Home | History | Annotate | Download | only in x509
      1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
      2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)
      3  * All rights reserved.
      4  *
      5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
      6  * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com).
      7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
      8  *
      9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
     10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
     11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
     12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
     13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
     14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com).
     15  *
     16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
     17  * the code are not to be removed.
     18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
     19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
     20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
     21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
     22  *
     23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
     24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
     25  * are met:
     26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
     27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
     28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
     29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
     30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
     31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
     32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
     33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
     34  *     Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)"
     35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
     36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
     37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
     38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
     39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)"
     40  *
     41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
     42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
     43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
     44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
     45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
     46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
     47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
     48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
     49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
     50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
     51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
     52  *
     53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
     54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
     55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
     56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
     57  */
     58 
     59 #include <stdio.h>
     60 #include <time.h>
     61 #include <errno.h>
     62 
     63 #include "cryptlib.h"
     64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
     65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
     66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
     67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
     68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
     69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
     70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
     71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
     72 
     73 /* CRL score values */
     74 
     75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
     76 
     77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL	0x100
     78 
     79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
     80 
     81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE		0x080
     82 
     83 /* CRL times valid */
     84 
     85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME		0x040
     86 
     87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
     88 
     89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME	0x020
     90 
     91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
     92 
     93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
     94 
     95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
     96 
     97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT	0x018
     98 
     99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
    100 
    101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH	0x008
    102 
    103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
    104 
    105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID		0x004
    106 
    107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
    108 
    109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA	0x002
    110 
    111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
    112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
    113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
    114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
    115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
    116 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
    117 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
    118 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
    119 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
    120 
    121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
    122 			unsigned int *preasons,
    123 			X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
    124 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
    125 				X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
    126 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
    127 			X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
    128 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
    129 				X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
    130 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
    131 				unsigned int *preasons);
    132 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
    133 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
    134 			STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
    135 			STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
    136 
    137 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
    138 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
    139 
    140 
    141 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
    142 	{
    143 	return ok;
    144 	}
    145 
    146 #if 0
    147 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
    148 	{
    149 	return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
    150 	}
    151 #endif
    152 
    153 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
    154 	{
    155 	X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
    156 	int bad_chain = 0;
    157 	X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
    158 	int depth,i,ok=0;
    159 	int num;
    160 	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
    161 	STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
    162 	if (ctx->cert == NULL)
    163 		{
    164 		X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
    165 		return -1;
    166 		}
    167 
    168 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
    169 
    170 	/* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
    171 	 * present and that the first entry is in place */
    172 	if (ctx->chain == NULL)
    173 		{
    174 		if (	((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
    175 			(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
    176 			{
    177 			X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
    178 			goto end;
    179 			}
    180 		CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
    181 		ctx->last_untrusted=1;
    182 		}
    183 
    184 	/* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
    185 	if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
    186 	    && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
    187 		{
    188 		X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
    189 		goto end;
    190 		}
    191 
    192 	num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
    193 	x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
    194 	depth=param->depth;
    195 
    196 
    197 	for (;;)
    198 		{
    199 		/* If we have enough, we break */
    200 		if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
    201 		                         * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
    202 		                         * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
    203 		                         * code later.
    204 		                         */
    205 
    206 		/* If we are self signed, we break */
    207 		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
    208 
    209 		/* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
    210 		if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
    211 			{
    212 			xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
    213 			if (xtmp != NULL)
    214 				{
    215 				if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
    216 					{
    217 					X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
    218 					goto end;
    219 					}
    220 				CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
    221 				(void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
    222 				ctx->last_untrusted++;
    223 				x=xtmp;
    224 				num++;
    225 				/* reparse the full chain for
    226 				 * the next one */
    227 				continue;
    228 				}
    229 			}
    230 		break;
    231 		}
    232 
    233 	/* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
    234 	 * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
    235 	 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
    236 
    237 	/* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
    238  	 * is self signed.
    239  	 */
    240 
    241 	i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
    242 	x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
    243 	if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
    244 		{
    245 		/* we have a self signed certificate */
    246 		if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
    247 			{
    248 			/* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
    249 			 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
    250 			 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
    251 			 */
    252 			ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
    253 			if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
    254 				{
    255 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
    256 				ctx->current_cert=x;
    257 				ctx->error_depth=i-1;
    258 				if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
    259 				bad_chain = 1;
    260 				ok=cb(0,ctx);
    261 				if (!ok) goto end;
    262 				}
    263 			else
    264 				{
    265 				/* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
    266 				 * so we get any trust settings.
    267 				 */
    268 				X509_free(x);
    269 				x = xtmp;
    270 				(void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
    271 				ctx->last_untrusted=0;
    272 				}
    273 			}
    274 		else
    275 			{
    276 			/* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
    277 			chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
    278 			ctx->last_untrusted--;
    279 			num--;
    280 			x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
    281 			}
    282 		}
    283 
    284 	/* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
    285 	for (;;)
    286 		{
    287 		/* If we have enough, we break */
    288 		if (depth < num) break;
    289 
    290 		/* If we are self signed, we break */
    291 		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
    292 
    293 		ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
    294 
    295 		if (ok < 0) return ok;
    296 		if (ok == 0) break;
    297 
    298 		x = xtmp;
    299 		if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
    300 			{
    301 			X509_free(xtmp);
    302 			X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
    303 			return 0;
    304 			}
    305 		num++;
    306 		}
    307 
    308 	/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
    309 
    310 	/* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
    311 	if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
    312 		{
    313 		if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
    314 			{
    315 			if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
    316 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
    317 			else
    318 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
    319 			ctx->current_cert=x;
    320 			}
    321 		else
    322 			{
    323 
    324 			sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
    325 			num++;
    326 			ctx->last_untrusted=num;
    327 			ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
    328 			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
    329 			chain_ss=NULL;
    330 			}
    331 
    332 		ctx->error_depth=num-1;
    333 		bad_chain = 1;
    334 		ok=cb(0,ctx);
    335 		if (!ok) goto end;
    336 		}
    337 
    338 	/* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
    339 	ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
    340 
    341 	if (!ok) goto end;
    342 
    343 	/* Check name constraints */
    344 
    345 	ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
    346 
    347 	if (!ok) goto end;
    348 
    349 	/* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
    350 
    351 	if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
    352 
    353 	if (!ok) goto end;
    354 
    355 	/* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
    356 	X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
    357 
    358 	/* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
    359 	 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
    360 	 */
    361 
    362 	ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
    363 	if(!ok) goto end;
    364 
    365 	/* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
    366 	if (ctx->verify != NULL)
    367 		ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
    368 	else
    369 		ok=internal_verify(ctx);
    370 	if(!ok) goto end;
    371 
    372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
    373 	/* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
    374 	ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
    375 	if (!ok) goto end;
    376 	ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
    377 	if (!ok) goto end;
    378 #endif
    379 
    380 	/* If we get this far evaluate policies */
    381 	if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
    382 		ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
    383 	if(!ok) goto end;
    384 	if (0)
    385 		{
    386 end:
    387 		X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
    388 		}
    389 	if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
    390 	if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
    391 	return ok;
    392 	}
    393 
    394 
    395 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
    396  */
    397 
    398 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
    399 {
    400 	int i;
    401 	X509 *issuer;
    402 	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
    403 		{
    404 		issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
    405 		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
    406 			return issuer;
    407 		}
    408 	return NULL;
    409 }
    410 
    411 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
    412 
    413 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
    414 {
    415 	int ret;
    416 	ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
    417 	if (ret == X509_V_OK)
    418 		return 1;
    419 	/* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
    420 	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
    421 		return 0;
    422 
    423 	ctx->error = ret;
    424 	ctx->current_cert = x;
    425 	ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
    426 	return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
    427 	return 0;
    428 }
    429 
    430 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
    431 
    432 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
    433 {
    434 	*issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
    435 	if (*issuer)
    436 		{
    437 		CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
    438 		return 1;
    439 		}
    440 	else
    441 		return 0;
    442 }
    443 
    444 
    445 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
    446  * with the supplied purpose
    447  */
    448 
    449 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
    450 {
    451 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
    452 	return 1;
    453 #else
    454 	int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
    455 	X509 *x;
    456 	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
    457 	int proxy_path_length = 0;
    458 	int purpose;
    459 	int allow_proxy_certs;
    460 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
    461 
    462 	/* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
    463 	   -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
    464 	       use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
    465 	   0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
    466 	       used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
    467 	   1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
    468 	       all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
    469 	*/
    470 	must_be_ca = -1;
    471 
    472 	/* CRL path validation */
    473 	if (ctx->parent)
    474 		{
    475 		allow_proxy_certs = 0;
    476 		purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
    477 		}
    478 	else
    479 		{
    480 		allow_proxy_certs =
    481 			!!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
    482 		/* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
    483 		   software happy */
    484 		if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
    485 			allow_proxy_certs = 1;
    486 		purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
    487 		}
    488 
    489 	/* Check all untrusted certificates */
    490 	for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
    491 		{
    492 		int ret;
    493 		x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
    494 		if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
    495 			&& (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
    496 			{
    497 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
    498 			ctx->error_depth = i;
    499 			ctx->current_cert = x;
    500 			ok=cb(0,ctx);
    501 			if (!ok) goto end;
    502 			}
    503 		if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
    504 			{
    505 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
    506 			ctx->error_depth = i;
    507 			ctx->current_cert = x;
    508 			ok=cb(0,ctx);
    509 			if (!ok) goto end;
    510 			}
    511 		ret = X509_check_ca(x);
    512 		switch(must_be_ca)
    513 			{
    514 		case -1:
    515 			if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
    516 				&& (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
    517 				{
    518 				ret = 0;
    519 				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
    520 				}
    521 			else
    522 				ret = 1;
    523 			break;
    524 		case 0:
    525 			if (ret != 0)
    526 				{
    527 				ret = 0;
    528 				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
    529 				}
    530 			else
    531 				ret = 1;
    532 			break;
    533 		default:
    534 			if ((ret == 0)
    535 				|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
    536 					&& (ret != 1)))
    537 				{
    538 				ret = 0;
    539 				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
    540 				}
    541 			else
    542 				ret = 1;
    543 			break;
    544 			}
    545 		if (ret == 0)
    546 			{
    547 			ctx->error_depth = i;
    548 			ctx->current_cert = x;
    549 			ok=cb(0,ctx);
    550 			if (!ok) goto end;
    551 			}
    552 		if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
    553 			{
    554 			ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
    555 			if ((ret == 0)
    556 				|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
    557 					&& (ret != 1)))
    558 				{
    559 				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
    560 				ctx->error_depth = i;
    561 				ctx->current_cert = x;
    562 				ok=cb(0,ctx);
    563 				if (!ok) goto end;
    564 				}
    565 			}
    566 		/* Check pathlen if not self issued */
    567 		if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
    568 			   && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
    569 			   && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
    570 			{
    571 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
    572 			ctx->error_depth = i;
    573 			ctx->current_cert = x;
    574 			ok=cb(0,ctx);
    575 			if (!ok) goto end;
    576 			}
    577 		/* Increment path length if not self issued */
    578 		if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
    579 			plen++;
    580 		/* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
    581 		   certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
    582 		   certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
    583 		   CA certificate.  */
    584 		if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
    585 			{
    586 			if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
    587 				{
    588 				ctx->error =
    589 					X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
    590 				ctx->error_depth = i;
    591 				ctx->current_cert = x;
    592 				ok=cb(0,ctx);
    593 				if (!ok) goto end;
    594 				}
    595 			proxy_path_length++;
    596 			must_be_ca = 0;
    597 			}
    598 		else
    599 			must_be_ca = 1;
    600 		}
    601 	ok = 1;
    602  end:
    603 	return ok;
    604 #endif
    605 }
    606 
    607 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
    608 	{
    609 	X509 *x;
    610 	int i, j, rv;
    611 	/* Check name constraints for all certificates */
    612 	for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
    613 		{
    614 		x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
    615 		/* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
    616 		if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
    617 			continue;
    618 		/* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
    619 		 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
    620 		 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
    621 		 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
    622 		 */
    623 		for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
    624 			{
    625 			NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
    626 			if (nc)
    627 				{
    628 				rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
    629 				if (rv != X509_V_OK)
    630 					{
    631 					ctx->error = rv;
    632 					ctx->error_depth = i;
    633 					ctx->current_cert = x;
    634 					if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
    635 						return 0;
    636 					}
    637 				}
    638 			}
    639 		}
    640 	return 1;
    641 	}
    642 
    643 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
    644 {
    645 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
    646 	return 1;
    647 #else
    648 	int i, ok;
    649 	X509 *x;
    650 	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
    651 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
    652 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
    653 	i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
    654 	x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
    655 	ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
    656 	if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
    657 		return 1;
    658 	ctx->error_depth = i;
    659 	ctx->current_cert = x;
    660 	if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
    661 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
    662 	else
    663 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
    664 	ok = cb(0, ctx);
    665 	return ok;
    666 #endif
    667 }
    668 
    669 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
    670 	{
    671 	int i, last, ok;
    672 	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
    673 		return 1;
    674 	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
    675 		last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
    676 	else
    677 		{
    678 		/* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
    679 		if (ctx->parent)
    680 			return 1;
    681 		last = 0;
    682 		}
    683 	for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
    684 		{
    685 		ctx->error_depth = i;
    686 		ok = check_cert(ctx);
    687 		if (!ok) return ok;
    688 		}
    689 	return 1;
    690 	}
    691 
    692 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
    693 	{
    694 	X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
    695 	X509 *x;
    696 	int ok, cnum;
    697 	cnum = ctx->error_depth;
    698 	x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
    699 	ctx->current_cert = x;
    700 	ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
    701 	ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
    702 	ctx->current_reasons = 0;
    703 	while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
    704 		{
    705 		/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
    706 		if (ctx->get_crl)
    707 			ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
    708 		else
    709 			ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
    710 		/* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
    711 		 * notify callback
    712 		 */
    713 		if(!ok)
    714 			{
    715 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
    716 			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
    717 			goto err;
    718 			}
    719 		ctx->current_crl = crl;
    720 		ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
    721 		if (!ok)
    722 			goto err;
    723 
    724 		if (dcrl)
    725 			{
    726 			ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
    727 			if (!ok)
    728 				goto err;
    729 			ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
    730 			if (!ok)
    731 				goto err;
    732 			}
    733 		else
    734 			ok = 1;
    735 
    736 		/* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
    737 		if (ok != 2)
    738 			{
    739 			ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
    740 			if (!ok)
    741 				goto err;
    742 			}
    743 
    744 		X509_CRL_free(crl);
    745 		X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
    746 		crl = NULL;
    747 		dcrl = NULL;
    748 		}
    749 	err:
    750 	X509_CRL_free(crl);
    751 	X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
    752 
    753 	ctx->current_crl = NULL;
    754 	return ok;
    755 
    756 	}
    757 
    758 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
    759 
    760 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
    761 	{
    762 	time_t *ptime;
    763 	int i;
    764 	if (notify)
    765 		ctx->current_crl = crl;
    766 	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
    767 		ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
    768 	else
    769 		ptime = NULL;
    770 
    771 	i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
    772 	if (i == 0)
    773 		{
    774 		if (!notify)
    775 			return 0;
    776 		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
    777 		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
    778 			return 0;
    779 		}
    780 
    781 	if (i > 0)
    782 		{
    783 		if (!notify)
    784 			return 0;
    785 		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
    786 		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
    787 			return 0;
    788 		}
    789 
    790 	if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
    791 		{
    792 		i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
    793 
    794 		if (i == 0)
    795 			{
    796 			if (!notify)
    797 				return 0;
    798 			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
    799 			if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
    800 				return 0;
    801 			}
    802 		/* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
    803 		if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
    804 			{
    805 			if (!notify)
    806 				return 0;
    807 			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
    808 			if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
    809 				return 0;
    810 			}
    811 		}
    812 
    813 	if (notify)
    814 		ctx->current_crl = NULL;
    815 
    816 	return 1;
    817 	}
    818 
    819 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
    820 			X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
    821 			STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
    822 	{
    823 	int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
    824 	unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
    825 	X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
    826 	X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
    827 	X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
    828 
    829 	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
    830 		{
    831 		crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
    832 		reasons = *preasons;
    833 		crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
    834 
    835 		if (crl_score > best_score)
    836 			{
    837 			best_crl = crl;
    838 			best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
    839 			best_score = crl_score;
    840 			best_reasons = reasons;
    841 			}
    842 		}
    843 
    844 	if (best_crl)
    845 		{
    846 		if (*pcrl)
    847 			X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
    848 		*pcrl = best_crl;
    849 		*pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
    850 		*pscore = best_score;
    851 		*preasons = best_reasons;
    852 		CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
    853 		if (*pdcrl)
    854 			{
    855 			X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
    856 			*pdcrl = NULL;
    857 			}
    858 		get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
    859 		}
    860 
    861 	if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
    862 		return 1;
    863 
    864 	return 0;
    865 	}
    866 
    867 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
    868  * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
    869  */
    870 
    871 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
    872 	{
    873 	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
    874 	int i;
    875 	i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
    876 	if (i >= 0)
    877 		{
    878 		/* Can't have multiple occurrences */
    879 		if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
    880 			return 0;
    881 		exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
    882 		}
    883 	else
    884 		exta = NULL;
    885 
    886 	i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
    887 
    888 	if (i >= 0)
    889 		{
    890 
    891 		if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
    892 			return 0;
    893 		extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
    894 		}
    895 	else
    896 		extb = NULL;
    897 
    898 	if (!exta && !extb)
    899 		return 1;
    900 
    901 	if (!exta || !extb)
    902 		return 0;
    903 
    904 
    905 	if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
    906 		return 0;
    907 
    908 	return 1;
    909 	}
    910 
    911 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
    912 
    913 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
    914 	{
    915 	/* Delta CRL must be a delta */
    916 	if (!delta->base_crl_number)
    917 			return 0;
    918 	/* Base must have a CRL number */
    919 	if (!base->crl_number)
    920 			return 0;
    921 	/* Issuer names must match */
    922 	if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
    923 				X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
    924 		return 0;
    925 	/* AKID and IDP must match */
    926 	if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
    927 			return 0;
    928 	if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
    929 			return 0;
    930 	/* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
    931 	if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
    932 			return 0;
    933 	/* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
    934 	if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
    935 			return 1;
    936 	return 0;
    937 	}
    938 
    939 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
    940  * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
    941  */
    942 
    943 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
    944 			X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
    945 	{
    946 	X509_CRL *delta;
    947 	int i;
    948 	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
    949 		return;
    950 	if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
    951 		return;
    952 	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
    953 		{
    954 		delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
    955 		if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
    956 			{
    957 			if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
    958 				*pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
    959 			CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
    960 			*dcrl = delta;
    961 			return;
    962 			}
    963 		}
    964 	*dcrl = NULL;
    965 	}
    966 
    967 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
    968  * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
    969  * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
    970  * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
    971  * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
    972  */
    973 
    974 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
    975 			unsigned int *preasons,
    976 			X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
    977 	{
    978 
    979 	int crl_score = 0;
    980 	unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
    981 
    982 	/* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
    983 
    984 	/* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
    985 	if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
    986 		return 0;
    987 	/* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
    988 	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
    989 		{
    990 		if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
    991 			return 0;
    992 		}
    993 	else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
    994 		{
    995 		/* If no new reasons reject */
    996 		if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
    997 			return 0;
    998 		}
    999 	/* Don't process deltas at this stage */
   1000 	else if (crl->base_crl_number)
   1001 		return 0;
   1002 	/* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
   1003 	if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
   1004 		{
   1005 		if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
   1006 			return 0;
   1007 		}
   1008 	else
   1009 		crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
   1010 
   1011 	if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
   1012 		crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
   1013 
   1014 	/* Check expiry */
   1015 	if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
   1016 		crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
   1017 
   1018 	/* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
   1019 	crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
   1020 
   1021 	/* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
   1022 
   1023 	if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
   1024 		return 0;
   1025 
   1026 	/* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
   1027 
   1028 	if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
   1029 		{
   1030 		/* If no new reasons reject */
   1031 		if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
   1032 			return 0;
   1033 		tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
   1034 		crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
   1035 		}
   1036 
   1037 	*preasons = tmp_reasons;
   1038 
   1039 	return crl_score;
   1040 
   1041 	}
   1042 
   1043 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
   1044 				X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
   1045 	{
   1046 	X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
   1047 	X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
   1048 	int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
   1049 	int i;
   1050 
   1051 	if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
   1052 		cidx++;
   1053 
   1054 	crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
   1055 
   1056 	if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
   1057 		{
   1058 		if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
   1059 			{
   1060 			*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
   1061 			*pissuer = crl_issuer;
   1062 			return;
   1063 			}
   1064 		}
   1065 
   1066 	for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
   1067 		{
   1068 		crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
   1069 		if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
   1070 			continue;
   1071 		if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
   1072 			{
   1073 			*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
   1074 			*pissuer = crl_issuer;
   1075 			return;
   1076 			}
   1077 		}
   1078 
   1079 	/* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
   1080 
   1081 	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
   1082 		return;
   1083 
   1084 	/* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
   1085 	 * set of untrusted certificates.
   1086 	 */
   1087 	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
   1088 		{
   1089 		crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
   1090 		if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
   1091 			continue;
   1092 		if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
   1093 			{
   1094 			*pissuer = crl_issuer;
   1095 			*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
   1096 			return;
   1097 			}
   1098 		}
   1099 	}
   1100 
   1101 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
   1102  * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
   1103  * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
   1104  * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
   1105  * practice.
   1106  */
   1107 
   1108 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
   1109 	{
   1110 	X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
   1111 	int ret;
   1112 	/* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
   1113 	if (ctx->parent)
   1114 		return 0;
   1115 	if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
   1116 		return -1;
   1117 
   1118 	crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
   1119 	/* Copy verify params across */
   1120 	X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
   1121 
   1122 	crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
   1123 	crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
   1124 
   1125 	/* Verify CRL issuer */
   1126 	ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
   1127 
   1128 	if (ret <= 0)
   1129 		goto err;
   1130 
   1131 	/* Check chain is acceptable */
   1132 
   1133 	ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
   1134 	err:
   1135 	X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
   1136 	return ret;
   1137 	}
   1138 
   1139 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
   1140  * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
   1141  * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
   1142  * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
   1143  * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
   1144  * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
   1145  */
   1146 
   1147 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
   1148 			STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
   1149 			STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
   1150 	{
   1151 	X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
   1152 	cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
   1153 	crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
   1154 	if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
   1155 		return 1;
   1156 	return 0;
   1157 	}
   1158 
   1159 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
   1160  * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
   1161  * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
   1162  * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
   1163  * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
   1164  */
   1165 
   1166 
   1167 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
   1168 	{
   1169 	X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
   1170 	GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
   1171 	GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
   1172 	int i, j;
   1173 	if (!a || !b)
   1174 		return 1;
   1175 	if (a->type == 1)
   1176 		{
   1177 		if (!a->dpname)
   1178 			return 0;
   1179 		/* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
   1180 		if (b->type == 1)
   1181 			{
   1182 			if (!b->dpname)
   1183 				return 0;
   1184 			if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
   1185 				return 1;
   1186 			else
   1187 				return 0;
   1188 			}
   1189 		/* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
   1190 		nm = a->dpname;
   1191 		gens = b->name.fullname;
   1192 		}
   1193 	else if (b->type == 1)
   1194 		{
   1195 		if (!b->dpname)
   1196 			return 0;
   1197 		/* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
   1198 		gens = a->name.fullname;
   1199 		nm = b->dpname;
   1200 		}
   1201 
   1202 	/* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
   1203 	if (nm)
   1204 		{
   1205 		for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
   1206 			{
   1207 			gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
   1208 			if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
   1209 				continue;
   1210 			if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
   1211 				return 1;
   1212 			}
   1213 		return 0;
   1214 		}
   1215 
   1216 	/* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
   1217 
   1218 	for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
   1219 		{
   1220 		gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
   1221 		for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
   1222 			{
   1223 			genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
   1224 			if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
   1225 				return 1;
   1226 			}
   1227 		}
   1228 
   1229 	return 0;
   1230 
   1231 	}
   1232 
   1233 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
   1234 	{
   1235 	int i;
   1236 	X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
   1237 	/* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
   1238 	if (!dp->CRLissuer)
   1239 		return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
   1240 	for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
   1241 		{
   1242 		GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
   1243 		if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
   1244 			continue;
   1245 		if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
   1246 			return 1;
   1247 		}
   1248 	return 0;
   1249 	}
   1250 
   1251 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
   1252 
   1253 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
   1254 				unsigned int *preasons)
   1255 	{
   1256 	int i;
   1257 	if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
   1258 		return 0;
   1259 	if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
   1260 		{
   1261 		if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
   1262 			return 0;
   1263 		}
   1264 	else
   1265 		{
   1266 		if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
   1267 			return 0;
   1268 		}
   1269 	*preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
   1270 	for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
   1271 		{
   1272 		DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
   1273 		if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
   1274 			{
   1275 			if (!crl->idp ||
   1276 			     idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
   1277 				{
   1278 				*preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
   1279 				return 1;
   1280 				}
   1281 			}
   1282 		}
   1283 	if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
   1284 		return 1;
   1285 	return 0;
   1286 	}
   1287 
   1288 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
   1289  * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
   1290  */
   1291 
   1292 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
   1293 				X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
   1294 	{
   1295 	int ok;
   1296 	X509 *issuer = NULL;
   1297 	int crl_score = 0;
   1298 	unsigned int reasons;
   1299 	X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
   1300 	STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
   1301 	X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
   1302 	reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
   1303 	ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
   1304 				&issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
   1305 
   1306 	if (ok)
   1307 		goto done;
   1308 
   1309 	/* Lookup CRLs from store */
   1310 
   1311 	skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
   1312 
   1313 	/* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
   1314 	if (!skcrl && crl)
   1315 		goto done;
   1316 
   1317 	get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
   1318 
   1319 	sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
   1320 
   1321 	done:
   1322 
   1323 	/* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
   1324 	if (crl)
   1325 		{
   1326 		ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
   1327 		ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
   1328 		ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
   1329 		*pcrl = crl;
   1330 		*pdcrl = dcrl;
   1331 		return 1;
   1332 		}
   1333 
   1334 	return 0;
   1335 	}
   1336 
   1337 /* Check CRL validity */
   1338 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
   1339 	{
   1340 	X509 *issuer = NULL;
   1341 	EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
   1342 	int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
   1343 	cnum = ctx->error_depth;
   1344 	chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
   1345 	/* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
   1346 	if (ctx->current_issuer)
   1347 		issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
   1348 
   1349 	/* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
   1350 	 * is next certificate in chain.
   1351 	 */
   1352 	else if (cnum < chnum)
   1353 		issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
   1354 	else
   1355 		{
   1356 		issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
   1357 		/* If not self signed, can't check signature */
   1358 		if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
   1359 			{
   1360 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
   1361 			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
   1362 			if(!ok) goto err;
   1363 			}
   1364 		}
   1365 
   1366 	if(issuer)
   1367 		{
   1368 		/* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
   1369 		 * been done
   1370 		 */
   1371 		if (!crl->base_crl_number)
   1372 			{
   1373 			/* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
   1374 			if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
   1375 				!(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
   1376 				{
   1377 				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
   1378 				ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
   1379 				if(!ok) goto err;
   1380 				}
   1381 
   1382 			if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
   1383 				{
   1384 				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
   1385 				ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
   1386 				if(!ok) goto err;
   1387 				}
   1388 
   1389 			if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
   1390 				{
   1391 				if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
   1392 					{
   1393 					ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
   1394 					ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
   1395 					if(!ok) goto err;
   1396 					}
   1397 				}
   1398 
   1399 			if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
   1400 				{
   1401 				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
   1402 				ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
   1403 				if(!ok) goto err;
   1404 				}
   1405 
   1406 
   1407 			}
   1408 
   1409 		if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
   1410 			{
   1411 			ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
   1412 			if (!ok)
   1413 				goto err;
   1414 			}
   1415 
   1416 		/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
   1417 		ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
   1418 
   1419 		if(!ikey)
   1420 			{
   1421 			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
   1422 			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
   1423 			if (!ok) goto err;
   1424 			}
   1425 		else
   1426 			{
   1427 			/* Verify CRL signature */
   1428 			if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
   1429 				{
   1430 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
   1431 				ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
   1432 				if (!ok) goto err;
   1433 				}
   1434 			}
   1435 		}
   1436 
   1437 	ok = 1;
   1438 
   1439 	err:
   1440 	EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
   1441 	return ok;
   1442 	}
   1443 
   1444 /* Check certificate against CRL */
   1445 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
   1446 	{
   1447 	int ok;
   1448 	X509_REVOKED *rev;
   1449 	/* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
   1450 	 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
   1451 	 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
   1452 	 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
   1453 	 */
   1454 	if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
   1455 		{
   1456 		if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
   1457 			return 1;
   1458 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
   1459 		ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
   1460 		if(!ok)
   1461 			return 0;
   1462 		}
   1463 	/* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
   1464 	 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
   1465 	 */
   1466 	if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
   1467 		{
   1468 		if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
   1469 			return 2;
   1470 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
   1471 		ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
   1472 		if (!ok)
   1473 			return 0;
   1474 		}
   1475 
   1476 	return 1;
   1477 	}
   1478 
   1479 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
   1480 	{
   1481 	int ret;
   1482 	if (ctx->parent)
   1483 		return 1;
   1484 	ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
   1485 				ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
   1486 	if (ret == 0)
   1487 		{
   1488 		X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
   1489 		return 0;
   1490 		}
   1491 	/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
   1492 	if (ret == -1)
   1493 		{
   1494 		/* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
   1495 		 * callback.
   1496 		 */
   1497 		X509 *x;
   1498 		int i;
   1499 		for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
   1500 			{
   1501 			x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
   1502 			if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
   1503 				continue;
   1504 			ctx->current_cert = x;
   1505 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
   1506 			if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
   1507 				return 0;
   1508 			}
   1509 		return 1;
   1510 		}
   1511 	if (ret == -2)
   1512 		{
   1513 		ctx->current_cert = NULL;
   1514 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
   1515 		return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
   1516 		}
   1517 
   1518 	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
   1519 		{
   1520 		ctx->current_cert = NULL;
   1521 		ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
   1522 		if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
   1523 			return 0;
   1524 		}
   1525 
   1526 	return 1;
   1527 	}
   1528 
   1529 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
   1530 	{
   1531 	time_t *ptime;
   1532 	int i;
   1533 
   1534 	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
   1535 		ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
   1536 	else
   1537 		ptime = NULL;
   1538 
   1539 	i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
   1540 	if (i == 0)
   1541 		{
   1542 		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
   1543 		ctx->current_cert=x;
   1544 		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
   1545 			return 0;
   1546 		}
   1547 
   1548 	if (i > 0)
   1549 		{
   1550 		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
   1551 		ctx->current_cert=x;
   1552 		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
   1553 			return 0;
   1554 		}
   1555 
   1556 	i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
   1557 	if (i == 0)
   1558 		{
   1559 		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
   1560 		ctx->current_cert=x;
   1561 		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
   1562 			return 0;
   1563 		}
   1564 
   1565 	if (i < 0)
   1566 		{
   1567 		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
   1568 		ctx->current_cert=x;
   1569 		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
   1570 			return 0;
   1571 		}
   1572 
   1573 	return 1;
   1574 	}
   1575 
   1576 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
   1577 	{
   1578 	int ok=0,n;
   1579 	X509 *xs,*xi;
   1580 	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
   1581 	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
   1582 
   1583 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
   1584 
   1585 	n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
   1586 	ctx->error_depth=n-1;
   1587 	n--;
   1588 	xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
   1589 
   1590 	if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
   1591 		xs=xi;
   1592 	else
   1593 		{
   1594 		if (n <= 0)
   1595 			{
   1596 			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
   1597 			ctx->current_cert=xi;
   1598 			ok=cb(0,ctx);
   1599 			goto end;
   1600 			}
   1601 		else
   1602 			{
   1603 			n--;
   1604 			ctx->error_depth=n;
   1605 			xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
   1606 			}
   1607 		}
   1608 
   1609 /*	ctx->error=0;  not needed */
   1610 	while (n >= 0)
   1611 		{
   1612 		ctx->error_depth=n;
   1613 
   1614 		/* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
   1615 		 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
   1616 		 * just wastes time.
   1617 		 */
   1618 		if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
   1619 			{
   1620 			if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
   1621 				{
   1622 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
   1623 				ctx->current_cert=xi;
   1624 				ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
   1625 				if (!ok) goto end;
   1626 				}
   1627 			else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
   1628 				{
   1629 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
   1630 				ctx->current_cert=xs;
   1631 				ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
   1632 				if (!ok)
   1633 					{
   1634 					EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
   1635 					goto end;
   1636 					}
   1637 				}
   1638 			EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
   1639 			pkey=NULL;
   1640 			}
   1641 
   1642 		xs->valid = 1;
   1643 
   1644 		ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
   1645 		if (!ok)
   1646 			goto end;
   1647 
   1648 		/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
   1649 		ctx->current_issuer=xi;
   1650 		ctx->current_cert=xs;
   1651 		ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
   1652 		if (!ok) goto end;
   1653 
   1654 		n--;
   1655 		if (n >= 0)
   1656 			{
   1657 			xi=xs;
   1658 			xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
   1659 			}
   1660 		}
   1661 	ok=1;
   1662 end:
   1663 	return ok;
   1664 	}
   1665 
   1666 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
   1667 {
   1668 	return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
   1669 }
   1670 
   1671 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
   1672 	{
   1673 	char *str;
   1674 	ASN1_TIME atm;
   1675 	long offset;
   1676 	char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
   1677 	int i,j;
   1678 
   1679 	p=buff1;
   1680 	i=ctm->length;
   1681 	str=(char *)ctm->data;
   1682 	if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
   1683 		{
   1684 		if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
   1685 		memcpy(p,str,10);
   1686 		p+=10;
   1687 		str+=10;
   1688 		}
   1689 	else
   1690 		{
   1691 		if (i < 13) return 0;
   1692 		memcpy(p,str,12);
   1693 		p+=12;
   1694 		str+=12;
   1695 		}
   1696 
   1697 	if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
   1698 		{ *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
   1699 	else
   1700 		{
   1701 		*(p++)= *(str++);
   1702 		*(p++)= *(str++);
   1703 		/* Skip any fractional seconds... */
   1704 		if (*str == '.')
   1705 			{
   1706 			str++;
   1707 			while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
   1708 			}
   1709 
   1710 		}
   1711 	*(p++)='Z';
   1712 	*(p++)='\0';
   1713 
   1714 	if (*str == 'Z')
   1715 		offset=0;
   1716 	else
   1717 		{
   1718 		if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
   1719 			return 0;
   1720 		offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
   1721 		offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
   1722 		if (*str == '-')
   1723 			offset= -offset;
   1724 		}
   1725 	atm.type=ctm->type;
   1726 	atm.flags = 0;
   1727 	atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
   1728 	atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
   1729 
   1730 	if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
   1731 		return 0;
   1732 
   1733 	if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
   1734 		{
   1735 		i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
   1736 		if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
   1737 		j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
   1738 		if (j < 50) j+=100;
   1739 
   1740 		if (i < j) return -1;
   1741 		if (i > j) return 1;
   1742 		}
   1743 	i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
   1744 	if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
   1745 		return -1;
   1746 	else
   1747 		return i;
   1748 	}
   1749 
   1750 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
   1751 {
   1752 	return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
   1753 }
   1754 
   1755 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
   1756 	{
   1757 	return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
   1758 	}
   1759 
   1760 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
   1761 				int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
   1762 	{
   1763 	time_t t;
   1764 
   1765 	if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
   1766 	else time(&t);
   1767 
   1768 	if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
   1769 		{
   1770 		if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
   1771 			return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
   1772 		if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
   1773 			return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
   1774 								offset_sec);
   1775 		}
   1776 	return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
   1777 	}
   1778 
   1779 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
   1780 	{
   1781 	EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
   1782 	int i,j;
   1783 
   1784 	if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
   1785 
   1786 	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
   1787 		{
   1788 		ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
   1789 		if (ktmp == NULL)
   1790 			{
   1791 			X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
   1792 			return 0;
   1793 			}
   1794 		if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
   1795 			break;
   1796 		else
   1797 			{
   1798 			EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
   1799 			ktmp=NULL;
   1800 			}
   1801 		}
   1802 	if (ktmp == NULL)
   1803 		{
   1804 		X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
   1805 		return 0;
   1806 		}
   1807 
   1808 	/* first, populate the other certs */
   1809 	for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
   1810 		{
   1811 		ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
   1812 		EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
   1813 		EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
   1814 		}
   1815 
   1816 	if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
   1817 	EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
   1818 	return 1;
   1819 	}
   1820 
   1821 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
   1822 	     CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
   1823 	{
   1824 	/* This function is (usually) called only once, by
   1825 	 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
   1826 	return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
   1827 			new_func, dup_func, free_func);
   1828 	}
   1829 
   1830 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
   1831 	{
   1832 	return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
   1833 	}
   1834 
   1835 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
   1836 	{
   1837 	return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
   1838 	}
   1839 
   1840 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
   1841 	{
   1842 	return ctx->error;
   1843 	}
   1844 
   1845 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
   1846 	{
   1847 	ctx->error=err;
   1848 	}
   1849 
   1850 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
   1851 	{
   1852 	return ctx->error_depth;
   1853 	}
   1854 
   1855 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
   1856 	{
   1857 	return ctx->current_cert;
   1858 	}
   1859 
   1860 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
   1861 	{
   1862 	return ctx->chain;
   1863 	}
   1864 
   1865 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
   1866 	{
   1867 	int i;
   1868 	X509 *x;
   1869 	STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
   1870 	if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
   1871 	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
   1872 		{
   1873 		x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
   1874 		CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
   1875 		}
   1876 	return chain;
   1877 	}
   1878 
   1879 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
   1880 	{
   1881 	return ctx->current_issuer;
   1882 	}
   1883 
   1884 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
   1885 	{
   1886 	return ctx->current_crl;
   1887 	}
   1888 
   1889 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
   1890 	{
   1891 	return ctx->parent;
   1892 	}
   1893 
   1894 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
   1895 	{
   1896 	ctx->cert=x;
   1897 	}
   1898 
   1899 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
   1900 	{
   1901 	ctx->untrusted=sk;
   1902 	}
   1903 
   1904 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
   1905 	{
   1906 	ctx->crls=sk;
   1907 	}
   1908 
   1909 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
   1910 	{
   1911 	return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
   1912 	}
   1913 
   1914 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
   1915 	{
   1916 	return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
   1917 	}
   1918 
   1919 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
   1920  * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
   1921  * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
   1922  * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
   1923  * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
   1924  * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
   1925  * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
   1926  * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
   1927  */
   1928 
   1929 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
   1930 				int purpose, int trust)
   1931 {
   1932 	int idx;
   1933 	/* If purpose not set use default */
   1934 	if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
   1935 	/* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
   1936 	if (purpose)
   1937 		{
   1938 		X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
   1939 		idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
   1940 		if (idx == -1)
   1941 			{
   1942 			X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
   1943 						X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
   1944 			return 0;
   1945 			}
   1946 		ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
   1947 		if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
   1948 			{
   1949 			idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
   1950 			if (idx == -1)
   1951 				{
   1952 				X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
   1953 						X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
   1954 				return 0;
   1955 				}
   1956 			ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
   1957 			}
   1958 		/* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
   1959 		if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
   1960 		}
   1961 	if (trust)
   1962 		{
   1963 		idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
   1964 		if (idx == -1)
   1965 			{
   1966 			X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
   1967 						X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
   1968 			return 0;
   1969 			}
   1970 		}
   1971 
   1972 	if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
   1973 	if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
   1974 	return 1;
   1975 }
   1976 
   1977 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
   1978 {
   1979 	X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
   1980 	ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
   1981 	if (!ctx)
   1982 		{
   1983 		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
   1984 		return NULL;
   1985 		}
   1986 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
   1987 	return ctx;
   1988 }
   1989 
   1990 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
   1991 {
   1992 	X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
   1993 	OPENSSL_free(ctx);
   1994 }
   1995 
   1996 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
   1997 	     STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
   1998 	{
   1999 	int ret = 1;
   2000 	ctx->ctx=store;
   2001 	ctx->current_method=0;
   2002 	ctx->cert=x509;
   2003 	ctx->untrusted=chain;
   2004 	ctx->crls = NULL;
   2005 	ctx->last_untrusted=0;
   2006 	ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
   2007 	ctx->valid=0;
   2008 	ctx->chain=NULL;
   2009 	ctx->error=0;
   2010 	ctx->explicit_policy=0;
   2011 	ctx->error_depth=0;
   2012 	ctx->current_cert=NULL;
   2013 	ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
   2014 	ctx->current_crl=NULL;
   2015 	ctx->current_crl_score=0;
   2016 	ctx->current_reasons=0;
   2017 	ctx->tree = NULL;
   2018 	ctx->parent = NULL;
   2019 
   2020 	ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
   2021 
   2022 	if (!ctx->param)
   2023 		{
   2024 		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
   2025 		return 0;
   2026 		}
   2027 
   2028 	/* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
   2029 	 * use defaults.
   2030 	 */
   2031 
   2032 
   2033 	if (store)
   2034 		ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
   2035 	else
   2036 		ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
   2037 
   2038 	if (store)
   2039 		{
   2040 		ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
   2041 		ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
   2042 		}
   2043 	else
   2044 		ctx->cleanup = 0;
   2045 
   2046 	if (ret)
   2047 		ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
   2048 					X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
   2049 
   2050 	if (ret == 0)
   2051 		{
   2052 		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
   2053 		return 0;
   2054 		}
   2055 
   2056 	if (store && store->check_issued)
   2057 		ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
   2058 	else
   2059 		ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
   2060 
   2061 	if (store && store->get_issuer)
   2062 		ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
   2063 	else
   2064 		ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
   2065 
   2066 	if (store && store->verify_cb)
   2067 		ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
   2068 	else
   2069 		ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
   2070 
   2071 	if (store && store->verify)
   2072 		ctx->verify = store->verify;
   2073 	else
   2074 		ctx->verify = internal_verify;
   2075 
   2076 	if (store && store->check_revocation)
   2077 		ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
   2078 	else
   2079 		ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
   2080 
   2081 	if (store && store->get_crl)
   2082 		ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
   2083 	else
   2084 		ctx->get_crl = NULL;
   2085 
   2086 	if (store && store->check_crl)
   2087 		ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
   2088 	else
   2089 		ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
   2090 
   2091 	if (store && store->cert_crl)
   2092 		ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
   2093 	else
   2094 		ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
   2095 
   2096 	if (store && store->lookup_certs)
   2097 		ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
   2098 	else
   2099 		ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
   2100 
   2101 	if (store && store->lookup_crls)
   2102 		ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
   2103 	else
   2104 		ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
   2105 
   2106 	ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
   2107 
   2108 
   2109 	/* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
   2110 	 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
   2111 	 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
   2112 	/* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
   2113 	if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
   2114 				&(ctx->ex_data)))
   2115 		{
   2116 		OPENSSL_free(ctx);
   2117 		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
   2118 		return 0;
   2119 		}
   2120 	return 1;
   2121 	}
   2122 
   2123 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
   2124  * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
   2125  */
   2126 
   2127 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
   2128 {
   2129 	ctx->other_ctx = sk;
   2130 	ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
   2131 }
   2132 
   2133 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
   2134 	{
   2135 	if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
   2136 	if (ctx->param != NULL)
   2137 		{
   2138 		if (ctx->parent == NULL)
   2139 			X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
   2140 		ctx->param=NULL;
   2141 		}
   2142 	if (ctx->tree != NULL)
   2143 		{
   2144 		X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
   2145 		ctx->tree=NULL;
   2146 		}
   2147 	if (ctx->chain != NULL)
   2148 		{
   2149 		sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
   2150 		ctx->chain=NULL;
   2151 		}
   2152 	CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
   2153 	memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
   2154 	}
   2155 
   2156 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
   2157 	{
   2158 	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
   2159 	}
   2160 
   2161 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
   2162 	{
   2163 	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
   2164 	}
   2165 
   2166 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
   2167 	{
   2168 	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
   2169 	}
   2170 
   2171 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
   2172 				  int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
   2173 	{
   2174 	ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
   2175 	}
   2176 
   2177 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
   2178 	{
   2179 	return ctx->tree;
   2180 	}
   2181 
   2182 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
   2183 	{
   2184 	return ctx->explicit_policy;
   2185 	}
   2186 
   2187 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
   2188 	{
   2189 	const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
   2190 	param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
   2191 	if (!param)
   2192 		return 0;
   2193 	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
   2194 	}
   2195 
   2196 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
   2197 	{
   2198 	return ctx->param;
   2199 	}
   2200 
   2201 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
   2202 	{
   2203 	if (ctx->param)
   2204 		X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
   2205 	ctx->param = param;
   2206 	}
   2207 
   2208 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
   2209 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
   2210 
   2211 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
   2212 
   2213 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
   2214 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
   2215