1 /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ 57 58 #include <string.h> 59 60 #include <openssl/asn1.h> 61 #include <openssl/buf.h> 62 #include <openssl/digest.h> 63 #include <openssl/err.h> 64 #include <openssl/mem.h> 65 #include <openssl/obj.h> 66 #include <openssl/stack.h> 67 #include <openssl/x509.h> 68 #include <openssl/x509v3.h> 69 70 71 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 72 { 73 int i; 74 X509_CINF *ai,*bi; 75 76 ai=a->cert_info; 77 bi=b->cert_info; 78 i=M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber,bi->serialNumber); 79 if (i) return(i); 80 return(X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer,bi->issuer)); 81 } 82 83 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) 84 { 85 unsigned long ret=0; 86 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 87 unsigned char md[16]; 88 char *f; 89 90 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 91 f=X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,NULL,0); 92 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) 93 goto err; 94 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)f,strlen(f))) 95 goto err; 96 OPENSSL_free(f); 97 if(!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data, 98 (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length)) 99 goto err; 100 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,&(md[0]),NULL)) 101 goto err; 102 ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)| 103 ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L) 104 )&0xffffffffL; 105 err: 106 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 107 return(ret); 108 } 109 110 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 111 { 112 return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer,b->cert_info->issuer)); 113 } 114 115 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 116 { 117 return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject,b->cert_info->subject)); 118 } 119 120 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) 121 { 122 return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer,b->crl->issuer)); 123 } 124 125 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) 126 { 127 return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); 128 } 129 130 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a) 131 { 132 return(a->cert_info->issuer); 133 } 134 135 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) 136 { 137 return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer)); 138 } 139 140 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) 141 { 142 return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); 143 } 144 145 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a) 146 { 147 return(a->cert_info->subject); 148 } 149 150 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) 151 { 152 return(a->cert_info->serialNumber); 153 } 154 155 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) 156 { 157 return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject)); 158 } 159 160 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) 161 { 162 return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject)); 163 } 164 165 /* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for 166 * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally 167 * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in 168 * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may 169 * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring 170 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point 171 * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt 172 * with an evil cast. 173 */ 174 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 175 { 176 int rv; 177 /* ensure hash is valid */ 178 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); 179 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); 180 181 rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); 182 if (rv) 183 return rv; 184 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ 185 if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) 186 { 187 rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len); 188 if (rv) 189 return rv; 190 return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc, 191 a->cert_info->enc.len); 192 } 193 return rv; 194 } 195 196 197 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) 198 { 199 int ret; 200 201 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ 202 203 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) 204 { 205 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); 206 if (ret < 0) 207 return -2; 208 } 209 210 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) 211 { 212 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); 213 if (ret < 0) 214 return -2; 215 } 216 217 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; 218 219 if (ret) 220 return ret; 221 222 return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); 223 224 } 225 226 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) 227 { 228 unsigned long ret=0; 229 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 230 231 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ 232 i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL); 233 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), 234 NULL)) 235 return 0; 236 237 ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)| 238 ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L) 239 )&0xffffffffL; 240 return(ret); 241 } 242 243 244 /* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, 245 * this is reasonably efficient. */ 246 247 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) 248 { 249 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 250 unsigned long ret=0; 251 unsigned char md[16]; 252 253 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ 254 i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL); 255 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 256 /* EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); */ 257 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) 258 && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) 259 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,md,NULL)) 260 ret=(((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)| 261 ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L) 262 )&0xffffffffL; 263 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 264 265 return(ret); 266 } 267 268 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ 269 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, 270 ASN1_INTEGER *serial) 271 { 272 size_t i; 273 X509_CINF cinf; 274 X509 x,*x509=NULL; 275 276 if(!sk) return NULL; 277 278 x.cert_info= &cinf; 279 cinf.serialNumber=serial; 280 cinf.issuer=name; 281 282 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++) 283 { 284 x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i); 285 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509,&x) == 0) 286 return(x509); 287 } 288 return(NULL); 289 } 290 291 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) 292 { 293 X509 *x509; 294 size_t i; 295 296 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++) 297 { 298 x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i); 299 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509),name) == 0) 300 return(x509); 301 } 302 return(NULL); 303 } 304 305 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) 306 { 307 if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL)) 308 return(NULL); 309 return(X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); 310 } 311 312 ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) 313 { 314 if(!x) return NULL; 315 return x->cert_info->key->public_key; 316 } 317 318 319 int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) 320 { 321 EVP_PKEY *xk; 322 int ret; 323 324 xk=X509_get_pubkey(x); 325 326 if (xk) 327 ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); 328 else 329 ret = -2; 330 331 switch (ret) 332 { 333 case 1: 334 break; 335 case 0: 336 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); 337 break; 338 case -1: 339 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); 340 break; 341 case -2: 342 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); 343 } 344 if (xk) 345 EVP_PKEY_free(xk); 346 if (ret > 0) 347 return 1; 348 return 0; 349 } 350 351 /* Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and 352 * the NID of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is 353 * a pointer to a flags field which must contain the suite B verification 354 * flags. 355 */ 356 357 358 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) 359 { 360 const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; 361 int curve_nid; 362 if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 363 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec); 364 if (!grp) 365 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; 366 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); 367 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ 368 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) /* P-384 */ 369 { 370 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with 371 * curve. 372 */ 373 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) 374 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; 375 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) 376 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; 377 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ 378 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; 379 } 380 else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) /* P-256 */ 381 { 382 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) 383 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; 384 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) 385 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; 386 } 387 else 388 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; 389 390 return X509_V_OK; 391 } 392 393 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, 394 unsigned long flags) 395 { 396 int rv, sign_nid; 397 size_t i; 398 EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; 399 unsigned long tflags; 400 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) 401 return X509_V_OK; 402 tflags = flags; 403 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ 404 if (x == NULL) 405 { 406 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); 407 i = 1; 408 } 409 else 410 i = 0; 411 412 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) 413 { 414 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; 415 /* Correct error depth */ 416 i = 0; 417 goto end; 418 } 419 420 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); 421 /* Check EE key only */ 422 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); 423 if (rv != X509_V_OK) 424 { 425 /* Correct error depth */ 426 i = 0; 427 goto end; 428 } 429 for(; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 430 { 431 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); 432 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 433 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) 434 { 435 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; 436 goto end; 437 } 438 EVP_PKEY_free(pk); 439 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); 440 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); 441 if (rv != X509_V_OK) 442 goto end; 443 } 444 445 /* Final check: root CA signature */ 446 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); 447 end: 448 if (pk) 449 EVP_PKEY_free(pk); 450 if (rv != X509_V_OK) 451 { 452 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ 453 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM 454 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) 455 i--; 456 /* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing 457 * P-384 with P-256. Use more meaninggul error. 458 */ 459 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) 460 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; 461 if (perror_depth) 462 *perror_depth = i; 463 } 464 return rv; 465 } 466 467 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) 468 { 469 int sign_nid; 470 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) 471 return X509_V_OK; 472 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm); 473 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); 474 } 475 476 /* Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference 477 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref 478 * of each X509 structure. 479 */ 480 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 481 { 482 STACK_OF(X509) *ret; 483 size_t i; 484 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); 485 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) 486 { 487 X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i)); 488 } 489 return ret; 490 } 491
