1 /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ 57 58 #include <string.h> 59 60 #include <openssl/asn1.h> 61 #include <openssl/buf.h> 62 #include <openssl/digest.h> 63 #include <openssl/err.h> 64 #include <openssl/mem.h> 65 #include <openssl/obj.h> 66 #include <openssl/stack.h> 67 #include <openssl/x509.h> 68 #include <openssl/x509v3.h> 69 70 #include "../internal.h" 71 72 73 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 74 { 75 int i; 76 X509_CINF *ai, *bi; 77 78 ai = a->cert_info; 79 bi = b->cert_info; 80 i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber); 81 if (i) 82 return (i); 83 return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer)); 84 } 85 86 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) 87 { 88 unsigned long ret = 0; 89 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 90 unsigned char md[16]; 91 char *f; 92 93 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 94 f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0); 95 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) 96 goto err; 97 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) 98 goto err; 99 OPENSSL_free(f); 100 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate 101 (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data, 102 (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length)) 103 goto err; 104 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) 105 goto err; 106 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | 107 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) 108 ) & 0xffffffffL; 109 err: 110 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 111 return (ret); 112 } 113 114 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 115 { 116 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer)); 117 } 118 119 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 120 { 121 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject)); 122 } 123 124 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) 125 { 126 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer)); 127 } 128 129 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) 130 { 131 return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); 132 } 133 134 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a) 135 { 136 return (a->cert_info->issuer); 137 } 138 139 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) 140 { 141 return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer)); 142 } 143 144 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) 145 { 146 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); 147 } 148 149 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a) 150 { 151 return (a->cert_info->subject); 152 } 153 154 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) 155 { 156 return (a->cert_info->serialNumber); 157 } 158 159 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) 160 { 161 return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject)); 162 } 163 164 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) 165 { 166 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject)); 167 } 168 169 /* 170 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: 171 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" 172 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these 173 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring 174 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the 175 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. 176 */ 177 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) 178 { 179 int rv; 180 /* ensure hash is valid */ 181 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); 182 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); 183 184 rv = OPENSSL_memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); 185 if (rv) 186 return rv; 187 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ 188 if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) { 189 rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len); 190 if (rv) 191 return rv; 192 return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc, 193 a->cert_info->enc.len); 194 } 195 return rv; 196 } 197 198 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) 199 { 200 int ret; 201 202 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ 203 204 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { 205 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); 206 if (ret < 0) 207 return -2; 208 } 209 210 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { 211 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); 212 if (ret < 0) 213 return -2; 214 } 215 216 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; 217 218 if (ret) 219 return ret; 220 221 return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); 222 223 } 224 225 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) 226 { 227 unsigned long ret = 0; 228 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 229 230 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ 231 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); 232 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), 233 NULL)) 234 return 0; 235 236 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | 237 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) 238 ) & 0xffffffffL; 239 return (ret); 240 } 241 242 /* 243 * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, 244 * this is reasonably efficient. 245 */ 246 247 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) 248 { 249 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 250 unsigned long ret = 0; 251 unsigned char md[16]; 252 253 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ 254 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); 255 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 256 /* EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); */ 257 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) 258 && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) 259 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL)) 260 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | 261 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) 262 ) & 0xffffffffL; 263 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 264 265 return (ret); 266 } 267 268 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ 269 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, 270 ASN1_INTEGER *serial) 271 { 272 size_t i; 273 X509_CINF cinf; 274 X509 x, *x509 = NULL; 275 276 if (!sk) 277 return NULL; 278 279 x.cert_info = &cinf; 280 cinf.serialNumber = serial; 281 cinf.issuer = name; 282 283 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { 284 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 285 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) 286 return (x509); 287 } 288 return (NULL); 289 } 290 291 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) 292 { 293 X509 *x509; 294 size_t i; 295 296 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { 297 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 298 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) 299 return (x509); 300 } 301 return (NULL); 302 } 303 304 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) 305 { 306 if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL)) 307 return (NULL); 308 return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); 309 } 310 311 ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) 312 { 313 if (!x) 314 return NULL; 315 return x->cert_info->key->public_key; 316 } 317 318 int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) 319 { 320 EVP_PKEY *xk; 321 int ret; 322 323 xk = X509_get_pubkey(x); 324 325 if (xk) 326 ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); 327 else 328 ret = -2; 329 330 switch (ret) { 331 case 1: 332 break; 333 case 0: 334 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); 335 break; 336 case -1: 337 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); 338 break; 339 case -2: 340 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); 341 } 342 if (xk) 343 EVP_PKEY_free(xk); 344 if (ret > 0) 345 return 1; 346 return 0; 347 } 348 349 /* 350 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID 351 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a 352 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags. 353 */ 354 355 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) 356 { 357 const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; 358 int curve_nid; 359 if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 360 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec); 361 if (!grp) 362 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; 363 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); 364 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ 365 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */ 366 /* 367 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve. 368 */ 369 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) 370 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; 371 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) 372 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; 373 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ 374 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; 375 } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */ 376 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) 377 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; 378 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) 379 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; 380 } else 381 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; 382 383 return X509_V_OK; 384 } 385 386 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, 387 unsigned long flags) 388 { 389 int rv, sign_nid; 390 size_t i; 391 EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; 392 unsigned long tflags; 393 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) 394 return X509_V_OK; 395 tflags = flags; 396 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ 397 if (x == NULL) { 398 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); 399 i = 1; 400 } else 401 i = 0; 402 403 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { 404 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; 405 /* Correct error depth */ 406 i = 0; 407 goto end; 408 } 409 410 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); 411 /* Check EE key only */ 412 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); 413 if (rv != X509_V_OK) { 414 /* Correct error depth */ 415 i = 0; 416 goto end; 417 } 418 for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 419 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); 420 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 421 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { 422 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; 423 goto end; 424 } 425 EVP_PKEY_free(pk); 426 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); 427 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); 428 if (rv != X509_V_OK) 429 goto end; 430 } 431 432 /* Final check: root CA signature */ 433 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); 434 end: 435 if (pk) 436 EVP_PKEY_free(pk); 437 if (rv != X509_V_OK) { 438 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ 439 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM 440 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) 441 i--; 442 /* 443 * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 444 * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error. 445 */ 446 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) 447 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; 448 if (perror_depth) 449 *perror_depth = i; 450 } 451 return rv; 452 } 453 454 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) 455 { 456 int sign_nid; 457 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) 458 return X509_V_OK; 459 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm); 460 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); 461 } 462 463 /* 464 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference 465 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of 466 * each X509 structure. 467 */ 468 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 469 { 470 STACK_OF(X509) *ret; 471 size_t i; 472 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); 473 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { 474 X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i)); 475 } 476 return ret; 477 } 478
