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      1 /* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.53 2015/06/15 18:44:22 jsing Exp $ */
      2 /*
      3  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
      4  *
      5  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
      6  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
      7  * are met:
      8  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
      9  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
     10  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
     11  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
     12  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
     13  *
     14  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
     15  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
     16  * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
     17  * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
     18  * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
     19  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
     20  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
     21  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
     22  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
     23  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
     24  */
     25 
     26 #include "includes.h"
     27 
     28 #include <sys/types.h>
     29 #include <sys/stat.h>
     30 #include <sys/wait.h>
     31 
     32 #include <errno.h>
     33 #include <fcntl.h>
     34 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
     35 # include <paths.h>
     36 #endif
     37 #include <pwd.h>
     38 #include <signal.h>
     39 #include <stdio.h>
     40 #include <stdarg.h>
     41 #include <string.h>
     42 #include <time.h>
     43 #include <unistd.h>
     44 #include <limits.h>
     45 
     46 #include "xmalloc.h"
     47 #include "ssh.h"
     48 #include "ssh2.h"
     49 #include "packet.h"
     50 #include "buffer.h"
     51 #include "log.h"
     52 #include "misc.h"
     53 #include "servconf.h"
     54 #include "compat.h"
     55 #include "key.h"
     56 #include "hostfile.h"
     57 #include "auth.h"
     58 #include "pathnames.h"
     59 #include "uidswap.h"
     60 #include "auth-options.h"
     61 #include "canohost.h"
     62 #ifdef GSSAPI
     63 #include "ssh-gss.h"
     64 #endif
     65 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
     66 #include "authfile.h"
     67 #include "match.h"
     68 #include "ssherr.h"
     69 #include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */
     70 #include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */
     71 
     72 /* import */
     73 extern ServerOptions options;
     74 extern u_char *session_id2;
     75 extern u_int session_id2_len;
     76 
     77 static int
     78 userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
     79 {
     80 	Buffer b;
     81 	Key *key = NULL;
     82 	char *pkalg, *userstyle;
     83 	u_char *pkblob, *sig;
     84 	u_int alen, blen, slen;
     85 	int have_sig, pktype;
     86 	int authenticated = 0;
     87 
     88 	if (!authctxt->valid) {
     89 		debug2("userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user");
     90 		return 0;
     91 	}
     92 	have_sig = packet_get_char();
     93 	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
     94 		debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH");
     95 		/* no explicit pkalg given */
     96 		pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
     97 		buffer_init(&b);
     98 		buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
     99 		/* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */
    100 		pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
    101 		buffer_free(&b);
    102 	} else {
    103 		pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
    104 		pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
    105 	}
    106 	pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
    107 	if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
    108 		/* this is perfectly legal */
    109 		logit("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
    110 		    pkalg);
    111 		goto done;
    112 	}
    113 	key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
    114 	if (key == NULL) {
    115 		error("userauth_pubkey: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
    116 		goto done;
    117 	}
    118 	if (key->type != pktype) {
    119 		error("userauth_pubkey: type mismatch for decoded key "
    120 		    "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
    121 		goto done;
    122 	}
    123 	if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
    124 	    (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
    125 		logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe "
    126 		    "signature scheme");
    127 		goto done;
    128 	}
    129 	if (auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
    130 		logit("refusing previously-used %s key", key_type(key));
    131 		goto done;
    132 	}
    133 	if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
    134 	    options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) {
    135 		logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
    136 		    __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
    137 		goto done;
    138 	}
    139 
    140 	if (have_sig) {
    141 		sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
    142 		packet_check_eom();
    143 		buffer_init(&b);
    144 		if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
    145 			buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
    146 		} else {
    147 			buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
    148 		}
    149 		/* reconstruct packet */
    150 		buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
    151 		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
    152 		    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
    153 		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
    154 		buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle);
    155 		free(userstyle);
    156 		buffer_put_cstring(&b,
    157 		    datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
    158 		    "ssh-userauth" :
    159 		    authctxt->service);
    160 		if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
    161 			buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
    162 		} else {
    163 			buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
    164 			buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
    165 			buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
    166 		}
    167 		buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
    168 #ifdef DEBUG_PK
    169 		buffer_dump(&b);
    170 #endif
    171 		pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
    172 
    173 		/* test for correct signature */
    174 		authenticated = 0;
    175 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) &&
    176 		    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
    177 		    buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
    178 			authenticated = 1;
    179 			/* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */
    180 			auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
    181 			key = NULL; /* Don't free below */
    182 		}
    183 		buffer_free(&b);
    184 		free(sig);
    185 	} else {
    186 		debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
    187 		packet_check_eom();
    188 
    189 		/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
    190 		/*
    191 		 * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
    192 		 * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
    193 		 * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
    194 		 * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
    195 		 * issue? -markus
    196 		 */
    197 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 0))) {
    198 			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
    199 			packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
    200 			packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
    201 			packet_send();
    202 			packet_write_wait();
    203 			authctxt->postponed = 1;
    204 		}
    205 	}
    206 	if (authenticated != 1)
    207 		auth_clear_options();
    208 done:
    209 	debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
    210 	if (key != NULL)
    211 		key_free(key);
    212 	free(pkalg);
    213 	free(pkblob);
    214 	return authenticated;
    215 }
    216 
    217 void
    218 pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
    219 {
    220 	char *fp, *extra;
    221 	va_list ap;
    222 	int i;
    223 
    224 	extra = NULL;
    225 	if (fmt != NULL) {
    226 		va_start(ap, fmt);
    227 		i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap);
    228 		va_end(ap);
    229 		if (i < 0 || extra == NULL)
    230 			fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
    231 	}
    232 
    233 	if (key_is_cert(key)) {
    234 		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
    235 		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
    236 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s",
    237 		    key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
    238 		    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
    239 		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
    240 		    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
    241 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
    242 		free(fp);
    243 	} else {
    244 		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
    245 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
    246 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key),
    247 		    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
    248 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
    249 		free(fp);
    250 	}
    251 	free(extra);
    252 }
    253 
    254 /*
    255  * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic
    256  * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector
    257  * and its members.
    258  */
    259 static int
    260 split_argv(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp)
    261 {
    262 	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
    263 	int argc = 0, quote, i, j;
    264 	char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv));
    265 
    266 	*argvp = NULL;
    267 	*argcp = 0;
    268 
    269 	for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
    270 		/* Skip leading whitespace */
    271 		if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')
    272 			continue;
    273 
    274 		/* Start of a token */
    275 		quote = 0;
    276 		if (s[i] == '\\' &&
    277 		    (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\'))
    278 			i++;
    279 		else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"')
    280 			quote = s[i++];
    281 
    282 		argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv));
    283 		arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1);
    284 		argv[argc] = NULL;
    285 
    286 		/* Copy the token in, removing escapes */
    287 		for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
    288 			if (s[i] == '\\') {
    289 				if (s[i + 1] == '\'' ||
    290 				    s[i + 1] == '\"' ||
    291 				    s[i + 1] == '\\') {
    292 					i++; /* Skip '\' */
    293 					arg[j++] = s[i];
    294 				} else {
    295 					/* Unrecognised escape */
    296 					arg[j++] = s[i];
    297 				}
    298 			} else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t'))
    299 				break; /* done */
    300 			else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote)
    301 				break; /* done */
    302 			else
    303 				arg[j++] = s[i];
    304 		}
    305 		if (s[i] == '\0') {
    306 			if (quote != 0) {
    307 				/* Ran out of string looking for close quote */
    308 				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
    309 				goto out;
    310 			}
    311 			break;
    312 		}
    313 	}
    314 	/* Success */
    315 	*argcp = argc;
    316 	*argvp = argv;
    317 	argc = 0;
    318 	argv = NULL;
    319 	r = 0;
    320  out:
    321 	if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) {
    322 		for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
    323 			free(argv[i]);
    324 		free(argv);
    325 	}
    326 	return r;
    327 }
    328 
    329 /*
    330  * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as
    331  * necessary. Caller must free returned string.
    332  */
    333 static char *
    334 assemble_argv(int argc, char **argv)
    335 {
    336 	int i, j, ws, r;
    337 	char c, *ret;
    338 	struct sshbuf *buf, *arg;
    339 
    340 	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
    341 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
    342 
    343 	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
    344 		ws = 0;
    345 		sshbuf_reset(arg);
    346 		for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) {
    347 			r = 0;
    348 			c = argv[i][j];
    349 			switch (c) {
    350 			case ' ':
    351 			case '\t':
    352 				ws = 1;
    353 				r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
    354 				break;
    355 			case '\\':
    356 			case '\'':
    357 			case '"':
    358 				if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0)
    359 					break;
    360 				/* FALLTHROUGH */
    361 			default:
    362 				r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
    363 				break;
    364 			}
    365 			if (r != 0)
    366 				fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s",
    367 				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
    368 		}
    369 		if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) ||
    370 		    (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) ||
    371 		    (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 ||
    372 		    (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0))
    373 			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
    374 	}
    375 	if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL)
    376 		fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__);
    377 	memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
    378 	ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0';
    379 	sshbuf_free(buf);
    380 	sshbuf_free(arg);
    381 	return ret;
    382 }
    383 
    384 /*
    385  * Runs command in a subprocess. Returns pid on success and a FILE* to the
    386  * subprocess' stdout or 0 on failure.
    387  * NB. "command" is only used for logging.
    388  */
    389 static pid_t
    390 subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
    391     int ac, char **av, FILE **child)
    392 {
    393 	FILE *f;
    394 	struct stat st;
    395 	int devnull, p[2], i;
    396 	pid_t pid;
    397 	char *cp, errmsg[512];
    398 	u_int envsize;
    399 	char **child_env;
    400 
    401 	*child = NULL;
    402 
    403 	debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s", __func__,
    404 	    tag, command, pw->pw_name);
    405 
    406 	/* Verify the path exists and is safe-ish to execute */
    407 	if (*av[0] != '/') {
    408 		error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
    409 		return 0;
    410 	}
    411 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
    412 	if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) {
    413 		error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
    414 		    av[0], strerror(errno));
    415 		restore_uid();
    416 		return 0;
    417 	}
    418 	if (auth_secure_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0,
    419 	    errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
    420 		error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg);
    421 		restore_uid();
    422 		return 0;
    423 	}
    424 
    425 	/*
    426 	 * Run the command; stderr is left in place, stdout is the
    427 	 * authorized_keys output.
    428 	 */
    429 	if (pipe(p) != 0) {
    430 		error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
    431 		restore_uid();
    432 		return 0;
    433 	}
    434 
    435 	/*
    436 	 * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
    437 	 * run cleanup_exit() code.
    438 	 */
    439 	restore_uid();
    440 
    441 	switch ((pid = fork())) {
    442 	case -1: /* error */
    443 		error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
    444 		close(p[0]);
    445 		close(p[1]);
    446 		return 0;
    447 	case 0: /* child */
    448 		/* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
    449 		envsize = 5;
    450 		child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize);
    451 		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
    452 		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
    453 		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
    454 		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
    455 		if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
    456 			child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp);
    457 
    458 		for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
    459 			signal(i, SIG_DFL);
    460 
    461 		if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
    462 			error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
    463 			    strerror(errno));
    464 			_exit(1);
    465 		}
    466 		/* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
    467 		if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
    468 		    dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
    469 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
    470 			_exit(1);
    471 		}
    472 		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
    473 
    474 		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
    475 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
    476 			error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
    477 			    strerror(errno));
    478 			_exit(1);
    479 		}
    480 		if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
    481 			error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
    482 			    strerror(errno));
    483 			_exit(1);
    484 		}
    485 		/* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
    486 		if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
    487 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
    488 			_exit(1);
    489 		}
    490 
    491 		execve(av[0], av, child_env);
    492 		error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
    493 		_exit(127);
    494 	default: /* parent */
    495 		break;
    496 	}
    497 
    498 	close(p[1]);
    499 	if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
    500 		error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
    501 		close(p[0]);
    502 		/* Don't leave zombie child */
    503 		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
    504 		while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
    505 			;
    506 		return 0;
    507 	}
    508 	/* Success */
    509 	debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid);
    510 	*child = f;
    511 	return pid;
    512 }
    513 
    514 /* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */
    515 static int
    516 exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd)
    517 {
    518 	int status;
    519 
    520 	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
    521 		if (errno != EINTR) {
    522 			error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
    523 			return -1;
    524 		}
    525 	}
    526 	if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
    527 		error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status));
    528 		return -1;
    529 	} else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
    530 		error("%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status));
    531 		return -1;
    532 	}
    533 	return 0;
    534 }
    535 
    536 static int
    537 match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
    538 {
    539 	char *result;
    540 	u_int i;
    541 
    542 	/* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
    543 
    544 	for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
    545 		if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
    546 		    principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
    547 			debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
    548 			    result);
    549 			free(result);
    550 			return 1;
    551 		}
    552 	}
    553 	return 0;
    554 }
    555 
    556 static int
    557 process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
    558     struct sshkey_cert *cert)
    559 {
    560 	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;
    561 	u_long linenum = 0;
    562 	u_int i;
    563 
    564 	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
    565 		/* Skip leading whitespace. */
    566 		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
    567 			;
    568 		/* Skip blank and comment lines. */
    569 		if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL)
    570 			*ep = '\0';
    571 		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n')
    572 			continue;
    573 		/* Trim trailing whitespace. */
    574 		ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
    575 		while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
    576 			*ep-- = '\0';
    577 		/*
    578 		 * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
    579 		 * key options.
    580 		 */
    581 		line_opts = NULL;
    582 		if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
    583 		    (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
    584 			for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
    585 				;
    586 			line_opts = cp;
    587 			cp = ep;
    588 		}
    589 		for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
    590 			if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
    591 				debug3("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
    592 				    file == NULL ? "(command)" : file,
    593 				    linenum, cert->principals[i]);
    594 				if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
    595 				    file, linenum) != 1)
    596 					continue;
    597 				return 1;
    598 			}
    599 		}
    600 	}
    601 	return 0;
    602 }
    603 
    604 static int
    605 match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
    606 {
    607 	FILE *f;
    608 	int success;
    609 
    610 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
    611 	debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
    612 	if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
    613 		restore_uid();
    614 		return 0;
    615 	}
    616 	success = process_principals(f, file, pw, cert);
    617 	fclose(f);
    618 	restore_uid();
    619 	return success;
    620 }
    621 
    622 /*
    623  * Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command.
    624  * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise.
    625  */
    626 static int
    627 match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
    628 {
    629 	FILE *f = NULL;
    630 	int ok, found_principal = 0;
    631 	struct passwd *pw;
    632 	int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0;
    633 	pid_t pid;
    634 	char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
    635 	void (*osigchld)(int);
    636 
    637 	if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL)
    638 		return 0;
    639 	if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) {
    640 		error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, "
    641 		    "skipping");
    642 		return 0;
    643 	}
    644 
    645 	/*
    646 	 * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
    647 	 * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
    648 	 */
    649 	osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
    650 
    651 	/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
    652 	username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user,
    653 	    "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
    654 	pw = getpwnam(username);
    655 	if (pw == NULL) {
    656 		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
    657 		    username, strerror(errno));
    658 		goto out;
    659 	}
    660 
    661 	/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
    662 	if (split_argv(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
    663 		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains "
    664 		    "invalid quotes", command);
    665 		goto out;
    666 	}
    667 	if (ac == 0) {
    668 		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
    669 		    command);
    670 		goto out;
    671 	}
    672 	for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
    673 		tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
    674 		    "u", user_pw->pw_name,
    675 		    "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
    676 		    (char *)NULL);
    677 		if (tmp == NULL)
    678 			fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
    679 		free(av[i]);
    680 		av[i] = tmp;
    681 	}
    682 	/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
    683 	command = assemble_argv(ac, av);
    684 
    685 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", pw, command,
    686 	    ac, av, &f)) == 0)
    687 		goto out;
    688 
    689 	uid_swapped = 1;
    690 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
    691 
    692 	ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, cert);
    693 
    694 	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command) != 0)
    695 		goto out;
    696 
    697 	/* Read completed successfully */
    698 	found_principal = ok;
    699  out:
    700 	if (f != NULL)
    701 		fclose(f);
    702 	signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
    703 	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
    704 		free(av[i]);
    705 	free(av);
    706 	if (uid_swapped)
    707 		restore_uid();
    708 	free(command);
    709 	free(username);
    710 	return found_principal;
    711 }
    712 /*
    713  * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
    714  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
    715  */
    716 static int
    717 check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
    718 {
    719 	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
    720 	const char *reason;
    721 	int found_key = 0;
    722 	u_long linenum = 0;
    723 	Key *found;
    724 	char *fp;
    725 
    726 	found_key = 0;
    727 
    728 	found = NULL;
    729 	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
    730 		char *cp, *key_options = NULL;
    731 		if (found != NULL)
    732 			key_free(found);
    733 		found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
    734 		auth_clear_options();
    735 
    736 		/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
    737 		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
    738 			;
    739 		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
    740 			continue;
    741 
    742 		if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
    743 			/* no key?  check if there are options for this key */
    744 			int quoted = 0;
    745 			debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
    746 			key_options = cp;
    747 			for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
    748 				if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
    749 					cp++;	/* Skip both */
    750 				else if (*cp == '"')
    751 					quoted = !quoted;
    752 			}
    753 			/* Skip remaining whitespace. */
    754 			for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
    755 				;
    756 			if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
    757 				debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
    758 				/* still no key?  advance to next line*/
    759 				continue;
    760 			}
    761 		}
    762 		if (key_is_cert(key)) {
    763 			if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
    764 				continue;
    765 			if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
    766 			    linenum) != 1)
    767 				continue;
    768 			if (!key_is_cert_authority)
    769 				continue;
    770 			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
    771 			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
    772 				continue;
    773 			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
    774 			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
    775 			/*
    776 			 * If the user has specified a list of principals as
    777 			 * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
    778 			 * their username in the certificate principals list.
    779 			 */
    780 			if (authorized_principals != NULL &&
    781 			    !match_principals_option(authorized_principals,
    782 			    key->cert)) {
    783 				reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
    784 				    "authorized principal";
    785  fail_reason:
    786 				free(fp);
    787 				error("%s", reason);
    788 				auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
    789 				continue;
    790 			}
    791 			if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
    792 			    authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
    793 			    &reason) != 0)
    794 				goto fail_reason;
    795 			if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0) {
    796 				free(fp);
    797 				continue;
    798 			}
    799 			verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" "
    800 			    "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
    801 			    key_type(found), fp, file);
    802 			free(fp);
    803 			found_key = 1;
    804 			break;
    805 		} else if (key_equal(found, key)) {
    806 			if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
    807 			    linenum) != 1)
    808 				continue;
    809 			if (key_is_cert_authority)
    810 				continue;
    811 			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
    812 			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
    813 				continue;
    814 			debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
    815 			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
    816 			free(fp);
    817 			found_key = 1;
    818 			break;
    819 		}
    820 	}
    821 	if (found != NULL)
    822 		key_free(found);
    823 	if (!found_key)
    824 		debug2("key not found");
    825 	return found_key;
    826 }
    827 
    828 /* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */
    829 static int
    830 user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
    831 {
    832 	char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
    833 	const char *reason;
    834 	int ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals;
    835 
    836 	if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
    837 		return 0;
    838 
    839 	if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
    840 	    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
    841 		return 0;
    842 
    843 	if (sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
    844 	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0) != 0) {
    845 		debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
    846 		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
    847 		    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
    848 		goto out;
    849 	}
    850 	/*
    851 	 * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate
    852 	 * principals against the names in that file rather than matching
    853 	 * against the username.
    854 	 */
    855 	if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
    856 		if (match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert))
    857 			found_principal = 1;
    858 	}
    859 	/* Try querying command if specified */
    860 	if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key->cert))
    861 		found_principal = 1;
    862 	/* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */
    863 	use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL ||
    864             options.authorized_principals_command != NULL;
    865 	if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) {
    866 		reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
    867  fail_reason:
    868 		error("%s", reason);
    869 		auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
    870 		goto out;
    871 	}
    872 	if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
    873 	    use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
    874 		goto fail_reason;
    875 	if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0)
    876 		goto out;
    877 
    878 	verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by %s CA %s via %s",
    879 	    key->cert->key_id, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
    880 	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
    881 	ret = 1;
    882 
    883  out:
    884 	free(principals_file);
    885 	free(ca_fp);
    886 	return ret;
    887 }
    888 
    889 /*
    890  * Checks whether key is allowed in file.
    891  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
    892  */
    893 static int
    894 user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
    895 {
    896 	FILE *f;
    897 	int found_key = 0;
    898 
    899 	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
    900 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
    901 
    902 	debug("trying public key file %s", file);
    903 	if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
    904 		found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw);
    905 		fclose(f);
    906 	}
    907 
    908 	restore_uid();
    909 	return found_key;
    910 }
    911 
    912 /*
    913  * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
    914  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
    915  */
    916 static int
    917 user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
    918 {
    919 	FILE *f = NULL;
    920 	int r, ok, found_key = 0;
    921 	struct passwd *pw;
    922 	int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0;
    923 	pid_t pid;
    924 	char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
    925 	char *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
    926 	void (*osigchld)(int);
    927 
    928 	if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL)
    929 		return 0;
    930 	if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
    931 		error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
    932 		return 0;
    933 	}
    934 
    935 	/*
    936 	 * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
    937 	 * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
    938 	 */
    939 	osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
    940 
    941 	/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
    942 	username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
    943 	    "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
    944 	pw = getpwnam(username);
    945 	if (pw == NULL) {
    946 		error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
    947 		    username, strerror(errno));
    948 		goto out;
    949 	}
    950 
    951 	/* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */
    952 	if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
    953 	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
    954 		error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
    955 		goto out;
    956 	}
    957 	if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
    958 		error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
    959 		goto out;
    960 	}
    961 
    962 	/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
    963 	if (split_argv(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
    964 		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes",
    965 		    command);
    966 		goto out;
    967 	}
    968 	if (ac == 0) {
    969 		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
    970 		    command);
    971 		goto out;
    972 	}
    973 	for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
    974 		tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
    975 		    "u", user_pw->pw_name,
    976 		    "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
    977 		    "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
    978 		    "f", key_fp,
    979 		    "k", keytext,
    980 		    (char *)NULL);
    981 		if (tmp == NULL)
    982 			fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
    983 		free(av[i]);
    984 		av[i] = tmp;
    985 	}
    986 	/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
    987 	command = assemble_argv(ac, av);
    988 
    989 	/*
    990 	 * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments
    991 	 * then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the
    992 	 * target username as a single argument.
    993 	 */
    994 	if (ac == 1) {
    995 		av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av));
    996 		av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name);
    997 		av[2] = NULL;
    998 		/* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */
    999 		free(command);
   1000 		xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
   1001 	}
   1002 
   1003 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command,
   1004 	    ac, av, &f)) == 0)
   1005 		goto out;
   1006 
   1007 	uid_swapped = 1;
   1008 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
   1009 
   1010 	ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
   1011 
   1012 	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command) != 0)
   1013 		goto out;
   1014 
   1015 	/* Read completed successfully */
   1016 	found_key = ok;
   1017  out:
   1018 	if (f != NULL)
   1019 		fclose(f);
   1020 	signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
   1021 	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
   1022 		free(av[i]);
   1023 	free(av);
   1024 	if (uid_swapped)
   1025 		restore_uid();
   1026 	free(command);
   1027 	free(username);
   1028 	free(key_fp);
   1029 	free(keytext);
   1030 	return found_key;
   1031 }
   1032 
   1033 /*
   1034  * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
   1035  */
   1036 int
   1037 user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int auth_attempt)
   1038 {
   1039 	u_int success, i;
   1040 	char *file;
   1041 
   1042 	if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
   1043 		return 0;
   1044 	if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
   1045 		return 0;
   1046 
   1047 	success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key);
   1048 	if (success)
   1049 		return success;
   1050 
   1051 	success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key);
   1052 	if (success > 0)
   1053 		return success;
   1054 
   1055 	for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
   1056 
   1057 		if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
   1058 			continue;
   1059 		file = expand_authorized_keys(
   1060 		    options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
   1061 
   1062 		success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
   1063 		free(file);
   1064 	}
   1065 
   1066 	return success;
   1067 }
   1068 
   1069 /* Records a public key in the list of previously-successful keys */
   1070 void
   1071 auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key)
   1072 {
   1073 	struct sshkey **tmp;
   1074 
   1075 	if (authctxt->nprev_userkeys >= INT_MAX ||
   1076 	    (tmp = reallocarray(authctxt->prev_userkeys,
   1077 	    authctxt->nprev_userkeys + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL)
   1078 		fatal("%s: reallocarray failed", __func__);
   1079 	authctxt->prev_userkeys = tmp;
   1080 	authctxt->prev_userkeys[authctxt->nprev_userkeys] = key;
   1081 	authctxt->nprev_userkeys++;
   1082 }
   1083 
   1084 /* Checks whether a key has already been used successfully for authentication */
   1085 int
   1086 auth2_userkey_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key)
   1087 {
   1088 	u_int i;
   1089 
   1090 	for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_userkeys; i++) {
   1091 		if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_userkeys[i])) {
   1092 			return 1;
   1093 		}
   1094 	}
   1095 	return 0;
   1096 }
   1097 
   1098 Authmethod method_pubkey = {
   1099 	"publickey",
   1100 	userauth_pubkey,
   1101 	&options.pubkey_authentication
   1102 };
   1103