1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 2 * All rights reserved. 3 * 4 * This package is an SSL implementation written 5 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 7 * 8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 14 * 15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 16 * the code are not to be removed. 17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 18 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 21 * 22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 24 * are met: 25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 31 * must display the following acknowledgement: 32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 33 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 39 * 40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 50 * SUCH DAMAGE. 51 * 52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 54 * copied and put under another distribution licence 55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ 56 57 #include <string.h> 58 #include <time.h> 59 60 #include <openssl/asn1.h> 61 #include <openssl/buf.h> 62 #include <openssl/err.h> 63 #include <openssl/evp.h> 64 #include <openssl/lhash.h> 65 #include <openssl/mem.h> 66 #include <openssl/obj.h> 67 #include <openssl/thread.h> 68 #include <openssl/x509.h> 69 #include <openssl/x509v3.h> 70 71 #include "vpm_int.h" 72 #include "../internal.h" 73 74 static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = 75 CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA; 76 77 /* CRL score values */ 78 79 /* No unhandled critical extensions */ 80 81 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 82 83 /* certificate is within CRL scope */ 84 85 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 86 87 /* CRL times valid */ 88 89 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 90 91 /* Issuer name matches certificate */ 92 93 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 94 95 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ 96 97 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) 98 99 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ 100 101 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 102 103 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ 104 105 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 106 107 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ 108 109 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 110 111 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ 112 113 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 114 115 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); 116 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); 117 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); 118 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 119 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 120 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 121 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 122 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 123 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 124 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 125 126 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 127 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); 128 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 129 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); 130 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, 131 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, 132 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); 133 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, 134 int *pcrl_score); 135 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 136 unsigned int *preasons); 137 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); 138 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 139 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 140 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); 141 142 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 143 144 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) 145 { 146 return ok; 147 } 148 149 #if 0 150 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) 151 { 152 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b); 153 } 154 #endif 155 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */ 156 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x) 157 { 158 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); 159 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) 160 return 1; 161 else 162 return 0; 163 } 164 165 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ 166 167 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 168 { 169 STACK_OF(X509) *certs; 170 X509 *xtmp = NULL; 171 size_t i; 172 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ 173 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); 174 if (certs == NULL) 175 return NULL; 176 /* Look for exact match */ 177 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { 178 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); 179 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) 180 break; 181 } 182 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) 183 X509_up_ref(xtmp); 184 else 185 xtmp = NULL; 186 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); 187 return xtmp; 188 } 189 190 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 191 { 192 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL; 193 int bad_chain = 0; 194 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; 195 int depth, i, ok = 0; 196 int num, j, retry, trust; 197 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 198 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; 199 if (ctx->cert == NULL) { 200 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); 201 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; 202 return -1; 203 } 204 if (ctx->chain != NULL) { 205 /* 206 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We 207 * cannot do another one. 208 */ 209 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); 210 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; 211 return -1; 212 } 213 214 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 215 216 /* 217 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that 218 * the first entry is in place 219 */ 220 ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null(); 221 if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) { 222 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 223 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 224 goto end; 225 } 226 X509_up_ref(ctx->cert); 227 ctx->last_untrusted = 1; 228 229 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it. 230 * sktmp = ctx->untrusted ++ ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted */ 231 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL 232 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { 233 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 234 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 235 goto end; 236 } 237 238 if (ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted != NULL) { 239 if (sktmp == NULL) { 240 sktmp = sk_X509_new_null(); 241 if (sktmp == NULL) { 242 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 243 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 244 goto end; 245 } 246 } 247 248 for (size_t k = 0; k < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted); 249 k++) { 250 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, 251 sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted, 252 k))) { 253 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 254 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 255 goto end; 256 } 257 } 258 } 259 260 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 261 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); 262 depth = param->depth; 263 264 for (;;) { 265 /* If we have enough, we break */ 266 if (depth < num) 267 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take 268 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the 269 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code 270 * later. */ 271 272 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 273 if (cert_self_signed(x)) 274 break; 275 /* 276 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first 277 */ 278 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) { 279 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 280 if (ok < 0) { 281 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; 282 goto end; 283 } 284 /* 285 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up 286 * again later. 287 */ 288 if (ok > 0) { 289 X509_free(xtmp); 290 break; 291 } 292 } 293 294 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ 295 if (sktmp != NULL) { 296 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); 297 if (xtmp != NULL) { 298 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { 299 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 300 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 301 ok = 0; 302 goto end; 303 } 304 X509_up_ref(xtmp); 305 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); 306 ctx->last_untrusted++; 307 x = xtmp; 308 num++; 309 /* 310 * reparse the full chain for the next one 311 */ 312 continue; 313 } 314 } 315 break; 316 } 317 318 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */ 319 j = num; 320 /* 321 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates. 322 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we 323 * complain. 324 */ 325 326 do { 327 /* 328 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed. 329 */ 330 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 331 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); 332 if (cert_self_signed(x)) { 333 /* we have a self signed certificate */ 334 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) { 335 /* 336 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can 337 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid 338 * possible impersonation. 339 */ 340 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 341 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) { 342 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; 343 ctx->current_cert = x; 344 ctx->error_depth = i - 1; 345 if (ok == 1) 346 X509_free(xtmp); 347 bad_chain = 1; 348 ok = cb(0, ctx); 349 if (!ok) 350 goto end; 351 } else { 352 /* 353 * We have a match: replace certificate with store 354 * version so we get any trust settings. 355 */ 356 X509_free(x); 357 x = xtmp; 358 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); 359 ctx->last_untrusted = 0; 360 } 361 } else { 362 /* 363 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use 364 */ 365 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); 366 ctx->last_untrusted--; 367 num--; 368 j--; 369 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); 370 } 371 } 372 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ 373 for (;;) { 374 /* If we have enough, we break */ 375 if (depth < num) 376 break; 377 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 378 if (cert_self_signed(x)) 379 break; 380 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 381 382 if (ok < 0) { 383 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; 384 goto end; 385 } 386 if (ok == 0) 387 break; 388 x = xtmp; 389 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { 390 X509_free(xtmp); 391 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 392 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 393 ok = 0; 394 goto end; 395 } 396 num++; 397 } 398 399 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ 400 trust = check_trust(ctx); 401 402 /* If explicitly rejected error */ 403 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { 404 ok = 0; 405 goto end; 406 } 407 /* 408 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative 409 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already 410 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate 411 * chain checking 412 */ 413 retry = 0; 414 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED 415 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) 416 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) { 417 while (j-- > 1) { 418 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1); 419 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2); 420 if (ok < 0) 421 goto end; 422 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */ 423 if (ok > 0) { 424 /* 425 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later 426 */ 427 X509_free(xtmp); 428 429 /* 430 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an 431 * alternate chain 432 */ 433 while (num > j) { 434 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); 435 X509_free(xtmp); 436 num--; 437 } 438 ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 439 retry = 1; 440 break; 441 } 442 } 443 } 444 } while (retry); 445 446 /* 447 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single 448 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already 449 * and set bad_chain == 1 450 */ 451 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) { 452 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) { 453 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) 454 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; 455 else 456 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; 457 ctx->current_cert = x; 458 } else { 459 460 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss); 461 num++; 462 ctx->last_untrusted = num; 463 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss; 464 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; 465 chain_ss = NULL; 466 } 467 468 ctx->error_depth = num - 1; 469 bad_chain = 1; 470 ok = cb(0, ctx); 471 if (!ok) 472 goto end; 473 } 474 475 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ 476 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); 477 478 if (!ok) 479 goto end; 480 481 /* Check name constraints */ 482 483 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); 484 485 if (!ok) 486 goto end; 487 488 ok = check_id(ctx); 489 490 if (!ok) 491 goto end; 492 493 /* 494 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because 495 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification. 496 */ 497 498 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); 499 if (!ok) 500 goto end; 501 502 int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, 503 ctx->param->flags); 504 if (err != X509_V_OK) { 505 ctx->error = err; 506 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth); 507 ok = cb(0, ctx); 508 if (!ok) 509 goto end; 510 } 511 512 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ 513 if (ctx->verify != NULL) 514 ok = ctx->verify(ctx); 515 else 516 ok = internal_verify(ctx); 517 if (!ok) 518 goto end; 519 520 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ 521 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) 522 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); 523 524 end: 525 if (sktmp != NULL) 526 sk_X509_free(sktmp); 527 if (chain_ss != NULL) 528 X509_free(chain_ss); 529 530 /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */ 531 if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) 532 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; 533 return ok; 534 } 535 536 /* 537 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) 538 */ 539 540 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) 541 { 542 size_t i; 543 X509 *issuer; 544 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { 545 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 546 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) 547 return issuer; 548 } 549 return NULL; 550 } 551 552 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ 553 554 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) 555 { 556 int ret; 557 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); 558 if (ret == X509_V_OK) 559 return 1; 560 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ 561 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) 562 return 0; 563 564 ctx->error = ret; 565 ctx->current_cert = x; 566 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 567 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 568 } 569 570 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ 571 572 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 573 { 574 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); 575 if (*issuer) { 576 X509_up_ref(*issuer); 577 return 1; 578 } else 579 return 0; 580 } 581 582 /* 583 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied 584 * purpose 585 */ 586 587 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 588 { 589 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; 590 X509 *x; 591 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 592 int proxy_path_length = 0; 593 int purpose; 594 int allow_proxy_certs; 595 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 596 597 /* 598 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: -1: we accept both CA and non-CA 599 * certificates, to allow direct use of self-signed certificates (which 600 * are marked as CA). 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is 601 * currently not used, but the possibility is present for future 602 * extensions. 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used 603 * for all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. 604 */ 605 must_be_ca = -1; 606 607 /* CRL path validation */ 608 if (ctx->parent) { 609 allow_proxy_certs = 0; 610 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; 611 } else { 612 allow_proxy_certs = 613 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); 614 purpose = ctx->param->purpose; 615 } 616 617 /* Check all untrusted certificates */ 618 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) { 619 int ret; 620 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 621 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 622 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { 623 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; 624 ctx->error_depth = i; 625 ctx->current_cert = x; 626 ok = cb(0, ctx); 627 if (!ok) 628 goto end; 629 } 630 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { 631 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; 632 ctx->error_depth = i; 633 ctx->current_cert = x; 634 ok = cb(0, ctx); 635 if (!ok) 636 goto end; 637 } 638 ret = X509_check_ca(x); 639 switch (must_be_ca) { 640 case -1: 641 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 642 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { 643 ret = 0; 644 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 645 } else 646 ret = 1; 647 break; 648 case 0: 649 if (ret != 0) { 650 ret = 0; 651 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; 652 } else 653 ret = 1; 654 break; 655 default: 656 if ((ret == 0) 657 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 658 && (ret != 1))) { 659 ret = 0; 660 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 661 } else 662 ret = 1; 663 break; 664 } 665 if (ret == 0) { 666 ctx->error_depth = i; 667 ctx->current_cert = x; 668 ok = cb(0, ctx); 669 if (!ok) 670 goto end; 671 } 672 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) { 673 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); 674 if ((ret == 0) 675 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 676 && (ret != 1))) { 677 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; 678 ctx->error_depth = i; 679 ctx->current_cert = x; 680 ok = cb(0, ctx); 681 if (!ok) 682 goto end; 683 } 684 } 685 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ 686 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) 687 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) 688 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { 689 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 690 ctx->error_depth = i; 691 ctx->current_cert = x; 692 ok = cb(0, ctx); 693 if (!ok) 694 goto end; 695 } 696 /* Increment path length if not self issued */ 697 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 698 plen++; 699 /* 700 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate 701 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, 702 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. 703 */ 704 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { 705 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) { 706 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 707 ctx->error_depth = i; 708 ctx->current_cert = x; 709 ok = cb(0, ctx); 710 if (!ok) 711 goto end; 712 } 713 proxy_path_length++; 714 must_be_ca = 0; 715 } else 716 must_be_ca = 1; 717 } 718 ok = 1; 719 end: 720 return ok; 721 } 722 723 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 724 { 725 X509 *x; 726 int i, j, rv; 727 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ 728 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 729 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 730 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ 731 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 732 continue; 733 /* 734 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain 735 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed 736 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them 737 * to be obeyed. 738 */ 739 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { 740 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; 741 if (nc) { 742 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); 743 switch (rv) { 744 case X509_V_OK: 745 continue; 746 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: 747 ctx->error = rv; 748 return 0; 749 default: 750 ctx->error = rv; 751 ctx->error_depth = i; 752 ctx->current_cert = x; 753 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 754 return 0; 755 break; 756 } 757 } 758 } 759 } 760 return 1; 761 } 762 763 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) 764 { 765 ctx->error = errcode; 766 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert; 767 ctx->error_depth = 0; 768 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 769 } 770 771 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id) 772 { 773 size_t i; 774 size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts); 775 char *name; 776 777 if (id->peername != NULL) { 778 OPENSSL_free(id->peername); 779 id->peername = NULL; 780 } 781 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { 782 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i); 783 if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), id->hostflags, 784 &id->peername) > 0) 785 return 1; 786 } 787 return n == 0; 788 } 789 790 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 791 { 792 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; 793 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id; 794 X509 *x = ctx->cert; 795 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) { 796 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) 797 return 0; 798 } 799 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { 800 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) 801 return 0; 802 } 803 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) { 804 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) 805 return 0; 806 } 807 return 1; 808 } 809 810 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 811 { 812 size_t i; 813 int ok; 814 X509 *x = NULL; 815 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 816 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 817 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */ 818 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { 819 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 820 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); 821 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ 822 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) 823 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; 824 /* 825 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not 826 * overridden. 827 */ 828 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { 829 ctx->error_depth = i; 830 ctx->current_cert = x; 831 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; 832 ok = cb(0, ctx); 833 if (!ok) 834 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; 835 } 836 } 837 /* 838 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate 839 * return success. 840 */ 841 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { 842 X509 *mx; 843 if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain)) 844 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; 845 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0); 846 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); 847 if (mx) { 848 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); 849 X509_free(x); 850 ctx->last_untrusted = 0; 851 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; 852 } 853 } 854 855 /* 856 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow 857 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. 858 */ 859 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; 860 } 861 862 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 863 { 864 int i, last, ok; 865 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) 866 return 1; 867 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) 868 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 869 else { 870 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ 871 if (ctx->parent) 872 return 1; 873 last = 0; 874 } 875 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { 876 ctx->error_depth = i; 877 ok = check_cert(ctx); 878 if (!ok) 879 return ok; 880 } 881 return 1; 882 } 883 884 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 885 { 886 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 887 X509 *x; 888 int ok = 0, cnum; 889 unsigned int last_reasons; 890 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 891 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); 892 ctx->current_cert = x; 893 ctx->current_issuer = NULL; 894 ctx->current_crl_score = 0; 895 ctx->current_reasons = 0; 896 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { 897 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; 898 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ 899 if (ctx->get_crl) 900 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); 901 else 902 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); 903 /* 904 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback 905 */ 906 if (!ok) { 907 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 908 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 909 goto err; 910 } 911 ctx->current_crl = crl; 912 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); 913 if (!ok) 914 goto err; 915 916 if (dcrl) { 917 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); 918 if (!ok) 919 goto err; 920 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); 921 if (!ok) 922 goto err; 923 } else 924 ok = 1; 925 926 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ 927 if (ok != 2) { 928 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); 929 if (!ok) 930 goto err; 931 } 932 933 X509_CRL_free(crl); 934 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 935 crl = NULL; 936 dcrl = NULL; 937 /* 938 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration, 939 * so exit loop. 940 */ 941 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { 942 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 943 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 944 goto err; 945 } 946 } 947 err: 948 X509_CRL_free(crl); 949 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 950 951 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 952 return ok; 953 954 } 955 956 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ 957 958 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) 959 { 960 time_t *ptime; 961 int i; 962 if (notify) 963 ctx->current_crl = crl; 964 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 965 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 966 else 967 ptime = NULL; 968 969 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); 970 if (i == 0) { 971 if (!notify) 972 return 0; 973 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; 974 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 975 return 0; 976 } 977 978 if (i > 0) { 979 if (!notify) 980 return 0; 981 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; 982 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 983 return 0; 984 } 985 986 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) { 987 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); 988 989 if (i == 0) { 990 if (!notify) 991 return 0; 992 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; 993 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 994 return 0; 995 } 996 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ 997 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { 998 if (!notify) 999 return 0; 1000 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; 1001 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1002 return 0; 1003 } 1004 } 1005 1006 if (notify) 1007 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 1008 1009 return 1; 1010 } 1011 1012 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, 1013 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, 1014 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 1015 { 1016 int crl_score, best_score = *pscore; 1017 size_t i; 1018 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; 1019 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; 1020 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; 1021 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; 1022 1023 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { 1024 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 1025 reasons = *preasons; 1026 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); 1027 if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0) 1028 continue; 1029 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */ 1030 if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) { 1031 int day, sec; 1032 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl), 1033 X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) 1034 continue; 1035 /* 1036 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day| 1037 * and |sec|. 1038 */ 1039 if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0) 1040 continue; 1041 } 1042 best_crl = crl; 1043 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; 1044 best_score = crl_score; 1045 best_reasons = reasons; 1046 } 1047 1048 if (best_crl) { 1049 if (*pcrl) 1050 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); 1051 *pcrl = best_crl; 1052 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; 1053 *pscore = best_score; 1054 *preasons = best_reasons; 1055 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl); 1056 if (*pdcrl) { 1057 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); 1058 *pdcrl = NULL; 1059 } 1060 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); 1061 } 1062 1063 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) 1064 return 1; 1065 1066 return 0; 1067 } 1068 1069 /* 1070 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be 1071 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. 1072 */ 1073 1074 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) 1075 { 1076 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; 1077 int i; 1078 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); 1079 if (i >= 0) { 1080 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ 1081 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) 1082 return 0; 1083 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); 1084 } else 1085 exta = NULL; 1086 1087 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); 1088 1089 if (i >= 0) { 1090 1091 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) 1092 return 0; 1093 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); 1094 } else 1095 extb = NULL; 1096 1097 if (!exta && !extb) 1098 return 1; 1099 1100 if (!exta || !extb) 1101 return 0; 1102 1103 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) 1104 return 0; 1105 1106 return 1; 1107 } 1108 1109 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ 1110 1111 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) 1112 { 1113 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ 1114 if (!delta->base_crl_number) 1115 return 0; 1116 /* Base must have a CRL number */ 1117 if (!base->crl_number) 1118 return 0; 1119 /* Issuer names must match */ 1120 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) 1121 return 0; 1122 /* AKID and IDP must match */ 1123 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) 1124 return 0; 1125 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) 1126 return 0; 1127 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ 1128 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 1129 return 0; 1130 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ 1131 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 1132 return 1; 1133 return 0; 1134 } 1135 1136 /* 1137 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or 1138 * retrieve a chain of deltas... 1139 */ 1140 1141 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, 1142 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 1143 { 1144 X509_CRL *delta; 1145 size_t i; 1146 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) 1147 return; 1148 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) 1149 return; 1150 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { 1151 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 1152 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { 1153 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) 1154 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; 1155 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta); 1156 *dcrl = delta; 1157 return; 1158 } 1159 } 1160 *dcrl = NULL; 1161 } 1162 1163 /* 1164 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 1165 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not 1166 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is 1167 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL 1168 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. 1169 */ 1170 1171 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 1172 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 1173 { 1174 1175 int crl_score = 0; 1176 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; 1177 1178 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ 1179 1180 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ 1181 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) 1182 return 0; 1183 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ 1184 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { 1185 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) 1186 return 0; 1187 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { 1188 /* If no new reasons reject */ 1189 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 1190 return 0; 1191 } 1192 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ 1193 else if (crl->base_crl_number) 1194 return 0; 1195 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ 1196 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { 1197 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) 1198 return 0; 1199 } else 1200 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; 1201 1202 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 1203 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; 1204 1205 /* Check expiry */ 1206 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) 1207 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; 1208 1209 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ 1210 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); 1211 1212 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ 1213 1214 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) 1215 return 0; 1216 1217 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ 1218 1219 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { 1220 /* If no new reasons reject */ 1221 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 1222 return 0; 1223 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; 1224 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; 1225 } 1226 1227 *preasons = tmp_reasons; 1228 1229 return crl_score; 1230 1231 } 1232 1233 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, 1234 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) 1235 { 1236 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; 1237 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1238 int cidx = ctx->error_depth; 1239 size_t i; 1240 1241 if ((size_t)cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) 1242 cidx++; 1243 1244 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1245 1246 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { 1247 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { 1248 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; 1249 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1250 return; 1251 } 1252 } 1253 1254 for (cidx++; cidx < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { 1255 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1256 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1257 continue; 1258 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { 1259 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; 1260 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1261 return; 1262 } 1263 } 1264 1265 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ 1266 1267 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) 1268 return; 1269 1270 /* 1271 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of 1272 * untrusted certificates. 1273 */ 1274 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { 1275 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); 1276 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1277 continue; 1278 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { 1279 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1280 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; 1281 return; 1282 } 1283 } 1284 1285 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted); i++) { 1286 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted, i); 1287 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1288 continue; 1289 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { 1290 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1291 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; 1292 return; 1293 } 1294 } 1295 } 1296 1297 /* 1298 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new 1299 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the 1300 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will 1301 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. 1302 */ 1303 1304 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1305 { 1306 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; 1307 int ret; 1308 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ 1309 if (ctx->parent) 1310 return 0; 1311 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) 1312 return -1; 1313 1314 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; 1315 /* Copy verify params across */ 1316 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); 1317 1318 crl_ctx.parent = ctx; 1319 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; 1320 1321 /* Verify CRL issuer */ 1322 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); 1323 1324 if (ret <= 0) 1325 goto err; 1326 1327 /* Check chain is acceptable */ 1328 1329 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); 1330 err: 1331 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); 1332 return ret; 1333 } 1334 1335 /* 1336 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and 1337 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could 1338 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more 1339 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, 1340 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the 1341 * RFC5280 version 1342 */ 1343 1344 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1345 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 1346 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) 1347 { 1348 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; 1349 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); 1350 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); 1351 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) 1352 return 1; 1353 return 0; 1354 } 1355 1356 /* 1357 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1. 1358 * Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 2. One full, one 1359 * relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 3. Both are full names and 1360 * compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 4. One is NULL: automatic match. 1361 */ 1362 1363 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) 1364 { 1365 X509_NAME *nm = NULL; 1366 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; 1367 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; 1368 size_t i, j; 1369 if (!a || !b) 1370 return 1; 1371 if (a->type == 1) { 1372 if (!a->dpname) 1373 return 0; 1374 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ 1375 if (b->type == 1) { 1376 if (!b->dpname) 1377 return 0; 1378 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) 1379 return 1; 1380 else 1381 return 0; 1382 } 1383 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1384 nm = a->dpname; 1385 gens = b->name.fullname; 1386 } else if (b->type == 1) { 1387 if (!b->dpname) 1388 return 0; 1389 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1390 gens = a->name.fullname; 1391 nm = b->dpname; 1392 } 1393 1394 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ 1395 if (nm) { 1396 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { 1397 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); 1398 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1399 continue; 1400 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) 1401 return 1; 1402 } 1403 return 0; 1404 } 1405 1406 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ 1407 1408 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { 1409 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); 1410 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { 1411 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); 1412 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) 1413 return 1; 1414 } 1415 } 1416 1417 return 0; 1418 1419 } 1420 1421 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) 1422 { 1423 size_t i; 1424 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1425 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ 1426 if (!dp->CRLissuer) 1427 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); 1428 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { 1429 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); 1430 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1431 continue; 1432 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) 1433 return 1; 1434 } 1435 return 0; 1436 } 1437 1438 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ 1439 1440 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 1441 unsigned int *preasons) 1442 { 1443 size_t i; 1444 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) 1445 return 0; 1446 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { 1447 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) 1448 return 0; 1449 } else { 1450 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) 1451 return 0; 1452 } 1453 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; 1454 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { 1455 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); 1456 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { 1457 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { 1458 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; 1459 return 1; 1460 } 1461 } 1462 } 1463 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) 1464 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) 1465 return 1; 1466 return 0; 1467 } 1468 1469 /* 1470 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try 1471 * to find a delta CRL too 1472 */ 1473 1474 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1475 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) 1476 { 1477 int ok; 1478 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1479 int crl_score = 0; 1480 unsigned int reasons; 1481 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 1482 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; 1483 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 1484 reasons = ctx->current_reasons; 1485 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 1486 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); 1487 1488 if (ok) 1489 goto done; 1490 1491 /* Lookup CRLs from store */ 1492 1493 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); 1494 1495 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ 1496 if (!skcrl && crl) 1497 goto done; 1498 1499 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); 1500 1501 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); 1502 1503 done: 1504 1505 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ 1506 if (crl) { 1507 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 1508 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; 1509 ctx->current_reasons = reasons; 1510 *pcrl = crl; 1511 *pdcrl = dcrl; 1512 return 1; 1513 } 1514 1515 return 0; 1516 } 1517 1518 /* Check CRL validity */ 1519 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) 1520 { 1521 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1522 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; 1523 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; 1524 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 1525 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 1526 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ 1527 if (ctx->current_issuer) 1528 issuer = ctx->current_issuer; 1529 1530 /* 1531 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next 1532 * certificate in chain. 1533 */ 1534 else if (cnum < chnum) 1535 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); 1536 else { 1537 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); 1538 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ 1539 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) { 1540 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; 1541 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1542 if (!ok) 1543 goto err; 1544 } 1545 } 1546 1547 if (issuer) { 1548 /* 1549 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done 1550 */ 1551 if (!crl->base_crl_number) { 1552 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ 1553 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && 1554 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) { 1555 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; 1556 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1557 if (!ok) 1558 goto err; 1559 } 1560 1561 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) { 1562 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; 1563 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1564 if (!ok) 1565 goto err; 1566 } 1567 1568 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) { 1569 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) { 1570 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; 1571 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1572 if (!ok) 1573 goto err; 1574 } 1575 } 1576 1577 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) { 1578 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; 1579 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1580 if (!ok) 1581 goto err; 1582 } 1583 1584 } 1585 1586 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) { 1587 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); 1588 if (!ok) 1589 goto err; 1590 } 1591 1592 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ 1593 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); 1594 1595 if (!ikey) { 1596 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1597 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1598 if (!ok) 1599 goto err; 1600 } else { 1601 int rv; 1602 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); 1603 if (rv != X509_V_OK) { 1604 ctx->error = rv; 1605 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1606 if (!ok) 1607 goto err; 1608 } 1609 /* Verify CRL signature */ 1610 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) { 1611 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1612 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1613 if (!ok) 1614 goto err; 1615 } 1616 } 1617 } 1618 1619 ok = 1; 1620 1621 err: 1622 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); 1623 return ok; 1624 } 1625 1626 /* Check certificate against CRL */ 1627 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 1628 { 1629 int ok; 1630 X509_REVOKED *rev; 1631 /* 1632 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled 1633 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate 1634 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can 1635 * change the meaning of CRL entries. 1636 */ 1637 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 1638 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { 1639 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; 1640 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1641 if (!ok) 1642 return 0; 1643 } 1644 /* 1645 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason 1646 * is not removeFromCRL. 1647 */ 1648 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { 1649 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) 1650 return 2; 1651 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; 1652 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1653 if (!ok) 1654 return 0; 1655 } 1656 1657 return 1; 1658 } 1659 1660 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1661 { 1662 int ret; 1663 if (ctx->parent) 1664 return 1; 1665 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, 1666 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); 1667 if (ret == 0) { 1668 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1669 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 1670 return 0; 1671 } 1672 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ 1673 if (ret == -1) { 1674 /* 1675 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. 1676 */ 1677 X509 *x; 1678 size_t i; 1679 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { 1680 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 1681 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) 1682 continue; 1683 ctx->current_cert = x; 1684 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; 1685 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1686 return 0; 1687 } 1688 return 1; 1689 } 1690 if (ret == -2) { 1691 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1692 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; 1693 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1694 } 1695 1696 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { 1697 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1698 /* 1699 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed 1700 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then 1701 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier 1702 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK. 1703 */ 1704 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) 1705 return 0; 1706 } 1707 1708 return 1; 1709 } 1710 1711 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1712 { 1713 time_t *ptime; 1714 int i; 1715 1716 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 1717 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 1718 else 1719 ptime = NULL; 1720 1721 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); 1722 if (i == 0) { 1723 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; 1724 ctx->current_cert = x; 1725 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1726 return 0; 1727 } 1728 1729 if (i > 0) { 1730 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; 1731 ctx->current_cert = x; 1732 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1733 return 0; 1734 } 1735 1736 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); 1737 if (i == 0) { 1738 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; 1739 ctx->current_cert = x; 1740 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1741 return 0; 1742 } 1743 1744 if (i < 0) { 1745 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; 1746 ctx->current_cert = x; 1747 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1748 return 0; 1749 } 1750 1751 return 1; 1752 } 1753 1754 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1755 { 1756 int ok = 0, n; 1757 X509 *xs, *xi; 1758 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 1759 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 1760 1761 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 1762 1763 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 1764 ctx->error_depth = n - 1; 1765 n--; 1766 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); 1767 1768 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) 1769 xs = xi; 1770 else { 1771 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { 1772 xs = xi; 1773 goto check_cert; 1774 } 1775 if (n <= 0) { 1776 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; 1777 ctx->current_cert = xi; 1778 ok = cb(0, ctx); 1779 goto end; 1780 } else { 1781 n--; 1782 ctx->error_depth = n; 1783 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); 1784 } 1785 } 1786 1787 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ 1788 while (n >= 0) { 1789 ctx->error_depth = n; 1790 1791 /* 1792 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless 1793 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes 1794 * time. 1795 */ 1796 if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) { 1797 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { 1798 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1799 ctx->current_cert = xi; 1800 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); 1801 if (!ok) 1802 goto end; 1803 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { 1804 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1805 ctx->current_cert = xs; 1806 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); 1807 if (!ok) { 1808 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1809 goto end; 1810 } 1811 } 1812 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1813 pkey = NULL; 1814 } 1815 1816 check_cert: 1817 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); 1818 if (!ok) 1819 goto end; 1820 1821 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ 1822 ctx->current_issuer = xi; 1823 ctx->current_cert = xs; 1824 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx); 1825 if (!ok) 1826 goto end; 1827 1828 n--; 1829 if (n >= 0) { 1830 xi = xs; 1831 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); 1832 } 1833 } 1834 ok = 1; 1835 end: 1836 return ok; 1837 } 1838 1839 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) 1840 { 1841 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); 1842 } 1843 1844 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) 1845 { 1846 char *str; 1847 ASN1_TIME atm; 1848 long offset; 1849 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p; 1850 int i, j, remaining; 1851 1852 p = buff1; 1853 remaining = ctm->length; 1854 str = (char *)ctm->data; 1855 /* 1856 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in 1857 * the time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: 1858 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ 1859 */ 1860 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { 1861 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */ 1862 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; 1863 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1; 1864 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) 1865 return 0; 1866 OPENSSL_memcpy(p, str, 10); 1867 p += 10; 1868 str += 10; 1869 remaining -= 10; 1870 } else { 1871 /* 1872 * YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm 1873 */ 1874 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; 1875 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1; 1876 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) 1877 return 0; 1878 OPENSSL_memcpy(p, str, 12); 1879 p += 12; 1880 str += 12; 1881 remaining -= 12; 1882 } 1883 1884 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) { 1885 *(p++) = '0'; 1886 *(p++) = '0'; 1887 } else { 1888 /* SS (seconds) */ 1889 if (remaining < 2) 1890 return 0; 1891 *(p++) = *(str++); 1892 *(p++) = *(str++); 1893 remaining -= 2; 1894 /* 1895 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds... TODO(emilia): in 1896 * RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden. Can we just kill them 1897 * altogether? 1898 */ 1899 if (remaining && *str == '.') { 1900 str++; 1901 remaining--; 1902 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) { 1903 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9') 1904 break; 1905 } 1906 } 1907 1908 } 1909 *(p++) = 'Z'; 1910 *(p++) = '\0'; 1911 1912 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */ 1913 if (!remaining) 1914 return 0; 1915 if (*str == 'Z') { 1916 if (remaining != 1) 1917 return 0; 1918 offset = 0; 1919 } else { 1920 /* (+-)HHMM */ 1921 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) 1922 return 0; 1923 /* 1924 * Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. 1925 */ 1926 if (remaining != 5) 1927 return 0; 1928 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' || 1929 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9') 1930 return 0; 1931 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60; 1932 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0'); 1933 if (*str == '-') 1934 offset = -offset; 1935 } 1936 atm.type = ctm->type; 1937 atm.flags = 0; 1938 atm.length = sizeof(buff2); 1939 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2; 1940 1941 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL) 1942 return 0; 1943 1944 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { 1945 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0'); 1946 if (i < 50) 1947 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ 1948 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0'); 1949 if (j < 50) 1950 j += 100; 1951 1952 if (i < j) 1953 return -1; 1954 if (i > j) 1955 return 1; 1956 } 1957 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2); 1958 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ 1959 return -1; 1960 else 1961 return i; 1962 } 1963 1964 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) 1965 { 1966 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); 1967 } 1968 1969 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1970 { 1971 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); 1972 } 1973 1974 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, 1975 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1976 { 1977 time_t t = 0; 1978 1979 if (in_tm) 1980 t = *in_tm; 1981 else 1982 time(&t); 1983 1984 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { 1985 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1986 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1987 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) 1988 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1989 } 1990 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1991 } 1992 1993 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */ 1994 1995 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, 1996 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) 1997 { 1998 X509_CRL *crl = NULL; 1999 int i; 2000 size_t j; 2001 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; 2002 /* CRLs can't be delta already */ 2003 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) { 2004 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); 2005 return NULL; 2006 } 2007 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ 2008 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) { 2009 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); 2010 return NULL; 2011 } 2012 /* Issuer names must match */ 2013 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) { 2014 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); 2015 return NULL; 2016 } 2017 /* AKID and IDP must match */ 2018 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { 2019 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); 2020 return NULL; 2021 } 2022 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { 2023 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); 2024 return NULL; 2025 } 2026 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ 2027 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { 2028 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); 2029 return NULL; 2030 } 2031 /* CRLs must verify */ 2032 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || 2033 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { 2034 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); 2035 return NULL; 2036 } 2037 /* Create new CRL */ 2038 crl = X509_CRL_new(); 2039 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) 2040 goto memerr; 2041 /* Set issuer name */ 2042 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) 2043 goto memerr; 2044 2045 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer))) 2046 goto memerr; 2047 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer))) 2048 goto memerr; 2049 2050 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ 2051 2052 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) 2053 goto memerr; 2054 2055 /* 2056 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL 2057 * number to correct value too. 2058 */ 2059 2060 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { 2061 X509_EXTENSION *ext; 2062 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); 2063 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) 2064 goto memerr; 2065 } 2066 2067 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ 2068 2069 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); 2070 2071 for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); j++) { 2072 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; 2073 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, j); 2074 /* 2075 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here 2076 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs. 2077 */ 2078 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) { 2079 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); 2080 if (!rvtmp) 2081 goto memerr; 2082 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { 2083 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); 2084 goto memerr; 2085 } 2086 } 2087 } 2088 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ 2089 2090 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) 2091 goto memerr; 2092 2093 return crl; 2094 2095 memerr: 2096 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2097 if (crl) 2098 X509_CRL_free(crl); 2099 return NULL; 2100 } 2101 2102 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, 2103 CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused, 2104 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, 2105 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) 2106 { 2107 /* 2108 * This function is (usually) called only once, by 2109 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). 2110 */ 2111 int index; 2112 if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, 2113 dup_func, free_func)) { 2114 return -1; 2115 } 2116 return index; 2117 } 2118 2119 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) 2120 { 2121 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); 2122 } 2123 2124 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) 2125 { 2126 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); 2127 } 2128 2129 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2130 { 2131 return ctx->error; 2132 } 2133 2134 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) 2135 { 2136 ctx->error = err; 2137 } 2138 2139 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2140 { 2141 return ctx->error_depth; 2142 } 2143 2144 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2145 { 2146 return ctx->current_cert; 2147 } 2148 2149 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2150 { 2151 return ctx->chain; 2152 } 2153 2154 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2155 { 2156 if (!ctx->chain) 2157 return NULL; 2158 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); 2159 } 2160 2161 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2162 { 2163 return ctx->current_issuer; 2164 } 2165 2166 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2167 { 2168 return ctx->current_crl; 2169 } 2170 2171 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2172 { 2173 return ctx->parent; 2174 } 2175 2176 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 2177 { 2178 ctx->cert = x; 2179 } 2180 2181 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 2182 { 2183 ctx->untrusted = sk; 2184 } 2185 2186 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) 2187 { 2188 ctx->crls = sk; 2189 } 2190 2191 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) 2192 { 2193 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); 2194 } 2195 2196 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) 2197 { 2198 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); 2199 } 2200 2201 /* 2202 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. 2203 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and 2204 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't 2205 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then 2206 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL 2207 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the 2208 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL 2209 * client/server. 2210 */ 2211 2212 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, 2213 int purpose, int trust) 2214 { 2215 int idx; 2216 /* If purpose not set use default */ 2217 if (!purpose) 2218 purpose = def_purpose; 2219 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ 2220 if (purpose) { 2221 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; 2222 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); 2223 if (idx == -1) { 2224 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 2225 return 0; 2226 } 2227 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 2228 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { 2229 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); 2230 if (idx == -1) { 2231 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 2232 return 0; 2233 } 2234 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 2235 } 2236 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ 2237 if (!trust) 2238 trust = ptmp->trust; 2239 } 2240 if (trust) { 2241 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); 2242 if (idx == -1) { 2243 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); 2244 return 0; 2245 } 2246 } 2247 2248 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) 2249 ctx->param->purpose = purpose; 2250 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) 2251 ctx->param->trust = trust; 2252 return 1; 2253 } 2254 2255 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) 2256 { 2257 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; 2258 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 2259 if (!ctx) { 2260 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2261 return NULL; 2262 } 2263 OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 2264 return ctx; 2265 } 2266 2267 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2268 { 2269 if (ctx == NULL) { 2270 return; 2271 } 2272 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); 2273 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 2274 } 2275 2276 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, 2277 STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 2278 { 2279 int ret = 1; 2280 2281 OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 2282 ctx->ctx = store; 2283 ctx->cert = x509; 2284 ctx->untrusted = chain; 2285 2286 CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data); 2287 2288 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); 2289 if (!ctx->param) 2290 goto err; 2291 2292 /* 2293 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. 2294 */ 2295 2296 if (store) 2297 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); 2298 else 2299 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; 2300 2301 if (store) { 2302 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 2303 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; 2304 } else 2305 ctx->cleanup = 0; 2306 2307 if (ret) 2308 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, 2309 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); 2310 2311 if (ret == 0) 2312 goto err; 2313 2314 if (store && store->check_issued) 2315 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; 2316 else 2317 ctx->check_issued = check_issued; 2318 2319 if (store && store->get_issuer) 2320 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; 2321 else 2322 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; 2323 2324 if (store && store->verify_cb) 2325 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 2326 else 2327 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; 2328 2329 if (store && store->verify) 2330 ctx->verify = store->verify; 2331 else 2332 ctx->verify = internal_verify; 2333 2334 if (store && store->check_revocation) 2335 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; 2336 else 2337 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; 2338 2339 if (store && store->get_crl) 2340 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; 2341 else 2342 ctx->get_crl = NULL; 2343 2344 if (store && store->check_crl) 2345 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; 2346 else 2347 ctx->check_crl = check_crl; 2348 2349 if (store && store->cert_crl) 2350 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; 2351 else 2352 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; 2353 2354 if (store && store->lookup_certs) 2355 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; 2356 else 2357 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; 2358 2359 if (store && store->lookup_crls) 2360 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; 2361 else 2362 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; 2363 2364 ctx->check_policy = check_policy; 2365 2366 return 1; 2367 2368 err: 2369 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data); 2370 if (ctx->param != NULL) { 2371 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2372 } 2373 2374 OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 2375 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2376 return 0; 2377 } 2378 2379 /* 2380 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This 2381 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. 2382 */ 2383 2384 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 2385 { 2386 ctx->other_ctx = sk; 2387 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; 2388 } 2389 2390 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2391 { 2392 /* We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, |X509_STORE_CTX_free| 2393 * also calls this function. */ 2394 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { 2395 ctx->cleanup(ctx); 2396 ctx->cleanup = NULL; 2397 } 2398 if (ctx->param != NULL) { 2399 if (ctx->parent == NULL) 2400 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2401 ctx->param = NULL; 2402 } 2403 if (ctx->tree != NULL) { 2404 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); 2405 ctx->tree = NULL; 2406 } 2407 if (ctx->chain != NULL) { 2408 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); 2409 ctx->chain = NULL; 2410 } 2411 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); 2412 OPENSSL_memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); 2413 } 2414 2415 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) 2416 { 2417 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); 2418 } 2419 2420 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) 2421 { 2422 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); 2423 } 2424 2425 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, 2426 time_t t) 2427 { 2428 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); 2429 } 2430 2431 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 2432 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) 2433 { 2434 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; 2435 } 2436 2437 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2438 { 2439 return ctx->tree; 2440 } 2441 2442 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2443 { 2444 return ctx->explicit_policy; 2445 } 2446 2447 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) 2448 { 2449 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; 2450 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); 2451 if (!param) 2452 return 0; 2453 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); 2454 } 2455 2456 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2457 { 2458 return ctx->param; 2459 } 2460 2461 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) 2462 { 2463 if (ctx->param) 2464 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2465 ctx->param = param; 2466 } 2467 2468 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) 2469 2470 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 2471
