1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. 2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be 3 // found in the LICENSE file. 4 5 #include <asm/unistd.h> 6 #include <fcntl.h> 7 #include <sys/mman.h> 8 #include <sys/syscall.h> 9 #include <unistd.h> 10 11 #include <vector> 12 13 #include "base/basictypes.h" 14 #include "base/posix/eintr_wrapper.h" 15 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/bpf_tests.h" 16 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h" 17 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall.h" 18 #include "sandbox/linux/tests/unit_tests.h" 19 #include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" 20 21 namespace sandbox { 22 23 namespace { 24 25 // Different platforms use different symbols for the six-argument version 26 // of the mmap() system call. Test for the correct symbol at compile time. 27 #ifdef __NR_mmap2 28 const int kMMapNr = __NR_mmap2; 29 #else 30 const int kMMapNr = __NR_mmap; 31 #endif 32 33 TEST(Syscall, WellKnownEntryPoint) { 34 // Test that SandboxSyscall(-1) is handled specially. Don't do this on ARM, 35 // where syscall(-1) crashes with SIGILL. Not running the test is fine, as we 36 // are still testing ARM code in the next set of tests. 37 #if !defined(__arm__) 38 EXPECT_NE(SandboxSyscall(-1), syscall(-1)); 39 #endif 40 41 // If possible, test that SandboxSyscall(-1) returns the address right after 42 // a kernel entry point. 43 #if defined(__i386__) 44 EXPECT_EQ(0x80CDu, ((uint16_t*)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // INT 0x80 45 #elif defined(__x86_64__) 46 EXPECT_EQ(0x050Fu, ((uint16_t*)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // SYSCALL 47 #elif defined(__arm__) 48 #if defined(__thumb__) 49 EXPECT_EQ(0xDF00u, ((uint16_t*)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // SWI 0 50 #else 51 EXPECT_EQ(0xEF000000u, ((uint32_t*)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // SVC 0 52 #endif 53 #else 54 #warning Incomplete test case; need port for target platform 55 #endif 56 } 57 58 TEST(Syscall, TrivialSyscallNoArgs) { 59 // Test that we can do basic system calls 60 EXPECT_EQ(SandboxSyscall(__NR_getpid), syscall(__NR_getpid)); 61 } 62 63 TEST(Syscall, TrivialSyscallOneArg) { 64 int new_fd; 65 // Duplicate standard error and close it. 66 ASSERT_GE(new_fd = SandboxSyscall(__NR_dup, 2), 0); 67 int close_return_value = IGNORE_EINTR(SandboxSyscall(__NR_close, new_fd)); 68 ASSERT_EQ(close_return_value, 0); 69 } 70 71 // SIGSYS trap handler that will be called on __NR_uname. 72 intptr_t CopySyscallArgsToAux(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args, void* aux) { 73 // |aux| is a pointer to our BPF_AUX. 74 std::vector<uint64_t>* const seen_syscall_args = 75 static_cast<std::vector<uint64_t>*>(aux); 76 BPF_ASSERT(arraysize(args.args) == 6); 77 seen_syscall_args->assign(args.args, args.args + arraysize(args.args)); 78 return -ENOMEM; 79 } 80 81 ErrorCode CopyAllArgsOnUnamePolicy(SandboxBPF* sandbox, int sysno, void* aux) { 82 if (!SandboxBPF::IsValidSyscallNumber(sysno)) { 83 return ErrorCode(ENOSYS); 84 } 85 if (sysno == __NR_uname) { 86 return sandbox->Trap(CopySyscallArgsToAux, aux); 87 } else { 88 return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED); 89 } 90 } 91 92 // We are testing SandboxSyscall() by making use of a BPF filter that allows us 93 // to inspect the system call arguments that the kernel saw. 94 BPF_TEST(Syscall, 95 SyntheticSixArgs, 96 CopyAllArgsOnUnamePolicy, 97 std::vector<uint64_t> /* BPF_AUX */) { 98 const int kExpectedValue = 42; 99 // In this test we only pass integers to the kernel. We might want to make 100 // additional tests to try other types. What we will see depends on 101 // implementation details of kernel BPF filters and we will need to document 102 // the expected behavior very clearly. 103 int syscall_args[6]; 104 for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(syscall_args); ++i) { 105 syscall_args[i] = kExpectedValue + i; 106 } 107 108 // We could use pretty much any system call we don't need here. uname() is 109 // nice because it doesn't have any dangerous side effects. 110 BPF_ASSERT(SandboxSyscall(__NR_uname, 111 syscall_args[0], 112 syscall_args[1], 113 syscall_args[2], 114 syscall_args[3], 115 syscall_args[4], 116 syscall_args[5]) == -ENOMEM); 117 118 // We expect the trap handler to have copied the 6 arguments. 119 BPF_ASSERT(BPF_AUX.size() == 6); 120 121 // Don't loop here so that we can see which argument does cause the failure 122 // easily from the failing line. 123 // uint64_t is the type passed to our SIGSYS handler. 124 BPF_ASSERT(BPF_AUX[0] == static_cast<uint64_t>(syscall_args[0])); 125 BPF_ASSERT(BPF_AUX[1] == static_cast<uint64_t>(syscall_args[1])); 126 BPF_ASSERT(BPF_AUX[2] == static_cast<uint64_t>(syscall_args[2])); 127 BPF_ASSERT(BPF_AUX[3] == static_cast<uint64_t>(syscall_args[3])); 128 BPF_ASSERT(BPF_AUX[4] == static_cast<uint64_t>(syscall_args[4])); 129 BPF_ASSERT(BPF_AUX[5] == static_cast<uint64_t>(syscall_args[5])); 130 } 131 132 TEST(Syscall, ComplexSyscallSixArgs) { 133 int fd; 134 ASSERT_LE(0, fd = SandboxSyscall(__NR_open, "/dev/null", O_RDWR, 0L)); 135 136 // Use mmap() to allocate some read-only memory 137 char* addr0; 138 ASSERT_NE((char*)NULL, 139 addr0 = reinterpret_cast<char*>( 140 SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr, 141 (void*)NULL, 142 4096, 143 PROT_READ, 144 MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 145 fd, 146 0L))); 147 148 // Try to replace the existing mapping with a read-write mapping 149 char* addr1; 150 ASSERT_EQ(addr0, 151 addr1 = reinterpret_cast<char*>( 152 SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr, 153 addr0, 154 4096L, 155 PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, 156 MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, 157 fd, 158 0L))); 159 ++*addr1; // This should not seg fault 160 161 // Clean up 162 EXPECT_EQ(0, SandboxSyscall(__NR_munmap, addr1, 4096L)); 163 EXPECT_EQ(0, IGNORE_EINTR(SandboxSyscall(__NR_close, fd))); 164 165 // Check that the offset argument (i.e. the sixth argument) is processed 166 // correctly. 167 ASSERT_GE(fd = SandboxSyscall(__NR_open, "/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY, 0L), 0); 168 char* addr2, *addr3; 169 ASSERT_NE((char*)NULL, 170 addr2 = reinterpret_cast<char*>(SandboxSyscall( 171 kMMapNr, (void*)NULL, 8192L, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0L))); 172 ASSERT_NE((char*)NULL, 173 addr3 = reinterpret_cast<char*>(SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr, 174 (void*)NULL, 175 4096L, 176 PROT_READ, 177 MAP_PRIVATE, 178 fd, 179 #if defined(__NR_mmap2) 180 1L 181 #else 182 4096L 183 #endif 184 ))); 185 EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(addr2 + 4096, addr3, 4096)); 186 187 // Just to be absolutely on the safe side, also verify that the file 188 // contents matches what we are getting from a read() operation. 189 char buf[8192]; 190 EXPECT_EQ(8192, SandboxSyscall(__NR_read, fd, buf, 8192L)); 191 EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(addr2, buf, 8192)); 192 193 // Clean up 194 EXPECT_EQ(0, SandboxSyscall(__NR_munmap, addr2, 8192L)); 195 EXPECT_EQ(0, SandboxSyscall(__NR_munmap, addr3, 4096L)); 196 EXPECT_EQ(0, IGNORE_EINTR(SandboxSyscall(__NR_close, fd))); 197 } 198 199 } // namespace 200 201 } // namespace sandbox 202