1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core (at) openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 /* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124 /* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 153 154 #include <stdio.h> 155 #include "ssl_locl.h" 156 #include "kssl_lcl.h" 157 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 158 #include <openssl/rand.h> 159 #include <openssl/objects.h> 160 #include <openssl/evp.h> 161 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 162 #include <openssl/x509.h> 163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 164 #include <openssl/dh.h> 165 #endif 166 #include <openssl/bn.h> 167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 169 #endif 170 #include <openssl/md5.h> 171 172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 173 174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 175 { 176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 177 return(SSLv3_server_method()); 178 else 179 return(NULL); 180 } 181 182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 183 ssl3_accept, 184 ssl_undefined_function, 185 ssl3_get_server_method) 186 187 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 188 { 189 BUF_MEM *buf; 190 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); 191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; 192 int ret= -1; 193 int new_state,state,skip=0; 194 195 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); 196 ERR_clear_error(); 197 clear_sys_error(); 198 199 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 200 cb=s->info_callback; 201 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 202 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 203 204 /* init things to blank */ 205 s->in_handshake++; 206 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 207 208 if (s->cert == NULL) 209 { 210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 211 return(-1); 212 } 213 214 for (;;) 215 { 216 state=s->state; 217 218 switch (s->state) 219 { 220 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 221 s->new_session=1; 222 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 223 224 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 225 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 226 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 227 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 228 229 s->server=1; 230 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); 231 232 if ((s->version>>8) != 3) 233 { 234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 235 return -1; 236 } 237 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 238 239 if (s->init_buf == NULL) 240 { 241 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) 242 { 243 ret= -1; 244 goto end; 245 } 246 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) 247 { 248 ret= -1; 249 goto end; 250 } 251 s->init_buf=buf; 252 } 253 254 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) 255 { 256 ret= -1; 257 goto end; 258 } 259 260 s->init_num=0; 261 262 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) 263 { 264 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that 265 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 266 */ 267 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } 268 269 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 270 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 271 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 272 } 273 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && 274 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 275 { 276 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with 277 * client that doesn't support secure 278 * renegotiation. 279 */ 280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 281 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 282 ret = -1; 283 goto end; 284 } 285 else 286 { 287 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, 288 * we will just send a HelloRequest */ 289 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 290 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 291 } 292 break; 293 294 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 295 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 296 297 s->shutdown=0; 298 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 299 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 300 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 301 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 302 s->init_num=0; 303 304 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 305 break; 306 307 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 308 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 309 break; 310 311 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 312 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 313 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 314 315 s->shutdown=0; 316 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 317 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 318 319 s->new_session = 2; 320 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 321 s->init_num=0; 322 break; 323 324 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 325 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 326 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 327 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 329 if (s->hit) 330 { 331 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 332 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 333 else 334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 335 } 336 #else 337 if (s->hit) 338 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 339 #endif 340 else 341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 342 s->init_num=0; 343 break; 344 345 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 346 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 347 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 348 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */ 349 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) 350 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) 351 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) 352 { 353 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 354 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 355 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 356 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 357 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 358 else 359 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 360 } 361 else 362 { 363 skip = 1; 364 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 365 } 366 #else 367 } 368 else 369 skip=1; 370 371 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 372 #endif 373 s->init_num=0; 374 break; 375 376 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 377 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 378 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 379 380 /* clear this, it may get reset by 381 * send_server_key_exchange */ 382 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) 383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 384 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) 385 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 386 ) 387 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key 388 * even when forbidden by protocol specs 389 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to 390 * be able to handle this) */ 391 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 392 else 393 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; 394 395 396 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or 397 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate 398 * 399 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints 400 * 401 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange 402 * message only if the cipher suite is either 403 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the 404 * server certificate contains the server's 405 * public key for key exchange. 406 */ 407 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp 408 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity 409 * hint if provided */ 410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 411 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) 412 #endif 413 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH)) 414 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 415 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 416 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 417 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 418 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 419 ) 420 ) 421 ) 422 ) 423 { 424 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 425 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 426 } 427 else 428 skip=1; 429 430 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 431 s->init_num=0; 432 break; 433 434 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 435 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 436 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 437 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 438 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, 439 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ 440 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 441 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 442 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites 443 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts 444 * and in RFC 2246): */ 445 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && 446 /* ... except when the application insists on verification 447 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ 448 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 449 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ 450 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) 451 /* With normal PSK Certificates and 452 * Certificate Requests are omitted */ 453 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) 454 { 455 /* no cert request */ 456 skip=1; 457 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; 458 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 459 } 460 else 461 { 462 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; 463 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 464 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 465 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 466 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 467 #else 468 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 469 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 470 #endif 471 s->init_num=0; 472 } 473 break; 474 475 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 476 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 477 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); 478 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 479 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 480 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 481 s->init_num=0; 482 break; 483 484 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 485 486 /* This code originally checked to see if 487 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO 488 * and then flushed. This caused problems 489 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed 490 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue 491 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING 492 * still exist. So instead we just flush 493 * unconditionally. 494 */ 495 496 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; 497 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) 498 { 499 ret= -1; 500 goto end; 501 } 502 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 503 504 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; 505 break; 506 507 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 508 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 509 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ 510 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); 511 if (ret <= 0) 512 goto end; 513 if (ret == 2) 514 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; 515 else { 516 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 517 { 518 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 519 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 520 } 521 s->init_num=0; 522 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 523 } 524 break; 525 526 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 527 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 528 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 529 if (ret <= 0) 530 goto end; 531 if (ret == 2) 532 { 533 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when 534 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in 535 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify 536 * message is not sent. 537 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when 538 * the client uses its key from the certificate 539 * for key exchange. 540 */ 541 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 542 s->init_num = 0; 543 } 544 else 545 { 546 int offset=0; 547 int dgst_num; 548 549 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 550 s->init_num=0; 551 552 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is 553 * a client cert, it can be verified 554 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify 555 * should be generalized. But it is next step 556 */ 557 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 558 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 559 return -1; 560 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++) 561 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) 562 { 563 int dgst_size; 564 565 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset])); 566 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); 567 if (dgst_size < 0) 568 { 569 ret = -1; 570 goto end; 571 } 572 offset+=dgst_size; 573 } 574 } 575 break; 576 577 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 579 580 /* we should decide if we expected this one */ 581 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 582 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 583 584 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 585 s->init_num=0; 586 break; 587 588 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 589 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 590 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 591 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 592 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 594 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 595 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 596 else if (s->hit) 597 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 598 #else 599 if (s->hit) 600 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 601 #endif 602 else 603 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 604 s->init_num=0; 605 break; 606 607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 608 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 609 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 610 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 611 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 612 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 613 s->init_num=0; 614 break; 615 616 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 617 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 618 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 619 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 620 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 621 s->init_num=0; 622 break; 623 624 #endif 625 626 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 627 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 628 629 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 630 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) 631 { ret= -1; goto end; } 632 633 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 634 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 635 636 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 637 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 638 s->init_num=0; 639 640 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 641 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 642 { 643 ret= -1; 644 goto end; 645 } 646 647 break; 648 649 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 650 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 651 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, 652 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 653 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 654 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 655 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 656 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 657 if (s->hit) 658 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 659 else 660 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; 661 s->init_num=0; 662 break; 663 664 case SSL_ST_OK: 665 /* clean a few things up */ 666 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 667 668 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 669 s->init_buf=NULL; 670 671 /* remove buffering on output */ 672 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 673 674 s->init_num=0; 675 676 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ 677 { 678 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless 679 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */ 680 681 s->new_session=0; 682 683 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 684 685 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 686 /* s->server=1; */ 687 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; 688 689 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); 690 } 691 692 ret = 1; 693 goto end; 694 /* break; */ 695 696 default: 697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 698 ret= -1; 699 goto end; 700 /* break; */ 701 } 702 703 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) 704 { 705 if (s->debug) 706 { 707 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 708 goto end; 709 } 710 711 712 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) 713 { 714 new_state=s->state; 715 s->state=state; 716 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); 717 s->state=new_state; 718 } 719 } 720 skip=0; 721 } 722 end: 723 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 724 725 s->in_handshake--; 726 if (cb != NULL) 727 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); 728 return(ret); 729 } 730 731 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 732 { 733 unsigned char *p; 734 735 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) 736 { 737 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 738 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 739 *(p++)=0; 740 *(p++)=0; 741 *(p++)=0; 742 743 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 744 /* number of bytes to write */ 745 s->init_num=4; 746 s->init_off=0; 747 } 748 749 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 750 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 751 } 752 753 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) 754 { 755 int ok; 756 long n; 757 758 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, 759 * so permit appropriate message length */ 760 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 761 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 762 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 763 -1, 764 s->max_cert_list, 765 &ok); 766 if (!ok) return((int)n); 767 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 768 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) 769 { 770 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, 771 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) 772 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared 773 * when a handshake is not completed ... */ 774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 775 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 776 { 777 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 778 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 779 } 780 #endif 781 return 2; 782 } 783 return 1; 784 } 785 786 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 787 { 788 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1; 789 unsigned int cookie_len; 790 long n; 791 unsigned long id; 792 unsigned char *p,*d,*q; 793 SSL_CIPHER *c; 794 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 795 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL; 796 #endif 797 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; 798 799 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. 800 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, 801 * This down switching should be handled by a different method. 802 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with 803 * TLSv1. 804 */ 805 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) 806 { 807 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 808 } 809 s->first_packet=1; 810 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 811 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 812 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 813 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 814 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, 815 &ok); 816 817 if (!ok) return((int)n); 818 s->first_packet=0; 819 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 820 821 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header 822 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ 823 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; 824 p+=2; 825 826 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || 827 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) 828 { 829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 830 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) 831 { 832 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ 833 s->version = s->client_version; 834 } 835 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 836 goto f_err; 837 } 838 839 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't 840 * contain one, just return since we do not want to 841 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... 842 */ 843 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) 844 { 845 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; 846 847 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 848 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); 849 850 if (cookie_length == 0) 851 return 1; 852 } 853 854 /* load the client random */ 855 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 856 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 857 858 /* get the session-id */ 859 j= *(p++); 860 861 s->hit=0; 862 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation 863 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option 864 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7. 865 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default, 866 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications 867 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with 868 * an earlier library version) 869 */ 870 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) 871 { 872 if (!s->session_creation_enabled) 873 { 874 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED); 876 goto err; 877 } 878 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 879 goto err; 880 } 881 else 882 { 883 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); 884 if (i == 1) 885 { /* previous session */ 886 s->hit=1; 887 } 888 else if (i == -1) 889 goto err; 890 else /* i == 0 */ 891 { 892 if (!s->session_creation_enabled) 893 { 894 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED); 896 goto err; 897 } 898 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 899 goto err; 900 } 901 } 902 903 p+=j; 904 905 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 906 { 907 /* cookie stuff */ 908 cookie_len = *(p++); 909 910 /* 911 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 912 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 913 * does not cause an overflow. 914 */ 915 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) 916 { 917 /* too much data */ 918 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 919 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 920 goto f_err; 921 } 922 923 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 924 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 925 cookie_len > 0) 926 { 927 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 928 929 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) 930 { 931 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 932 cookie_len) == 0) 933 { 934 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 936 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 937 goto f_err; 938 } 939 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 940 } 941 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 942 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */ 943 { 944 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 946 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 947 goto f_err; 948 } 949 950 ret = 2; 951 } 952 953 p += cookie_len; 954 } 955 956 n2s(p,i); 957 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) 958 { 959 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ 960 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 962 goto f_err; 963 } 964 if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) 965 { 966 /* not enough data */ 967 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 969 goto f_err; 970 } 971 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers)) 972 == NULL)) 973 { 974 goto err; 975 } 976 p+=i; 977 978 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 979 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) 980 { 981 j=0; 982 id=s->session->cipher->id; 983 984 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 985 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers)); 986 #endif 987 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) 988 { 989 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i); 990 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 991 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 992 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 993 #endif 994 if (c->id == id) 995 { 996 j=1; 997 break; 998 } 999 } 1000 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) 1001 { 1002 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may 1003 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to 1004 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server 1005 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not 1006 * enabled, though. */ 1007 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 1008 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) 1009 { 1010 s->session->cipher = c; 1011 j = 1; 1012 } 1013 } 1014 if (j == 0) 1015 { 1016 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher 1017 * list if we are asked to reuse it */ 1018 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1020 goto f_err; 1021 } 1022 } 1023 1024 /* compression */ 1025 i= *(p++); 1026 if ((p+i) > (d+n)) 1027 { 1028 /* not enough data */ 1029 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1031 goto f_err; 1032 } 1033 q=p; 1034 for (j=0; j<i; j++) 1035 { 1036 if (p[j] == 0) break; 1037 } 1038 1039 p+=i; 1040 if (j >= i) 1041 { 1042 /* no compress */ 1043 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1045 goto f_err; 1046 } 1047 1048 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1049 /* TLS extensions*/ 1050 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) 1051 { 1052 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) 1053 { 1054 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ 1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1056 goto f_err; 1057 } 1058 } 1059 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { 1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1061 goto err; 1062 } 1063 1064 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this 1065 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate 1066 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow 1067 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */ 1068 { 1069 unsigned long Time; 1070 unsigned char *pos; 1071 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ 1072 pos=s->s3->server_random; 1073 l2n(Time,pos); 1074 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) 1075 { 1076 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1077 goto f_err; 1078 } 1079 } 1080 1081 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) 1082 { 1083 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; 1084 1085 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1086 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, 1087 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) 1088 { 1089 s->hit=1; 1090 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; 1091 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK; 1092 1093 ciphers=NULL; 1094 1095 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1096 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1097 if (pref_cipher == NULL) 1098 { 1099 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1101 goto f_err; 1102 } 1103 1104 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher; 1105 1106 if (s->cipher_list) 1107 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1108 1109 if (s->cipher_list_by_id) 1110 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1111 1112 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1113 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1114 } 1115 } 1116 #endif 1117 1118 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1119 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 1120 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ 1121 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; 1122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1123 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1124 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) 1125 { 1126 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1127 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1128 /* Can't disable compression */ 1129 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) 1130 { 1131 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1133 goto f_err; 1134 } 1135 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 1136 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) 1137 { 1138 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); 1139 if (comp_id == comp->id) 1140 { 1141 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; 1142 break; 1143 } 1144 } 1145 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1146 { 1147 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1149 goto f_err; 1150 } 1151 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 1152 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) 1153 { 1154 if (q[m] == comp_id) 1155 break; 1156 } 1157 if (m >= i) 1158 { 1159 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 1161 goto f_err; 1162 } 1163 } 1164 else if (s->hit) 1165 comp = NULL; 1166 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) 1167 { /* See if we have a match */ 1168 int m,nn,o,v,done=0; 1169 1170 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1171 for (m=0; m<nn; m++) 1172 { 1173 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); 1174 v=comp->id; 1175 for (o=0; o<i; o++) 1176 { 1177 if (v == q[o]) 1178 { 1179 done=1; 1180 break; 1181 } 1182 } 1183 if (done) break; 1184 } 1185 if (done) 1186 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; 1187 else 1188 comp=NULL; 1189 } 1190 #else 1191 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 1192 * using compression. 1193 */ 1194 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) 1195 { 1196 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1198 goto f_err; 1199 } 1200 #endif 1201 1202 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must 1203 * pick a cipher */ 1204 1205 if (!s->hit) 1206 { 1207 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1208 s->session->compress_meth=0; 1209 #else 1210 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id; 1211 #endif 1212 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 1213 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1214 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; 1215 if (ciphers == NULL) 1216 { 1217 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); 1219 goto f_err; 1220 } 1221 ciphers=NULL; 1222 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers, 1223 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1224 1225 if (c == NULL) 1226 { 1227 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1229 goto f_err; 1230 } 1231 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; 1232 } 1233 else 1234 { 1235 /* Session-id reuse */ 1236 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 1237 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1238 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL; 1239 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL; 1240 1241 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 1242 { 1243 sk=s->session->ciphers; 1244 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) 1245 { 1246 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); 1247 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) 1248 nc=c; 1249 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 1250 ec=c; 1251 } 1252 if (nc != NULL) 1253 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc; 1254 else if (ec != NULL) 1255 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec; 1256 else 1257 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1258 } 1259 else 1260 #endif 1261 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1262 } 1263 1264 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 1265 goto f_err; 1266 1267 /* we now have the following setup. 1268 * client_random 1269 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1270 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1271 * compression - basically ignored right now 1272 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1273 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1274 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1275 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1276 */ 1277 1278 if (ret < 0) ret=1; 1279 if (0) 1280 { 1281 f_err: 1282 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1283 } 1284 err: 1285 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1286 return(ret); 1287 } 1288 1289 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1290 { 1291 unsigned char *buf; 1292 unsigned char *p,*d; 1293 int i,sl; 1294 unsigned long l; 1295 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1296 unsigned long Time; 1297 #endif 1298 1299 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1300 { 1301 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1302 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1303 p=s->s3->server_random; 1304 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */ 1305 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ 1306 l2n(Time,p); 1307 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) 1308 return -1; 1309 #endif 1310 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1311 d=p= &(buf[4]); 1312 1313 *(p++)=s->version>>8; 1314 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; 1315 1316 /* Random stuff */ 1317 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1318 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1319 1320 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the 1321 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the 1322 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send 1323 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length 1324 * session-id if we want it to be single use. 1325 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id 1326 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff. 1327 * 1328 * We also have an additional case where stateless session 1329 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old 1330 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can 1331 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful 1332 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality 1333 * is unaffected. 1334 */ 1335 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1336 && !s->hit) 1337 s->session->session_id_length=0; 1338 1339 sl=s->session->session_id_length; 1340 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) 1341 { 1342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1343 return -1; 1344 } 1345 *(p++)=sl; 1346 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); 1347 p+=sl; 1348 1349 /* put the cipher */ 1350 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); 1351 p+=i; 1352 1353 /* put the compression method */ 1354 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1355 *(p++)=0; 1356 #else 1357 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1358 *(p++)=0; 1359 else 1360 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1361 #endif 1362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1363 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) 1364 { 1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 1366 return -1; 1367 } 1368 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1369 { 1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1371 return -1; 1372 } 1373 #endif 1374 /* do the header */ 1375 l=(p-d); 1376 d=buf; 1377 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1378 l2n3(l,d); 1379 1380 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; 1381 /* number of bytes to write */ 1382 s->init_num=p-buf; 1383 s->init_off=0; 1384 } 1385 1386 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1387 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1388 } 1389 1390 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1391 { 1392 unsigned char *p; 1393 1394 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) 1395 { 1396 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1397 1398 /* do the header */ 1399 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1400 *(p++)=0; 1401 *(p++)=0; 1402 *(p++)=0; 1403 1404 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1405 /* number of bytes to write */ 1406 s->init_num=4; 1407 s->init_off=0; 1408 } 1409 1410 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1411 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1412 } 1413 1414 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1415 { 1416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1417 unsigned char *q; 1418 int j,num; 1419 RSA *rsa; 1420 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1421 unsigned int u; 1422 #endif 1423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1424 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; 1425 #endif 1426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1427 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; 1428 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1429 int encodedlen = 0; 1430 int curve_id = 0; 1431 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1432 #endif 1433 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1434 unsigned char *p,*d; 1435 int al,i; 1436 unsigned long type; 1437 int n; 1438 CERT *cert; 1439 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1440 int nr[4],kn; 1441 BUF_MEM *buf; 1442 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1443 1444 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1445 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) 1446 { 1447 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1448 cert=s->cert; 1449 1450 buf=s->init_buf; 1451 1452 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; 1453 n=0; 1454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1455 if (type & SSL_kRSA) 1456 { 1457 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; 1458 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1459 { 1460 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1461 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1462 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1463 if(rsa == NULL) 1464 { 1465 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1467 goto f_err; 1468 } 1469 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1470 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; 1471 } 1472 if (rsa == NULL) 1473 { 1474 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1476 goto f_err; 1477 } 1478 r[0]=rsa->n; 1479 r[1]=rsa->e; 1480 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 1481 } 1482 else 1483 #endif 1484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1485 if (type & SSL_kEDH) 1486 { 1487 dhp=cert->dh_tmp; 1488 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1489 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1490 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1491 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1492 if (dhp == NULL) 1493 { 1494 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1496 goto f_err; 1497 } 1498 1499 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 1500 { 1501 DH_free(dh); 1502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1503 goto err; 1504 } 1505 1506 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) 1507 { 1508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1509 goto err; 1510 } 1511 1512 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; 1513 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || 1514 dhp->priv_key == NULL || 1515 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) 1516 { 1517 if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) 1518 { 1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1520 ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1521 goto err; 1522 } 1523 } 1524 else 1525 { 1526 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); 1527 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); 1528 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || 1529 (dh->priv_key == NULL)) 1530 { 1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1532 goto err; 1533 } 1534 } 1535 r[0]=dh->p; 1536 r[1]=dh->g; 1537 r[2]=dh->pub_key; 1538 } 1539 else 1540 #endif 1541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1542 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) 1543 { 1544 const EC_GROUP *group; 1545 1546 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; 1547 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1548 { 1549 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1550 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1551 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1552 } 1553 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1554 { 1555 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1557 goto f_err; 1558 } 1559 1560 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) 1561 { 1562 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1564 goto err; 1565 } 1566 1567 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1568 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1569 { 1570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1571 goto err; 1572 } 1573 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp)) 1574 { 1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1576 goto err; 1577 } 1578 ecdh = ecdhp; 1579 1580 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; 1581 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1582 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1583 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) 1584 { 1585 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) 1586 { 1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1588 goto err; 1589 } 1590 } 1591 1592 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1593 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1594 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) 1595 { 1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1597 goto err; 1598 } 1599 1600 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1601 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 1602 { 1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1604 goto err; 1605 } 1606 1607 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH 1608 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 1609 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. 1610 */ 1611 if ((curve_id = 1612 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1613 == 0) 1614 { 1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1616 goto err; 1617 } 1618 1619 /* Encode the public key. 1620 * First check the size of encoding and 1621 * allocate memory accordingly. 1622 */ 1623 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1624 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1625 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1626 NULL, 0, NULL); 1627 1628 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1629 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 1630 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1631 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) 1632 { 1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1634 goto err; 1635 } 1636 1637 1638 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1639 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1640 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1641 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1642 1643 if (encodedlen == 0) 1644 { 1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1646 goto err; 1647 } 1648 1649 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; 1650 1651 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 1652 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1653 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes 1654 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1655 * structure. 1656 */ 1657 n = 4 + encodedlen; 1658 1659 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message 1660 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs 1661 */ 1662 r[0]=NULL; 1663 r[1]=NULL; 1664 r[2]=NULL; 1665 r[3]=NULL; 1666 } 1667 else 1668 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1670 if (type & SSL_kPSK) 1671 { 1672 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/ 1673 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1674 } 1675 else 1676 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1677 { 1678 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1680 goto f_err; 1681 } 1682 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) 1683 { 1684 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1685 n+=2+nr[i]; 1686 } 1687 1688 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) 1689 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) 1690 { 1691 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) 1692 == NULL) 1693 { 1694 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1695 goto f_err; 1696 } 1697 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1698 } 1699 else 1700 { 1701 pkey=NULL; 1702 kn=0; 1703 } 1704 1705 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn)) 1706 { 1707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); 1708 goto err; 1709 } 1710 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1711 p= &(d[4]); 1712 1713 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) 1714 { 1715 s2n(nr[i],p); 1716 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); 1717 p+=nr[i]; 1718 } 1719 1720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1721 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) 1722 { 1723 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. 1724 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: 1725 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 1726 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by 1727 * the actual encoded point itself 1728 */ 1729 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1730 p += 1; 1731 *p = 0; 1732 p += 1; 1733 *p = curve_id; 1734 p += 1; 1735 *p = encodedlen; 1736 p += 1; 1737 memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 1738 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 1739 encodedlen); 1740 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1741 p += encodedlen; 1742 } 1743 #endif 1744 1745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1746 if (type & SSL_kPSK) 1747 { 1748 /* copy PSK identity hint */ 1749 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); 1750 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); 1751 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1752 } 1753 #endif 1754 1755 /* not anonymous */ 1756 if (pkey != NULL) 1757 { 1758 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) 1759 * and p points to the space at the end. */ 1760 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1761 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) 1762 { 1763 q=md_buf; 1764 j=0; 1765 for (num=2; num > 0; num--) 1766 { 1767 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) 1768 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); 1769 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1770 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1771 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1772 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, 1773 (unsigned int *)&i); 1774 q+=i; 1775 j+=i; 1776 } 1777 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 1778 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) 1779 { 1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA); 1781 goto err; 1782 } 1783 s2n(u,p); 1784 n+=u+2; 1785 } 1786 else 1787 #endif 1788 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) 1789 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) 1790 { 1791 /* lets do DSS */ 1792 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL); 1793 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1794 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1795 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1796 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), 1797 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) 1798 { 1799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA); 1800 goto err; 1801 } 1802 s2n(i,p); 1803 n+=i+2; 1804 } 1805 else 1806 #endif 1807 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA) 1808 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 1809 { 1810 /* let's do ECDSA */ 1811 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL); 1812 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1813 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1814 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1815 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), 1816 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) 1817 { 1818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA); 1819 goto err; 1820 } 1821 s2n(i,p); 1822 n+=i+2; 1823 } 1824 else 1825 #endif 1826 { 1827 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 1828 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 1830 goto f_err; 1831 } 1832 } 1833 1834 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 1835 l2n3(n,d); 1836 1837 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 1838 * it off */ 1839 s->init_num=n+4; 1840 s->init_off=0; 1841 } 1842 1843 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 1844 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1845 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1846 f_err: 1847 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1848 err: 1849 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1850 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1851 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1852 #endif 1853 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1854 return(-1); 1855 } 1856 1857 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 1858 { 1859 unsigned char *p,*d; 1860 int i,j,nl,off,n; 1861 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; 1862 X509_NAME *name; 1863 BUF_MEM *buf; 1864 1865 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) 1866 { 1867 buf=s->init_buf; 1868 1869 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); 1870 1871 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 1872 p++; 1873 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); 1874 d[0]=n; 1875 p+=n; 1876 n++; 1877 1878 off=n; 1879 p+=2; 1880 n+=2; 1881 1882 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 1883 nl=0; 1884 if (sk != NULL) 1885 { 1886 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) 1887 { 1888 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); 1889 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL); 1890 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2)) 1891 { 1892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 1893 goto err; 1894 } 1895 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]); 1896 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) 1897 { 1898 s2n(j,p); 1899 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 1900 n+=2+j; 1901 nl+=2+j; 1902 } 1903 else 1904 { 1905 d=p; 1906 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 1907 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; 1908 n+=j; 1909 nl+=j; 1910 } 1911 } 1912 } 1913 /* else no CA names */ 1914 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]); 1915 s2n(nl,p); 1916 1917 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; 1918 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 1919 l2n3(n,d); 1920 1921 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 1922 * it off */ 1923 1924 s->init_num=n+4; 1925 s->init_off=0; 1926 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 1927 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 1928 1929 /* do the header */ 1930 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1931 *(p++)=0; 1932 *(p++)=0; 1933 *(p++)=0; 1934 s->init_num += 4; 1935 #endif 1936 1937 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 1938 } 1939 1940 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 1941 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1942 err: 1943 return(-1); 1944 } 1945 1946 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1947 { 1948 int i,al,ok; 1949 long n; 1950 unsigned long alg_k; 1951 unsigned char *p; 1952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1953 RSA *rsa=NULL; 1954 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 1955 #endif 1956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1957 BIGNUM *pub=NULL; 1958 DH *dh_srvr; 1959 #endif 1960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 1961 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 1962 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 1963 1964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1965 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 1966 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 1967 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 1968 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1969 #endif 1970 1971 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 1972 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 1973 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 1974 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1975 2048, /* ??? */ 1976 &ok); 1977 1978 if (!ok) return((int)n); 1979 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 1980 1981 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1982 1983 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1984 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 1985 { 1986 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 1987 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) 1988 { 1989 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 1990 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp; 1991 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should 1992 * be sent already */ 1993 if (rsa == NULL) 1994 { 1995 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 1997 goto f_err; 1998 1999 } 2000 } 2001 else 2002 { 2003 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 2004 if ( (pkey == NULL) || 2005 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || 2006 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) 2007 { 2008 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2010 goto f_err; 2011 } 2012 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; 2013 } 2014 2015 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ 2016 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 2017 { 2018 n2s(p,i); 2019 if (n != i+2) 2020 { 2021 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) 2022 { 2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2024 goto err; 2025 } 2026 else 2027 p-=2; 2028 } 2029 else 2030 n=i; 2031 } 2032 2033 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 2034 2035 al = -1; 2036 2037 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2038 { 2039 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2040 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ 2041 } 2042 2043 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 2044 { 2045 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2046 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2047 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2048 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 2049 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 2050 * protocol version. 2051 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ 2052 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) && 2053 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) 2054 { 2055 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2056 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ 2057 2058 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 2059 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version 2060 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would 2061 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext 2062 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except 2063 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, 2064 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */ 2065 } 2066 } 2067 2068 if (al != -1) 2069 { 2070 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure 2071 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding 2072 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */ 2073 ERR_clear_error(); 2074 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; 2075 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8; 2076 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; 2077 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */ 2078 goto err; 2079 } 2080 2081 s->session->master_key_length= 2082 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2083 s->session->master_key, 2084 p,i); 2085 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 2086 } 2087 else 2088 #endif 2089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2090 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) 2091 { 2092 n2s(p,i); 2093 if (n != i+2) 2094 { 2095 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) 2096 { 2097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2098 goto err; 2099 } 2100 else 2101 { 2102 p-=2; 2103 i=(int)n; 2104 } 2105 } 2106 2107 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */ 2108 { 2109 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); 2111 goto f_err; 2112 } 2113 else 2114 { 2115 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) 2116 { 2117 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2119 goto f_err; 2120 } 2121 else 2122 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; 2123 } 2124 2125 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL); 2126 if (pub == NULL) 2127 { 2128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB); 2129 goto err; 2130 } 2131 2132 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr); 2133 2134 if (i <= 0) 2135 { 2136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 2137 goto err; 2138 } 2139 2140 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 2141 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; 2142 2143 BN_clear_free(pub); 2144 pub=NULL; 2145 s->session->master_key_length= 2146 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2147 s->session->master_key,p,i); 2148 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 2149 } 2150 else 2151 #endif 2152 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2153 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) 2154 { 2155 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 2156 krb5_data enc_ticket; 2157 krb5_data authenticator; 2158 krb5_data enc_pms; 2159 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 2160 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 2161 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 2162 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2163 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 2164 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 2165 int padl, outl; 2166 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 2167 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 2168 2169 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 2170 2171 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 2172 2173 n2s(p,i); 2174 enc_ticket.length = i; 2175 2176 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) 2177 { 2178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2179 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2180 goto err; 2181 } 2182 2183 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 2184 p+=enc_ticket.length; 2185 2186 n2s(p,i); 2187 authenticator.length = i; 2188 2189 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) 2190 { 2191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2192 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2193 goto err; 2194 } 2195 2196 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 2197 p+=authenticator.length; 2198 2199 n2s(p,i); 2200 enc_pms.length = i; 2201 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 2202 p+=enc_pms.length; 2203 2204 /* Note that the length is checked again below, 2205 ** after decryption 2206 */ 2207 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) 2208 { 2209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2210 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2211 goto err; 2212 } 2213 2214 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 2215 enc_pms.length + 6)) 2216 { 2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2218 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2219 goto err; 2220 } 2221 2222 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 2223 &kssl_err)) != 0) 2224 { 2225 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2226 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 2227 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2228 if (kssl_err.text) 2229 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2230 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2232 kssl_err.reason); 2233 goto err; 2234 } 2235 2236 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, 2237 ** but will return authtime == 0. 2238 */ 2239 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 2240 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) 2241 { 2242 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2243 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 2244 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2245 if (kssl_err.text) 2246 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2247 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2249 kssl_err.reason); 2250 goto err; 2251 } 2252 2253 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) 2254 { 2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 2256 goto err; 2257 } 2258 2259 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2260 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 2261 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2262 2263 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 2264 if (enc == NULL) 2265 goto err; 2266 2267 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 2268 2269 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv)) 2270 { 2271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2272 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2273 goto err; 2274 } 2275 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl, 2276 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 2277 { 2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2279 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2280 goto err; 2281 } 2282 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2283 { 2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2285 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2286 goto err; 2287 } 2288 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl)) 2289 { 2290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2291 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2292 goto err; 2293 } 2294 outl += padl; 2295 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2296 { 2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2298 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2299 goto err; 2300 } 2301 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 2302 { 2303 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2304 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2305 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2306 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of 2307 * the protocol version. 2308 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2309 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher) 2310 */ 2311 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) 2312 { 2313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2314 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2315 goto err; 2316 } 2317 } 2318 2319 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2320 2321 s->session->master_key_length= 2322 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2323 s->session->master_key, pms, outl); 2324 2325 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) 2326 { 2327 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2328 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 2329 { 2330 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2331 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len); 2332 } 2333 } 2334 2335 2336 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2337 ** but it caused problems for apache. 2338 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2339 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2340 */ 2341 } 2342 else 2343 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2344 2345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2346 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) 2347 { 2348 int ret = 1; 2349 int field_size = 0; 2350 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2351 const EC_GROUP *group; 2352 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2353 2354 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2355 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 2356 { 2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2358 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2359 goto err; 2360 } 2361 2362 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2363 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) 2364 { 2365 /* use the certificate */ 2366 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2367 } 2368 else 2369 { 2370 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when 2371 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. 2372 */ 2373 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2374 } 2375 2376 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2377 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2378 2379 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2380 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) 2381 { 2382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2383 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2384 goto err; 2385 } 2386 2387 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2388 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) 2389 { 2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2391 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2392 goto err; 2393 } 2394 2395 if (n == 0L) 2396 { 2397 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2398 2399 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 2400 { 2401 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2403 goto f_err; 2404 } 2405 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2406 == NULL) || 2407 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) 2408 { 2409 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client 2410 * authentication using ECDH certificates 2411 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is 2412 * never executed. When that support is 2413 * added, we ought to ensure the key 2414 * received in the certificate is 2415 * authorized for key agreement. 2416 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that 2417 * the two ECDH shares are for the same 2418 * group. 2419 */ 2420 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2422 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2423 goto f_err; 2424 } 2425 2426 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2427 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0) 2428 { 2429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2430 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2431 goto err; 2432 } 2433 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2434 } 2435 else 2436 { 2437 /* Get client's public key from encoded point 2438 * in the ClientKeyExchange message. 2439 */ 2440 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) 2441 { 2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2443 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2444 goto err; 2445 } 2446 2447 /* Get encoded point length */ 2448 i = *p; 2449 p += 1; 2450 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 2451 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) 2452 { 2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2454 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2455 goto err; 2456 } 2457 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer 2458 * currently, so set it to the start 2459 */ 2460 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2461 } 2462 2463 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2464 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2465 if (field_size <= 0) 2466 { 2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2468 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2469 goto err; 2470 } 2471 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); 2472 if (i <= 0) 2473 { 2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2475 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2476 goto err; 2477 } 2478 2479 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2480 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2481 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2482 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2483 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 2484 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 2485 2486 /* Compute the master secret */ 2487 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \ 2488 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i); 2489 2490 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2491 return (ret); 2492 } 2493 else 2494 #endif 2495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2496 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) 2497 { 2498 unsigned char *t = NULL; 2499 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; 2500 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; 2501 int psk_err = 1; 2502 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; 2503 2504 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2505 2506 n2s(p,i); 2507 if (n != i+2) 2508 { 2509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2510 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2511 goto psk_err; 2512 } 2513 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) 2514 { 2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2516 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2517 goto psk_err; 2518 } 2519 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) 2520 { 2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2522 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2523 goto psk_err; 2524 } 2525 2526 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity 2527 * string for the callback */ 2528 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); 2529 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i); 2530 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, 2531 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2532 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1); 2533 2534 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) 2535 { 2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2537 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2538 goto psk_err; 2539 } 2540 else if (psk_len == 0) 2541 { 2542 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */ 2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2544 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2545 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 2546 goto psk_err; 2547 } 2548 2549 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ 2550 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len; 2551 t = psk_or_pre_ms; 2552 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); 2553 s2n(psk_len, t); 2554 memset(t, 0, psk_len); 2555 t+=psk_len; 2556 s2n(psk_len, t); 2557 2558 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) 2559 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); 2560 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p); 2561 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) 2562 { 2563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2564 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2565 goto psk_err; 2566 } 2567 2568 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) 2569 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); 2570 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 2571 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && 2572 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) 2573 { 2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2575 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2576 goto psk_err; 2577 } 2578 2579 s->session->master_key_length= 2580 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2581 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); 2582 psk_err = 0; 2583 psk_err: 2584 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2585 if (psk_err != 0) 2586 goto f_err; 2587 } 2588 else 2589 #endif 2590 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) 2591 { 2592 int ret = 0; 2593 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 2594 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL; 2595 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; 2596 size_t outlen=32, inlen; 2597 2598 /* Get our certificate private key*/ 2599 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(s->cert->key->privatekey,NULL); 2600 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); 2601 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 2602 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 2603 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use 2604 * a client certificate for authorization only. */ 2605 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2606 if (client_pub_pkey) 2607 { 2608 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 2609 ERR_clear_error(); 2610 } 2611 /* Decrypt session key */ 2612 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))) 2613 { 2614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2615 goto gerr; 2616 } 2617 if (p[1] == 0x81) 2618 { 2619 start = p+3; 2620 inlen = p[2]; 2621 } 2622 else if (p[1] < 0x80) 2623 { 2624 start = p+2; 2625 inlen = p[1]; 2626 } 2627 else 2628 { 2629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2630 goto gerr; 2631 } 2632 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0) 2633 2634 { 2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2636 goto gerr; 2637 } 2638 /* Generate master secret */ 2639 s->session->master_key_length= 2640 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2641 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32); 2642 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2643 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2644 ret = 2; 2645 else 2646 ret = 1; 2647 gerr: 2648 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2649 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2650 if (ret) 2651 return ret; 2652 else 2653 goto err; 2654 } 2655 else 2656 { 2657 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2659 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2660 goto f_err; 2661 } 2662 2663 return(1); 2664 f_err: 2665 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2666 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) 2667 err: 2668 #endif 2669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2670 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2671 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2672 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2673 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2674 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2675 #endif 2676 return(-1); 2677 } 2678 2679 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2680 { 2681 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 2682 unsigned char *p; 2683 int al,ok,ret=0; 2684 long n; 2685 int type=0,i,j; 2686 X509 *peer; 2687 2688 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2689 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2690 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 2691 -1, 2692 514, /* 514? */ 2693 &ok); 2694 2695 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2696 2697 if (s->session->peer != NULL) 2698 { 2699 peer=s->session->peer; 2700 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2701 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); 2702 } 2703 else 2704 { 2705 peer=NULL; 2706 pkey=NULL; 2707 } 2708 2709 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) 2710 { 2711 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 2712 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 2713 { 2714 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); 2716 goto f_err; 2717 } 2718 ret=1; 2719 goto end; 2720 } 2721 2722 if (peer == NULL) 2723 { 2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); 2725 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2726 goto f_err; 2727 } 2728 2729 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 2730 { 2731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 2732 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2733 goto f_err; 2734 } 2735 2736 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 2737 { 2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 2739 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2740 goto f_err; 2741 } 2742 2743 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 2744 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2745 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ 2746 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare 2747 * signature without length field */ 2748 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 2749 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) 2750 { 2751 i=64; 2752 } 2753 else 2754 { 2755 n2s(p,i); 2756 n-=2; 2757 if (i > n) 2758 { 2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2760 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2761 goto f_err; 2762 } 2763 } 2764 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 2765 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) 2766 { 2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 2768 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2769 goto f_err; 2770 } 2771 2772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2773 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) 2774 { 2775 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 2776 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 2777 pkey->pkey.rsa); 2778 if (i < 0) 2779 { 2780 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 2782 goto f_err; 2783 } 2784 if (i == 0) 2785 { 2786 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 2788 goto f_err; 2789 } 2790 } 2791 else 2792 #endif 2793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2794 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) 2795 { 2796 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 2797 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 2798 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); 2799 if (j <= 0) 2800 { 2801 /* bad signature */ 2802 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 2804 goto f_err; 2805 } 2806 } 2807 else 2808 #endif 2809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2810 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 2811 { 2812 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 2813 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 2814 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); 2815 if (j <= 0) 2816 { 2817 /* bad signature */ 2818 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 2820 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 2821 goto f_err; 2822 } 2823 } 2824 else 2825 #endif 2826 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) 2827 { unsigned char signature[64]; 2828 int idx; 2829 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL); 2830 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); 2831 if (i!=64) { 2832 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i); 2833 } 2834 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) { 2835 signature[63-idx]=p[idx]; 2836 } 2837 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32); 2838 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2839 if (j<=0) 2840 { 2841 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 2843 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 2844 goto f_err; 2845 } 2846 } 2847 else 2848 { 2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2850 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 2851 goto f_err; 2852 } 2853 2854 2855 ret=1; 2856 if (0) 2857 { 2858 f_err: 2859 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2860 } 2861 end: 2862 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 2863 return(ret); 2864 } 2865 2866 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 2867 { 2868 int i,ok,al,ret= -1; 2869 X509 *x=NULL; 2870 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; 2871 const unsigned char *p,*q; 2872 unsigned char *d; 2873 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; 2874 2875 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2876 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 2877 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 2878 -1, 2879 s->max_cert_list, 2880 &ok); 2881 2882 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2883 2884 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) 2885 { 2886 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2887 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 2888 { 2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2890 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2891 goto f_err; 2892 } 2893 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ 2894 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 2895 { 2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 2897 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2898 goto f_err; 2899 } 2900 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 2901 return(1); 2902 } 2903 2904 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) 2905 { 2906 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 2908 goto f_err; 2909 } 2910 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2911 2912 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) 2913 { 2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2915 goto err; 2916 } 2917 2918 n2l3(p,llen); 2919 if (llen+3 != n) 2920 { 2921 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2923 goto f_err; 2924 } 2925 for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) 2926 { 2927 n2l3(p,l); 2928 if ((l+nc+3) > llen) 2929 { 2930 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2932 goto f_err; 2933 } 2934 2935 q=p; 2936 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l); 2937 if (x == NULL) 2938 { 2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 2940 goto err; 2941 } 2942 if (p != (q+l)) 2943 { 2944 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2946 goto f_err; 2947 } 2948 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) 2949 { 2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2951 goto err; 2952 } 2953 x=NULL; 2954 nc+=l+3; 2955 } 2956 2957 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) 2958 { 2959 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 2960 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) 2961 { 2962 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 2964 goto f_err; 2965 } 2966 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 2967 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2968 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 2969 { 2970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2971 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2972 goto f_err; 2973 } 2974 } 2975 else 2976 { 2977 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); 2978 if (i <= 0) 2979 { 2980 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 2981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 2982 goto f_err; 2983 } 2984 } 2985 2986 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 2987 X509_free(s->session->peer); 2988 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); 2989 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 2990 2991 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL 2992 * when we arrive here. */ 2993 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 2994 { 2995 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 2996 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 2997 { 2998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2999 goto err; 3000 } 3001 } 3002 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 3003 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 3004 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; 3005 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the 3006 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ 3007 3008 sk=NULL; 3009 3010 ret=1; 3011 if (0) 3012 { 3013 f_err: 3014 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 3015 } 3016 err: 3017 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); 3018 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); 3019 return(ret); 3020 } 3021 3022 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 3023 { 3024 unsigned long l; 3025 X509 *x; 3026 3027 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) 3028 { 3029 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); 3030 if (x == NULL) 3031 { 3032 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 3033 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || 3034 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) 3035 { 3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3037 return(0); 3038 } 3039 } 3040 3041 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x); 3042 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 3043 s->init_num=(int)l; 3044 s->init_off=0; 3045 } 3046 3047 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 3048 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3049 } 3050 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 3051 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 3052 { 3053 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) 3054 { 3055 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; 3056 int len, slen; 3057 unsigned int hlen; 3058 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3059 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3060 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3061 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3062 unsigned char key_name[16]; 3063 3064 /* get session encoding length */ 3065 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3066 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is 3067 * too long 3068 */ 3069 if (slen > 0xFF00) 3070 return -1; 3071 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3072 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length 3073 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 3074 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 3075 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 3076 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 3077 */ 3078 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 3079 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + 3080 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 3081 return -1; 3082 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen); 3083 if (!senc) 3084 return -1; 3085 p = senc; 3086 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); 3087 3088 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3089 /* do the header */ 3090 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; 3091 /* Skip message length for now */ 3092 p += 3; 3093 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3094 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3095 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present 3096 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values 3097 * from parent ctx. 3098 */ 3099 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 3100 { 3101 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, 3102 &hctx, 1) < 0) 3103 { 3104 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3105 return -1; 3106 } 3107 } 3108 else 3109 { 3110 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); 3111 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3112 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); 3113 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3114 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 3115 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 3116 } 3117 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p); 3118 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 3119 p += 2; 3120 /* Output key name */ 3121 macstart = p; 3122 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 3123 p += 16; 3124 /* output IV */ 3125 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 3126 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3127 /* Encrypt session data */ 3128 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); 3129 p += len; 3130 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); 3131 p += len; 3132 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3133 3134 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); 3135 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); 3136 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3137 3138 p += hlen; 3139 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 3140 /* Total length */ 3141 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3142 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; 3143 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ 3144 p += 4; 3145 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ 3146 3147 /* number of bytes to write */ 3148 s->init_num= len; 3149 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 3150 s->init_off=0; 3151 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3152 } 3153 3154 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 3155 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3156 } 3157 3158 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 3159 { 3160 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) 3161 { 3162 unsigned char *p; 3163 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3164 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + 3165 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 3166 * + (ocsp response) 3167 */ 3168 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) 3169 return -1; 3170 3171 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3172 3173 /* do the header */ 3174 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 3175 /* message length */ 3176 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); 3177 /* status type */ 3178 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; 3179 /* length of OCSP response */ 3180 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 3181 /* actual response */ 3182 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 3183 /* number of bytes to write */ 3184 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; 3185 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 3186 s->init_off = 0; 3187 } 3188 3189 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 3190 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3191 } 3192 #endif 3193
