1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 59 #include <stdio.h> 60 #include <time.h> 61 #include <errno.h> 62 63 #include "cryptlib.h" 64 #include <openssl/crypto.h> 65 #include <openssl/lhash.h> 66 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 67 #include <openssl/evp.h> 68 #include <openssl/asn1.h> 69 #include <openssl/x509.h> 70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h> 71 #include <openssl/objects.h> 72 73 /* CRL score values */ 74 75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */ 76 77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 78 79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */ 80 81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 82 83 /* CRL times valid */ 84 85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 86 87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */ 88 89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 90 91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ 92 93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) 94 95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ 96 97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 98 99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ 100 101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 102 103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ 104 105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 106 107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ 108 109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 110 111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); 112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); 113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); 114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 116 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 117 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 118 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 119 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 120 121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 122 unsigned int *preasons, 123 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); 124 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 125 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); 126 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score, 127 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); 128 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, 129 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score); 130 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 131 unsigned int *preasons); 132 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); 133 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 134 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 135 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); 136 137 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 138 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 139 140 141 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) 142 { 143 return ok; 144 } 145 146 #if 0 147 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) 148 { 149 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b); 150 } 151 #endif 152 153 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 154 { 155 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; 156 int bad_chain = 0; 157 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; 158 int depth,i,ok=0; 159 int num; 160 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 161 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL; 162 if (ctx->cert == NULL) 163 { 164 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); 165 return -1; 166 } 167 168 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 169 170 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is 171 * present and that the first entry is in place */ 172 if (ctx->chain == NULL) 173 { 174 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || 175 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert))) 176 { 177 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 178 goto end; 179 } 180 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 181 ctx->last_untrusted=1; 182 } 183 184 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ 185 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL 186 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) 187 { 188 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 189 goto end; 190 } 191 192 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 193 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); 194 depth=param->depth; 195 196 197 for (;;) 198 { 199 /* If we have enough, we break */ 200 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take 201 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the 202 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error 203 * code later. 204 */ 205 206 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 207 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break; 208 209 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ 210 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) 211 { 212 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x); 213 if (xtmp != NULL) 214 { 215 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp)) 216 { 217 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 218 goto end; 219 } 220 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 221 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); 222 ctx->last_untrusted++; 223 x=xtmp; 224 num++; 225 /* reparse the full chain for 226 * the next one */ 227 continue; 228 } 229 } 230 break; 231 } 232 233 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted 234 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, 235 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ 236 237 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it 238 * is self signed. 239 */ 240 241 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 242 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1); 243 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) 244 { 245 /* we have a self signed certificate */ 246 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) 247 { 248 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if 249 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact 250 * match to avoid possible impersonation. 251 */ 252 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 253 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 254 { 255 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; 256 ctx->current_cert=x; 257 ctx->error_depth=i-1; 258 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); 259 bad_chain = 1; 260 ok=cb(0,ctx); 261 if (!ok) goto end; 262 } 263 else 264 { 265 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version 266 * so we get any trust settings. 267 */ 268 X509_free(x); 269 x = xtmp; 270 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); 271 ctx->last_untrusted=0; 272 } 273 } 274 else 275 { 276 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ 277 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); 278 ctx->last_untrusted--; 279 num--; 280 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); 281 } 282 } 283 284 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ 285 for (;;) 286 { 287 /* If we have enough, we break */ 288 if (depth < num) break; 289 290 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 291 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break; 292 293 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 294 295 if (ok < 0) return ok; 296 if (ok == 0) break; 297 298 x = xtmp; 299 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x)) 300 { 301 X509_free(xtmp); 302 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 303 return 0; 304 } 305 num++; 306 } 307 308 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ 309 310 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ 311 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) 312 { 313 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) 314 { 315 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) 316 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; 317 else 318 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; 319 ctx->current_cert=x; 320 } 321 else 322 { 323 324 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss); 325 num++; 326 ctx->last_untrusted=num; 327 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; 328 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; 329 chain_ss=NULL; 330 } 331 332 ctx->error_depth=num-1; 333 bad_chain = 1; 334 ok=cb(0,ctx); 335 if (!ok) goto end; 336 } 337 338 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ 339 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); 340 341 if (!ok) goto end; 342 343 /* Check name constraints */ 344 345 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); 346 347 if (!ok) goto end; 348 349 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ 350 351 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); 352 353 if (!ok) goto end; 354 355 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ 356 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); 357 358 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters 359 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification. 360 */ 361 362 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); 363 if(!ok) goto end; 364 365 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ 366 if (ctx->verify != NULL) 367 ok=ctx->verify(ctx); 368 else 369 ok=internal_verify(ctx); 370 if(!ok) goto end; 371 372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 373 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ 374 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); 375 if (!ok) goto end; 376 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); 377 if (!ok) goto end; 378 #endif 379 380 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ 381 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) 382 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); 383 if(!ok) goto end; 384 if (0) 385 { 386 end: 387 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); 388 } 389 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); 390 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); 391 return ok; 392 } 393 394 395 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) 396 */ 397 398 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) 399 { 400 int i; 401 X509 *issuer; 402 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) 403 { 404 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 405 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) 406 return issuer; 407 } 408 return NULL; 409 } 410 411 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ 412 413 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) 414 { 415 int ret; 416 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); 417 if (ret == X509_V_OK) 418 return 1; 419 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ 420 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) 421 return 0; 422 423 ctx->error = ret; 424 ctx->current_cert = x; 425 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 426 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 427 return 0; 428 } 429 430 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ 431 432 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 433 { 434 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); 435 if (*issuer) 436 { 437 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 438 return 1; 439 } 440 else 441 return 0; 442 } 443 444 445 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency 446 * with the supplied purpose 447 */ 448 449 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 450 { 451 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 452 return 1; 453 #else 454 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; 455 X509 *x; 456 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 457 int proxy_path_length = 0; 458 int purpose; 459 int allow_proxy_certs; 460 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 461 462 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: 463 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct 464 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). 465 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not 466 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. 467 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for 468 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. 469 */ 470 must_be_ca = -1; 471 472 /* CRL path validation */ 473 if (ctx->parent) 474 { 475 allow_proxy_certs = 0; 476 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; 477 } 478 else 479 { 480 allow_proxy_certs = 481 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); 482 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their 483 software happy */ 484 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) 485 allow_proxy_certs = 1; 486 purpose = ctx->param->purpose; 487 } 488 489 /* Check all untrusted certificates */ 490 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) 491 { 492 int ret; 493 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 494 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 495 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 496 { 497 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; 498 ctx->error_depth = i; 499 ctx->current_cert = x; 500 ok=cb(0,ctx); 501 if (!ok) goto end; 502 } 503 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) 504 { 505 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; 506 ctx->error_depth = i; 507 ctx->current_cert = x; 508 ok=cb(0,ctx); 509 if (!ok) goto end; 510 } 511 ret = X509_check_ca(x); 512 switch(must_be_ca) 513 { 514 case -1: 515 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 516 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) 517 { 518 ret = 0; 519 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 520 } 521 else 522 ret = 1; 523 break; 524 case 0: 525 if (ret != 0) 526 { 527 ret = 0; 528 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; 529 } 530 else 531 ret = 1; 532 break; 533 default: 534 if ((ret == 0) 535 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 536 && (ret != 1))) 537 { 538 ret = 0; 539 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 540 } 541 else 542 ret = 1; 543 break; 544 } 545 if (ret == 0) 546 { 547 ctx->error_depth = i; 548 ctx->current_cert = x; 549 ok=cb(0,ctx); 550 if (!ok) goto end; 551 } 552 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) 553 { 554 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); 555 if ((ret == 0) 556 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 557 && (ret != 1))) 558 { 559 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; 560 ctx->error_depth = i; 561 ctx->current_cert = x; 562 ok=cb(0,ctx); 563 if (!ok) goto end; 564 } 565 } 566 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ 567 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) 568 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) 569 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) 570 { 571 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 572 ctx->error_depth = i; 573 ctx->current_cert = x; 574 ok=cb(0,ctx); 575 if (!ok) goto end; 576 } 577 /* Increment path length if not self issued */ 578 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 579 plen++; 580 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next 581 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE 582 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a 583 CA certificate. */ 584 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) 585 { 586 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) 587 { 588 ctx->error = 589 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 590 ctx->error_depth = i; 591 ctx->current_cert = x; 592 ok=cb(0,ctx); 593 if (!ok) goto end; 594 } 595 proxy_path_length++; 596 must_be_ca = 0; 597 } 598 else 599 must_be_ca = 1; 600 } 601 ok = 1; 602 end: 603 return ok; 604 #endif 605 } 606 607 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 608 { 609 X509 *x; 610 int i, j, rv; 611 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ 612 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) 613 { 614 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 615 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ 616 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 617 continue; 618 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in 619 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly 620 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be 621 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed. 622 */ 623 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) 624 { 625 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; 626 if (nc) 627 { 628 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); 629 if (rv != X509_V_OK) 630 { 631 ctx->error = rv; 632 ctx->error_depth = i; 633 ctx->current_cert = x; 634 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx)) 635 return 0; 636 } 637 } 638 } 639 } 640 return 1; 641 } 642 643 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 644 { 645 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 646 return 1; 647 #else 648 int i, ok; 649 X509 *x; 650 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 651 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 652 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ 653 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 654 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 655 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); 656 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) 657 return 1; 658 ctx->error_depth = i; 659 ctx->current_cert = x; 660 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) 661 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; 662 else 663 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; 664 ok = cb(0, ctx); 665 return ok; 666 #endif 667 } 668 669 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 670 { 671 int i, last, ok; 672 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) 673 return 1; 674 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) 675 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 676 else 677 { 678 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ 679 if (ctx->parent) 680 return 1; 681 last = 0; 682 } 683 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++) 684 { 685 ctx->error_depth = i; 686 ok = check_cert(ctx); 687 if (!ok) return ok; 688 } 689 return 1; 690 } 691 692 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 693 { 694 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 695 X509 *x; 696 int ok, cnum; 697 unsigned int last_reasons; 698 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 699 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); 700 ctx->current_cert = x; 701 ctx->current_issuer = NULL; 702 ctx->current_crl_score = 0; 703 ctx->current_reasons = 0; 704 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) 705 { 706 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; 707 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ 708 if (ctx->get_crl) 709 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); 710 else 711 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); 712 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except 713 * notify callback 714 */ 715 if(!ok) 716 { 717 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 718 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 719 goto err; 720 } 721 ctx->current_crl = crl; 722 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); 723 if (!ok) 724 goto err; 725 726 if (dcrl) 727 { 728 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); 729 if (!ok) 730 goto err; 731 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); 732 if (!ok) 733 goto err; 734 } 735 else 736 ok = 1; 737 738 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ 739 if (ok != 2) 740 { 741 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); 742 if (!ok) 743 goto err; 744 } 745 746 X509_CRL_free(crl); 747 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 748 crl = NULL; 749 dcrl = NULL; 750 /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by 751 * another iteration, so exit loop. 752 */ 753 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) 754 { 755 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 756 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 757 goto err; 758 } 759 } 760 err: 761 X509_CRL_free(crl); 762 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 763 764 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 765 return ok; 766 767 } 768 769 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ 770 771 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) 772 { 773 time_t *ptime; 774 int i; 775 if (notify) 776 ctx->current_crl = crl; 777 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 778 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 779 else 780 ptime = NULL; 781 782 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); 783 if (i == 0) 784 { 785 if (!notify) 786 return 0; 787 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; 788 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 789 return 0; 790 } 791 792 if (i > 0) 793 { 794 if (!notify) 795 return 0; 796 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; 797 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 798 return 0; 799 } 800 801 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) 802 { 803 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); 804 805 if (i == 0) 806 { 807 if (!notify) 808 return 0; 809 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; 810 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 811 return 0; 812 } 813 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ 814 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) 815 { 816 if (!notify) 817 return 0; 818 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; 819 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 820 return 0; 821 } 822 } 823 824 if (notify) 825 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 826 827 return 1; 828 } 829 830 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, 831 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, 832 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 833 { 834 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; 835 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; 836 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; 837 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; 838 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; 839 840 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) 841 { 842 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 843 reasons = *preasons; 844 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); 845 846 if (crl_score > best_score) 847 { 848 best_crl = crl; 849 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; 850 best_score = crl_score; 851 best_reasons = reasons; 852 } 853 } 854 855 if (best_crl) 856 { 857 if (*pcrl) 858 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); 859 *pcrl = best_crl; 860 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; 861 *pscore = best_score; 862 *preasons = best_reasons; 863 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 864 if (*pdcrl) 865 { 866 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); 867 *pdcrl = NULL; 868 } 869 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); 870 } 871 872 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) 873 return 1; 874 875 return 0; 876 } 877 878 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be 879 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. 880 */ 881 882 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) 883 { 884 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; 885 int i; 886 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); 887 if (i >= 0) 888 { 889 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ 890 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) 891 return 0; 892 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); 893 } 894 else 895 exta = NULL; 896 897 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); 898 899 if (i >= 0) 900 { 901 902 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) 903 return 0; 904 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); 905 } 906 else 907 extb = NULL; 908 909 if (!exta && !extb) 910 return 1; 911 912 if (!exta || !extb) 913 return 0; 914 915 916 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) 917 return 0; 918 919 return 1; 920 } 921 922 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ 923 924 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) 925 { 926 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ 927 if (!delta->base_crl_number) 928 return 0; 929 /* Base must have a CRL number */ 930 if (!base->crl_number) 931 return 0; 932 /* Issuer names must match */ 933 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), 934 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) 935 return 0; 936 /* AKID and IDP must match */ 937 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) 938 return 0; 939 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) 940 return 0; 941 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ 942 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 943 return 0; 944 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ 945 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 946 return 1; 947 return 0; 948 } 949 950 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring 951 * or retrieve a chain of deltas... 952 */ 953 954 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, 955 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 956 { 957 X509_CRL *delta; 958 int i; 959 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) 960 return; 961 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) 962 return; 963 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) 964 { 965 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 966 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) 967 { 968 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) 969 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; 970 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 971 *dcrl = delta; 972 return; 973 } 974 } 975 *dcrl = NULL; 976 } 977 978 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'. 979 * The return value is a mask of several criteria. 980 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. 981 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if 982 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. 983 */ 984 985 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 986 unsigned int *preasons, 987 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 988 { 989 990 int crl_score = 0; 991 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; 992 993 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ 994 995 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ 996 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) 997 return 0; 998 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ 999 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) 1000 { 1001 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) 1002 return 0; 1003 } 1004 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) 1005 { 1006 /* If no new reasons reject */ 1007 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 1008 return 0; 1009 } 1010 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ 1011 else if (crl->base_crl_number) 1012 return 0; 1013 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ 1014 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) 1015 { 1016 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) 1017 return 0; 1018 } 1019 else 1020 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; 1021 1022 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 1023 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; 1024 1025 /* Check expiry */ 1026 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) 1027 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; 1028 1029 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ 1030 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); 1031 1032 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ 1033 1034 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) 1035 return 0; 1036 1037 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ 1038 1039 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) 1040 { 1041 /* If no new reasons reject */ 1042 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 1043 return 0; 1044 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; 1045 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; 1046 } 1047 1048 *preasons = tmp_reasons; 1049 1050 return crl_score; 1051 1052 } 1053 1054 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, 1055 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) 1056 { 1057 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; 1058 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1059 int cidx = ctx->error_depth; 1060 int i; 1061 1062 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) 1063 cidx++; 1064 1065 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1066 1067 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) 1068 { 1069 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) 1070 { 1071 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; 1072 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1073 return; 1074 } 1075 } 1076 1077 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) 1078 { 1079 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1080 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1081 continue; 1082 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) 1083 { 1084 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; 1085 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1086 return; 1087 } 1088 } 1089 1090 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ 1091 1092 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) 1093 return; 1094 1095 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the 1096 * set of untrusted certificates. 1097 */ 1098 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) 1099 { 1100 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); 1101 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1102 continue; 1103 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) 1104 { 1105 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1106 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; 1107 return; 1108 } 1109 } 1110 } 1111 1112 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new 1113 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the 1114 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking 1115 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in 1116 * practice. 1117 */ 1118 1119 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1120 { 1121 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; 1122 int ret; 1123 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ 1124 if (ctx->parent) 1125 return 0; 1126 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) 1127 return -1; 1128 1129 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; 1130 /* Copy verify params across */ 1131 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); 1132 1133 crl_ctx.parent = ctx; 1134 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; 1135 1136 /* Verify CRL issuer */ 1137 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); 1138 1139 if (ret <= 0) 1140 goto err; 1141 1142 /* Check chain is acceptable */ 1143 1144 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); 1145 err: 1146 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); 1147 return ret; 1148 } 1149 1150 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path 1151 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a 1152 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised 1153 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must 1154 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain... 1155 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version 1156 */ 1157 1158 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1159 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 1160 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) 1161 { 1162 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; 1163 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); 1164 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); 1165 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) 1166 return 1; 1167 return 0; 1168 } 1169 1170 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1171 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 1172 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 1173 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 1174 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. 1175 */ 1176 1177 1178 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) 1179 { 1180 X509_NAME *nm = NULL; 1181 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; 1182 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; 1183 int i, j; 1184 if (!a || !b) 1185 return 1; 1186 if (a->type == 1) 1187 { 1188 if (!a->dpname) 1189 return 0; 1190 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ 1191 if (b->type == 1) 1192 { 1193 if (!b->dpname) 1194 return 0; 1195 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) 1196 return 1; 1197 else 1198 return 0; 1199 } 1200 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1201 nm = a->dpname; 1202 gens = b->name.fullname; 1203 } 1204 else if (b->type == 1) 1205 { 1206 if (!b->dpname) 1207 return 0; 1208 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1209 gens = a->name.fullname; 1210 nm = b->dpname; 1211 } 1212 1213 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ 1214 if (nm) 1215 { 1216 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) 1217 { 1218 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); 1219 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1220 continue; 1221 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) 1222 return 1; 1223 } 1224 return 0; 1225 } 1226 1227 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ 1228 1229 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) 1230 { 1231 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); 1232 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) 1233 { 1234 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); 1235 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) 1236 return 1; 1237 } 1238 } 1239 1240 return 0; 1241 1242 } 1243 1244 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) 1245 { 1246 int i; 1247 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1248 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ 1249 if (!dp->CRLissuer) 1250 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); 1251 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) 1252 { 1253 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); 1254 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1255 continue; 1256 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) 1257 return 1; 1258 } 1259 return 0; 1260 } 1261 1262 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ 1263 1264 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 1265 unsigned int *preasons) 1266 { 1267 int i; 1268 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) 1269 return 0; 1270 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) 1271 { 1272 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) 1273 return 0; 1274 } 1275 else 1276 { 1277 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) 1278 return 0; 1279 } 1280 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; 1281 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) 1282 { 1283 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); 1284 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) 1285 { 1286 if (!crl->idp || 1287 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) 1288 { 1289 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; 1290 return 1; 1291 } 1292 } 1293 } 1294 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) 1295 return 1; 1296 return 0; 1297 } 1298 1299 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. 1300 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too 1301 */ 1302 1303 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1304 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) 1305 { 1306 int ok; 1307 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1308 int crl_score = 0; 1309 unsigned int reasons; 1310 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 1311 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; 1312 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 1313 reasons = ctx->current_reasons; 1314 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 1315 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); 1316 1317 if (ok) 1318 goto done; 1319 1320 /* Lookup CRLs from store */ 1321 1322 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); 1323 1324 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ 1325 if (!skcrl && crl) 1326 goto done; 1327 1328 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); 1329 1330 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); 1331 1332 done: 1333 1334 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ 1335 if (crl) 1336 { 1337 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 1338 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; 1339 ctx->current_reasons = reasons; 1340 *pcrl = crl; 1341 *pdcrl = dcrl; 1342 return 1; 1343 } 1344 1345 return 0; 1346 } 1347 1348 /* Check CRL validity */ 1349 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) 1350 { 1351 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1352 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; 1353 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; 1354 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 1355 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 1356 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ 1357 if (ctx->current_issuer) 1358 issuer = ctx->current_issuer; 1359 1360 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer 1361 * is next certificate in chain. 1362 */ 1363 else if (cnum < chnum) 1364 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); 1365 else 1366 { 1367 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); 1368 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ 1369 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) 1370 { 1371 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; 1372 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1373 if(!ok) goto err; 1374 } 1375 } 1376 1377 if(issuer) 1378 { 1379 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already 1380 * been done 1381 */ 1382 if (!crl->base_crl_number) 1383 { 1384 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ 1385 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && 1386 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) 1387 { 1388 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; 1389 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1390 if(!ok) goto err; 1391 } 1392 1393 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) 1394 { 1395 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; 1396 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1397 if(!ok) goto err; 1398 } 1399 1400 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) 1401 { 1402 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) 1403 { 1404 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; 1405 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1406 if(!ok) goto err; 1407 } 1408 } 1409 1410 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) 1411 { 1412 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; 1413 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1414 if(!ok) goto err; 1415 } 1416 1417 1418 } 1419 1420 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) 1421 { 1422 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); 1423 if (!ok) 1424 goto err; 1425 } 1426 1427 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ 1428 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); 1429 1430 if(!ikey) 1431 { 1432 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1433 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1434 if (!ok) goto err; 1435 } 1436 else 1437 { 1438 /* Verify CRL signature */ 1439 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) 1440 { 1441 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1442 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1443 if (!ok) goto err; 1444 } 1445 } 1446 } 1447 1448 ok = 1; 1449 1450 err: 1451 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); 1452 return ok; 1453 } 1454 1455 /* Check certificate against CRL */ 1456 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 1457 { 1458 int ok; 1459 X509_REVOKED *rev; 1460 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained 1461 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate 1462 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since 1463 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries. 1464 */ 1465 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 1466 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 1467 { 1468 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; 1469 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1470 if(!ok) 1471 return 0; 1472 } 1473 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL 1474 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL. 1475 */ 1476 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) 1477 { 1478 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) 1479 return 2; 1480 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; 1481 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1482 if (!ok) 1483 return 0; 1484 } 1485 1486 return 1; 1487 } 1488 1489 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1490 { 1491 int ret; 1492 if (ctx->parent) 1493 return 1; 1494 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, 1495 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); 1496 if (ret == 0) 1497 { 1498 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1499 return 0; 1500 } 1501 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ 1502 if (ret == -1) 1503 { 1504 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify 1505 * callback. 1506 */ 1507 X509 *x; 1508 int i; 1509 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) 1510 { 1511 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 1512 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) 1513 continue; 1514 ctx->current_cert = x; 1515 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; 1516 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1517 return 0; 1518 } 1519 return 1; 1520 } 1521 if (ret == -2) 1522 { 1523 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1524 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; 1525 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1526 } 1527 1528 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) 1529 { 1530 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1531 ctx->error = X509_V_OK; 1532 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) 1533 return 0; 1534 } 1535 1536 return 1; 1537 } 1538 1539 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1540 { 1541 time_t *ptime; 1542 int i; 1543 1544 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 1545 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 1546 else 1547 ptime = NULL; 1548 1549 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); 1550 if (i == 0) 1551 { 1552 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; 1553 ctx->current_cert=x; 1554 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1555 return 0; 1556 } 1557 1558 if (i > 0) 1559 { 1560 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; 1561 ctx->current_cert=x; 1562 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1563 return 0; 1564 } 1565 1566 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); 1567 if (i == 0) 1568 { 1569 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; 1570 ctx->current_cert=x; 1571 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1572 return 0; 1573 } 1574 1575 if (i < 0) 1576 { 1577 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; 1578 ctx->current_cert=x; 1579 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1580 return 0; 1581 } 1582 1583 return 1; 1584 } 1585 1586 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1587 { 1588 int ok=0,n; 1589 X509 *xs,*xi; 1590 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 1591 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 1592 1593 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 1594 1595 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 1596 ctx->error_depth=n-1; 1597 n--; 1598 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 1599 1600 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) 1601 xs=xi; 1602 else 1603 { 1604 if (n <= 0) 1605 { 1606 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; 1607 ctx->current_cert=xi; 1608 ok=cb(0,ctx); 1609 goto end; 1610 } 1611 else 1612 { 1613 n--; 1614 ctx->error_depth=n; 1615 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 1616 } 1617 } 1618 1619 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ 1620 while (n >= 0) 1621 { 1622 ctx->error_depth=n; 1623 1624 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless 1625 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and 1626 * just wastes time. 1627 */ 1628 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) 1629 { 1630 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) 1631 { 1632 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1633 ctx->current_cert=xi; 1634 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); 1635 if (!ok) goto end; 1636 } 1637 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) 1638 { 1639 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1640 ctx->current_cert=xs; 1641 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); 1642 if (!ok) 1643 { 1644 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1645 goto end; 1646 } 1647 } 1648 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1649 pkey=NULL; 1650 } 1651 1652 xs->valid = 1; 1653 1654 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); 1655 if (!ok) 1656 goto end; 1657 1658 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ 1659 ctx->current_issuer=xi; 1660 ctx->current_cert=xs; 1661 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); 1662 if (!ok) goto end; 1663 1664 n--; 1665 if (n >= 0) 1666 { 1667 xi=xs; 1668 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 1669 } 1670 } 1671 ok=1; 1672 end: 1673 return ok; 1674 } 1675 1676 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) 1677 { 1678 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); 1679 } 1680 1681 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) 1682 { 1683 char *str; 1684 ASN1_TIME atm; 1685 long offset; 1686 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; 1687 int i,j; 1688 1689 p=buff1; 1690 i=ctm->length; 1691 str=(char *)ctm->data; 1692 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1693 { 1694 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0; 1695 memcpy(p,str,10); 1696 p+=10; 1697 str+=10; 1698 } 1699 else 1700 { 1701 if (i < 13) return 0; 1702 memcpy(p,str,12); 1703 p+=12; 1704 str+=12; 1705 } 1706 1707 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) 1708 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } 1709 else 1710 { 1711 *(p++)= *(str++); 1712 *(p++)= *(str++); 1713 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ 1714 if (*str == '.') 1715 { 1716 str++; 1717 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++; 1718 } 1719 1720 } 1721 *(p++)='Z'; 1722 *(p++)='\0'; 1723 1724 if (*str == 'Z') 1725 offset=0; 1726 else 1727 { 1728 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) 1729 return 0; 1730 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; 1731 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); 1732 if (*str == '-') 1733 offset= -offset; 1734 } 1735 atm.type=ctm->type; 1736 atm.flags = 0; 1737 atm.length=sizeof(buff2); 1738 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; 1739 1740 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL) 1741 return 0; 1742 1743 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1744 { 1745 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); 1746 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ 1747 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); 1748 if (j < 50) j+=100; 1749 1750 if (i < j) return -1; 1751 if (i > j) return 1; 1752 } 1753 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); 1754 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ 1755 return -1; 1756 else 1757 return i; 1758 } 1759 1760 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) 1761 { 1762 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); 1763 } 1764 1765 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1766 { 1767 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); 1768 } 1769 1770 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, 1771 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1772 { 1773 time_t t; 1774 1775 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; 1776 else time(&t); 1777 1778 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) 1779 { 1780 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1781 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1782 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) 1783 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, 1784 offset_sec); 1785 } 1786 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1787 } 1788 1789 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 1790 { 1791 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2; 1792 int i,j; 1793 1794 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; 1795 1796 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 1797 { 1798 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i)); 1799 if (ktmp == NULL) 1800 { 1801 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); 1802 return 0; 1803 } 1804 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) 1805 break; 1806 else 1807 { 1808 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1809 ktmp=NULL; 1810 } 1811 } 1812 if (ktmp == NULL) 1813 { 1814 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); 1815 return 0; 1816 } 1817 1818 /* first, populate the other certs */ 1819 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--) 1820 { 1821 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j)); 1822 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp); 1823 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); 1824 } 1825 1826 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp); 1827 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1828 return 1; 1829 } 1830 1831 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, 1832 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) 1833 { 1834 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by 1835 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */ 1836 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, 1837 new_func, dup_func, free_func); 1838 } 1839 1840 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) 1841 { 1842 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data); 1843 } 1844 1845 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) 1846 { 1847 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx); 1848 } 1849 1850 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1851 { 1852 return ctx->error; 1853 } 1854 1855 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) 1856 { 1857 ctx->error=err; 1858 } 1859 1860 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1861 { 1862 return ctx->error_depth; 1863 } 1864 1865 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1866 { 1867 return ctx->current_cert; 1868 } 1869 1870 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1871 { 1872 return ctx->chain; 1873 } 1874 1875 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1876 { 1877 int i; 1878 X509 *x; 1879 STACK_OF(X509) *chain; 1880 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL; 1881 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 1882 { 1883 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 1884 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 1885 } 1886 return chain; 1887 } 1888 1889 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1890 { 1891 return ctx->current_issuer; 1892 } 1893 1894 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1895 { 1896 return ctx->current_crl; 1897 } 1898 1899 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1900 { 1901 return ctx->parent; 1902 } 1903 1904 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1905 { 1906 ctx->cert=x; 1907 } 1908 1909 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 1910 { 1911 ctx->untrusted=sk; 1912 } 1913 1914 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) 1915 { 1916 ctx->crls=sk; 1917 } 1918 1919 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) 1920 { 1921 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); 1922 } 1923 1924 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) 1925 { 1926 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); 1927 } 1928 1929 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust 1930 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its 1931 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by 1932 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default 1933 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value. 1934 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own 1935 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they 1936 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server. 1937 */ 1938 1939 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, 1940 int purpose, int trust) 1941 { 1942 int idx; 1943 /* If purpose not set use default */ 1944 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; 1945 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ 1946 if (purpose) 1947 { 1948 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; 1949 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); 1950 if (idx == -1) 1951 { 1952 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1953 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 1954 return 0; 1955 } 1956 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 1957 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) 1958 { 1959 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); 1960 if (idx == -1) 1961 { 1962 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1963 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 1964 return 0; 1965 } 1966 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 1967 } 1968 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ 1969 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; 1970 } 1971 if (trust) 1972 { 1973 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); 1974 if (idx == -1) 1975 { 1976 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1977 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); 1978 return 0; 1979 } 1980 } 1981 1982 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose; 1983 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust; 1984 return 1; 1985 } 1986 1987 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) 1988 { 1989 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; 1990 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 1991 if (!ctx) 1992 { 1993 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1994 return NULL; 1995 } 1996 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 1997 return ctx; 1998 } 1999 2000 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2001 { 2002 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); 2003 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 2004 } 2005 2006 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, 2007 STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 2008 { 2009 int ret = 1; 2010 ctx->ctx=store; 2011 ctx->current_method=0; 2012 ctx->cert=x509; 2013 ctx->untrusted=chain; 2014 ctx->crls = NULL; 2015 ctx->last_untrusted=0; 2016 ctx->other_ctx=NULL; 2017 ctx->valid=0; 2018 ctx->chain=NULL; 2019 ctx->error=0; 2020 ctx->explicit_policy=0; 2021 ctx->error_depth=0; 2022 ctx->current_cert=NULL; 2023 ctx->current_issuer=NULL; 2024 ctx->current_crl=NULL; 2025 ctx->current_crl_score=0; 2026 ctx->current_reasons=0; 2027 ctx->tree = NULL; 2028 ctx->parent = NULL; 2029 2030 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); 2031 2032 if (!ctx->param) 2033 { 2034 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2035 return 0; 2036 } 2037 2038 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set 2039 * use defaults. 2040 */ 2041 2042 2043 if (store) 2044 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); 2045 else 2046 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; 2047 2048 if (store) 2049 { 2050 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 2051 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; 2052 } 2053 else 2054 ctx->cleanup = 0; 2055 2056 if (ret) 2057 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, 2058 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); 2059 2060 if (ret == 0) 2061 { 2062 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2063 return 0; 2064 } 2065 2066 if (store && store->check_issued) 2067 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; 2068 else 2069 ctx->check_issued = check_issued; 2070 2071 if (store && store->get_issuer) 2072 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; 2073 else 2074 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; 2075 2076 if (store && store->verify_cb) 2077 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 2078 else 2079 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; 2080 2081 if (store && store->verify) 2082 ctx->verify = store->verify; 2083 else 2084 ctx->verify = internal_verify; 2085 2086 if (store && store->check_revocation) 2087 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; 2088 else 2089 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; 2090 2091 if (store && store->get_crl) 2092 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; 2093 else 2094 ctx->get_crl = NULL; 2095 2096 if (store && store->check_crl) 2097 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; 2098 else 2099 ctx->check_crl = check_crl; 2100 2101 if (store && store->cert_crl) 2102 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; 2103 else 2104 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; 2105 2106 if (store && store->lookup_certs) 2107 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; 2108 else 2109 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; 2110 2111 if (store && store->lookup_crls) 2112 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; 2113 else 2114 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; 2115 2116 ctx->check_policy = check_policy; 2117 2118 2119 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As 2120 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a 2121 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */ 2122 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ 2123 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, 2124 &(ctx->ex_data))) 2125 { 2126 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 2127 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2128 return 0; 2129 } 2130 return 1; 2131 } 2132 2133 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. 2134 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. 2135 */ 2136 2137 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 2138 { 2139 ctx->other_ctx = sk; 2140 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; 2141 } 2142 2143 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2144 { 2145 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx); 2146 if (ctx->param != NULL) 2147 { 2148 if (ctx->parent == NULL) 2149 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2150 ctx->param=NULL; 2151 } 2152 if (ctx->tree != NULL) 2153 { 2154 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); 2155 ctx->tree=NULL; 2156 } 2157 if (ctx->chain != NULL) 2158 { 2159 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free); 2160 ctx->chain=NULL; 2161 } 2162 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); 2163 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); 2164 } 2165 2166 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) 2167 { 2168 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); 2169 } 2170 2171 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) 2172 { 2173 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); 2174 } 2175 2176 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t) 2177 { 2178 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); 2179 } 2180 2181 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 2182 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) 2183 { 2184 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb; 2185 } 2186 2187 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2188 { 2189 return ctx->tree; 2190 } 2191 2192 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2193 { 2194 return ctx->explicit_policy; 2195 } 2196 2197 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) 2198 { 2199 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; 2200 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); 2201 if (!param) 2202 return 0; 2203 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); 2204 } 2205 2206 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2207 { 2208 return ctx->param; 2209 } 2210 2211 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) 2212 { 2213 if (ctx->param) 2214 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2215 ctx->param = param; 2216 } 2217 2218 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) 2219 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) 2220 2221 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) 2222 2223 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 2224 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 2225
