 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ 371 372 i = check_trust(ctx); 373 374 /* If explicitly rejected error */ 375 if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) 376 goto end; 377 /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's 378 * a single self signed certificate in which case we've indicated 379 * an error already and set bad_chain == 1 380 */ 381 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) 382 { 383 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) 384 { 385 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) 386 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; 387 else 388 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; 389 ctx->current_cert=x; 390 } 391 else 392 { 393 394 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss); 395 num++; 396 ctx->last_untrusted=num; 397 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; 398 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; 399 chain_ss=NULL; 400 } 401 402 ctx->error_depth=num-1; 403 bad_chain = 1; 404 ok=cb(0,ctx); 405 if (!ok) goto end; 406 } 407 408 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ 409 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); 410 411 if (!ok) goto end; 412 413 /* Check name constraints */ 414 415 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); 416 417 if (!ok) goto end; 418 419 ok = check_id(ctx); 420 421 if (!ok) goto end; 422 423 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters 424 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification. 425 */ 426 427 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); 428 if(!ok) goto end; 429 430 i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, 431 ctx->param->flags); 432 if (i != X509_V_OK) 433 { 434 ctx->error = i; 435 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth); 436 ok = cb(0, ctx); 437 if (!ok) 438 goto end; 439 } 440 441 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ 442 if (ctx->verify != NULL) 443 ok=ctx->verify(ctx); 444 else 445 ok=internal_verify(ctx); 446 if(!ok) goto end; 447 448 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ 449 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) 450 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); 451 452 end: 453 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); 454 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); 455 return ok; 456 } 457 458 459 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) 460 */ 461 462 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) 463 { 464 size_t i; 465 X509 *issuer; 466 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) 467 { 468 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 469 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) 470 return issuer; 471 } 472 return NULL; 473 } 474 475 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ 476 477 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) 478 { 479 int ret; 480 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); 481 if (ret == X509_V_OK) 482 return 1; 483 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ 484 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) 485 return 0; 486 487 ctx->error = ret; 488 ctx->current_cert = x; 489 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 490 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 491 } 492 493 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ 494 495 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 496 { 497 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); 498 if (*issuer) 499 { 500 X509_up_ref(*issuer); 501 return 1; 502 } 503 else 504 return 0; 505 } 506 507 508 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency 509 * with the supplied purpose 510 */ 511 512 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 513 { 514 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; 515 X509 *x; 516 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 517 int proxy_path_length = 0; 518 int purpose; 519 int allow_proxy_certs; 520 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 521 522 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: 523 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct 524 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). 525 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not 526 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. 527 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for 528 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. 529 */ 530 must_be_ca = -1; 531 532 /* CRL path validation */ 533 if (ctx->parent) 534 { 535 allow_proxy_certs = 0; 536 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; 537 } 538 else 539 { 540 allow_proxy_certs = 541 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); 542 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their 543 software happy */ 544 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) 545 allow_proxy_certs = 1; 546 purpose = ctx->param->purpose; 547 } 548 549 /* Check all untrusted certificates */ 550 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) 551 { 552 int ret; 553 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 554 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 555 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 556 { 557 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; 558 ctx->error_depth = i; 559 ctx->current_cert = x; 560 ok=cb(0,ctx); 561 if (!ok) goto end; 562 } 563 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) 564 { 565 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; 566 ctx->error_depth = i; 567 ctx->current_cert = x; 568 ok=cb(0,ctx); 569 if (!ok) goto end; 570 } 571 ret = X509_check_ca(x); 572 switch(must_be_ca) 573 { 574 case -1: 575 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 576 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) 577 { 578 ret = 0; 579 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 580 } 581 else 582 ret = 1; 583 break; 584 case 0: 585 if (ret != 0) 586 { 587 ret = 0; 588 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; 589 } 590 else 591 ret = 1; 592 break; 593 default: 594 if ((ret == 0) 595 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 596 && (ret != 1))) 597 { 598 ret = 0; 599 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 600 } 601 else 602 ret = 1; 603 break; 604 } 605 if (ret == 0) 606 { 607 ctx->error_depth = i; 608 ctx->current_cert = x; 609 ok=cb(0,ctx); 610 if (!ok) goto end; 611 } 612 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) 613 { 614 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); 615 if ((ret == 0) 616 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 617 && (ret != 1))) 618 { 619 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; 620 ctx->error_depth = i; 621 ctx->current_cert = x; 622 ok=cb(0,ctx); 623 if (!ok) goto end; 624 } 625 } 626 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ 627 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) 628 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) 629 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) 630 { 631 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 632 ctx->error_depth = i; 633 ctx->current_cert = x; 634 ok=cb(0,ctx); 635 if (!ok) goto end; 636 } 637 /* Increment path length if not self issued */ 638 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 639 plen++; 640 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next 641 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE 642 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a 643 CA certificate. */ 644 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) 645 { 646 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) 647 { 648 ctx->error = 649 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 650 ctx->error_depth = i; 651 ctx->current_cert = x; 652 ok=cb(0,ctx); 653 if (!ok) goto end; 654 } 655 proxy_path_length++; 656 must_be_ca = 0; 657 } 658 else 659 must_be_ca = 1; 660 } 661 ok = 1; 662 end: 663 return ok; 664 } 665 666 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 667 { 668 X509 *x; 669 int i, j, rv; 670 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ 671 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) 672 { 673 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 674 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ 675 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 676 continue; 677 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in 678 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly 679 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be 680 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed. 681 */ 682 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) 683 { 684 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; 685 if (nc) 686 { 687 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); 688 if (rv != X509_V_OK) 689 { 690 ctx->error = rv; 691 ctx->error_depth = i; 692 ctx->current_cert = x; 693 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx)) 694 return 0; 695 } 696 } 697 } 698 } 699 return 1; 700 } 701 702 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) 703 { 704 ctx->error = errcode; 705 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert; 706 ctx->error_depth = 0; 707 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 708 } 709 710 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id) 711 { 712 size_t i; 713 size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts); 714 char *name; 715 716 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) 717 { 718 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i); 719 if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), id->hostflags, 720 &id->peername) > 0) 721 return 1; 722 } 723 return n == 0; 724 } 725 726 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 727 { 728 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; 729 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id; 730 X509 *x = ctx->cert; 731 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) 732 { 733 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) 734 return 0; 735 } 736 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) 737 { 738 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) 739 return 0; 740 } 741 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) 742 { 743 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) 744 return 0; 745 } 746 return 1; 747 } 748 749 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 750 { 751 size_t i; 752 int ok; 753 X509 *x = NULL; 754 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 755 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 756 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */ 757 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) 758 { 759 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 760 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); 761 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ 762 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) 763 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; 764 /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if 765 * not overridden. 766 */ 767 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) 768 { 769 ctx->error_depth = i; 770 ctx->current_cert = x; 771 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; 772 ok = cb(0, ctx); 773 if (!ok) 774 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; 775 } 776 } 777 /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted 778 * certificate return success. 779 */ 780 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) 781 { 782 X509 *mx; 783 if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int) sk_X509_num(ctx->chain)) 784 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; 785 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0); 786 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); 787 if (mx) 788 { 789 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); 790 X509_free(x); 791 ctx->last_untrusted = 0; 792 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; 793 } 794 } 795 796 /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and 797 * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. 798 */ 799 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; 800 } 801 802 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 803 { 804 int i, last, ok; 805 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) 806 return 1; 807 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) 808 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 809 else 810 { 811 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ 812 if (ctx->parent) 813 return 1; 814 last = 0; 815 } 816 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++) 817 { 818 ctx->error_depth = i; 819 ok = check_cert(ctx); 820 if (!ok) return ok; 821 } 822 return 1; 823 } 824 825 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 826 OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_POTENTIALLY_UNINITIALIZED_WARNINGS 827 { 828 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 829 X509 *x; 830 int ok, cnum; 831 unsigned int last_reasons; 832 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 833 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); 834 ctx->current_cert = x; 835 ctx->current_issuer = NULL; 836 ctx->current_crl_score = 0; 837 ctx->current_reasons = 0; 838 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) 839 { 840 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; 841 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ 842 if (ctx->get_crl) 843 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); 844 else 845 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); 846 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except 847 * notify callback 848 */ 849 if(!ok) 850 { 851 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 852 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 853 goto err; 854 } 855 ctx->current_crl = crl; 856 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); 857 if (!ok) 858 goto err; 859 860 if (dcrl) 861 { 862 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); 863 if (!ok) 864 goto err; 865 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); 866 if (!ok) 867 goto err; 868 } 869 else 870 ok = 1; 871 872 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ 873 if (ok != 2) 874 { 875 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); 876 if (!ok) 877 goto err; 878 } 879 880 X509_CRL_free(crl); 881 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 882 crl = NULL; 883 dcrl = NULL; 884 /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by 885 * another iteration, so exit loop. 886 */ 887 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) 888 { 889 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 890 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 891 goto err; 892 } 893 } 894 err: 895 X509_CRL_free(crl); 896 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 897 898 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 899 return ok; 900 901 } 902 903 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ 904 905 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) 906 { 907 time_t *ptime; 908 int i; 909 if (notify) 910 ctx->current_crl = crl; 911 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 912 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 913 else 914 ptime = NULL; 915 916 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); 917 if (i == 0) 918 { 919 if (!notify) 920 return 0; 921 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; 922 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 923 return 0; 924 } 925 926 if (i > 0) 927 { 928 if (!notify) 929 return 0; 930 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; 931 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 932 return 0; 933 } 934 935 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) 936 { 937 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); 938 939 if (i == 0) 940 { 941 if (!notify) 942 return 0; 943 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; 944 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 945 return 0; 946 } 947 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ 948 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) 949 { 950 if (!notify) 951 return 0; 952 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; 953 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 954 return 0; 955 } 956 } 957 958 if (notify) 959 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 960 961 return 1; 962 } 963 964 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, 965 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, 966 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 967 { 968 int crl_score, best_score = *pscore; 969 size_t i; 970 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; 971 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; 972 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; 973 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; 974 975 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) 976 { 977 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 978 reasons = *preasons; 979 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); 980 981 if (crl_score > best_score) 982 { 983 best_crl = crl; 984 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; 985 best_score = crl_score; 986 best_reasons = reasons; 987 } 988 } 989 990 if (best_crl) 991 { 992 if (*pcrl) 993 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); 994 *pcrl = best_crl; 995 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; 996 *pscore = best_score; 997 *preasons = best_reasons; 998 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl); 999 if (*pdcrl) 1000 { 1001 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); 1002 *pdcrl = NULL; 1003 } 1004 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); 1005 } 1006 1007 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) 1008 return 1; 1009 1010 return 0; 1011 } 1012 1013 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be 1014 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. 1015 */ 1016 1017 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) 1018 { 1019 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; 1020 int i; 1021 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); 1022 if (i >= 0) 1023 { 1024 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ 1025 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) 1026 return 0; 1027 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); 1028 } 1029 else 1030 exta = NULL; 1031 1032 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); 1033 1034 if (i >= 0) 1035 { 1036 1037 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) 1038 return 0; 1039 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); 1040 } 1041 else 1042 extb = NULL; 1043 1044 if (!exta && !extb) 1045 return 1; 1046 1047 if (!exta || !extb) 1048 return 0; 1049 1050 1051 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) 1052 return 0; 1053 1054 return 1; 1055 } 1056 1057 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ 1058 1059 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) 1060 { 1061 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ 1062 if (!delta->base_crl_number) 1063 return 0; 1064 /* Base must have a CRL number */ 1065 if (!base->crl_number) 1066 return 0; 1067 /* Issuer names must match */ 1068 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), 1069 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) 1070 return 0; 1071 /* AKID and IDP must match */ 1072 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) 1073 return 0; 1074 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) 1075 return 0; 1076 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ 1077 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 1078 return 0; 1079 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ 1080 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 1081 return 1; 1082 return 0; 1083 } 1084 1085 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring 1086 * or retrieve a chain of deltas... 1087 */ 1088 1089 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, 1090 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 1091 { 1092 X509_CRL *delta; 1093 size_t i; 1094 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) 1095 return; 1096 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) 1097 return; 1098 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) 1099 { 1100 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 1101 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) 1102 { 1103 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) 1104 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; 1105 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta); 1106 *dcrl = delta; 1107 return; 1108 } 1109 } 1110 *dcrl = NULL; 1111 } 1112 1113 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'. 1114 * The return value is a mask of several criteria. 1115 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. 1116 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if 1117 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. 1118 */ 1119 1120 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 1121 unsigned int *preasons, 1122 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 1123 { 1124 1125 int crl_score = 0; 1126 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; 1127 1128 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ 1129 1130 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ 1131 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) 1132 return 0; 1133 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ 1134 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) 1135 { 1136 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) 1137 return 0; 1138 } 1139 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) 1140 { 1141 /* If no new reasons reject */ 1142 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 1143 return 0; 1144 } 1145 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ 1146 else if (crl->base_crl_number) 1147 return 0; 1148 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ 1149 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) 1150 { 1151 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) 1152 return 0; 1153 } 1154 else 1155 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; 1156 1157 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 1158 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; 1159 1160 /* Check expiry */ 1161 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) 1162 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; 1163 1164 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ 1165 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); 1166 1167 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ 1168 1169 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) 1170 return 0; 1171 1172 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ 1173 1174 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) 1175 { 1176 /* If no new reasons reject */ 1177 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 1178 return 0; 1179 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; 1180 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; 1181 } 1182 1183 *preasons = tmp_reasons; 1184 1185 return crl_score; 1186 1187 } 1188 1189 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, 1190 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) 1191 { 1192 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; 1193 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1194 int cidx = ctx->error_depth; 1195 size_t i; 1196 1197 if ((size_t) cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) 1198 cidx++; 1199 1200 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1201 1202 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) 1203 { 1204 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) 1205 { 1206 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; 1207 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1208 return; 1209 } 1210 } 1211 1212 for (cidx++; cidx < (int) sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) 1213 { 1214 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1215 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1216 continue; 1217 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) 1218 { 1219 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; 1220 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1221 return; 1222 } 1223 } 1224 1225 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ 1226 1227 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) 1228 return; 1229 1230 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the 1231 * set of untrusted certificates. 1232 */ 1233 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) 1234 { 1235 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); 1236 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1237 continue; 1238 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) 1239 { 1240 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1241 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; 1242 return; 1243 } 1244 } 1245 } 1246 1247 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new 1248 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the 1249 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking 1250 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in 1251 * practice. 1252 */ 1253 1254 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1255 { 1256 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; 1257 int ret; 1258 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ 1259 if (ctx->parent) 1260 return 0; 1261 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) 1262 return -1; 1263 1264 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; 1265 /* Copy verify params across */ 1266 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); 1267 1268 crl_ctx.parent = ctx; 1269 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; 1270 1271 /* Verify CRL issuer */ 1272 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); 1273 1274 if (ret <= 0) 1275 goto err; 1276 1277 /* Check chain is acceptable */ 1278 1279 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); 1280 err: 1281 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); 1282 return ret; 1283 } 1284 1285 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path 1286 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a 1287 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised 1288 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must 1289 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain... 1290 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version 1291 */ 1292 1293 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1294 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 1295 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) 1296 { 1297 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; 1298 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); 1299 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); 1300 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) 1301 return 1; 1302 return 0; 1303 } 1304 1305 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1306 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 1307 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 1308 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 1309 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. 1310 */ 1311 1312 1313 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) 1314 { 1315 X509_NAME *nm = NULL; 1316 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; 1317 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; 1318 size_t i, j; 1319 if (!a || !b) 1320 return 1; 1321 if (a->type == 1) 1322 { 1323 if (!a->dpname) 1324 return 0; 1325 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ 1326 if (b->type == 1) 1327 { 1328 if (!b->dpname) 1329 return 0; 1330 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) 1331 return 1; 1332 else 1333 return 0; 1334 } 1335 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1336 nm = a->dpname; 1337 gens = b->name.fullname; 1338 } 1339 else if (b->type == 1) 1340 { 1341 if (!b->dpname) 1342 return 0; 1343 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1344 gens = a->name.fullname; 1345 nm = b->dpname; 1346 } 1347 1348 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ 1349 if (nm) 1350 { 1351 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) 1352 { 1353 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); 1354 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1355 continue; 1356 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) 1357 return 1; 1358 } 1359 return 0; 1360 } 1361 1362 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ 1363 1364 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) 1365 { 1366 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); 1367 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) 1368 { 1369 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); 1370 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) 1371 return 1; 1372 } 1373 } 1374 1375 return 0; 1376 1377 } 1378 1379 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) 1380 { 1381 size_t i; 1382 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1383 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ 1384 if (!dp->CRLissuer) 1385 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); 1386 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) 1387 { 1388 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); 1389 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1390 continue; 1391 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) 1392 return 1; 1393 } 1394 return 0; 1395 } 1396 1397 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ 1398 1399 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 1400 unsigned int *preasons) 1401 { 1402 size_t i; 1403 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) 1404 return 0; 1405 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) 1406 { 1407 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) 1408 return 0; 1409 } 1410 else 1411 { 1412 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) 1413 return 0; 1414 } 1415 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; 1416 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) 1417 { 1418 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); 1419 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) 1420 { 1421 if (!crl->idp || 1422 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) 1423 { 1424 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; 1425 return 1; 1426 } 1427 } 1428 } 1429 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) 1430 return 1; 1431 return 0; 1432 } 1433 1434 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. 1435 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too 1436 */ 1437 1438 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1439 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) 1440 { 1441 int ok; 1442 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1443 int crl_score = 0; 1444 unsigned int reasons; 1445 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 1446 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; 1447 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 1448 reasons = ctx->current_reasons; 1449 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 1450 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); 1451 1452 if (ok) 1453 goto done; 1454 1455 /* Lookup CRLs from store */ 1456 1457 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); 1458 1459 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ 1460 if (!skcrl && crl) 1461 goto done; 1462 1463 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); 1464 1465 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); 1466 1467 done: 1468 1469 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ 1470 if (crl) 1471 { 1472 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 1473 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; 1474 ctx->current_reasons = reasons; 1475 *pcrl = crl; 1476 *pdcrl = dcrl; 1477 return 1; 1478 } 1479 1480 return 0; 1481 } 1482 1483 /* Check CRL validity */ 1484 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) 1485 { 1486 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1487 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; 1488 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; 1489 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 1490 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 1491 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ 1492 if (ctx->current_issuer) 1493 issuer = ctx->current_issuer; 1494 1495 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer 1496 * is next certificate in chain. 1497 */ 1498 else if (cnum < chnum) 1499 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); 1500 else 1501 { 1502 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); 1503 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ 1504 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) 1505 { 1506 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; 1507 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1508 if(!ok) goto err; 1509 } 1510 } 1511 1512 if(issuer) 1513 { 1514 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already 1515 * been done 1516 */ 1517 if (!crl->base_crl_number) 1518 { 1519 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ 1520 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && 1521 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) 1522 { 1523 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; 1524 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1525 if(!ok) goto err; 1526 } 1527 1528 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) 1529 { 1530 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; 1531 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1532 if(!ok) goto err; 1533 } 1534 1535 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) 1536 { 1537 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) 1538 { 1539 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; 1540 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1541 if(!ok) goto err; 1542 } 1543 } 1544 1545 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) 1546 { 1547 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; 1548 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1549 if(!ok) goto err; 1550 } 1551 1552 1553 } 1554 1555 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) 1556 { 1557 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); 1558 if (!ok) 1559 goto err; 1560 } 1561 1562 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ 1563 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); 1564 1565 if(!ikey) 1566 { 1567 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1568 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1569 if (!ok) goto err; 1570 } 1571 else 1572 { 1573 int rv; 1574 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); 1575 if (rv != X509_V_OK) 1576 { 1577 ctx->error=rv; 1578 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1579 if (!ok) 1580 goto err; 1581 } 1582 /* Verify CRL signature */ 1583 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) 1584 { 1585 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1586 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1587 if (!ok) goto err; 1588 } 1589 } 1590 } 1591 1592 ok = 1; 1593 1594 err: 1595 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); 1596 return ok; 1597 } 1598 1599 /* Check certificate against CRL */ 1600 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 1601 { 1602 int ok; 1603 X509_REVOKED *rev; 1604 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained 1605 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate 1606 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since 1607 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries. 1608 */ 1609 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 1610 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 1611 { 1612 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; 1613 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1614 if(!ok) 1615 return 0; 1616 } 1617 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL 1618 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL. 1619 */ 1620 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) 1621 { 1622 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) 1623 return 2; 1624 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; 1625 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1626 if (!ok) 1627 return 0; 1628 } 1629 1630 return 1; 1631 } 1632 1633 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1634 { 1635 int ret; 1636 if (ctx->parent) 1637 return 1; 1638 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, 1639 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); 1640 if (ret == 0) 1641 { 1642 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1643 return 0; 1644 } 1645 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ 1646 if (ret == -1) 1647 { 1648 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify 1649 * callback. 1650 */ 1651 X509 *x; 1652 size_t i; 1653 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) 1654 { 1655 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 1656 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) 1657 continue; 1658 ctx->current_cert = x; 1659 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; 1660 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1661 return 0; 1662 } 1663 return 1; 1664 } 1665 if (ret == -2) 1666 { 1667 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1668 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; 1669 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1670 } 1671 1672 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) 1673 { 1674 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1675 ctx->error = X509_V_OK; 1676 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) 1677 return 0; 1678 } 1679 1680 return 1; 1681 } 1682 1683 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1684 { 1685 time_t *ptime; 1686 int i; 1687 1688 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 1689 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 1690 else 1691 ptime = NULL; 1692 1693 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); 1694 if (i == 0) 1695 { 1696 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; 1697 ctx->current_cert=x; 1698 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1699 return 0; 1700 } 1701 1702 if (i > 0) 1703 { 1704 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; 1705 ctx->current_cert=x; 1706 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1707 return 0; 1708 } 1709 1710 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); 1711 if (i == 0) 1712 { 1713 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; 1714 ctx->current_cert=x; 1715 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1716 return 0; 1717 } 1718 1719 if (i < 0) 1720 { 1721 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; 1722 ctx->current_cert=x; 1723 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1724 return 0; 1725 } 1726 1727 return 1; 1728 } 1729 1730 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1731 { 1732 int ok=0,n; 1733 X509 *xs,*xi; 1734 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 1735 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 1736 1737 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 1738 1739 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 1740 ctx->error_depth=n-1; 1741 n--; 1742 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 1743 1744 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) 1745 xs=xi; 1746 else 1747 { 1748 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) 1749 { 1750 xs = xi; 1751 goto check_cert; 1752 } 1753 if (n <= 0) 1754 { 1755 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; 1756 ctx->current_cert=xi; 1757 ok=cb(0,ctx); 1758 goto end; 1759 } 1760 else 1761 { 1762 n--; 1763 ctx->error_depth=n; 1764 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 1765 } 1766 } 1767 1768 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ 1769 while (n >= 0) 1770 { 1771 ctx->error_depth=n; 1772 1773 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless 1774 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and 1775 * just wastes time. 1776 */ 1777 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) 1778 { 1779 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) 1780 { 1781 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1782 ctx->current_cert=xi; 1783 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); 1784 if (!ok) goto end; 1785 } 1786 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) 1787 { 1788 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1789 ctx->current_cert=xs; 1790 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); 1791 if (!ok) 1792 { 1793 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1794 goto end; 1795 } 1796 } 1797 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1798 pkey=NULL; 1799 } 1800 1801 xs->valid = 1; 1802 1803 check_cert: 1804 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); 1805 if (!ok) 1806 goto end; 1807 1808 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ 1809 ctx->current_issuer=xi; 1810 ctx->current_cert=xs; 1811 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); 1812 if (!ok) goto end; 1813 1814 n--; 1815 if (n >= 0) 1816 { 1817 xi=xs; 1818 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 1819 } 1820 } 1821 ok=1; 1822 end: 1823 return ok; 1824 } 1825 1826 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) 1827 { 1828 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); 1829 } 1830 1831 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) 1832 { 1833 char *str; 1834 ASN1_TIME atm; 1835 long offset; 1836 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; 1837 int i, j, remaining; 1838 1839 p=buff1; 1840 remaining = ctm->length; 1841 str=(char *)ctm->data; 1842 /* Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in 1843 * the time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is 1844 * fixed: 1845 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ 1846 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ */ 1847 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1848 { 1849 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */ 1850 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; 1851 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1; 1852 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) 1853 return 0; 1854 memcpy(p,str,10); 1855 p+=10; 1856 str+=10; 1857 remaining -= 10; 1858 } 1859 else 1860 { 1861 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */ 1862 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; 1863 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1; 1864 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) 1865 return 0; 1866 memcpy(p,str,12); 1867 p+=12; 1868 str+=12; 1869 remaining -= 12; 1870 } 1871 1872 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) 1873 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } 1874 else 1875 { 1876 /* SS (seconds) */ 1877 if (remaining < 2) 1878 return 0; 1879 *(p++)= *(str++); 1880 *(p++)= *(str++); 1881 remaining -= 2; 1882 /* Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds... 1883 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden. 1884 * Can we just kill them altogether? */ 1885 if (remaining && *str == '.') 1886 { 1887 str++; 1888 remaining--; 1889 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) 1890 { 1891 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9') 1892 break; 1893 } 1894 } 1895 1896 } 1897 *(p++)='Z'; 1898 *(p++)='\0'; 1899 1900 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */ 1901 if (!remaining) 1902 return 0; 1903 if (*str == 'Z') 1904 { 1905 if (remaining != 1) 1906 return 0; 1907 offset=0; 1908 } 1909 else 1910 { 1911 /* (+-)HHMM */ 1912 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) 1913 return 0; 1914 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */ 1915 if (remaining != 5) 1916 return 0; 1917 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' || 1918 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9') 1919 return 0; 1920 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; 1921 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); 1922 if (*str == '-') 1923 offset= -offset; 1924 } 1925 atm.type=ctm->type; 1926 atm.flags = 0; 1927 atm.length=sizeof(buff2); 1928 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; 1929 1930 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL) 1931 return 0; 1932 1933 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1934 { 1935 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); 1936 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ 1937 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); 1938 if (j < 50) j+=100; 1939 1940 if (i < j) return -1; 1941 if (i > j) return 1; 1942 } 1943 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); 1944 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ 1945 return -1; 1946 else 1947 return i; 1948 } 1949 1950 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) 1951 { 1952 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); 1953 } 1954 1955 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1956 { 1957 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); 1958 } 1959 1960 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, 1961 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1962 { 1963 time_t t = 0; 1964 1965 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; 1966 else time(&t); 1967 1968 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) 1969 { 1970 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1971 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1972 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) 1973 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, 1974 offset_sec); 1975 } 1976 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1977 } 1978 1979 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */ 1980 1981 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, 1982 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) 1983 { 1984 X509_CRL *crl = NULL; 1985 int i; 1986 size_t j; 1987 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; 1988 /* CRLs can't be delta already */ 1989 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) 1990 { 1991 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); 1992 return NULL; 1993 } 1994 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ 1995 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) 1996 { 1997 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); 1998 return NULL; 1999 } 2000 /* Issuer names must match */ 2001 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), 2002 X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) 2003 { 2004 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); 2005 return NULL; 2006 } 2007 /* AKID and IDP must match */ 2008 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) 2009 { 2010 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); 2011 return NULL; 2012 } 2013 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) 2014 { 2015 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); 2016 return NULL; 2017 } 2018 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ 2019 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) 2020 { 2021 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); 2022 return NULL; 2023 } 2024 /* CRLs must verify */ 2025 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || 2026 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) 2027 { 2028 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); 2029 return NULL; 2030 } 2031 /* Create new CRL */ 2032 crl = X509_CRL_new(); 2033 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) 2034 goto memerr; 2035 /* Set issuer name */ 2036 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) 2037 goto memerr; 2038 2039 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer))) 2040 goto memerr; 2041 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer))) 2042 goto memerr; 2043 2044 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ 2045 2046 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) 2047 goto memerr; 2048 2049 /* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set 2050 * CRL number to correct value too. 2051 */ 2052 2053 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) 2054 { 2055 X509_EXTENSION *ext; 2056 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); 2057 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) 2058 goto memerr; 2059 } 2060 2061 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ 2062 2063 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); 2064 2065 for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); j++) 2066 { 2067 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; 2068 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, j); 2069 /* Add only if not also in base. 2070 * TODO: need something cleverer here for some more complex 2071 * CRLs covering multiple CAs. 2072 */ 2073 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) 2074 { 2075 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); 2076 if (!rvtmp) 2077 goto memerr; 2078 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) 2079 { 2080 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); 2081 goto memerr; 2082 } 2083 } 2084 } 2085 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ 2086 2087 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) 2088 goto memerr; 2089 2090 return crl; 2091 2092 memerr: 2093 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2094 if (crl) 2095 X509_CRL_free(crl); 2096 return NULL; 2097 } 2098 2099 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused, 2100 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) 2101 { 2102 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by 2103 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */ 2104 int index; 2105 if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, 2106 dup_func, free_func)) 2107 { 2108 return -1; 2109 } 2110 return index; 2111 } 2112 2113 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) 2114 { 2115 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data); 2116 } 2117 2118 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) 2119 { 2120 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx); 2121 } 2122 2123 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2124 { 2125 return ctx->error; 2126 } 2127 2128 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) 2129 { 2130 ctx->error=err; 2131 } 2132 2133 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2134 { 2135 return ctx->error_depth; 2136 } 2137 2138 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2139 { 2140 return ctx->current_cert; 2141 } 2142 2143 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2144 { 2145 return ctx->chain; 2146 } 2147 2148 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2149 { 2150 if (!ctx->chain) 2151 return NULL; 2152 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); 2153 } 2154 2155 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2156 { 2157 return ctx->current_issuer; 2158 } 2159 2160 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2161 { 2162 return ctx->current_crl; 2163 } 2164 2165 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2166 { 2167 return ctx->parent; 2168 } 2169 2170 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 2171 { 2172 ctx->cert=x; 2173 } 2174 2175 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 2176 { 2177 ctx->untrusted=sk; 2178 } 2179 2180 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) 2181 { 2182 ctx->crls=sk; 2183 } 2184 2185 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) 2186 { 2187 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); 2188 } 2189 2190 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) 2191 { 2192 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); 2193 } 2194 2195 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust 2196 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its 2197 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by 2198 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default 2199 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value. 2200 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own 2201 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they 2202 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server. 2203 */ 2204 2205 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, 2206 int purpose, int trust) 2207 { 2208 int idx; 2209 /* If purpose not set use default */ 2210 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; 2211 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ 2212 if (purpose) 2213 { 2214 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; 2215 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); 2216 if (idx == -1) 2217 { 2218 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 2219 return 0; 2220 } 2221 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 2222 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) 2223 { 2224 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); 2225 if (idx == -1) 2226 { 2227 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 2228 return 0; 2229 } 2230 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 2231 } 2232 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ 2233 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; 2234 } 2235 if (trust) 2236 { 2237 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); 2238 if (idx == -1) 2239 { 2240 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); 2241 return 0; 2242 } 2243 } 2244 2245 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose; 2246 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust; 2247 return 1; 2248 } 2249 2250 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) 2251 { 2252 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; 2253 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 2254 if (!ctx) 2255 { 2256 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2257 return NULL; 2258 } 2259 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 2260 return ctx; 2261 } 2262 2263 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2264 { 2265 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); 2266 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 2267 } 2268 2269 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, 2270 STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 2271 { 2272 int ret = 1; 2273 2274 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 2275 ctx->ctx=store; 2276 ctx->cert=x509; 2277 ctx->untrusted=chain; 2278 2279 CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data); 2280 2281 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); 2282 if (!ctx->param) 2283 goto err; 2284 2285 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set 2286 * use defaults. */ 2287 2288 if (store) 2289 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); 2290 else 2291 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; 2292 2293 if (store) 2294 { 2295 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 2296 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; 2297 } 2298 else 2299 ctx->cleanup = 0; 2300 2301 if (ret) 2302 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, 2303 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); 2304 2305 if (ret == 0) 2306 goto err; 2307 2308 if (store && store->check_issued) 2309 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; 2310 else 2311 ctx->check_issued = check_issued; 2312 2313 if (store && store->get_issuer) 2314 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; 2315 else 2316 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; 2317 2318 if (store && store->verify_cb) 2319 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 2320 else 2321 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; 2322 2323 if (store && store->verify) 2324 ctx->verify = store->verify; 2325 else 2326 ctx->verify = internal_verify; 2327 2328 if (store && store->check_revocation) 2329 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; 2330 else 2331 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; 2332 2333 if (store && store->get_crl) 2334 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; 2335 else 2336 ctx->get_crl = NULL; 2337 2338 if (store && store->check_crl) 2339 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; 2340 else 2341 ctx->check_crl = check_crl; 2342 2343 if (store && store->cert_crl) 2344 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; 2345 else 2346 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; 2347 2348 if (store && store->lookup_certs) 2349 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; 2350 else 2351 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; 2352 2353 if (store && store->lookup_crls) 2354 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; 2355 else 2356 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; 2357 2358 ctx->check_policy = check_policy; 2359 2360 return 1; 2361 2362 err: 2363 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data); 2364 if (ctx->param != NULL) 2365 { 2366 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2367 } 2368 2369 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 2370 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2371 return 0; 2372 } 2373 2374 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. 2375 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. 2376 */ 2377 2378 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 2379 { 2380 ctx->other_ctx = sk; 2381 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; 2382 } 2383 2384 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2385 { 2386 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx); 2387 if (ctx->param != NULL) 2388 { 2389 if (ctx->parent == NULL) 2390 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2391 ctx->param=NULL; 2392 } 2393 if (ctx->tree != NULL) 2394 { 2395 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); 2396 ctx->tree=NULL; 2397 } 2398 if (ctx->chain != NULL) 2399 { 2400 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free); 2401 ctx->chain=NULL; 2402 } 2403 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); 2404 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); 2405 } 2406 2407 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) 2408 { 2409 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); 2410 } 2411 2412 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) 2413 { 2414 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); 2415 } 2416 2417 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t) 2418 { 2419 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); 2420 } 2421 2422 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 2423 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) 2424 { 2425 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb; 2426 } 2427 2428 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2429 { 2430 return ctx->tree; 2431 } 2432 2433 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2434 { 2435 return ctx->explicit_policy; 2436 } 2437 2438 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) 2439 { 2440 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; 2441 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); 2442 if (!param) 2443 return 0; 2444 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); 2445 } 2446 2447 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2448 { 2449 return ctx->param; 2450 } 2451 2452 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) 2453 { 2454 if (ctx->param) 2455 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2456 ctx->param = param; 2457 } 2458 2459 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) 2460 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 2461
