1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core (at) openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112 #include <stdio.h> 113 #include <openssl/objects.h> 114 #include <openssl/evp.h> 115 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h> 117 #include <openssl/rand.h> 118 #include "ssl_locl.h" 119 120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 121 122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, 124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 125 SSL_SESSION **psess); 126 #endif 127 128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ 129 tls1_enc, 130 tls1_mac, 131 tls1_setup_key_block, 132 tls1_generate_master_secret, 133 tls1_change_cipher_state, 134 tls1_final_finish_mac, 135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 136 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 139 tls1_alert_code, 140 tls1_export_keying_material, 141 }; 142 143 long tls1_default_timeout(void) 144 { 145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec 146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */ 147 return(60*60*2); 148 } 149 150 int tls1_new(SSL *s) 151 { 152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0); 153 s->method->ssl_clear(s); 154 return(1); 155 } 156 157 void tls1_free(SSL *s) 158 { 159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) 161 { 162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); 163 } 164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ 165 ssl3_free(s); 166 } 167 168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s) 169 { 170 ssl3_clear(s); 171 s->version = s->method->version; 172 } 173 174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 175 176 static int nid_list[] = 177 { 178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ 203 }; 204 205 static int pref_list[] = 206 { 207 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 208 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 209 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 210 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 211 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 212 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 213 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 214 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 215 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 216 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 217 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 220 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 221 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 222 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 223 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 224 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 225 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 229 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 230 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 231 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 232 }; 233 234 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) 235 { 236 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ 237 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > 238 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))) 239 return 0; 240 return nid_list[curve_id-1]; 241 } 242 243 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) 244 { 245 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ 246 switch (nid) 247 { 248 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 249 return 1; 250 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 251 return 2; 252 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 253 return 3; 254 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 255 return 4; 256 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 257 return 5; 258 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 259 return 6; 260 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 261 return 7; 262 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 263 return 8; 264 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 265 return 9; 266 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 267 return 10; 268 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 269 return 11; 270 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 271 return 12; 272 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 273 return 13; 274 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 275 return 14; 276 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 277 return 15; 278 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 279 return 16; 280 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 281 return 17; 282 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 283 return 18; 284 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 285 return 19; 286 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 287 return 20; 288 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 289 return 21; 290 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 291 return 22; 292 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 293 return 23; 294 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 295 return 24; 296 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 297 return 25; 298 default: 299 return 0; 300 } 301 } 302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 303 304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 305 306 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this 307 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. 308 */ 309 310 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 311 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ 312 #else 313 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, 314 #endif 315 316 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 317 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ 318 #else 319 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, 320 #endif 321 322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 323 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */ 324 #else 325 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, 326 #endif 327 328 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ 329 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ 330 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ 331 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 332 333 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { 334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) 336 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 337 #endif 338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 340 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) 341 #endif 342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) 344 #endif 345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 346 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5) 347 #endif 348 }; 349 350 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) 351 { 352 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 353 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 354 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */ 355 if (FIPS_mode()) 356 slen -= 2; 357 #endif 358 if (p) 359 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen); 360 return (int)slen; 361 } 362 363 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) 364 { 365 int extdatalen=0; 366 unsigned char *ret = p; 367 368 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ 369 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION 370 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 371 return p; 372 373 ret+=2; 374 375 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 376 377 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 378 { 379 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ 380 unsigned long size_str; 381 long lenmax; 382 383 /* check for enough space. 384 4 for the servername type and entension length 385 2 for servernamelist length 386 1 for the hostname type 387 2 for hostname length 388 + hostname length 389 */ 390 391 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 392 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 393 return NULL; 394 395 /* extension type and length */ 396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 397 s2n(size_str+5,ret); 398 399 /* length of servername list */ 400 s2n(size_str+3,ret); 401 402 /* hostname type, length and hostname */ 403 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; 404 s2n(size_str,ret); 405 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); 406 ret+=size_str; 407 } 408 409 /* Add RI if renegotiating */ 410 if (s->renegotiate) 411 { 412 int el; 413 414 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 415 { 416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 417 return NULL; 418 } 419 420 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 421 422 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 423 s2n(el,ret); 424 425 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 426 { 427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 428 return NULL; 429 } 430 431 ret += el; 432 } 433 434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 435 /* Add SRP username if there is one */ 436 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 437 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */ 438 439 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); 440 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) 441 { 442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 443 return NULL; 444 } 445 446 /* check for enough space. 447 4 for the srp type type and entension length 448 1 for the srp user identity 449 + srp user identity length 450 */ 451 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL; 452 453 /* fill in the extension */ 454 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret); 455 s2n(login_len+1,ret); 456 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len; 457 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); 458 ret+=login_len; 459 } 460 #endif 461 462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 463 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && 464 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 465 { 466 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ 467 long lenmax; 468 469 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 470 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 471 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) 472 { 473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 474 return NULL; 475 } 476 477 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 478 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); 479 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 480 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 481 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 482 } 483 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL && 484 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 485 { 486 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ 487 long lenmax; 488 489 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; 490 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 491 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) 492 { 493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 494 return NULL; 495 } 496 497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret); 498 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); 499 500 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for 501 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes. 502 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html 503 * resolves this to two bytes. 504 */ 505 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); 506 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 507 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 508 } 509 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 510 511 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 512 { 513 int ticklen; 514 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) 515 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; 516 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 517 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) 518 { 519 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; 520 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 521 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) 522 return NULL; 523 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, 524 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, 525 ticklen); 526 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; 527 } 528 else 529 ticklen = 0; 530 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 531 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) 532 goto skip_ext; 533 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len 534 * rest for ticket 535 */ 536 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL; 537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 538 s2n(ticklen,ret); 539 if (ticklen) 540 { 541 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); 542 ret += ticklen; 543 } 544 } 545 skip_ext: 546 547 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 548 { 549 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6) 550 return NULL; 551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret); 552 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret); 553 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret); 554 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs)); 555 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 556 } 557 558 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 559 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 560 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 561 { 562 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; 563 564 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) 565 return NULL; 566 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 567 return NULL; 568 569 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 570 s2n(col + 2, ret); 571 s2n(col, ret); 572 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); 573 ret += col; 574 } 575 #endif 576 577 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && 578 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 579 { 580 int i; 581 long extlen, idlen, itmp; 582 OCSP_RESPID *id; 583 584 idlen = 0; 585 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) 586 { 587 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 588 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); 589 if (itmp <= 0) 590 return NULL; 591 idlen += itmp + 2; 592 } 593 594 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) 595 { 596 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); 597 if (extlen < 0) 598 return NULL; 599 } 600 else 601 extlen = 0; 602 603 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL; 604 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 605 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) 606 return NULL; 607 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); 608 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; 609 s2n(idlen, ret); 610 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) 611 { 612 /* save position of id len */ 613 unsigned char *q = ret; 614 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 615 /* skip over id len */ 616 ret += 2; 617 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); 618 /* write id len */ 619 s2n(itmp, q); 620 } 621 s2n(extlen, ret); 622 if (extlen > 0) 623 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); 624 } 625 626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 627 /* Add Heartbeat extension */ 628 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); 629 s2n(1,ret); 630 /* Set mode: 631 * 1: peer may send requests 632 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 633 */ 634 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 635 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 636 else 637 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 638 #endif 639 640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 641 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) 642 { 643 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its 644 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */ 645 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) 646 return NULL; 647 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); 648 s2n(0,ret); 649 } 650 #endif 651 652 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) 653 { 654 int el; 655 656 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 657 658 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 659 660 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); 661 s2n(el,ret); 662 663 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 664 { 665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 666 return NULL; 667 } 668 ret += el; 669 } 670 671 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 672 return p; 673 674 s2n(extdatalen,p); 675 return ret; 676 } 677 678 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) 679 { 680 int extdatalen=0; 681 unsigned char *ret = p; 682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 683 int next_proto_neg_seen; 684 #endif 685 686 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ 687 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 688 return p; 689 690 ret+=2; 691 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 692 693 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 694 { 695 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 696 697 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 698 s2n(0,ret); 699 } 700 701 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding) 702 { 703 int el; 704 705 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 706 { 707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 708 return NULL; 709 } 710 711 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 712 713 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 714 s2n(el,ret); 715 716 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 717 { 718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 719 return NULL; 720 } 721 722 ret += el; 723 } 724 725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 726 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && 727 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 728 { 729 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ 730 long lenmax; 731 732 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 733 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 734 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) 735 { 736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 737 return NULL; 738 } 739 740 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 741 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); 742 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 743 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 744 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 745 746 } 747 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */ 748 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 749 750 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected 751 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 752 { 753 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 754 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 755 s2n(0,ret); 756 } 757 758 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 759 { 760 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 761 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret); 762 s2n(0,ret); 763 } 764 765 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 766 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 767 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 768 { 769 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 770 771 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) 772 return NULL; 773 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 774 return NULL; 775 776 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 777 s2n(sol + 2, ret); 778 s2n(sol, ret); 779 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); 780 ret += sol; 781 } 782 #endif 783 784 if(s->srtp_profile) 785 { 786 int el; 787 788 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 789 790 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 791 792 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); 793 s2n(el,ret); 794 795 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 796 { 797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 798 return NULL; 799 } 800 ret+=el; 801 } 802 803 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) 804 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) 805 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 806 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/ 807 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/ 808 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 809 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 810 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 811 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17}; 812 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL; 813 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36); 814 ret+=36; 815 816 } 817 818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 819 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ 820 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) 821 { 822 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); 823 s2n(1,ret); 824 /* Set mode: 825 * 1: peer may send requests 826 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 827 */ 828 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 829 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 830 else 831 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 832 833 } 834 #endif 835 836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 837 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; 838 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 839 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) 840 { 841 const unsigned char *npa; 842 unsigned int npalen; 843 int r; 844 845 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); 846 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) 847 { 848 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL; 849 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); 850 s2n(npalen,ret); 851 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); 852 ret += npalen; 853 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 854 } 855 } 856 #endif 857 858 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 859 return p; 860 861 s2n(extdatalen,p); 862 return ret; 863 } 864 865 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 866 { 867 unsigned short type; 868 unsigned short size; 869 unsigned short len; 870 unsigned char *data = *p; 871 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 872 int sigalg_seen = 0; 873 874 s->servername_done = 0; 875 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 877 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 878 #endif 879 880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 881 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 882 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 883 #endif 884 885 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 886 goto ri_check; 887 n2s(data,len); 888 889 if (data > (d+n-len)) 890 goto ri_check; 891 892 while (data <= (d+n-4)) 893 { 894 n2s(data,type); 895 n2s(data,size); 896 897 if (data+size > (d+n)) 898 goto ri_check; 899 #if 0 900 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size); 901 #endif 902 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 903 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, 904 s->tlsext_debug_arg); 905 /* The servername extension is treated as follows: 906 907 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 908 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 909 in which case an fatal alert is generated. 910 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 911 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 912 to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 913 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 914 it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 915 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 916 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 917 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 918 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 919 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 920 the value of the Host: field. 921 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 922 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, 923 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. 924 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 925 926 */ 927 928 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 929 { 930 unsigned char *sdata; 931 int servname_type; 932 int dsize; 933 934 if (size < 2) 935 { 936 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 937 return 0; 938 } 939 n2s(data,dsize); 940 size -= 2; 941 if (dsize > size ) 942 { 943 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 944 return 0; 945 } 946 947 sdata = data; 948 while (dsize > 3) 949 { 950 servname_type = *(sdata++); 951 n2s(sdata,len); 952 dsize -= 3; 953 954 if (len > dsize) 955 { 956 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 957 return 0; 958 } 959 if (s->servername_done == 0) 960 switch (servname_type) 961 { 962 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: 963 if (!s->hit) 964 { 965 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname) 966 { 967 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 968 return 0; 969 } 970 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) 971 { 972 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 973 return 0; 974 } 975 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) 976 { 977 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 978 return 0; 979 } 980 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); 981 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0'; 982 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { 983 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); 984 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 985 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 986 return 0; 987 } 988 s->servername_done = 1; 989 990 } 991 else 992 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname 993 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 994 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; 995 996 break; 997 998 default: 999 break; 1000 } 1001 1002 dsize -= len; 1003 } 1004 if (dsize != 0) 1005 { 1006 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1007 return 0; 1008 } 1009 1010 } 1011 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1012 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) 1013 { 1014 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1)) 1015 { 1016 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1017 return 0; 1018 } 1019 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 1020 { 1021 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1022 return 0; 1023 } 1024 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) 1025 return -1; 1026 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); 1027 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0'; 1028 1029 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) 1030 { 1031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1032 return 0; 1033 } 1034 } 1035 #endif 1036 1037 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1038 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && 1039 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1040 { 1041 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1042 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1043 1044 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) 1045 { 1046 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1047 return 0; 1048 } 1049 if (!s->hit) 1050 { 1051 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) 1052 { 1053 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1054 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; 1055 } 1056 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1057 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) 1058 { 1059 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1060 return 0; 1061 } 1062 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; 1063 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); 1064 } 1065 #if 0 1066 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 1067 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1068 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1069 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1070 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1071 #endif 1072 } 1073 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves && 1074 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1075 { 1076 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1077 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); 1078 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); 1079 1080 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2) 1081 { 1082 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1083 return 0; 1084 } 1085 if (!s->hit) 1086 { 1087 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) 1088 { 1089 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1090 return 0; 1091 } 1092 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1093 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) 1094 { 1095 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1096 return 0; 1097 } 1098 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; 1099 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); 1100 } 1101 #if 0 1102 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 1103 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 1104 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) 1105 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1106 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1107 #endif 1108 } 1109 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1110 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1111 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1112 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1113 { 1114 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1115 1116 if (size < 2) 1117 { 1118 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1119 return 0; 1120 } 1121 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 1122 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) 1123 { 1124 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1125 return 0; 1126 } 1127 1128 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1129 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1130 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1131 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1132 else 1133 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 1134 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1135 { 1136 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1137 return 0; 1138 } 1139 } 1140 #endif 1141 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1142 { 1143 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1144 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1145 { 1146 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1147 return 0; 1148 } 1149 } 1150 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 1151 { 1152 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1153 return 0; 1154 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1155 } 1156 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) 1157 { 1158 int dsize; 1159 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) 1160 { 1161 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1162 return 0; 1163 } 1164 sigalg_seen = 1; 1165 n2s(data,dsize); 1166 size -= 2; 1167 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) 1168 { 1169 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1170 return 0; 1171 } 1172 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) 1173 { 1174 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1175 return 0; 1176 } 1177 } 1178 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1179 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 1180 { 1181 1182 if (size < 5) 1183 { 1184 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1185 return 0; 1186 } 1187 1188 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; 1189 size--; 1190 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) 1191 { 1192 const unsigned char *sdata; 1193 int dsize; 1194 /* Read in responder_id_list */ 1195 n2s(data,dsize); 1196 size -= 2; 1197 if (dsize > size ) 1198 { 1199 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1200 return 0; 1201 } 1202 while (dsize > 0) 1203 { 1204 OCSP_RESPID *id; 1205 int idsize; 1206 if (dsize < 4) 1207 { 1208 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1209 return 0; 1210 } 1211 n2s(data, idsize); 1212 dsize -= 2 + idsize; 1213 size -= 2 + idsize; 1214 if (dsize < 0) 1215 { 1216 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1217 return 0; 1218 } 1219 sdata = data; 1220 data += idsize; 1221 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, 1222 &sdata, idsize); 1223 if (!id) 1224 { 1225 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1226 return 0; 1227 } 1228 if (data != sdata) 1229 { 1230 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1231 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1232 return 0; 1233 } 1234 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids 1235 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = 1236 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) 1237 { 1238 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1239 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1240 return 0; 1241 } 1242 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push( 1243 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) 1244 { 1245 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1246 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1247 return 0; 1248 } 1249 } 1250 1251 /* Read in request_extensions */ 1252 if (size < 2) 1253 { 1254 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1255 return 0; 1256 } 1257 n2s(data,dsize); 1258 size -= 2; 1259 if (dsize != size) 1260 { 1261 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1262 return 0; 1263 } 1264 sdata = data; 1265 if (dsize > 0) 1266 { 1267 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) 1268 { 1269 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, 1270 X509_EXTENSION_free); 1271 } 1272 1273 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = 1274 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, 1275 &sdata, dsize); 1276 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts 1277 || (data + dsize != sdata)) 1278 { 1279 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1280 return 0; 1281 } 1282 } 1283 } 1284 /* We don't know what to do with any other type 1285 * so ignore it. 1286 */ 1287 else 1288 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 1289 } 1290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1291 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) 1292 { 1293 switch(data[0]) 1294 { 1295 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ 1296 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1297 break; 1298 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ 1299 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1300 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1301 break; 1302 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1303 return 0; 1304 } 1305 } 1306 #endif 1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1308 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1309 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) 1310 { 1311 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a 1312 * renegotiation. 1313 * 1314 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we 1315 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on 1316 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when 1317 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an 1318 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing 1319 * anything like that, but this might change). 1320 1321 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake 1322 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > 1323 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen 1324 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new 1325 * Finished message could have been computed.) */ 1326 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1327 } 1328 #endif 1329 1330 /* session ticket processed earlier */ 1331 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) 1332 { 1333 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, 1334 al)) 1335 return 0; 1336 } 1337 1338 data+=size; 1339 } 1340 1341 *p = data; 1342 1343 ri_check: 1344 1345 /* Need RI if renegotiating */ 1346 1347 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && 1348 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1349 { 1350 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1352 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1353 return 0; 1354 } 1355 1356 return 1; 1357 } 1358 1359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1360 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No 1361 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill 1362 * the length of the block. */ 1363 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) 1364 { 1365 unsigned int off = 0; 1366 1367 while (off < len) 1368 { 1369 if (d[off] == 0) 1370 return 0; 1371 off += d[off]; 1372 off++; 1373 } 1374 1375 return off == len; 1376 } 1377 #endif 1378 1379 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 1380 { 1381 unsigned short length; 1382 unsigned short type; 1383 unsigned short size; 1384 unsigned char *data = *p; 1385 int tlsext_servername = 0; 1386 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 1387 1388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1389 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1390 #endif 1391 1392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1393 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 1394 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 1395 #endif 1396 1397 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 1398 goto ri_check; 1399 1400 n2s(data,length); 1401 if (data+length != d+n) 1402 { 1403 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1404 return 0; 1405 } 1406 1407 while(data <= (d+n-4)) 1408 { 1409 n2s(data,type); 1410 n2s(data,size); 1411 1412 if (data+size > (d+n)) 1413 goto ri_check; 1414 1415 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1416 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, 1417 s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1418 1419 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1420 { 1421 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) 1422 { 1423 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1424 return 0; 1425 } 1426 tlsext_servername = 1; 1427 } 1428 1429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1430 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && 1431 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1432 { 1433 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1434 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1435 1436 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) 1437 { 1438 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1439 return 0; 1440 } 1441 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1442 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1443 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) 1444 { 1445 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1446 return 0; 1447 } 1448 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; 1449 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); 1450 #if 0 1451 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); 1452 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1453 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1454 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1455 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1456 #endif 1457 } 1458 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1459 1460 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1461 { 1462 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1463 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1464 { 1465 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1466 return 0; 1467 } 1468 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 1469 || (size > 0)) 1470 { 1471 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1472 return 0; 1473 } 1474 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1475 } 1476 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1477 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1478 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1479 { 1480 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1481 1482 if (size < 2) 1483 { 1484 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1485 return 0; 1486 } 1487 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1488 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) 1489 { 1490 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1491 return 0; 1492 } 1493 1494 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1495 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1496 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1497 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1498 else 1499 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1500 1501 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1502 { 1503 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1504 return 0; 1505 } 1506 } 1507 #endif 1508 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1509 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1510 { 1511 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested 1512 * a status request message. 1513 */ 1514 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) 1515 { 1516 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1517 return 0; 1518 } 1519 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ 1520 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1521 } 1522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1523 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1524 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) 1525 { 1526 unsigned char *selected; 1527 unsigned char selected_len; 1528 1529 /* We must have requested it. */ 1530 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)) 1531 { 1532 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1533 return 0; 1534 } 1535 /* The data must be valid */ 1536 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) 1537 { 1538 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1539 return 0; 1540 } 1541 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) 1542 { 1543 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1544 return 0; 1545 } 1546 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 1547 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) 1548 { 1549 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1550 return 0; 1551 } 1552 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); 1553 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; 1554 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1555 } 1556 #endif 1557 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 1558 { 1559 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1560 return 0; 1561 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1562 } 1563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1564 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) 1565 { 1566 switch(data[0]) 1567 { 1568 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ 1569 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1570 break; 1571 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ 1572 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1573 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1574 break; 1575 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1576 return 0; 1577 } 1578 } 1579 #endif 1580 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) 1581 { 1582 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, 1583 al)) 1584 return 0; 1585 } 1586 1587 data+=size; 1588 } 1589 1590 if (data != d+n) 1591 { 1592 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1593 return 0; 1594 } 1595 1596 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) 1597 { 1598 if (s->tlsext_hostname) 1599 { 1600 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) 1601 { 1602 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); 1603 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) 1604 { 1605 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1606 return 0; 1607 } 1608 } 1609 else 1610 { 1611 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1612 return 0; 1613 } 1614 } 1615 } 1616 1617 *p = data; 1618 1619 ri_check: 1620 1621 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to 1622 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server 1623 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an 1624 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server 1625 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI 1626 * absence on initial connect only. 1627 */ 1628 if (!renegotiate_seen 1629 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) 1630 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1631 { 1632 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 1634 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1635 return 0; 1636 } 1637 1638 return 1; 1639 } 1640 1641 1642 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1643 { 1644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1645 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats 1646 * and elliptic curves we support. 1647 */ 1648 int using_ecc = 0; 1649 int i; 1650 unsigned char *j; 1651 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; 1652 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); 1653 1654 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) 1655 { 1656 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); 1657 1658 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; 1659 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; 1660 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 1661 { 1662 using_ecc = 1; 1663 break; 1664 } 1665 } 1666 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION); 1667 if (using_ecc) 1668 { 1669 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1670 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) 1671 { 1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1673 return -1; 1674 } 1675 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1676 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1677 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1678 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1679 1680 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */ 1681 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); 1682 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2; 1683 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) 1684 { 1685 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1687 return -1; 1688 } 1689 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i < 1690 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) 1691 { 1692 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]); 1693 s2n(id,j); 1694 } 1695 } 1696 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1697 1698 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1699 { 1700 int r = 1; 1701 1702 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) 1703 { 1704 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1705 if (!r) 1706 return -1; 1707 } 1708 1709 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) 1710 { 1711 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1712 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1713 1714 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1715 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1716 else 1717 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1718 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1719 { 1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1721 return -1; 1722 } 1723 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1724 } 1725 1726 if (r == 2) 1727 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */ 1728 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1729 } 1730 #endif 1731 1732 return 1; 1733 } 1734 1735 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1736 { 1737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1738 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support 1739 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not 1740 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. 1741 */ 1742 1743 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1744 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1745 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); 1746 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); 1747 1748 if (using_ecc) 1749 { 1750 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1751 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) 1752 { 1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1754 return -1; 1755 } 1756 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1757 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1758 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1759 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1760 } 1761 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1762 1763 return 1; 1764 } 1765 1766 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1767 { 1768 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 1769 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1770 1771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1772 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in 1773 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1774 */ 1775 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in 1776 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1777 */ 1778 #endif 1779 1780 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1781 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1782 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1783 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1784 1785 /* If status request then ask callback what to do. 1786 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 1787 * the certificate has changed. 1788 */ 1789 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 1790 { 1791 int r; 1792 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 1793 switch (r) 1794 { 1795 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 1796 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1797 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1798 break; 1799 /* status request response should be sent */ 1800 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 1801 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 1802 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1803 else 1804 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1805 break; 1806 /* something bad happened */ 1807 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1808 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1809 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1810 goto err; 1811 } 1812 } 1813 else 1814 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1815 1816 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1817 { 1818 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), 1819 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, 1820 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */ 1821 1822 int r = 1; 1823 1824 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) 1825 { 1826 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1827 if (!r) 1828 { 1829 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1830 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1831 goto err; 1832 } 1833 } 1834 1835 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1836 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1837 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; 1838 1839 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) 1840 { 1841 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 1842 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) 1843 { 1844 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input 1845 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */ 1846 1847 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1848 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1849 else 1850 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1851 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1852 { 1853 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1854 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1855 goto err; 1856 } 1857 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1858 } 1859 } 1860 1861 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1862 { 1863 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, 1864 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; 1865 * abort the handshake. 1866 */ 1867 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1868 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1869 } 1870 } 1871 1872 #endif 1873 err: 1874 switch (ret) 1875 { 1876 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1877 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1878 return -1; 1879 1880 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 1881 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 1882 return 1; 1883 1884 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1885 s->servername_done=0; 1886 default: 1887 return 1; 1888 } 1889 } 1890 1891 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1892 { 1893 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 1894 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1895 1896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1897 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 1898 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension 1899 * it must contain uncompressed. 1900 */ 1901 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1902 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1903 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 1904 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 1905 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 1906 { 1907 /* we are using an ECC cipher */ 1908 size_t i; 1909 unsigned char *list; 1910 int found_uncompressed = 0; 1911 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1912 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1913 { 1914 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) 1915 { 1916 found_uncompressed = 1; 1917 break; 1918 } 1919 } 1920 if (!found_uncompressed) 1921 { 1922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 1923 return -1; 1924 } 1925 } 1926 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 1927 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1928 1929 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1930 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1931 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1932 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1933 1934 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1935 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) 1936 { 1937 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs. 1938 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */ 1939 1940 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1941 { 1942 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1943 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1944 } 1945 1946 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check 1947 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */ 1948 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || 1949 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) 1950 { 1951 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1952 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1953 } 1954 } 1955 #endif 1956 1957 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one 1958 * tell the callback 1959 */ 1960 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) 1961 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 1962 { 1963 int r; 1964 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows 1965 * there is no response. 1966 */ 1967 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 1968 { 1969 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); 1970 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; 1971 } 1972 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; 1973 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 1974 if (r == 0) 1975 { 1976 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; 1977 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1978 } 1979 if (r < 0) 1980 { 1981 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1982 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1983 } 1984 } 1985 1986 switch (ret) 1987 { 1988 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1989 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1990 return -1; 1991 1992 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 1993 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 1994 return 1; 1995 1996 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1997 s->servername_done=0; 1998 default: 1999 return 1; 2000 } 2001 } 2002 2003 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the 2004 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle 2005 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. 2006 * 2007 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will 2008 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket 2009 * extension, if any. 2010 * len: the length of the session ID. 2011 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. 2012 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2013 * point to the resulting session. 2014 * 2015 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key 2016 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will 2017 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. 2018 * 2019 * Returns: 2020 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2021 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). 2022 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports 2023 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. 2024 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but 2025 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. 2026 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. 2027 * 2028 * Side effects: 2029 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue 2030 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support 2031 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have 2032 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if 2033 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. 2034 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. 2035 */ 2036 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, 2037 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) 2038 { 2039 /* Point after session ID in client hello */ 2040 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; 2041 unsigned short i; 2042 2043 *ret = NULL; 2044 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 2045 2046 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present 2047 * to permit stateful resumption. 2048 */ 2049 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 2050 return 0; 2051 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) 2052 return 0; 2053 if (p >= limit) 2054 return -1; 2055 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ 2056 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 2057 { 2058 i = *(p++); 2059 p+= i; 2060 if (p >= limit) 2061 return -1; 2062 } 2063 /* Skip past cipher list */ 2064 n2s(p, i); 2065 p+= i; 2066 if (p >= limit) 2067 return -1; 2068 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ 2069 i = *(p++); 2070 p += i; 2071 if (p > limit) 2072 return -1; 2073 /* Now at start of extensions */ 2074 if ((p + 2) >= limit) 2075 return 0; 2076 n2s(p, i); 2077 while ((p + 4) <= limit) 2078 { 2079 unsigned short type, size; 2080 n2s(p, type); 2081 n2s(p, size); 2082 if (p + size > limit) 2083 return 0; 2084 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 2085 { 2086 int r; 2087 if (size == 0) 2088 { 2089 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't 2090 * currently have one. */ 2091 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2092 return 1; 2093 } 2094 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) 2095 { 2096 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be 2097 * decrypted rather than generating the session 2098 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated 2099 * handshake based on external mechanism to 2100 * calculate the master secret later. */ 2101 return 2; 2102 } 2103 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); 2104 switch (r) 2105 { 2106 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ 2107 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2108 return 2; 2109 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ 2110 return r; 2111 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ 2112 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2113 return 3; 2114 default: /* fatal error */ 2115 return -1; 2116 } 2117 } 2118 p += size; 2119 } 2120 return 0; 2121 } 2122 2123 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. 2124 * 2125 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. 2126 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. 2127 * sess_id: points at the session ID. 2128 * sesslen: the length of the session ID. 2129 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2130 * point to the resulting session. 2131 * 2132 * Returns: 2133 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2134 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. 2135 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. 2136 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. 2137 */ 2138 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, 2139 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 2140 SSL_SESSION **psess) 2141 { 2142 SSL_SESSION *sess; 2143 unsigned char *sdec; 2144 const unsigned char *p; 2145 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; 2146 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 2147 HMAC_CTX hctx; 2148 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 2149 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 2150 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ 2151 if (eticklen < 48) 2152 return 2; 2153 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ 2154 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 2155 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 2156 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 2157 { 2158 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; 2159 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, 2160 &ctx, &hctx, 0); 2161 if (rv < 0) 2162 return -1; 2163 if (rv == 0) 2164 return 2; 2165 if (rv == 2) 2166 renew_ticket = 1; 2167 } 2168 else 2169 { 2170 /* Check key name matches */ 2171 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) 2172 return 2; 2173 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 2174 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 2175 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 2176 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); 2177 } 2178 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and 2179 * integrity checks on ticket. 2180 */ 2181 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); 2182 if (mlen < 0) 2183 { 2184 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2185 return -1; 2186 } 2187 eticklen -= mlen; 2188 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ 2189 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); 2190 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); 2191 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2192 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) 2193 return 2; 2194 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ 2195 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ 2196 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2197 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2198 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); 2199 if (!sdec) 2200 { 2201 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2202 return -1; 2203 } 2204 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); 2205 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) 2206 return 2; 2207 slen += mlen; 2208 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2209 p = sdec; 2210 2211 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); 2212 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 2213 if (sess) 2214 { 2215 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to 2216 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to 2217 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero 2218 * as required by standard. 2219 */ 2220 if (sesslen) 2221 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); 2222 sess->session_id_length = sesslen; 2223 *psess = sess; 2224 if (renew_ticket) 2225 return 4; 2226 else 2227 return 3; 2228 } 2229 ERR_clear_error(); 2230 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new 2231 * ticket. */ 2232 return 2; 2233 } 2234 2235 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ 2236 2237 typedef struct 2238 { 2239 int nid; 2240 int id; 2241 } tls12_lookup; 2242 2243 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { 2244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 2245 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, 2246 #endif 2247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 2248 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, 2249 #endif 2250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 2251 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, 2252 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, 2253 #endif 2254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 2255 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, 2256 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} 2257 #endif 2258 }; 2259 2260 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { 2261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2262 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, 2263 #endif 2264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2265 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, 2266 #endif 2267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2268 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} 2269 #endif 2270 }; 2271 2272 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2273 { 2274 size_t i; 2275 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) 2276 { 2277 if (table[i].nid == nid) 2278 return table[i].id; 2279 } 2280 return -1; 2281 } 2282 #if 0 2283 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2284 { 2285 size_t i; 2286 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) 2287 { 2288 if (table[i].id == id) 2289 return table[i].nid; 2290 } 2291 return -1; 2292 } 2293 #endif 2294 2295 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) 2296 { 2297 int sig_id, md_id; 2298 if (!md) 2299 return 0; 2300 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, 2301 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2302 if (md_id == -1) 2303 return 0; 2304 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); 2305 if (sig_id == -1) 2306 return 0; 2307 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; 2308 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; 2309 return 1; 2310 } 2311 2312 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) 2313 { 2314 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, 2315 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2316 } 2317 2318 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) 2319 { 2320 switch(hash_alg) 2321 { 2322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 2323 case TLSEXT_hash_md5: 2324 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 2325 if (FIPS_mode()) 2326 return NULL; 2327 #endif 2328 return EVP_md5(); 2329 #endif 2330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 2331 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: 2332 return EVP_sha1(); 2333 #endif 2334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 2335 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: 2336 return EVP_sha224(); 2337 2338 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: 2339 return EVP_sha256(); 2340 #endif 2341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 2342 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: 2343 return EVP_sha384(); 2344 2345 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: 2346 return EVP_sha512(); 2347 #endif 2348 default: 2349 return NULL; 2350 2351 } 2352 } 2353 2354 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */ 2355 2356 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) 2357 { 2358 int i, idx; 2359 const EVP_MD *md; 2360 CERT *c = s->cert; 2361 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */ 2362 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) 2363 return 1; 2364 /* Should never happen */ 2365 if (!c) 2366 return 0; 2367 2368 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; 2369 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; 2370 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL; 2371 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL; 2372 2373 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) 2374 { 2375 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1]; 2376 2377 switch(sig_alg) 2378 { 2379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2380 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 2381 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; 2382 break; 2383 #endif 2384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2385 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 2386 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; 2387 break; 2388 #endif 2389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2390 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 2391 idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; 2392 break; 2393 #endif 2394 default: 2395 continue; 2396 } 2397 2398 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) 2399 { 2400 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg); 2401 if (md) 2402 { 2403 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 2404 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) 2405 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 2406 } 2407 } 2408 2409 } 2410 2411 2412 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not 2413 * supported it stays as NULL. 2414 */ 2415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2416 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) 2417 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1(); 2418 #endif 2419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2420 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) 2421 { 2422 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2423 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2424 } 2425 #endif 2426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2427 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) 2428 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa(); 2429 #endif 2430 return 1; 2431 } 2432 2433 #endif 2434 2435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2436 int 2437 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) 2438 { 2439 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; 2440 unsigned short hbtype; 2441 unsigned int payload; 2442 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 2443 2444 /* Read type and payload length first */ 2445 hbtype = *p++; 2446 n2s(p, payload); 2447 pl = p; 2448 2449 if (s->msg_callback) 2450 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2451 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, 2452 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2453 2454 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) 2455 { 2456 unsigned char *buffer, *bp; 2457 int r; 2458 2459 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes 2460 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus 2461 * payload, plus padding 2462 */ 2463 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 2464 bp = buffer; 2465 2466 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ 2467 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; 2468 s2n(payload, bp); 2469 memcpy(bp, pl, payload); 2470 bp += payload; 2471 /* Random padding */ 2472 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding); 2473 2474 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding); 2475 2476 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) 2477 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2478 buffer, 3 + payload + padding, 2479 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2480 2481 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 2482 2483 if (r < 0) 2484 return r; 2485 } 2486 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) 2487 { 2488 unsigned int seq; 2489 2490 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), 2491 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the 2492 * sequence number */ 2493 n2s(pl, seq); 2494 2495 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) 2496 { 2497 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 2498 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 2499 } 2500 } 2501 2502 return 0; 2503 } 2504 2505 int 2506 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) 2507 { 2508 unsigned char *buf, *p; 2509 int ret; 2510 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ 2511 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 2512 2513 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ 2514 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || 2515 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) 2516 { 2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); 2518 return -1; 2519 } 2520 2521 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ 2522 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) 2523 { 2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); 2525 return -1; 2526 } 2527 2528 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ 2529 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) 2530 { 2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 2532 return -1; 2533 } 2534 2535 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding 2536 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. 2537 */ 2538 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); 2539 2540 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number 2541 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add 2542 * some random stuff. 2543 * - Message Type, 1 byte 2544 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) 2545 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) 2546 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) 2547 * - Padding 2548 */ 2549 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 2550 p = buf; 2551 /* Message Type */ 2552 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; 2553 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ 2554 s2n(payload, p); 2555 /* Sequence number */ 2556 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); 2557 /* 16 random bytes */ 2558 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16); 2559 p += 16; 2560 /* Random padding */ 2561 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding); 2562 2563 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); 2564 if (ret >= 0) 2565 { 2566 if (s->msg_callback) 2567 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2568 buf, 3 + payload + padding, 2569 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2570 2571 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; 2572 } 2573 2574 OPENSSL_free(buf); 2575 2576 return ret; 2577 } 2578 #endif 2579
