1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 2 * All rights reserved. 3 * 4 * This package is an SSL implementation written 5 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 7 * 8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 14 * 15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 16 * the code are not to be removed. 17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 18 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 21 * 22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 24 * are met: 25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 31 * must display the following acknowledgement: 32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 33 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 39 * 40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 50 * SUCH DAMAGE. 51 * 52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 54 * copied and put under another distribution licence 55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ 56 57 #include <string.h> 58 #include <time.h> 59 60 #include <openssl/asn1.h> 61 #include <openssl/buf.h> 62 #include <openssl/err.h> 63 #include <openssl/evp.h> 64 #include <openssl/lhash.h> 65 #include <openssl/mem.h> 66 #include <openssl/obj.h> 67 #include <openssl/thread.h> 68 #include <openssl/x509.h> 69 #include <openssl/x509v3.h> 70 71 #include "vpm_int.h" 72 #include "../internal.h" 73 74 static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = 75 CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA; 76 77 /* CRL score values */ 78 79 /* No unhandled critical extensions */ 80 81 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 82 83 /* certificate is within CRL scope */ 84 85 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 86 87 /* CRL times valid */ 88 89 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 90 91 /* Issuer name matches certificate */ 92 93 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 94 95 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ 96 97 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) 98 99 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ 100 101 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 102 103 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ 104 105 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 106 107 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ 108 109 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 110 111 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ 112 113 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 114 115 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); 116 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); 117 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); 118 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 119 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 120 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 121 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 122 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 123 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 124 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 125 126 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 127 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); 128 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 129 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); 130 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, 131 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, 132 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); 133 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, 134 int *pcrl_score); 135 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 136 unsigned int *preasons); 137 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); 138 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 139 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 140 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); 141 142 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 143 144 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) 145 { 146 return ok; 147 } 148 149 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */ 150 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x) 151 { 152 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); 153 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) 154 return 1; 155 else 156 return 0; 157 } 158 159 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ 160 161 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 162 { 163 STACK_OF(X509) *certs; 164 X509 *xtmp = NULL; 165 size_t i; 166 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ 167 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); 168 if (certs == NULL) 169 return NULL; 170 /* Look for exact match */ 171 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { 172 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); 173 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) 174 break; 175 } 176 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) 177 X509_up_ref(xtmp); 178 else 179 xtmp = NULL; 180 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); 181 return xtmp; 182 } 183 184 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 185 { 186 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL; 187 int bad_chain = 0; 188 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; 189 int depth, i, ok = 0; 190 int num, j, retry, trust; 191 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 192 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; 193 if (ctx->cert == NULL) { 194 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); 195 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; 196 return -1; 197 } 198 if (ctx->chain != NULL) { 199 /* 200 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We 201 * cannot do another one. 202 */ 203 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); 204 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; 205 return -1; 206 } 207 208 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 209 210 /* 211 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that 212 * the first entry is in place 213 */ 214 ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null(); 215 if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) { 216 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 217 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 218 goto end; 219 } 220 X509_up_ref(ctx->cert); 221 ctx->last_untrusted = 1; 222 223 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it. 224 * sktmp = ctx->untrusted ++ ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted */ 225 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL 226 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { 227 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 228 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 229 goto end; 230 } 231 232 if (ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted != NULL) { 233 if (sktmp == NULL) { 234 sktmp = sk_X509_new_null(); 235 if (sktmp == NULL) { 236 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 237 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 238 goto end; 239 } 240 } 241 242 for (size_t k = 0; k < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted); 243 k++) { 244 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, 245 sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted, 246 k))) { 247 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 248 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 249 goto end; 250 } 251 } 252 } 253 254 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 255 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); 256 depth = param->depth; 257 258 for (;;) { 259 /* If we have enough, we break */ 260 if (depth < num) 261 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take 262 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the 263 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code 264 * later. */ 265 266 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 267 if (cert_self_signed(x)) 268 break; 269 /* 270 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first 271 */ 272 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) { 273 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 274 if (ok < 0) { 275 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; 276 goto end; 277 } 278 /* 279 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up 280 * again later. 281 */ 282 if (ok > 0) { 283 X509_free(xtmp); 284 break; 285 } 286 } 287 288 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ 289 if (sktmp != NULL) { 290 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); 291 if (xtmp != NULL) { 292 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { 293 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 294 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 295 ok = 0; 296 goto end; 297 } 298 X509_up_ref(xtmp); 299 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); 300 ctx->last_untrusted++; 301 x = xtmp; 302 num++; 303 /* 304 * reparse the full chain for the next one 305 */ 306 continue; 307 } 308 } 309 break; 310 } 311 312 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */ 313 j = num; 314 /* 315 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates. 316 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we 317 * complain. 318 */ 319 320 do { 321 /* 322 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed. 323 */ 324 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 325 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); 326 if (cert_self_signed(x)) { 327 /* we have a self signed certificate */ 328 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) { 329 /* 330 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can 331 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid 332 * possible impersonation. 333 */ 334 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 335 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) { 336 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; 337 ctx->current_cert = x; 338 ctx->error_depth = i - 1; 339 if (ok == 1) 340 X509_free(xtmp); 341 bad_chain = 1; 342 ok = cb(0, ctx); 343 if (!ok) 344 goto end; 345 } else { 346 /* 347 * We have a match: replace certificate with store 348 * version so we get any trust settings. 349 */ 350 X509_free(x); 351 x = xtmp; 352 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); 353 ctx->last_untrusted = 0; 354 } 355 } else { 356 /* 357 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use 358 */ 359 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); 360 ctx->last_untrusted--; 361 num--; 362 j--; 363 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); 364 } 365 } 366 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ 367 for (;;) { 368 /* If we have enough, we break */ 369 if (depth < num) 370 break; 371 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 372 if (cert_self_signed(x)) 373 break; 374 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 375 376 if (ok < 0) { 377 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; 378 goto end; 379 } 380 if (ok == 0) 381 break; 382 x = xtmp; 383 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { 384 X509_free(xtmp); 385 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 386 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 387 ok = 0; 388 goto end; 389 } 390 num++; 391 } 392 393 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ 394 trust = check_trust(ctx); 395 396 /* If explicitly rejected error */ 397 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { 398 ok = 0; 399 goto end; 400 } 401 /* 402 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative 403 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already 404 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate 405 * chain checking 406 */ 407 retry = 0; 408 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED 409 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) 410 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) { 411 while (j-- > 1) { 412 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1); 413 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2); 414 if (ok < 0) 415 goto end; 416 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */ 417 if (ok > 0) { 418 /* 419 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later 420 */ 421 X509_free(xtmp); 422 423 /* 424 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an 425 * alternate chain 426 */ 427 while (num > j) { 428 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); 429 X509_free(xtmp); 430 num--; 431 } 432 ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 433 retry = 1; 434 break; 435 } 436 } 437 } 438 } while (retry); 439 440 /* 441 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single 442 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already 443 * and set bad_chain == 1 444 */ 445 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) { 446 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) { 447 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) 448 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; 449 else 450 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; 451 ctx->current_cert = x; 452 } else { 453 454 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss); 455 num++; 456 ctx->last_untrusted = num; 457 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss; 458 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; 459 chain_ss = NULL; 460 } 461 462 ctx->error_depth = num - 1; 463 bad_chain = 1; 464 ok = cb(0, ctx); 465 if (!ok) 466 goto end; 467 } 468 469 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ 470 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); 471 472 if (!ok) 473 goto end; 474 475 /* Check name constraints */ 476 477 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); 478 479 if (!ok) 480 goto end; 481 482 ok = check_id(ctx); 483 484 if (!ok) 485 goto end; 486 487 /* 488 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because 489 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification. 490 */ 491 492 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); 493 if (!ok) 494 goto end; 495 496 int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, 497 ctx->param->flags); 498 if (err != X509_V_OK) { 499 ctx->error = err; 500 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth); 501 ok = cb(0, ctx); 502 if (!ok) 503 goto end; 504 } 505 506 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ 507 if (ctx->verify != NULL) 508 ok = ctx->verify(ctx); 509 else 510 ok = internal_verify(ctx); 511 if (!ok) 512 goto end; 513 514 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ 515 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) 516 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); 517 518 end: 519 if (sktmp != NULL) 520 sk_X509_free(sktmp); 521 if (chain_ss != NULL) 522 X509_free(chain_ss); 523 524 /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */ 525 if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) 526 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; 527 return ok; 528 } 529 530 /* 531 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) 532 */ 533 534 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) 535 { 536 size_t i; 537 X509 *issuer; 538 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { 539 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 540 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) 541 return issuer; 542 } 543 return NULL; 544 } 545 546 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ 547 548 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) 549 { 550 int ret; 551 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); 552 if (ret == X509_V_OK) 553 return 1; 554 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ 555 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) 556 return 0; 557 558 ctx->error = ret; 559 ctx->current_cert = x; 560 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 561 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 562 } 563 564 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ 565 566 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 567 { 568 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); 569 if (*issuer) { 570 X509_up_ref(*issuer); 571 return 1; 572 } else 573 return 0; 574 } 575 576 /* 577 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied 578 * purpose 579 */ 580 581 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 582 { 583 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; 584 X509 *x; 585 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 586 int proxy_path_length = 0; 587 int purpose; 588 int allow_proxy_certs; 589 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 590 591 /* 592 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: -1: we accept both CA and non-CA 593 * certificates, to allow direct use of self-signed certificates (which 594 * are marked as CA). 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is 595 * currently not used, but the possibility is present for future 596 * extensions. 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used 597 * for all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. 598 */ 599 must_be_ca = -1; 600 601 /* CRL path validation */ 602 if (ctx->parent) { 603 allow_proxy_certs = 0; 604 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; 605 } else { 606 allow_proxy_certs = 607 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); 608 purpose = ctx->param->purpose; 609 } 610 611 /* Check all untrusted certificates */ 612 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) { 613 int ret; 614 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 615 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 616 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { 617 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; 618 ctx->error_depth = i; 619 ctx->current_cert = x; 620 ok = cb(0, ctx); 621 if (!ok) 622 goto end; 623 } 624 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { 625 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; 626 ctx->error_depth = i; 627 ctx->current_cert = x; 628 ok = cb(0, ctx); 629 if (!ok) 630 goto end; 631 } 632 ret = X509_check_ca(x); 633 switch (must_be_ca) { 634 case -1: 635 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 636 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { 637 ret = 0; 638 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 639 } else 640 ret = 1; 641 break; 642 case 0: 643 if (ret != 0) { 644 ret = 0; 645 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; 646 } else 647 ret = 1; 648 break; 649 default: 650 if ((ret == 0) 651 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 652 && (ret != 1))) { 653 ret = 0; 654 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 655 } else 656 ret = 1; 657 break; 658 } 659 if (ret == 0) { 660 ctx->error_depth = i; 661 ctx->current_cert = x; 662 ok = cb(0, ctx); 663 if (!ok) 664 goto end; 665 } 666 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) { 667 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); 668 if ((ret == 0) 669 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 670 && (ret != 1))) { 671 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; 672 ctx->error_depth = i; 673 ctx->current_cert = x; 674 ok = cb(0, ctx); 675 if (!ok) 676 goto end; 677 } 678 } 679 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ 680 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) 681 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) 682 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { 683 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 684 ctx->error_depth = i; 685 ctx->current_cert = x; 686 ok = cb(0, ctx); 687 if (!ok) 688 goto end; 689 } 690 /* Increment path length if not self issued */ 691 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 692 plen++; 693 /* 694 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate 695 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, 696 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. 697 */ 698 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { 699 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) { 700 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 701 ctx->error_depth = i; 702 ctx->current_cert = x; 703 ok = cb(0, ctx); 704 if (!ok) 705 goto end; 706 } 707 proxy_path_length++; 708 must_be_ca = 0; 709 } else 710 must_be_ca = 1; 711 } 712 ok = 1; 713 end: 714 return ok; 715 } 716 717 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 718 { 719 X509 *x; 720 int i, j, rv; 721 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ 722 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 723 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 724 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ 725 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 726 continue; 727 /* 728 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain 729 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed 730 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them 731 * to be obeyed. 732 */ 733 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { 734 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; 735 if (nc) { 736 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); 737 switch (rv) { 738 case X509_V_OK: 739 continue; 740 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: 741 ctx->error = rv; 742 return 0; 743 default: 744 ctx->error = rv; 745 ctx->error_depth = i; 746 ctx->current_cert = x; 747 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 748 return 0; 749 break; 750 } 751 } 752 } 753 } 754 return 1; 755 } 756 757 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) 758 { 759 ctx->error = errcode; 760 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert; 761 ctx->error_depth = 0; 762 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 763 } 764 765 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id) 766 { 767 size_t i; 768 size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts); 769 char *name; 770 771 if (id->peername != NULL) { 772 OPENSSL_free(id->peername); 773 id->peername = NULL; 774 } 775 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { 776 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i); 777 if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), id->hostflags, 778 &id->peername) > 0) 779 return 1; 780 } 781 return n == 0; 782 } 783 784 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 785 { 786 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; 787 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id; 788 X509 *x = ctx->cert; 789 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) { 790 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) 791 return 0; 792 } 793 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { 794 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) 795 return 0; 796 } 797 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) { 798 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) 799 return 0; 800 } 801 return 1; 802 } 803 804 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 805 { 806 size_t i; 807 int ok; 808 X509 *x = NULL; 809 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 810 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 811 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */ 812 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { 813 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 814 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); 815 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ 816 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) 817 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; 818 /* 819 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not 820 * overridden. 821 */ 822 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { 823 ctx->error_depth = i; 824 ctx->current_cert = x; 825 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; 826 ok = cb(0, ctx); 827 if (!ok) 828 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; 829 } 830 } 831 /* 832 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate 833 * return success. 834 */ 835 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { 836 X509 *mx; 837 if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain)) 838 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; 839 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0); 840 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); 841 if (mx) { 842 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); 843 X509_free(x); 844 ctx->last_untrusted = 0; 845 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; 846 } 847 } 848 849 /* 850 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow 851 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. 852 */ 853 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; 854 } 855 856 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 857 { 858 int i, last, ok; 859 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) 860 return 1; 861 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) 862 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 863 else { 864 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ 865 if (ctx->parent) 866 return 1; 867 last = 0; 868 } 869 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { 870 ctx->error_depth = i; 871 ok = check_cert(ctx); 872 if (!ok) 873 return ok; 874 } 875 return 1; 876 } 877 878 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 879 { 880 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 881 X509 *x; 882 int ok = 0, cnum; 883 unsigned int last_reasons; 884 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 885 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); 886 ctx->current_cert = x; 887 ctx->current_issuer = NULL; 888 ctx->current_crl_score = 0; 889 ctx->current_reasons = 0; 890 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { 891 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; 892 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ 893 if (ctx->get_crl) 894 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); 895 else 896 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); 897 /* 898 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback 899 */ 900 if (!ok) { 901 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 902 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 903 goto err; 904 } 905 ctx->current_crl = crl; 906 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); 907 if (!ok) 908 goto err; 909 910 if (dcrl) { 911 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); 912 if (!ok) 913 goto err; 914 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); 915 if (!ok) 916 goto err; 917 } else 918 ok = 1; 919 920 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ 921 if (ok != 2) { 922 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); 923 if (!ok) 924 goto err; 925 } 926 927 X509_CRL_free(crl); 928 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 929 crl = NULL; 930 dcrl = NULL; 931 /* 932 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration, 933 * so exit loop. 934 */ 935 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { 936 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 937 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 938 goto err; 939 } 940 } 941 err: 942 X509_CRL_free(crl); 943 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 944 945 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 946 return ok; 947 948 } 949 950 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ 951 952 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) 953 { 954 time_t *ptime; 955 int i; 956 if (notify) 957 ctx->current_crl = crl; 958 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 959 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 960 else 961 ptime = NULL; 962 963 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); 964 if (i == 0) { 965 if (!notify) 966 return 0; 967 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; 968 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 969 return 0; 970 } 971 972 if (i > 0) { 973 if (!notify) 974 return 0; 975 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; 976 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 977 return 0; 978 } 979 980 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) { 981 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); 982 983 if (i == 0) { 984 if (!notify) 985 return 0; 986 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; 987 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 988 return 0; 989 } 990 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ 991 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { 992 if (!notify) 993 return 0; 994 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; 995 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 996 return 0; 997 } 998 } 999 1000 if (notify) 1001 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 1002 1003 return 1; 1004 } 1005 1006 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, 1007 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, 1008 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 1009 { 1010 int crl_score, best_score = *pscore; 1011 size_t i; 1012 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; 1013 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; 1014 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; 1015 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; 1016 1017 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { 1018 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 1019 reasons = *preasons; 1020 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); 1021 if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0) 1022 continue; 1023 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */ 1024 if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) { 1025 int day, sec; 1026 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl), 1027 X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) 1028 continue; 1029 /* 1030 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day| 1031 * and |sec|. 1032 */ 1033 if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0) 1034 continue; 1035 } 1036 best_crl = crl; 1037 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; 1038 best_score = crl_score; 1039 best_reasons = reasons; 1040 } 1041 1042 if (best_crl) { 1043 if (*pcrl) 1044 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); 1045 *pcrl = best_crl; 1046 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; 1047 *pscore = best_score; 1048 *preasons = best_reasons; 1049 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl); 1050 if (*pdcrl) { 1051 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); 1052 *pdcrl = NULL; 1053 } 1054 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); 1055 } 1056 1057 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) 1058 return 1; 1059 1060 return 0; 1061 } 1062 1063 /* 1064 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be 1065 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. 1066 */ 1067 1068 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) 1069 { 1070 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; 1071 int i; 1072 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); 1073 if (i >= 0) { 1074 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ 1075 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) 1076 return 0; 1077 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); 1078 } else 1079 exta = NULL; 1080 1081 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); 1082 1083 if (i >= 0) { 1084 1085 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) 1086 return 0; 1087 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); 1088 } else 1089 extb = NULL; 1090 1091 if (!exta && !extb) 1092 return 1; 1093 1094 if (!exta || !extb) 1095 return 0; 1096 1097 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) 1098 return 0; 1099 1100 return 1; 1101 } 1102 1103 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ 1104 1105 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) 1106 { 1107 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ 1108 if (!delta->base_crl_number) 1109 return 0; 1110 /* Base must have a CRL number */ 1111 if (!base->crl_number) 1112 return 0; 1113 /* Issuer names must match */ 1114 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) 1115 return 0; 1116 /* AKID and IDP must match */ 1117 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) 1118 return 0; 1119 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) 1120 return 0; 1121 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ 1122 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 1123 return 0; 1124 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ 1125 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 1126 return 1; 1127 return 0; 1128 } 1129 1130 /* 1131 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or 1132 * retrieve a chain of deltas... 1133 */ 1134 1135 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, 1136 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 1137 { 1138 X509_CRL *delta; 1139 size_t i; 1140 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) 1141 return; 1142 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) 1143 return; 1144 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { 1145 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 1146 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { 1147 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) 1148 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; 1149 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta); 1150 *dcrl = delta; 1151 return; 1152 } 1153 } 1154 *dcrl = NULL; 1155 } 1156 1157 /* 1158 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 1159 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not 1160 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is 1161 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL 1162 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. 1163 */ 1164 1165 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 1166 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 1167 { 1168 1169 int crl_score = 0; 1170 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; 1171 1172 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ 1173 1174 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ 1175 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) 1176 return 0; 1177 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ 1178 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { 1179 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) 1180 return 0; 1181 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { 1182 /* If no new reasons reject */ 1183 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 1184 return 0; 1185 } 1186 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ 1187 else if (crl->base_crl_number) 1188 return 0; 1189 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ 1190 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { 1191 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) 1192 return 0; 1193 } else 1194 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; 1195 1196 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 1197 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; 1198 1199 /* Check expiry */ 1200 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) 1201 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; 1202 1203 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ 1204 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); 1205 1206 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ 1207 1208 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) 1209 return 0; 1210 1211 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ 1212 1213 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { 1214 /* If no new reasons reject */ 1215 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 1216 return 0; 1217 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; 1218 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; 1219 } 1220 1221 *preasons = tmp_reasons; 1222 1223 return crl_score; 1224 1225 } 1226 1227 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, 1228 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) 1229 { 1230 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; 1231 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1232 int cidx = ctx->error_depth; 1233 size_t i; 1234 1235 if ((size_t)cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) 1236 cidx++; 1237 1238 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1239 1240 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { 1241 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { 1242 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; 1243 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1244 return; 1245 } 1246 } 1247 1248 for (cidx++; cidx < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { 1249 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1250 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1251 continue; 1252 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { 1253 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; 1254 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1255 return; 1256 } 1257 } 1258 1259 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ 1260 1261 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) 1262 return; 1263 1264 /* 1265 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of 1266 * untrusted certificates. 1267 */ 1268 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { 1269 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); 1270 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1271 continue; 1272 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { 1273 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1274 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; 1275 return; 1276 } 1277 } 1278 1279 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted); i++) { 1280 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted, i); 1281 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1282 continue; 1283 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { 1284 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1285 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; 1286 return; 1287 } 1288 } 1289 } 1290 1291 /* 1292 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new 1293 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the 1294 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will 1295 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. 1296 */ 1297 1298 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1299 { 1300 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; 1301 int ret; 1302 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ 1303 if (ctx->parent) 1304 return 0; 1305 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) 1306 return -1; 1307 1308 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; 1309 /* Copy verify params across */ 1310 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); 1311 1312 crl_ctx.parent = ctx; 1313 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; 1314 1315 /* Verify CRL issuer */ 1316 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); 1317 1318 if (ret <= 0) 1319 goto err; 1320 1321 /* Check chain is acceptable */ 1322 1323 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); 1324 err: 1325 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); 1326 return ret; 1327 } 1328 1329 /* 1330 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and 1331 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could 1332 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more 1333 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, 1334 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the 1335 * RFC5280 version 1336 */ 1337 1338 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1339 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 1340 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) 1341 { 1342 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; 1343 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); 1344 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); 1345 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) 1346 return 1; 1347 return 0; 1348 } 1349 1350 /* 1351 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1. 1352 * Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 2. One full, one 1353 * relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 3. Both are full names and 1354 * compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 4. One is NULL: automatic match. 1355 */ 1356 1357 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) 1358 { 1359 X509_NAME *nm = NULL; 1360 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; 1361 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; 1362 size_t i, j; 1363 if (!a || !b) 1364 return 1; 1365 if (a->type == 1) { 1366 if (!a->dpname) 1367 return 0; 1368 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ 1369 if (b->type == 1) { 1370 if (!b->dpname) 1371 return 0; 1372 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) 1373 return 1; 1374 else 1375 return 0; 1376 } 1377 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1378 nm = a->dpname; 1379 gens = b->name.fullname; 1380 } else if (b->type == 1) { 1381 if (!b->dpname) 1382 return 0; 1383 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1384 gens = a->name.fullname; 1385 nm = b->dpname; 1386 } 1387 1388 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ 1389 if (nm) { 1390 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { 1391 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); 1392 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1393 continue; 1394 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) 1395 return 1; 1396 } 1397 return 0; 1398 } 1399 1400 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ 1401 1402 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { 1403 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); 1404 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { 1405 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); 1406 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) 1407 return 1; 1408 } 1409 } 1410 1411 return 0; 1412 1413 } 1414 1415 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) 1416 { 1417 size_t i; 1418 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1419 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ 1420 if (!dp->CRLissuer) 1421 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); 1422 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { 1423 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); 1424 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1425 continue; 1426 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) 1427 return 1; 1428 } 1429 return 0; 1430 } 1431 1432 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ 1433 1434 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 1435 unsigned int *preasons) 1436 { 1437 size_t i; 1438 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) 1439 return 0; 1440 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { 1441 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) 1442 return 0; 1443 } else { 1444 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) 1445 return 0; 1446 } 1447 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; 1448 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { 1449 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); 1450 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { 1451 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { 1452 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; 1453 return 1; 1454 } 1455 } 1456 } 1457 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) 1458 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) 1459 return 1; 1460 return 0; 1461 } 1462 1463 /* 1464 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try 1465 * to find a delta CRL too 1466 */ 1467 1468 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1469 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) 1470 { 1471 int ok; 1472 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1473 int crl_score = 0; 1474 unsigned int reasons; 1475 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 1476 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; 1477 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 1478 reasons = ctx->current_reasons; 1479 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 1480 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); 1481 1482 if (ok) 1483 goto done; 1484 1485 /* Lookup CRLs from store */ 1486 1487 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); 1488 1489 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ 1490 if (!skcrl && crl) 1491 goto done; 1492 1493 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); 1494 1495 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); 1496 1497 done: 1498 1499 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ 1500 if (crl) { 1501 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 1502 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; 1503 ctx->current_reasons = reasons; 1504 *pcrl = crl; 1505 *pdcrl = dcrl; 1506 return 1; 1507 } 1508 1509 return 0; 1510 } 1511 1512 /* Check CRL validity */ 1513 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) 1514 { 1515 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1516 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; 1517 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; 1518 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 1519 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 1520 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ 1521 if (ctx->current_issuer) 1522 issuer = ctx->current_issuer; 1523 1524 /* 1525 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next 1526 * certificate in chain. 1527 */ 1528 else if (cnum < chnum) 1529 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); 1530 else { 1531 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); 1532 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ 1533 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) { 1534 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; 1535 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1536 if (!ok) 1537 goto err; 1538 } 1539 } 1540 1541 if (issuer) { 1542 /* 1543 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done 1544 */ 1545 if (!crl->base_crl_number) { 1546 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ 1547 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && 1548 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) { 1549 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; 1550 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1551 if (!ok) 1552 goto err; 1553 } 1554 1555 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) { 1556 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; 1557 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1558 if (!ok) 1559 goto err; 1560 } 1561 1562 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) { 1563 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) { 1564 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; 1565 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1566 if (!ok) 1567 goto err; 1568 } 1569 } 1570 1571 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) { 1572 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; 1573 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1574 if (!ok) 1575 goto err; 1576 } 1577 1578 } 1579 1580 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) { 1581 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); 1582 if (!ok) 1583 goto err; 1584 } 1585 1586 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ 1587 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); 1588 1589 if (!ikey) { 1590 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1591 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1592 if (!ok) 1593 goto err; 1594 } else { 1595 int rv; 1596 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); 1597 if (rv != X509_V_OK) { 1598 ctx->error = rv; 1599 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1600 if (!ok) 1601 goto err; 1602 } 1603 /* Verify CRL signature */ 1604 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) { 1605 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1606 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1607 if (!ok) 1608 goto err; 1609 } 1610 } 1611 } 1612 1613 ok = 1; 1614 1615 err: 1616 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); 1617 return ok; 1618 } 1619 1620 /* Check certificate against CRL */ 1621 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 1622 { 1623 int ok; 1624 X509_REVOKED *rev; 1625 /* 1626 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled 1627 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate 1628 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can 1629 * change the meaning of CRL entries. 1630 */ 1631 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 1632 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { 1633 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; 1634 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1635 if (!ok) 1636 return 0; 1637 } 1638 /* 1639 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason 1640 * is not removeFromCRL. 1641 */ 1642 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { 1643 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) 1644 return 2; 1645 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; 1646 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1647 if (!ok) 1648 return 0; 1649 } 1650 1651 return 1; 1652 } 1653 1654 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1655 { 1656 int ret; 1657 if (ctx->parent) 1658 return 1; 1659 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, 1660 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); 1661 if (ret == 0) { 1662 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1663 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 1664 return 0; 1665 } 1666 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ 1667 if (ret == -1) { 1668 /* 1669 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. 1670 */ 1671 X509 *x; 1672 size_t i; 1673 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { 1674 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 1675 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) 1676 continue; 1677 ctx->current_cert = x; 1678 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; 1679 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1680 return 0; 1681 } 1682 return 1; 1683 } 1684 if (ret == -2) { 1685 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1686 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; 1687 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1688 } 1689 1690 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { 1691 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1692 /* 1693 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed 1694 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then 1695 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier 1696 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK. 1697 */ 1698 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) 1699 return 0; 1700 } 1701 1702 return 1; 1703 } 1704 1705 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1706 { 1707 time_t *ptime; 1708 int i; 1709 1710 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 1711 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 1712 else 1713 ptime = NULL; 1714 1715 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); 1716 if (i == 0) { 1717 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; 1718 ctx->current_cert = x; 1719 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1720 return 0; 1721 } 1722 1723 if (i > 0) { 1724 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; 1725 ctx->current_cert = x; 1726 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1727 return 0; 1728 } 1729 1730 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); 1731 if (i == 0) { 1732 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; 1733 ctx->current_cert = x; 1734 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1735 return 0; 1736 } 1737 1738 if (i < 0) { 1739 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; 1740 ctx->current_cert = x; 1741 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1742 return 0; 1743 } 1744 1745 return 1; 1746 } 1747 1748 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1749 { 1750 int ok = 0, n; 1751 X509 *xs, *xi; 1752 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 1753 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 1754 1755 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 1756 1757 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 1758 ctx->error_depth = n - 1; 1759 n--; 1760 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); 1761 1762 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) 1763 xs = xi; 1764 else { 1765 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { 1766 xs = xi; 1767 goto check_cert; 1768 } 1769 if (n <= 0) { 1770 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; 1771 ctx->current_cert = xi; 1772 ok = cb(0, ctx); 1773 goto end; 1774 } else { 1775 n--; 1776 ctx->error_depth = n; 1777 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); 1778 } 1779 } 1780 1781 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ 1782 while (n >= 0) { 1783 ctx->error_depth = n; 1784 1785 /* 1786 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless 1787 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes 1788 * time. 1789 */ 1790 if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) { 1791 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { 1792 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1793 ctx->current_cert = xi; 1794 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); 1795 if (!ok) 1796 goto end; 1797 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { 1798 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1799 ctx->current_cert = xs; 1800 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); 1801 if (!ok) { 1802 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1803 goto end; 1804 } 1805 } 1806 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1807 pkey = NULL; 1808 } 1809 1810 check_cert: 1811 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); 1812 if (!ok) 1813 goto end; 1814 1815 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ 1816 ctx->current_issuer = xi; 1817 ctx->current_cert = xs; 1818 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx); 1819 if (!ok) 1820 goto end; 1821 1822 n--; 1823 if (n >= 0) { 1824 xi = xs; 1825 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); 1826 } 1827 } 1828 ok = 1; 1829 end: 1830 return ok; 1831 } 1832 1833 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) 1834 { 1835 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); 1836 } 1837 1838 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) 1839 { 1840 char *str; 1841 ASN1_TIME atm; 1842 long offset; 1843 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p; 1844 int i, j, remaining; 1845 1846 p = buff1; 1847 remaining = ctm->length; 1848 str = (char *)ctm->data; 1849 /* 1850 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in 1851 * the time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: 1852 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ 1853 */ 1854 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { 1855 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */ 1856 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; 1857 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1; 1858 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) 1859 return 0; 1860 OPENSSL_memcpy(p, str, 10); 1861 p += 10; 1862 str += 10; 1863 remaining -= 10; 1864 } else { 1865 /* 1866 * YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm 1867 */ 1868 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; 1869 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1; 1870 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) 1871 return 0; 1872 OPENSSL_memcpy(p, str, 12); 1873 p += 12; 1874 str += 12; 1875 remaining -= 12; 1876 } 1877 1878 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) { 1879 *(p++) = '0'; 1880 *(p++) = '0'; 1881 } else { 1882 /* SS (seconds) */ 1883 if (remaining < 2) 1884 return 0; 1885 *(p++) = *(str++); 1886 *(p++) = *(str++); 1887 remaining -= 2; 1888 /* 1889 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds... TODO(emilia): in 1890 * RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden. Can we just kill them 1891 * altogether? 1892 */ 1893 if (remaining && *str == '.') { 1894 str++; 1895 remaining--; 1896 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) { 1897 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9') 1898 break; 1899 } 1900 } 1901 1902 } 1903 *(p++) = 'Z'; 1904 *(p++) = '\0'; 1905 1906 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */ 1907 if (!remaining) 1908 return 0; 1909 if (*str == 'Z') { 1910 if (remaining != 1) 1911 return 0; 1912 offset = 0; 1913 } else { 1914 /* (+-)HHMM */ 1915 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) 1916 return 0; 1917 /* 1918 * Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. 1919 */ 1920 if (remaining != 5) 1921 return 0; 1922 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' || 1923 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9') 1924 return 0; 1925 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60; 1926 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0'); 1927 if (*str == '-') 1928 offset = -offset; 1929 } 1930 atm.type = ctm->type; 1931 atm.flags = 0; 1932 atm.length = sizeof(buff2); 1933 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2; 1934 1935 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL) 1936 return 0; 1937 1938 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { 1939 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0'); 1940 if (i < 50) 1941 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ 1942 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0'); 1943 if (j < 50) 1944 j += 100; 1945 1946 if (i < j) 1947 return -1; 1948 if (i > j) 1949 return 1; 1950 } 1951 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2); 1952 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ 1953 return -1; 1954 else 1955 return i; 1956 } 1957 1958 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) 1959 { 1960 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); 1961 } 1962 1963 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1964 { 1965 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); 1966 } 1967 1968 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, 1969 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1970 { 1971 time_t t = 0; 1972 1973 if (in_tm) 1974 t = *in_tm; 1975 else 1976 time(&t); 1977 1978 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { 1979 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1980 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1981 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) 1982 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1983 } 1984 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1985 } 1986 1987 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */ 1988 1989 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, 1990 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) 1991 { 1992 X509_CRL *crl = NULL; 1993 int i; 1994 size_t j; 1995 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; 1996 /* CRLs can't be delta already */ 1997 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) { 1998 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); 1999 return NULL; 2000 } 2001 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ 2002 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) { 2003 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); 2004 return NULL; 2005 } 2006 /* Issuer names must match */ 2007 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) { 2008 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); 2009 return NULL; 2010 } 2011 /* AKID and IDP must match */ 2012 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { 2013 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); 2014 return NULL; 2015 } 2016 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { 2017 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); 2018 return NULL; 2019 } 2020 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ 2021 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { 2022 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); 2023 return NULL; 2024 } 2025 /* CRLs must verify */ 2026 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || 2027 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { 2028 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); 2029 return NULL; 2030 } 2031 /* Create new CRL */ 2032 crl = X509_CRL_new(); 2033 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) 2034 goto memerr; 2035 /* Set issuer name */ 2036 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) 2037 goto memerr; 2038 2039 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer))) 2040 goto memerr; 2041 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer))) 2042 goto memerr; 2043 2044 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ 2045 2046 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) 2047 goto memerr; 2048 2049 /* 2050 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL 2051 * number to correct value too. 2052 */ 2053 2054 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { 2055 X509_EXTENSION *ext; 2056 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); 2057 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) 2058 goto memerr; 2059 } 2060 2061 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ 2062 2063 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); 2064 2065 for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); j++) { 2066 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; 2067 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, j); 2068 /* 2069 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here 2070 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs. 2071 */ 2072 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) { 2073 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); 2074 if (!rvtmp) 2075 goto memerr; 2076 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { 2077 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); 2078 goto memerr; 2079 } 2080 } 2081 } 2082 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ 2083 2084 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) 2085 goto memerr; 2086 2087 return crl; 2088 2089 memerr: 2090 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2091 if (crl) 2092 X509_CRL_free(crl); 2093 return NULL; 2094 } 2095 2096 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, 2097 CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused, 2098 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, 2099 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) 2100 { 2101 /* 2102 * This function is (usually) called only once, by 2103 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). 2104 */ 2105 int index; 2106 if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, 2107 free_func)) { 2108 return -1; 2109 } 2110 return index; 2111 } 2112 2113 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) 2114 { 2115 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); 2116 } 2117 2118 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) 2119 { 2120 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); 2121 } 2122 2123 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2124 { 2125 return ctx->error; 2126 } 2127 2128 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) 2129 { 2130 ctx->error = err; 2131 } 2132 2133 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2134 { 2135 return ctx->error_depth; 2136 } 2137 2138 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2139 { 2140 return ctx->current_cert; 2141 } 2142 2143 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2144 { 2145 return ctx->chain; 2146 } 2147 2148 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2149 { 2150 if (!ctx->chain) 2151 return NULL; 2152 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); 2153 } 2154 2155 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2156 { 2157 return ctx->current_issuer; 2158 } 2159 2160 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2161 { 2162 return ctx->current_crl; 2163 } 2164 2165 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2166 { 2167 return ctx->parent; 2168 } 2169 2170 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 2171 { 2172 ctx->cert = x; 2173 } 2174 2175 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 2176 { 2177 ctx->untrusted = sk; 2178 } 2179 2180 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) 2181 { 2182 ctx->crls = sk; 2183 } 2184 2185 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) 2186 { 2187 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); 2188 } 2189 2190 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) 2191 { 2192 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); 2193 } 2194 2195 /* 2196 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. 2197 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and 2198 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't 2199 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then 2200 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL 2201 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the 2202 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL 2203 * client/server. 2204 */ 2205 2206 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, 2207 int purpose, int trust) 2208 { 2209 int idx; 2210 /* If purpose not set use default */ 2211 if (!purpose) 2212 purpose = def_purpose; 2213 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ 2214 if (purpose) { 2215 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; 2216 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); 2217 if (idx == -1) { 2218 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 2219 return 0; 2220 } 2221 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 2222 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { 2223 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); 2224 if (idx == -1) { 2225 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 2226 return 0; 2227 } 2228 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 2229 } 2230 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ 2231 if (!trust) 2232 trust = ptmp->trust; 2233 } 2234 if (trust) { 2235 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); 2236 if (idx == -1) { 2237 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); 2238 return 0; 2239 } 2240 } 2241 2242 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) 2243 ctx->param->purpose = purpose; 2244 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) 2245 ctx->param->trust = trust; 2246 return 1; 2247 } 2248 2249 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) 2250 { 2251 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; 2252 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 2253 if (!ctx) { 2254 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2255 return NULL; 2256 } 2257 OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 2258 return ctx; 2259 } 2260 2261 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2262 { 2263 if (ctx == NULL) { 2264 return; 2265 } 2266 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); 2267 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 2268 } 2269 2270 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, 2271 STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 2272 { 2273 int ret = 1; 2274 2275 OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 2276 ctx->ctx = store; 2277 ctx->cert = x509; 2278 ctx->untrusted = chain; 2279 2280 CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data); 2281 2282 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); 2283 if (!ctx->param) 2284 goto err; 2285 2286 /* 2287 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. 2288 */ 2289 2290 if (store) 2291 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); 2292 else 2293 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; 2294 2295 if (store) { 2296 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 2297 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; 2298 } else 2299 ctx->cleanup = 0; 2300 2301 if (ret) 2302 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, 2303 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); 2304 2305 if (ret == 0) 2306 goto err; 2307 2308 if (store && store->check_issued) 2309 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; 2310 else 2311 ctx->check_issued = check_issued; 2312 2313 if (store && store->get_issuer) 2314 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; 2315 else 2316 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; 2317 2318 if (store && store->verify_cb) 2319 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 2320 else 2321 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; 2322 2323 if (store && store->verify) 2324 ctx->verify = store->verify; 2325 else 2326 ctx->verify = internal_verify; 2327 2328 if (store && store->check_revocation) 2329 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; 2330 else 2331 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; 2332 2333 if (store && store->get_crl) 2334 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; 2335 else 2336 ctx->get_crl = NULL; 2337 2338 if (store && store->check_crl) 2339 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; 2340 else 2341 ctx->check_crl = check_crl; 2342 2343 if (store && store->cert_crl) 2344 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; 2345 else 2346 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; 2347 2348 if (store && store->lookup_certs) 2349 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; 2350 else 2351 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; 2352 2353 if (store && store->lookup_crls) 2354 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; 2355 else 2356 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; 2357 2358 ctx->check_policy = check_policy; 2359 2360 return 1; 2361 2362 err: 2363 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data); 2364 if (ctx->param != NULL) { 2365 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2366 } 2367 2368 OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 2369 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2370 return 0; 2371 } 2372 2373 /* 2374 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This 2375 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. 2376 */ 2377 2378 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 2379 { 2380 ctx->other_ctx = sk; 2381 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; 2382 } 2383 2384 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2385 { 2386 /* We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, |X509_STORE_CTX_free| 2387 * also calls this function. */ 2388 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { 2389 ctx->cleanup(ctx); 2390 ctx->cleanup = NULL; 2391 } 2392 if (ctx->param != NULL) { 2393 if (ctx->parent == NULL) 2394 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2395 ctx->param = NULL; 2396 } 2397 if (ctx->tree != NULL) { 2398 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); 2399 ctx->tree = NULL; 2400 } 2401 if (ctx->chain != NULL) { 2402 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); 2403 ctx->chain = NULL; 2404 } 2405 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); 2406 OPENSSL_memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); 2407 } 2408 2409 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) 2410 { 2411 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); 2412 } 2413 2414 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) 2415 { 2416 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); 2417 } 2418 2419 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, 2420 time_t t) 2421 { 2422 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); 2423 } 2424 2425 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 2426 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) 2427 { 2428 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; 2429 } 2430 2431 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2432 { 2433 return ctx->tree; 2434 } 2435 2436 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2437 { 2438 return ctx->explicit_policy; 2439 } 2440 2441 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) 2442 { 2443 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; 2444 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); 2445 if (!param) 2446 return 0; 2447 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); 2448 } 2449 2450 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2451 { 2452 return ctx->param; 2453 } 2454 2455 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) 2456 { 2457 if (ctx->param) 2458 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2459 ctx->param = param; 2460 } 2461 2462 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) 2463 2464 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 2465
