1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 2 * All rights reserved. 3 * 4 * This package is an SSL implementation written 5 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 7 * 8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 14 * 15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 16 * the code are not to be removed. 17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 18 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 21 * 22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 24 * are met: 25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 31 * must display the following acknowledgement: 32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 33 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 39 * 40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 50 * SUCH DAMAGE. 51 * 52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 54 * copied and put under another distribution licence 55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 56 */ 57 /* ==================================================================== 58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 59 * 60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 62 * are met: 63 * 64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 66 * 67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 70 * distribution. 71 * 72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 73 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 76 * 77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 80 * openssl-core (at) openssl.org. 81 * 82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 85 * 86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 87 * acknowledgment: 88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 90 * 91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 103 * ==================================================================== 104 * 105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 106 * (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 107 * Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 108 * 109 */ 110 /* ==================================================================== 111 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 112 * 113 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 114 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 115 * 116 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 117 * license provided above. 118 * 119 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 120 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 121 * 122 */ 123 /* ==================================================================== 124 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 125 * 126 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 127 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 128 * license. 129 * 130 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 131 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 132 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 133 * 134 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 135 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 136 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 137 * 138 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 139 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 140 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 141 * to make use of the Contribution. 142 * 143 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 144 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 145 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 146 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 147 * OTHERWISE. 148 */ 149 150 #include <openssl/ssl.h> 151 152 #include <assert.h> 153 #include <string.h> 154 155 #include <openssl/aead.h> 156 #include <openssl/bn.h> 157 #include <openssl/buf.h> 158 #include <openssl/bytestring.h> 159 #include <openssl/dh.h> 160 #include <openssl/ec_key.h> 161 #include <openssl/ecdsa.h> 162 #include <openssl/err.h> 163 #include <openssl/evp.h> 164 #include <openssl/md5.h> 165 #include <openssl/mem.h> 166 #include <openssl/rand.h> 167 168 #include "../crypto/internal.h" 169 #include "internal.h" 170 171 172 static int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); 173 static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); 174 static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); 175 static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); 176 static int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); 177 static int ssl3_verify_server_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); 178 static int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); 179 static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); 180 static int ssl3_get_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); 181 static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); 182 static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); 183 static int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); 184 static int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); 185 static int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); 186 static int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); 187 188 int ssl3_connect(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { 189 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; 190 int ret = -1; 191 192 assert(ssl->handshake_func == ssl3_connect); 193 assert(!ssl->server); 194 195 for (;;) { 196 int state = hs->state; 197 198 switch (hs->state) { 199 case SSL_ST_INIT: 200 ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); 201 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; 202 break; 203 204 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: 205 ret = ssl3_send_client_hello(hs); 206 if (ret <= 0) { 207 goto end; 208 } 209 210 if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) || ssl->d1->send_cookie) { 211 if (hs->early_data_offered) { 212 if (!tls13_init_early_key_schedule(hs) || 213 !tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, ssl->session->master_key, 214 ssl->session->master_key_length) || 215 !tls13_derive_early_secrets(hs) || 216 !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal, 217 hs->early_traffic_secret, 218 hs->hash_len)) { 219 ret = -1; 220 goto end; 221 } 222 } 223 hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; 224 } else { 225 hs->next_state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; 226 } 227 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; 228 break; 229 230 case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: 231 assert(SSL_is_dtls(ssl)); 232 ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify(hs); 233 if (ret <= 0) { 234 goto end; 235 } 236 if (ssl->d1->send_cookie) { 237 ssl->method->received_flight(ssl); 238 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; 239 } else { 240 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; 241 } 242 break; 243 244 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: 245 ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(hs); 246 if (hs->state == SSL_ST_TLS13) { 247 break; 248 } 249 if (ret <= 0) { 250 goto end; 251 } 252 253 if (ssl->session != NULL) { 254 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; 255 } else { 256 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; 257 } 258 break; 259 260 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: 261 if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) { 262 ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(hs); 263 if (ret <= 0) { 264 goto end; 265 } 266 } 267 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; 268 break; 269 270 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: 271 if (hs->certificate_status_expected) { 272 ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(hs); 273 if (ret <= 0) { 274 goto end; 275 } 276 } 277 hs->state = SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT; 278 break; 279 280 case SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT: 281 if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) { 282 ret = ssl3_verify_server_cert(hs); 283 if (ret <= 0) { 284 goto end; 285 } 286 } 287 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; 288 break; 289 290 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: 291 ret = ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(hs); 292 if (ret <= 0) { 293 goto end; 294 } 295 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; 296 break; 297 298 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: 299 if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) { 300 ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(hs); 301 if (ret <= 0) { 302 goto end; 303 } 304 } 305 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; 306 break; 307 308 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: 309 ret = ssl3_get_server_hello_done(hs); 310 if (ret <= 0) { 311 goto end; 312 } 313 ssl->method->received_flight(ssl); 314 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; 315 break; 316 317 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: 318 if (hs->cert_request) { 319 ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(hs); 320 if (ret <= 0) { 321 goto end; 322 } 323 } 324 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; 325 break; 326 327 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: 328 ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(hs); 329 if (ret <= 0) { 330 goto end; 331 } 332 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; 333 break; 334 335 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: 336 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: 337 if (hs->cert_request && ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) { 338 ret = ssl3_send_cert_verify(hs); 339 if (ret <= 0) { 340 goto end; 341 } 342 } 343 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE; 344 break; 345 346 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE: 347 if (!ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl) || 348 !tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { 349 ret = -1; 350 goto end; 351 } 352 353 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; 354 break; 355 356 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: 357 if (hs->next_proto_neg_seen) { 358 ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(hs); 359 if (ret <= 0) { 360 goto end; 361 } 362 } 363 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A; 364 break; 365 366 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A: 367 if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { 368 ret = ssl3_send_channel_id(hs); 369 if (ret <= 0) { 370 goto end; 371 } 372 } 373 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; 374 break; 375 376 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: 377 ret = ssl3_send_finished(hs); 378 if (ret <= 0) { 379 goto end; 380 } 381 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; 382 383 if (ssl->session != NULL) { 384 hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE; 385 } else { 386 /* This is a non-resumption handshake. If it involves ChannelID, then 387 * record the handshake hashes at this point in the session so that 388 * any resumption of this session with ChannelID can sign those 389 * hashes. */ 390 ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(hs); 391 if (ret <= 0) { 392 goto end; 393 } 394 if ((SSL_get_mode(ssl) & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START) && 395 ssl3_can_false_start(ssl) && 396 /* No False Start on renegotiation (would complicate the state 397 * machine). */ 398 !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { 399 hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_FALSE_START; 400 } else { 401 hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; 402 } 403 } 404 break; 405 406 case SSL3_ST_FALSE_START: 407 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; 408 hs->in_false_start = 1; 409 hs->can_early_write = 1; 410 ret = 1; 411 goto end; 412 413 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: 414 if (hs->ticket_expected) { 415 ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(hs); 416 if (ret <= 0) { 417 goto end; 418 } 419 } 420 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; 421 break; 422 423 case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE: 424 ret = ssl->method->read_change_cipher_spec(ssl); 425 if (ret <= 0) { 426 goto end; 427 } 428 429 if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { 430 ret = -1; 431 goto end; 432 } 433 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; 434 break; 435 436 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: 437 ret = ssl3_get_finished(hs); 438 if (ret <= 0) { 439 goto end; 440 } 441 ssl->method->received_flight(ssl); 442 443 if (ssl->session != NULL) { 444 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE; 445 } else { 446 hs->state = SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE; 447 } 448 break; 449 450 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: 451 ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl); 452 if (ret <= 0) { 453 goto end; 454 } 455 hs->state = hs->next_state; 456 if (hs->state != SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE) { 457 ssl->method->expect_flight(ssl); 458 } 459 break; 460 461 case SSL_ST_TLS13: { 462 int early_return = 0; 463 ret = tls13_handshake(hs, &early_return); 464 if (ret <= 0) { 465 goto end; 466 } 467 468 if (early_return) { 469 ret = 1; 470 goto end; 471 } 472 473 hs->state = SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE; 474 break; 475 } 476 477 case SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE: 478 ssl->method->release_current_message(ssl, 1 /* free_buffer */); 479 480 SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->s3->established_session); 481 if (ssl->session != NULL) { 482 SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session); 483 ssl->s3->established_session = ssl->session; 484 } else { 485 /* We make a copy of the session in order to maintain the immutability 486 * of the new established_session due to False Start. The caller may 487 * have taken a reference to the temporary session. */ 488 ssl->s3->established_session = 489 SSL_SESSION_dup(hs->new_session, SSL_SESSION_DUP_ALL); 490 if (ssl->s3->established_session == NULL) { 491 ret = -1; 492 goto end; 493 } 494 ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable = 0; 495 496 SSL_SESSION_free(hs->new_session); 497 hs->new_session = NULL; 498 } 499 500 hs->state = SSL_ST_OK; 501 break; 502 503 case SSL_ST_OK: { 504 const int is_initial_handshake = !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete; 505 ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1; 506 if (is_initial_handshake) { 507 /* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */ 508 ssl_update_cache(hs, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); 509 } 510 511 ret = 1; 512 ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); 513 goto end; 514 } 515 516 default: 517 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 518 ret = -1; 519 goto end; 520 } 521 522 if (hs->state != state) { 523 ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1); 524 } 525 } 526 527 end: 528 ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret); 529 return ret; 530 } 531 532 uint16_t ssl_get_grease_value(const SSL *ssl, enum ssl_grease_index_t index) { 533 /* Use the client_random for entropy. This both avoids calling |RAND_bytes| on 534 * a single byte repeatedly and ensures the values are deterministic. This 535 * allows the same ClientHello be sent twice for a HelloRetryRequest or the 536 * same group be advertised in both supported_groups and key_shares. */ 537 uint16_t ret = ssl->s3->client_random[index]; 538 /* This generates a random value of the form 0xaa, for all 0 < 16. */ 539 ret = (ret & 0xf0) | 0x0a; 540 ret |= ret << 8; 541 return ret; 542 } 543 544 /* ssl_get_client_disabled sets |*out_mask_a| and |*out_mask_k| to masks of 545 * disabled algorithms. */ 546 static void ssl_get_client_disabled(SSL *ssl, uint32_t *out_mask_a, 547 uint32_t *out_mask_k) { 548 int have_rsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0; 549 *out_mask_a = 0; 550 *out_mask_k = 0; 551 552 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for RSA or 553 * ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. */ 554 const uint16_t *sigalgs; 555 size_t num_sigalgs = tls12_get_verify_sigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs); 556 for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) { 557 switch (sigalgs[i]) { 558 case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512: 559 case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384: 560 case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256: 561 case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512: 562 case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384: 563 case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256: 564 case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1: 565 have_rsa = 1; 566 break; 567 568 case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512: 569 case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384: 570 case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256: 571 case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1: 572 have_ecdsa = 1; 573 break; 574 } 575 } 576 577 /* Disable auth if we don't include any appropriate signature algorithms. */ 578 if (!have_rsa) { 579 *out_mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; 580 } 581 if (!have_ecdsa) { 582 *out_mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; 583 } 584 585 /* PSK requires a client callback. */ 586 if (ssl->psk_client_callback == NULL) { 587 *out_mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; 588 *out_mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; 589 } 590 } 591 592 static int ssl_write_client_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, CBB *out, 593 uint16_t min_version, 594 uint16_t max_version) { 595 uint32_t mask_a, mask_k; 596 ssl_get_client_disabled(ssl, &mask_a, &mask_k); 597 598 CBB child; 599 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &child)) { 600 return 0; 601 } 602 603 /* Add a fake cipher suite. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01. */ 604 if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled && 605 !CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_get_grease_value(ssl, ssl_grease_cipher))) { 606 return 0; 607 } 608 609 /* Add TLS 1.3 ciphers. Order ChaCha20-Poly1305 relative to AES-GCM based on 610 * hardware support. */ 611 if (max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { 612 if (!EVP_has_aes_hardware() && 613 !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 & 0xffff)) { 614 return 0; 615 } 616 if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 & 0xffff) || 617 !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 & 0xffff)) { 618 return 0; 619 } 620 if (EVP_has_aes_hardware() && 621 !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 & 0xffff)) { 622 return 0; 623 } 624 } 625 626 if (min_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) { 627 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); 628 int any_enabled = 0; 629 for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 630 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 631 /* Skip disabled ciphers */ 632 if ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) || 633 (cipher->algorithm_auth & mask_a)) { 634 continue; 635 } 636 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) > max_version || 637 SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(cipher) < min_version) { 638 continue; 639 } 640 any_enabled = 1; 641 if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_cipher_get_value(cipher))) { 642 return 0; 643 } 644 } 645 646 /* If all ciphers were disabled, return the error to the caller. */ 647 if (!any_enabled && max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) { 648 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); 649 return 0; 650 } 651 } 652 653 /* For SSLv3, the SCSV is added. Otherwise the renegotiation extension is 654 * added. */ 655 if (max_version == SSL3_VERSION && 656 !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { 657 if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) { 658 return 0; 659 } 660 } 661 662 if (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { 663 if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff)) { 664 return 0; 665 } 666 } 667 668 return CBB_flush(out); 669 } 670 671 int ssl_write_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { 672 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; 673 uint16_t min_version, max_version; 674 if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) { 675 return 0; 676 } 677 678 CBB cbb, body; 679 if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { 680 goto err; 681 } 682 683 /* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */ 684 int has_session = ssl->session != NULL && 685 !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete; 686 687 CBB child; 688 if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, hs->client_version) || 689 !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || 690 !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || 691 (has_session && 692 !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->session->session_id, 693 ssl->session->session_id_length))) { 694 goto err; 695 } 696 697 if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) { 698 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || 699 !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->d1->cookie, ssl->d1->cookie_len)) { 700 goto err; 701 } 702 } 703 704 size_t header_len = 705 SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ? DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH : SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 706 if (!ssl_write_client_cipher_list(ssl, &body, min_version, max_version) || 707 !CBB_add_u8(&body, 1 /* one compression method */) || 708 !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0 /* null compression */) || 709 !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(hs, &body, header_len + CBB_len(&body))) { 710 goto err; 711 } 712 713 uint8_t *msg = NULL; 714 size_t len; 715 if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb, &msg, &len)) { 716 goto err; 717 } 718 719 /* Now that the length prefixes have been computed, fill in the placeholder 720 * PSK binder. */ 721 if (hs->needs_psk_binder && 722 !tls13_write_psk_binder(hs, msg, len)) { 723 OPENSSL_free(msg); 724 goto err; 725 } 726 727 return ssl->method->add_message(ssl, msg, len); 728 729 err: 730 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 731 return 0; 732 } 733 734 static int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { 735 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; 736 /* The handshake buffer is reset on every ClientHello. Notably, in DTLS, we 737 * may send multiple ClientHellos if we receive HelloVerifyRequest. */ 738 if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_init(&hs->transcript)) { 739 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 740 return -1; 741 } 742 743 uint16_t min_version, max_version; 744 if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) { 745 return -1; 746 } 747 748 uint16_t max_wire_version = ssl->method->version_to_wire(max_version); 749 assert(hs->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A); 750 if (!ssl->s3->have_version) { 751 ssl->version = max_wire_version; 752 } 753 754 /* Always advertise the ClientHello version from the original maximum version, 755 * even on renegotiation. The static RSA key exchange uses this field, and 756 * some servers fail when it changes across handshakes. */ 757 hs->client_version = max_wire_version; 758 if (max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { 759 hs->client_version = ssl->method->version_to_wire(TLS1_2_VERSION); 760 } 761 762 /* If the configured session has expired or was created at a disabled 763 * version, drop it. */ 764 if (ssl->session != NULL) { 765 uint16_t session_version; 766 if (ssl->session->is_server || 767 !ssl->method->version_from_wire(&session_version, 768 ssl->session->ssl_version) || 769 (session_version < TLS1_3_VERSION && 770 ssl->session->session_id_length == 0) || 771 ssl->session->not_resumable || 772 !ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, ssl->session) || 773 session_version < min_version || session_version > max_version) { 774 ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL); 775 } 776 } 777 778 /* If resending the ClientHello in DTLS after a HelloVerifyRequest, don't 779 * renegerate the client_random. The random must be reused. */ 780 if ((!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) || !ssl->d1->send_cookie) && 781 !RAND_bytes(ssl->s3->client_random, sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random))) { 782 return -1; 783 } 784 785 if (!ssl_write_client_hello(hs)) { 786 return -1; 787 } 788 789 return 1; 790 } 791 792 static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { 793 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; 794 int al; 795 CBS hello_verify_request, cookie; 796 uint16_t server_version; 797 798 int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl); 799 if (ret <= 0) { 800 return ret; 801 } 802 803 if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { 804 ssl->d1->send_cookie = 0; 805 ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 806 return 1; 807 } 808 809 CBS_init(&hello_verify_request, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); 810 if (!CBS_get_u16(&hello_verify_request, &server_version) || 811 !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&hello_verify_request, &cookie) || 812 CBS_len(&hello_verify_request) != 0) { 813 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 814 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); 815 goto f_err; 816 } 817 818 if (CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(ssl->d1->cookie)) { 819 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 820 goto f_err; 821 } 822 823 OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->d1->cookie, CBS_data(&cookie), CBS_len(&cookie)); 824 ssl->d1->cookie_len = CBS_len(&cookie); 825 826 ssl->d1->send_cookie = 1; 827 return 1; 828 829 f_err: 830 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 831 return -1; 832 } 833 834 static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { 835 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; 836 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 837 CBS server_hello, server_random, session_id; 838 uint16_t server_wire_version, cipher_suite; 839 uint8_t compression_method; 840 841 int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl); 842 if (ret <= 0) { 843 uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error(); 844 if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL && 845 ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) { 846 /* Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure alert 847 * in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client behavior and 848 * gives a better error on a (probable) failure to negotiate initial 849 * parameters. Note: this error code comes after the original one. 850 * 851 * See https://crbug.com/446505. */ 852 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO); 853 } 854 return ret; 855 } 856 857 if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO && 858 ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) { 859 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 860 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 861 return -1; 862 } 863 864 CBS_init(&server_hello, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); 865 866 if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &server_wire_version)) { 867 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 868 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); 869 goto f_err; 870 } 871 872 uint16_t min_version, max_version, server_version; 873 if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version) || 874 !ssl->method->version_from_wire(&server_version, server_wire_version) || 875 server_version < min_version || server_version > max_version) { 876 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); 877 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 878 goto f_err; 879 } 880 881 assert(ssl->s3->have_version == ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete); 882 if (!ssl->s3->have_version) { 883 ssl->version = server_wire_version; 884 /* At this point, the connection's version is known and ssl->version is 885 * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */ 886 ssl->s3->have_version = 1; 887 } else if (server_wire_version != ssl->version) { 888 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); 889 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 890 goto f_err; 891 } 892 893 if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { 894 hs->state = SSL_ST_TLS13; 895 hs->do_tls13_handshake = tls13_client_handshake; 896 return 1; 897 } 898 899 if (hs->early_data_offered) { 900 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA); 901 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 902 goto f_err; 903 } 904 905 ssl_clear_tls13_state(hs); 906 907 if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)) { 908 return -1; 909 } 910 911 if (!CBS_get_bytes(&server_hello, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || 912 !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id) || 913 CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE || 914 !CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &cipher_suite) || 915 !CBS_get_u8(&server_hello, &compression_method)) { 916 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 917 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); 918 goto f_err; 919 } 920 921 /* Copy over the server random. */ 922 OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 923 924 /* TODO(davidben): Implement the TLS 1.1 and 1.2 downgrade sentinels once TLS 925 * 1.3 is finalized and we are not implementing a draft version. */ 926 927 if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete && ssl->session != NULL && 928 ssl->session->session_id_length != 0 && 929 CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, ssl->session->session_id, 930 ssl->session->session_id_length)) { 931 ssl->s3->session_reused = 1; 932 } else { 933 /* The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to 934 * fill out. */ 935 ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL); 936 if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs, 0 /* client */)) { 937 goto f_err; 938 } 939 /* Note: session_id could be empty. */ 940 hs->new_session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id); 941 OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->new_session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id), 942 CBS_len(&session_id)); 943 } 944 945 const SSL_CIPHER *c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); 946 if (c == NULL) { 947 /* unknown cipher */ 948 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 949 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); 950 goto f_err; 951 } 952 953 /* The cipher must be allowed in the selected version and enabled. */ 954 uint32_t mask_a, mask_k; 955 ssl_get_client_disabled(ssl, &mask_a, &mask_k); 956 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) || (c->algorithm_auth & mask_a) || 957 SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(c) > ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) || 958 SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(c) < ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) || 959 !sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(ssl), NULL, c)) { 960 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 961 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); 962 goto f_err; 963 } 964 965 if (ssl->session != NULL) { 966 if (ssl->session->ssl_version != ssl->version) { 967 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 968 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED); 969 goto f_err; 970 } 971 if (ssl->session->cipher != c) { 972 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 973 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); 974 goto f_err; 975 } 976 if (!ssl_session_is_context_valid(ssl, ssl->session)) { 977 /* This is actually a client application bug. */ 978 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 979 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, 980 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); 981 goto f_err; 982 } 983 } else { 984 hs->new_session->cipher = c; 985 } 986 hs->new_cipher = c; 987 988 /* Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash and hash the 989 * ServerHello. */ 990 if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_init_hash(&hs->transcript, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl), 991 c->algorithm_prf) || 992 !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) { 993 goto f_err; 994 } 995 996 /* If doing a full handshake, the server may request a client certificate 997 * which requires hashing the handshake transcript. Otherwise, the handshake 998 * buffer may be released. */ 999 if (ssl->session != NULL || 1000 !ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) { 1001 SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript); 1002 } 1003 1004 /* Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported. */ 1005 if (compression_method != 0) { 1006 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1007 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1008 goto f_err; 1009 } 1010 1011 /* TLS extensions */ 1012 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &server_hello)) { 1013 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1014 goto err; 1015 } 1016 1017 /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */ 1018 if (CBS_len(&server_hello) != 0) { 1019 /* wrong packet length */ 1020 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1021 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); 1022 goto f_err; 1023 } 1024 1025 if (ssl->session != NULL && 1026 hs->extended_master_secret != ssl->session->extended_master_secret) { 1027 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1028 if (ssl->session->extended_master_secret) { 1029 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION); 1030 } else { 1031 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_NON_EMS_SESSION_WITH_EMS_EXTENSION); 1032 } 1033 goto f_err; 1034 } 1035 1036 return 1; 1037 1038 f_err: 1039 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1040 err: 1041 return -1; 1042 } 1043 1044 static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { 1045 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; 1046 int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl); 1047 if (ret <= 0) { 1048 return ret; 1049 } 1050 1051 if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) || 1052 !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) { 1053 return -1; 1054 } 1055 1056 CBS cbs; 1057 CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); 1058 1059 uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1060 sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); 1061 EVP_PKEY_free(hs->peer_pubkey); 1062 hs->peer_pubkey = NULL; 1063 hs->new_session->certs = ssl_parse_cert_chain(&alert, &hs->peer_pubkey, NULL, 1064 &cbs, ssl->ctx->pool); 1065 if (hs->new_session->certs == NULL) { 1066 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); 1067 return -1; 1068 } 1069 1070 if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs) == 0 || 1071 CBS_len(&cbs) != 0 || 1072 !ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_cache_objects(hs->new_session)) { 1073 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); 1074 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 1075 return -1; 1076 } 1077 1078 if (!ssl_check_leaf_certificate( 1079 hs, hs->peer_pubkey, 1080 sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs, 0))) { 1081 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); 1082 return -1; 1083 } 1084 1085 /* Disallow the server certificate from changing during a renegotiation. See 1086 * https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE. We never resume on renegotiation, 1087 * so this check is sufficient. */ 1088 if (ssl->s3->established_session != NULL) { 1089 if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(ssl->s3->established_session->certs) != 1090 sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs)) { 1091 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED); 1092 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); 1093 return -1; 1094 } 1095 1096 for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs); i++) { 1097 const CRYPTO_BUFFER *old_cert = 1098 sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(ssl->s3->established_session->certs, i); 1099 const CRYPTO_BUFFER *new_cert = 1100 sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs, i); 1101 if (CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert) != CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(new_cert) || 1102 OPENSSL_memcmp(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(old_cert), 1103 CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(new_cert), 1104 CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert)) != 0) { 1105 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED); 1106 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); 1107 return -1; 1108 } 1109 } 1110 } 1111 1112 return 1; 1113 } 1114 1115 static int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { 1116 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; 1117 int al; 1118 CBS certificate_status, ocsp_response; 1119 uint8_t status_type; 1120 1121 int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl); 1122 if (ret <= 0) { 1123 return ret; 1124 } 1125 1126 if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { 1127 /* A server may send status_request in ServerHello and then change 1128 * its mind about sending CertificateStatus. */ 1129 ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 1130 return 1; 1131 } 1132 1133 if (!ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) { 1134 return -1; 1135 } 1136 1137 CBS_init(&certificate_status, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); 1138 if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_status, &status_type) || 1139 status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp || 1140 !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_status, &ocsp_response) || 1141 CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 || 1142 CBS_len(&certificate_status) != 0) { 1143 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1144 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); 1145 goto f_err; 1146 } 1147 1148 if (!CBS_stow(&ocsp_response, &hs->new_session->ocsp_response, 1149 &hs->new_session->ocsp_response_length)) { 1150 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1151 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1152 goto f_err; 1153 } 1154 return 1; 1155 1156 f_err: 1157 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1158 return -1; 1159 } 1160 1161 static int ssl3_verify_server_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { 1162 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; 1163 if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_verify_cert_chain(hs->new_session, ssl)) { 1164 return -1; 1165 } 1166 1167 return 1; 1168 } 1169 1170 static int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { 1171 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; 1172 int al; 1173 DH *dh = NULL; 1174 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; 1175 EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; 1176 1177 int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl); 1178 if (ret <= 0) { 1179 return ret; 1180 } 1181 1182 if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 1183 /* Some ciphers (pure PSK) have an optional ServerKeyExchange message. */ 1184 if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(hs->new_cipher)) { 1185 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1186 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1187 return -1; 1188 } 1189 1190 ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 1191 return 1; 1192 } 1193 1194 if (!ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) { 1195 return -1; 1196 } 1197 1198 /* Retain a copy of the original CBS to compute the signature over. */ 1199 CBS server_key_exchange; 1200 CBS_init(&server_key_exchange, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); 1201 CBS server_key_exchange_orig = server_key_exchange; 1202 1203 uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1204 uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1205 1206 if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { 1207 CBS psk_identity_hint; 1208 1209 /* Each of the PSK key exchanges begins with a psk_identity_hint. */ 1210 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, 1211 &psk_identity_hint)) { 1212 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1213 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); 1214 goto f_err; 1215 } 1216 1217 /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in 1218 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of a PSK 1219 * identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. 1220 * Also do not allow NULL characters; identities are saved as C strings. 1221 * 1222 * TODO(davidben): Should invalid hints be ignored? It's a hint rather than 1223 * a specific identity. */ 1224 if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN || 1225 CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity_hint)) { 1226 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1227 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 1228 goto f_err; 1229 } 1230 1231 /* Save non-empty identity hints as a C string. Empty identity hints we 1232 * treat as missing. Plain PSK makes it possible to send either no hint 1233 * (omit ServerKeyExchange) or an empty hint, while ECDHE_PSK can only spell 1234 * empty hint. Having different capabilities is odd, so we interpret empty 1235 * and missing as identical. */ 1236 if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) != 0 && 1237 !CBS_strdup(&psk_identity_hint, &hs->peer_psk_identity_hint)) { 1238 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1239 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1240 goto f_err; 1241 } 1242 } 1243 1244 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { 1245 CBS dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys; 1246 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_p) || 1247 CBS_len(&dh_p) == 0 || 1248 !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_g) || 1249 CBS_len(&dh_g) == 0 || 1250 !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_Ys) || 1251 CBS_len(&dh_Ys) == 0) { 1252 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1253 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); 1254 goto f_err; 1255 } 1256 1257 dh = DH_new(); 1258 if (dh == NULL) { 1259 goto err; 1260 } 1261 1262 dh->p = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_p), CBS_len(&dh_p), NULL); 1263 dh->g = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_g), CBS_len(&dh_g), NULL); 1264 if (dh->p == NULL || dh->g == NULL) { 1265 goto err; 1266 } 1267 1268 unsigned bits = DH_num_bits(dh); 1269 if (bits < 1024) { 1270 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); 1271 goto err; 1272 } else if (bits > 4096) { 1273 /* Overly large DHE groups are prohibitively expensive, so enforce a limit 1274 * to prevent a server from causing us to perform too expensive of a 1275 * computation. */ 1276 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DH_P_TOO_LONG); 1277 goto err; 1278 } 1279 1280 SSL_ECDH_CTX_init_for_dhe(&hs->ecdh_ctx, dh); 1281 dh = NULL; 1282 1283 /* Save the peer public key for later. */ 1284 if (!CBS_stow(&dh_Ys, &hs->peer_key, &hs->peer_key_len)) { 1285 goto err; 1286 } 1287 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { 1288 /* Parse the server parameters. */ 1289 uint8_t group_type; 1290 uint16_t group_id; 1291 CBS point; 1292 if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_key_exchange, &group_type) || 1293 group_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || 1294 !CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &group_id) || 1295 !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &point)) { 1296 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1297 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); 1298 goto f_err; 1299 } 1300 hs->new_session->group_id = group_id; 1301 1302 /* Ensure the group is consistent with preferences. */ 1303 if (!tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id)) { 1304 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1305 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); 1306 goto f_err; 1307 } 1308 1309 /* Initialize ECDH and save the peer public key for later. */ 1310 if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&hs->ecdh_ctx, group_id) || 1311 !CBS_stow(&point, &hs->peer_key, &hs->peer_key_len)) { 1312 goto err; 1313 } 1314 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { 1315 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1316 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1317 goto f_err; 1318 } 1319 1320 /* At this point, |server_key_exchange| contains the signature, if any, while 1321 * |server_key_exchange_orig| contains the entire message. From that, derive 1322 * a CBS containing just the parameter. */ 1323 CBS parameter; 1324 CBS_init(¶meter, CBS_data(&server_key_exchange_orig), 1325 CBS_len(&server_key_exchange_orig) - CBS_len(&server_key_exchange)); 1326 1327 /* ServerKeyExchange should be signed by the server's public key. */ 1328 if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) { 1329 uint16_t signature_algorithm = 0; 1330 if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 1331 if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &signature_algorithm)) { 1332 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1333 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); 1334 goto f_err; 1335 } 1336 if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &al, signature_algorithm)) { 1337 goto f_err; 1338 } 1339 hs->new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm; 1340 } else if (hs->peer_pubkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { 1341 signature_algorithm = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1; 1342 } else if (hs->peer_pubkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 1343 signature_algorithm = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1; 1344 } else { 1345 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 1346 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); 1347 goto f_err; 1348 } 1349 1350 /* The last field in |server_key_exchange| is the signature. */ 1351 CBS signature; 1352 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &signature) || 1353 CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) != 0) { 1354 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1355 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); 1356 goto f_err; 1357 } 1358 1359 CBB transcript; 1360 uint8_t *transcript_data; 1361 size_t transcript_len; 1362 if (!CBB_init(&transcript, 2*SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + CBS_len(¶meter)) || 1363 !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || 1364 !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || 1365 !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, CBS_data(¶meter), CBS_len(¶meter)) || 1366 !CBB_finish(&transcript, &transcript_data, &transcript_len)) { 1367 CBB_cleanup(&transcript); 1368 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1369 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1370 goto f_err; 1371 } 1372 1373 int sig_ok = ssl_public_key_verify( 1374 ssl, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), signature_algorithm, 1375 hs->peer_pubkey, transcript_data, transcript_len); 1376 OPENSSL_free(transcript_data); 1377 1378 #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) 1379 sig_ok = 1; 1380 ERR_clear_error(); 1381 #endif 1382 if (!sig_ok) { 1383 /* bad signature */ 1384 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 1385 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 1386 goto f_err; 1387 } 1388 } else { 1389 /* PSK ciphers are the only supported certificate-less ciphers. */ 1390 assert(alg_a == SSL_aPSK); 1391 1392 if (CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) > 0) { 1393 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1394 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); 1395 goto f_err; 1396 } 1397 } 1398 return 1; 1399 1400 f_err: 1401 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1402 err: 1403 DH_free(dh); 1404 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); 1405 EC_KEY_free(ecdh); 1406 return -1; 1407 } 1408 1409 static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { 1410 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; 1411 int msg_ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl); 1412 if (msg_ret <= 0) { 1413 return msg_ret; 1414 } 1415 1416 if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) { 1417 ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 1418 /* If we get here we don't need the handshake buffer as we won't be doing 1419 * client auth. */ 1420 SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript); 1421 return 1; 1422 } 1423 1424 if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) || 1425 !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) { 1426 return -1; 1427 } 1428 1429 CBS cbs; 1430 CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); 1431 1432 /* Get the certificate types. */ 1433 CBS certificate_types; 1434 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_types)) { 1435 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 1436 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); 1437 return -1; 1438 } 1439 1440 if (!CBS_stow(&certificate_types, &hs->certificate_types, 1441 &hs->num_certificate_types)) { 1442 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1443 return -1; 1444 } 1445 1446 if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 1447 CBS supported_signature_algorithms; 1448 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &supported_signature_algorithms) || 1449 !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(hs, &supported_signature_algorithms)) { 1450 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 1451 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); 1452 return -1; 1453 } 1454 } 1455 1456 uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1457 STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *ca_names = 1458 ssl_parse_client_CA_list(ssl, &alert, &cbs); 1459 if (ca_names == NULL) { 1460 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); 1461 return -1; 1462 } 1463 1464 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { 1465 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 1466 sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ca_names, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); 1467 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); 1468 return -1; 1469 } 1470 1471 hs->cert_request = 1; 1472 sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->ca_names, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); 1473 hs->ca_names = ca_names; 1474 ssl->ctx->x509_method->hs_flush_cached_ca_names(hs); 1475 return 1; 1476 } 1477 1478 static int ssl3_get_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { 1479 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; 1480 int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl); 1481 if (ret <= 0) { 1482 return ret; 1483 } 1484 1485 if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) || 1486 !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) { 1487 return -1; 1488 } 1489 1490 /* ServerHelloDone is empty. */ 1491 if (ssl->init_num > 0) { 1492 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 1493 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); 1494 return -1; 1495 } 1496 1497 return 1; 1498 } 1499 1500 static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { 1501 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; 1502 /* Call cert_cb to update the certificate. */ 1503 if (ssl->cert->cert_cb) { 1504 int ret = ssl->cert->cert_cb(ssl, ssl->cert->cert_cb_arg); 1505 if (ret < 0) { 1506 ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 1507 return -1; 1508 } 1509 if (ret == 0) { 1510 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); 1511 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1512 return -1; 1513 } 1514 } 1515 1516 if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) { 1517 /* Without a client certificate, the handshake buffer may be released. */ 1518 SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript); 1519 1520 /* In SSL 3.0, the Certificate message is replaced with a warning alert. */ 1521 if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 1522 if (!ssl->method->add_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING, 1523 SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE)) { 1524 return -1; 1525 } 1526 return 1; 1527 } 1528 } 1529 1530 if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->ssl_auto_chain_if_needed(ssl) || 1531 !ssl3_output_cert_chain(ssl)) { 1532 return -1; 1533 } 1534 return 1; 1535 } 1536 1537 OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(size_t) >= sizeof(unsigned), 1538 SIZE_T_IS_SMALLER_THAN_UNSIGNED); 1539 1540 static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { 1541 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; 1542 uint8_t *pms = NULL; 1543 size_t pms_len = 0; 1544 CBB cbb, body; 1545 if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, 1546 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { 1547 goto err; 1548 } 1549 1550 uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1551 uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1552 1553 /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */ 1554 unsigned psk_len = 0; 1555 uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; 1556 if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { 1557 if (ssl->psk_client_callback == NULL) { 1558 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); 1559 goto err; 1560 } 1561 1562 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; 1563 OPENSSL_memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); 1564 psk_len = 1565 ssl->psk_client_callback(ssl, hs->peer_psk_identity_hint, identity, 1566 sizeof(identity), psk, sizeof(psk)); 1567 if (psk_len == 0) { 1568 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 1569 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1570 goto err; 1571 } 1572 assert(psk_len <= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN); 1573 1574 OPENSSL_free(hs->new_session->psk_identity); 1575 hs->new_session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); 1576 if (hs->new_session->psk_identity == NULL) { 1577 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1578 goto err; 1579 } 1580 1581 /* Write out psk_identity. */ 1582 CBB child; 1583 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || 1584 !CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)identity, 1585 OPENSSL_strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity))) || 1586 !CBB_flush(&body)) { 1587 goto err; 1588 } 1589 } 1590 1591 /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |pms| and |pms_len|. */ 1592 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { 1593 pms_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; 1594 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); 1595 if (pms == NULL) { 1596 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1597 goto err; 1598 } 1599 1600 RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(hs->peer_pubkey); 1601 if (rsa == NULL) { 1602 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1603 goto err; 1604 } 1605 1606 pms[0] = hs->client_version >> 8; 1607 pms[1] = hs->client_version & 0xff; 1608 if (!RAND_bytes(&pms[2], SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - 2)) { 1609 goto err; 1610 } 1611 1612 CBB child, *enc_pms = &body; 1613 size_t enc_pms_len; 1614 /* In TLS, there is a length prefix. */ 1615 if (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION) { 1616 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child)) { 1617 goto err; 1618 } 1619 enc_pms = &child; 1620 } 1621 1622 uint8_t *ptr; 1623 if (!CBB_reserve(enc_pms, &ptr, RSA_size(rsa)) || 1624 !RSA_encrypt(rsa, &enc_pms_len, ptr, RSA_size(rsa), pms, pms_len, 1625 RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) || 1626 !CBB_did_write(enc_pms, enc_pms_len) || 1627 !CBB_flush(&body)) { 1628 goto err; 1629 } 1630 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kDHE)) { 1631 /* Generate a keypair and serialize the public half. */ 1632 CBB child; 1633 if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_add_key(&hs->ecdh_ctx, &body, &child)) { 1634 goto err; 1635 } 1636 1637 /* Compute the premaster. */ 1638 uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1639 if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_accept(&hs->ecdh_ctx, &child, &pms, &pms_len, &alert, 1640 hs->peer_key, hs->peer_key_len)) { 1641 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); 1642 goto err; 1643 } 1644 if (!CBB_flush(&body)) { 1645 goto err; 1646 } 1647 1648 /* The key exchange state may now be discarded. */ 1649 SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&hs->ecdh_ctx); 1650 OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_key); 1651 hs->peer_key = NULL; 1652 hs->peer_key_len = 0; 1653 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { 1654 /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as 1655 * the pre-shared key. */ 1656 pms_len = psk_len; 1657 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); 1658 if (pms == NULL) { 1659 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1660 goto err; 1661 } 1662 OPENSSL_memset(pms, 0, pms_len); 1663 } else { 1664 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1665 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1666 goto err; 1667 } 1668 1669 /* For a PSK cipher suite, other_secret is combined with the pre-shared 1670 * key. */ 1671 if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { 1672 CBB pms_cbb, child; 1673 uint8_t *new_pms; 1674 size_t new_pms_len; 1675 1676 CBB_zero(&pms_cbb); 1677 if (!CBB_init(&pms_cbb, 2 + psk_len + 2 + pms_len) || 1678 !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&pms_cbb, &child) || 1679 !CBB_add_bytes(&child, pms, pms_len) || 1680 !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&pms_cbb, &child) || 1681 !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) || 1682 !CBB_finish(&pms_cbb, &new_pms, &new_pms_len)) { 1683 CBB_cleanup(&pms_cbb); 1684 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1685 goto err; 1686 } 1687 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); 1688 OPENSSL_free(pms); 1689 pms = new_pms; 1690 pms_len = new_pms_len; 1691 } 1692 1693 /* The message must be added to the finished hash before calculating the 1694 * master secret. */ 1695 if (!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) { 1696 goto err; 1697 } 1698 1699 hs->new_session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret( 1700 hs, hs->new_session->master_key, pms, pms_len); 1701 if (hs->new_session->master_key_length == 0) { 1702 goto err; 1703 } 1704 hs->new_session->extended_master_secret = hs->extended_master_secret; 1705 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); 1706 OPENSSL_free(pms); 1707 1708 return 1; 1709 1710 err: 1711 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1712 if (pms != NULL) { 1713 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); 1714 OPENSSL_free(pms); 1715 } 1716 return -1; 1717 } 1718 1719 static int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { 1720 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; 1721 assert(ssl_has_private_key(ssl)); 1722 1723 CBB cbb, body, child; 1724 if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, 1725 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)) { 1726 goto err; 1727 } 1728 1729 uint16_t signature_algorithm; 1730 if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) { 1731 goto err; 1732 } 1733 if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 1734 /* Write out the digest type in TLS 1.2. */ 1735 if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) { 1736 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1737 goto err; 1738 } 1739 } 1740 1741 /* Set aside space for the signature. */ 1742 const size_t max_sig_len = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(ssl); 1743 uint8_t *ptr; 1744 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || 1745 !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) { 1746 goto err; 1747 } 1748 1749 size_t sig_len = max_sig_len; 1750 enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result; 1751 if (hs->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) { 1752 /* The SSL3 construction for CertificateVerify does not decompose into a 1753 * single final digest and signature, and must be special-cased. */ 1754 if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) == SSL3_VERSION) { 1755 if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) { 1756 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FOR_CUSTOM_KEY); 1757 goto err; 1758 } 1759 1760 uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 1761 size_t digest_len; 1762 if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_ssl3_cert_verify_hash(&hs->transcript, digest, 1763 &digest_len, hs->new_session, 1764 signature_algorithm)) { 1765 goto err; 1766 } 1767 1768 sign_result = ssl_private_key_success; 1769 1770 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ssl->cert->privatekey, NULL); 1771 if (pctx == NULL || 1772 !EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) || 1773 !EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, ptr, &sig_len, digest, digest_len)) { 1774 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 1775 sign_result = ssl_private_key_failure; 1776 goto err; 1777 } 1778 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 1779 } else { 1780 sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign( 1781 ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len, signature_algorithm, 1782 (const uint8_t *)hs->transcript.buffer->data, 1783 hs->transcript.buffer->length); 1784 } 1785 1786 /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary. */ 1787 SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript); 1788 } else { 1789 assert(hs->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B); 1790 sign_result = ssl_private_key_complete(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len); 1791 } 1792 1793 switch (sign_result) { 1794 case ssl_private_key_success: 1795 break; 1796 case ssl_private_key_failure: 1797 goto err; 1798 case ssl_private_key_retry: 1799 ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; 1800 hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; 1801 goto err; 1802 } 1803 1804 if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len) || 1805 !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) { 1806 goto err; 1807 } 1808 1809 return 1; 1810 1811 err: 1812 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1813 return -1; 1814 } 1815 1816 static int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { 1817 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; 1818 static const uint8_t kZero[32] = {0}; 1819 size_t padding_len = 32 - ((ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len + 2) % 32); 1820 1821 CBB cbb, body, child; 1822 if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) || 1823 !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || 1824 !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated, 1825 ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len) || 1826 !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || 1827 !CBB_add_bytes(&child, kZero, padding_len) || 1828 !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) { 1829 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1830 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1831 return -1; 1832 } 1833 1834 return 1; 1835 } 1836 1837 static int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { 1838 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; 1839 if (!ssl_do_channel_id_callback(ssl)) { 1840 return -1; 1841 } 1842 1843 if (ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private == NULL) { 1844 ssl->rwstate = SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP; 1845 return -1; 1846 } 1847 1848 CBB cbb, body; 1849 if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID) || 1850 !tls1_write_channel_id(hs, &body) || 1851 !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) { 1852 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1853 CBB_cleanup(&cbb); 1854 return -1; 1855 } 1856 1857 return 1; 1858 } 1859 1860 static int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { 1861 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; 1862 int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl); 1863 if (ret <= 0) { 1864 return ret; 1865 } 1866 1867 if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) || 1868 !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) { 1869 return -1; 1870 } 1871 1872 CBS new_session_ticket, ticket; 1873 uint32_t tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; 1874 CBS_init(&new_session_ticket, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); 1875 if (!CBS_get_u32(&new_session_ticket, &tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) || 1876 !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&new_session_ticket, &ticket) || 1877 CBS_len(&new_session_ticket) != 0) { 1878 ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 1879 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); 1880 return -1; 1881 } 1882 1883 if (CBS_len(&ticket) == 0) { 1884 /* RFC 5077 allows a server to change its mind and send no ticket after 1885 * negotiating the extension. The value of |ticket_expected| is checked in 1886 * |ssl_update_cache| so is cleared here to avoid an unnecessary update. */ 1887 hs->ticket_expected = 0; 1888 return 1; 1889 } 1890 1891 int session_renewed = ssl->session != NULL; 1892 SSL_SESSION *session = hs->new_session; 1893 if (session_renewed) { 1894 /* The server is sending a new ticket for an existing session. Sessions are 1895 * immutable once established, so duplicate all but the ticket of the 1896 * existing session. */ 1897 session = SSL_SESSION_dup(ssl->session, SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH); 1898 if (session == NULL) { 1899 /* This should never happen. */ 1900 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1901 goto err; 1902 } 1903 } 1904 1905 /* |tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint| is measured from when the ticket was issued. */ 1906 ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session); 1907 1908 if (!CBS_stow(&ticket, &session->tlsext_tick, &session->tlsext_ticklen)) { 1909 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1910 goto err; 1911 } 1912 session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; 1913 1914 /* Generate a session ID for this session based on the session ticket. We use 1915 * the session ID mechanism for detecting ticket resumption. This also fits in 1916 * with assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL.*/ 1917 if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), 1918 session->session_id, &session->session_id_length, 1919 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { 1920 goto err; 1921 } 1922 1923 if (session_renewed) { 1924 session->not_resumable = 0; 1925 SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session); 1926 ssl->session = session; 1927 } 1928 1929 return 1; 1930 1931 err: 1932 if (session_renewed) { 1933 SSL_SESSION_free(session); 1934 } 1935 return -1; 1936 } 1937
