1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. 2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be 3 // found in the LICENSE file. 4 5 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_win.h" 6 7 #include <string> 8 #include <vector> 9 10 #include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" 11 #include "base/sha1.h" 12 #include "base/strings/string_util.h" 13 #include "base/strings/utf_string_conversions.h" 14 #include "crypto/capi_util.h" 15 #include "crypto/scoped_capi_types.h" 16 #include "crypto/sha2.h" 17 #include "net/base/net_errors.h" 18 #include "net/cert/asn1_util.h" 19 #include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h" 20 #include "net/cert/cert_verifier.h" 21 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h" 22 #include "net/cert/crl_set.h" 23 #include "net/cert/ev_root_ca_metadata.h" 24 #include "net/cert/test_root_certs.h" 25 #include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h" 26 #include "net/cert/x509_certificate_known_roots_win.h" 27 28 #pragma comment(lib, "crypt32.lib") 29 30 #if !defined(CERT_TRUST_HAS_WEAK_SIGNATURE) 31 // This was introduced in Windows 8 / Windows Server 2012, but retroactively 32 // ported as far back as Windows XP via system update. 33 #define CERT_TRUST_HAS_WEAK_SIGNATURE 0x00100000 34 #endif 35 36 namespace net { 37 38 namespace { 39 40 struct FreeChainEngineFunctor { 41 void operator()(HCERTCHAINENGINE engine) const { 42 if (engine) 43 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(engine); 44 } 45 }; 46 47 struct FreeCertChainContextFunctor { 48 void operator()(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context) const { 49 if (chain_context) 50 CertFreeCertificateChain(chain_context); 51 } 52 }; 53 54 struct FreeCertContextFunctor { 55 void operator()(PCCERT_CONTEXT context) const { 56 if (context) 57 CertFreeCertificateContext(context); 58 } 59 }; 60 61 typedef crypto::ScopedCAPIHandle<HCERTCHAINENGINE, FreeChainEngineFunctor> 62 ScopedHCERTCHAINENGINE; 63 64 typedef scoped_ptr<const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT, FreeCertChainContextFunctor> 65 ScopedPCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT; 66 67 typedef scoped_ptr<const CERT_CONTEXT, FreeCertContextFunctor> 68 ScopedPCCERT_CONTEXT; 69 70 //----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 71 72 int MapSecurityError(SECURITY_STATUS err) { 73 // There are numerous security error codes, but these are the ones we thus 74 // far find interesting. 75 switch (err) { 76 case SEC_E_WRONG_PRINCIPAL: // Schannel 77 case CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH: // CryptoAPI 78 return ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID; 79 case SEC_E_UNTRUSTED_ROOT: // Schannel 80 case CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT: // CryptoAPI 81 return ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID; 82 case SEC_E_CERT_EXPIRED: // Schannel 83 case CERT_E_EXPIRED: // CryptoAPI 84 return ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID; 85 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK: 86 return ERR_CERT_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM; 87 case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE: 88 return ERR_CERT_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION; 89 case CRYPT_E_REVOKED: // Schannel and CryptoAPI 90 return ERR_CERT_REVOKED; 91 case SEC_E_CERT_UNKNOWN: 92 case CERT_E_ROLE: 93 return ERR_CERT_INVALID; 94 case CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE: 95 // TODO(wtc): Should we add ERR_CERT_WRONG_USAGE? 96 return ERR_CERT_INVALID; 97 // We received an unexpected_message or illegal_parameter alert message 98 // from the server. 99 case SEC_E_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE: 100 return ERR_SSL_PROTOCOL_ERROR; 101 case SEC_E_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH: 102 return ERR_SSL_VERSION_OR_CIPHER_MISMATCH; 103 case SEC_E_INVALID_HANDLE: 104 return ERR_UNEXPECTED; 105 case SEC_E_OK: 106 return OK; 107 default: 108 LOG(WARNING) << "Unknown error " << err << " mapped to net::ERR_FAILED"; 109 return ERR_FAILED; 110 } 111 } 112 113 // Map the errors in the chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus returned by 114 // CertGetCertificateChain to our certificate status flags. 115 int MapCertChainErrorStatusToCertStatus(DWORD error_status) { 116 CertStatus cert_status = 0; 117 118 // We don't include CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED because it's obsolete and 119 // we wouldn't consider it an error anyway 120 const DWORD kDateInvalidErrors = CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID | 121 CERT_TRUST_CTL_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID; 122 if (error_status & kDateInvalidErrors) 123 cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID; 124 125 const DWORD kAuthorityInvalidErrors = CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT | 126 CERT_TRUST_IS_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST | 127 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN; 128 if (error_status & kAuthorityInvalidErrors) 129 cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID; 130 131 if ((error_status & CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN) && 132 !(error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION)) 133 cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM; 134 135 if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION) 136 cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION; 137 138 if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED) 139 cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED; 140 141 const DWORD kWrongUsageErrors = CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE | 142 CERT_TRUST_CTL_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE; 143 if (error_status & kWrongUsageErrors) { 144 // TODO(wtc): Should we add CERT_STATUS_WRONG_USAGE? 145 cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; 146 } 147 148 if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID) { 149 // Check for a signature that does not meet the OS criteria for strong 150 // signatures. 151 // Note: These checks may be more restrictive than the current weak key 152 // criteria implemented within CertVerifier, such as excluding SHA-1 or 153 // excluding RSA keys < 2048 bits. However, if the user has configured 154 // these more stringent checks, respect that configuration and err on the 155 // more restrictive criteria. 156 if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_HAS_WEAK_SIGNATURE) { 157 cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY; 158 } else { 159 cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; 160 } 161 } 162 163 // The rest of the errors. 164 const DWORD kCertInvalidErrors = 165 CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC | 166 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | 167 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS | 168 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS | 169 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS | 170 CERT_TRUST_CTL_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID | 171 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT | 172 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_DEFINED_NAME_CONSTRAINT | 173 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT | 174 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT | 175 CERT_TRUST_NO_ISSUANCE_CHAIN_POLICY | 176 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT; 177 if (error_status & kCertInvalidErrors) 178 cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; 179 180 return cert_status; 181 } 182 183 // Returns true if any common name in the certificate's Subject field contains 184 // a NULL character. 185 bool CertSubjectCommonNameHasNull(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert) { 186 CRYPT_DECODE_PARA decode_para; 187 decode_para.cbSize = sizeof(decode_para); 188 decode_para.pfnAlloc = crypto::CryptAlloc; 189 decode_para.pfnFree = crypto::CryptFree; 190 CERT_NAME_INFO* name_info = NULL; 191 DWORD name_info_size = 0; 192 BOOL rv; 193 rv = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING, 194 X509_NAME, 195 cert->pCertInfo->Subject.pbData, 196 cert->pCertInfo->Subject.cbData, 197 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, 198 &decode_para, 199 &name_info, 200 &name_info_size); 201 if (rv) { 202 scoped_ptr<CERT_NAME_INFO, base::FreeDeleter> scoped_name_info(name_info); 203 204 // The Subject field may have multiple common names. According to the 205 // "PKI Layer Cake" paper, CryptoAPI uses every common name in the 206 // Subject field, so we inspect every common name. 207 // 208 // From RFC 5280: 209 // X520CommonName ::= CHOICE { 210 // teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), 211 // printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), 212 // universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), 213 // utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), 214 // bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)) } 215 // 216 // We also check IA5String and VisibleString. 217 for (DWORD i = 0; i < name_info->cRDN; ++i) { 218 PCERT_RDN rdn = &name_info->rgRDN[i]; 219 for (DWORD j = 0; j < rdn->cRDNAttr; ++j) { 220 PCERT_RDN_ATTR rdn_attr = &rdn->rgRDNAttr[j]; 221 if (strcmp(rdn_attr->pszObjId, szOID_COMMON_NAME) == 0) { 222 switch (rdn_attr->dwValueType) { 223 // After the CryptoAPI ASN.1 security vulnerabilities described in 224 // http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS09-056.mspx 225 // were patched, we get CERT_RDN_ENCODED_BLOB for a common name 226 // that contains a NULL character. 227 case CERT_RDN_ENCODED_BLOB: 228 break; 229 // Array of 8-bit characters. 230 case CERT_RDN_PRINTABLE_STRING: 231 case CERT_RDN_TELETEX_STRING: 232 case CERT_RDN_IA5_STRING: 233 case CERT_RDN_VISIBLE_STRING: 234 for (DWORD k = 0; k < rdn_attr->Value.cbData; ++k) { 235 if (rdn_attr->Value.pbData[k] == '\0') 236 return true; 237 } 238 break; 239 // Array of 16-bit characters. 240 case CERT_RDN_BMP_STRING: 241 case CERT_RDN_UTF8_STRING: { 242 DWORD num_wchars = rdn_attr->Value.cbData / 2; 243 wchar_t* common_name = 244 reinterpret_cast<wchar_t*>(rdn_attr->Value.pbData); 245 for (DWORD k = 0; k < num_wchars; ++k) { 246 if (common_name[k] == L'\0') 247 return true; 248 } 249 break; 250 } 251 // Array of ints (32-bit). 252 case CERT_RDN_UNIVERSAL_STRING: { 253 DWORD num_ints = rdn_attr->Value.cbData / 4; 254 int* common_name = 255 reinterpret_cast<int*>(rdn_attr->Value.pbData); 256 for (DWORD k = 0; k < num_ints; ++k) { 257 if (common_name[k] == 0) 258 return true; 259 } 260 break; 261 } 262 default: 263 NOTREACHED(); 264 break; 265 } 266 } 267 } 268 } 269 } 270 return false; 271 } 272 273 // IsIssuedByKnownRoot returns true if the given chain is rooted at a root CA 274 // which we recognise as a standard root. 275 // static 276 bool IsIssuedByKnownRoot(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context) { 277 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain_context->rgpChain[0]; 278 int num_elements = first_chain->cElement; 279 if (num_elements < 1) 280 return false; 281 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = first_chain->rgpElement; 282 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[num_elements - 1]->pCertContext; 283 284 SHA1HashValue hash = X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint(cert); 285 return IsSHA1HashInSortedArray( 286 hash, &kKnownRootCertSHA1Hashes[0][0], sizeof(kKnownRootCertSHA1Hashes)); 287 } 288 289 // Saves some information about the certificate chain |chain_context| in 290 // |*verify_result|. The caller MUST initialize |*verify_result| before 291 // calling this function. 292 void GetCertChainInfo(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context, 293 CertVerifyResult* verify_result) { 294 if (chain_context->cChain == 0) 295 return; 296 297 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain_context->rgpChain[0]; 298 int num_elements = first_chain->cElement; 299 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = first_chain->rgpElement; 300 301 PCCERT_CONTEXT verified_cert = NULL; 302 std::vector<PCCERT_CONTEXT> verified_chain; 303 304 bool has_root_ca = num_elements > 1 && 305 !(chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & 306 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN); 307 308 // Each chain starts with the end entity certificate (i = 0) and ends with 309 // either the root CA certificate or the last available intermediate. If a 310 // root CA certificate is present, do not inspect the signature algorithm of 311 // the root CA certificate because the signature on the trust anchor is not 312 // important. 313 if (has_root_ca) { 314 // If a full chain was constructed, regardless of whether it was trusted, 315 // don't inspect the root's signature algorithm. 316 num_elements -= 1; 317 } 318 319 for (int i = 0; i < num_elements; ++i) { 320 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[i]->pCertContext; 321 if (i == 0) { 322 verified_cert = cert; 323 } else { 324 verified_chain.push_back(cert); 325 } 326 327 const char* algorithm = cert->pCertInfo->SignatureAlgorithm.pszObjId; 328 if (strcmp(algorithm, szOID_RSA_MD5RSA) == 0) { 329 // md5WithRSAEncryption: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.4 330 verify_result->has_md5 = true; 331 } else if (strcmp(algorithm, szOID_RSA_MD2RSA) == 0) { 332 // md2WithRSAEncryption: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.2 333 verify_result->has_md2 = true; 334 } else if (strcmp(algorithm, szOID_RSA_MD4RSA) == 0) { 335 // md4WithRSAEncryption: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.3 336 verify_result->has_md4 = true; 337 } else if (strcmp(algorithm, szOID_RSA_SHA1RSA) == 0 || 338 strcmp(algorithm, szOID_X957_SHA1DSA) == 0 || 339 strcmp(algorithm, szOID_ECDSA_SHA1) == 0) { 340 // sha1WithRSAEncryption: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5 341 // id-dsa-with-sha1: 1.2.840.10040.4.3 342 // ecdsa-with-SHA1: 1.2.840.10045.4.1 343 verify_result->has_sha1 = true; 344 } 345 } 346 347 if (verified_cert) { 348 // Add the root certificate, if present, as it was not added above. 349 if (has_root_ca) 350 verified_chain.push_back(element[num_elements]->pCertContext); 351 verify_result->verified_cert = 352 X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(verified_cert, verified_chain); 353 } 354 } 355 356 // Decodes the cert's certificatePolicies extension into a CERT_POLICIES_INFO 357 // structure and stores it in *output. 358 void GetCertPoliciesInfo( 359 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, 360 scoped_ptr<CERT_POLICIES_INFO, base::FreeDeleter>* output) { 361 PCERT_EXTENSION extension = CertFindExtension(szOID_CERT_POLICIES, 362 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, 363 cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension); 364 if (!extension) 365 return; 366 367 CRYPT_DECODE_PARA decode_para; 368 decode_para.cbSize = sizeof(decode_para); 369 decode_para.pfnAlloc = crypto::CryptAlloc; 370 decode_para.pfnFree = crypto::CryptFree; 371 CERT_POLICIES_INFO* policies_info = NULL; 372 DWORD policies_info_size = 0; 373 BOOL rv; 374 rv = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING, 375 szOID_CERT_POLICIES, 376 extension->Value.pbData, 377 extension->Value.cbData, 378 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, 379 &decode_para, 380 &policies_info, 381 &policies_info_size); 382 if (rv) 383 output->reset(policies_info); 384 } 385 386 enum CRLSetResult { 387 kCRLSetOk, 388 kCRLSetUnknown, 389 kCRLSetRevoked, 390 }; 391 392 // CheckRevocationWithCRLSet attempts to check each element of |chain| 393 // against |crl_set|. It returns: 394 // kCRLSetRevoked: if any element of the chain is known to have been revoked. 395 // kCRLSetUnknown: if there is no fresh information about the leaf 396 // certificate in the chain or if the CRLSet has expired. 397 // 398 // Only the leaf certificate is considered for coverage because some 399 // intermediates have CRLs with no revocations (after filtering) and 400 // those CRLs are pruned from the CRLSet at generation time. This means 401 // that some EV sites would otherwise take the hit of an OCSP lookup for 402 // no reason. 403 // kCRLSetOk: otherwise. 404 CRLSetResult CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain, 405 CRLSet* crl_set) { 406 if (chain->cChain == 0) 407 return kCRLSetOk; 408 409 const PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain->rgpChain[0]; 410 const PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = first_chain->rgpElement; 411 412 const int num_elements = first_chain->cElement; 413 if (num_elements == 0) 414 return kCRLSetOk; 415 416 // error is set to true if any errors are found. It causes such chains to be 417 // considered as not covered. 418 bool error = false; 419 // last_covered is set to the coverage state of the previous certificate. The 420 // certificates are iterated over backwards thus, after the iteration, 421 // |last_covered| contains the coverage state of the leaf certificate. 422 bool last_covered = false; 423 424 // We iterate from the root certificate down to the leaf, keeping track of 425 // the issuer's SPKI at each step. 426 std::string issuer_spki_hash; 427 for (int i = num_elements - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 428 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[i]->pCertContext; 429 430 base::StringPiece der_bytes( 431 reinterpret_cast<const char*>(cert->pbCertEncoded), 432 cert->cbCertEncoded); 433 434 base::StringPiece spki; 435 if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der_bytes, &spki)) { 436 NOTREACHED(); 437 error = true; 438 continue; 439 } 440 441 const std::string spki_hash = crypto::SHA256HashString(spki); 442 443 const CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB* serial_blob = &cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber; 444 scoped_ptr<uint8[]> serial_bytes(new uint8[serial_blob->cbData]); 445 // The bytes of the serial number are stored little-endian. 446 for (unsigned j = 0; j < serial_blob->cbData; j++) 447 serial_bytes[j] = serial_blob->pbData[serial_blob->cbData - j - 1]; 448 base::StringPiece serial(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(serial_bytes.get()), 449 serial_blob->cbData); 450 451 CRLSet::Result result = crl_set->CheckSPKI(spki_hash); 452 453 if (result != CRLSet::REVOKED && !issuer_spki_hash.empty()) 454 result = crl_set->CheckSerial(serial, issuer_spki_hash); 455 456 issuer_spki_hash = spki_hash; 457 458 switch (result) { 459 case CRLSet::REVOKED: 460 return kCRLSetRevoked; 461 case CRLSet::UNKNOWN: 462 last_covered = false; 463 continue; 464 case CRLSet::GOOD: 465 last_covered = true; 466 continue; 467 default: 468 NOTREACHED(); 469 error = true; 470 continue; 471 } 472 } 473 474 if (error || !last_covered || crl_set->IsExpired()) 475 return kCRLSetUnknown; 476 return kCRLSetOk; 477 } 478 479 void AppendPublicKeyHashes(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain, 480 HashValueVector* hashes) { 481 if (chain->cChain == 0) 482 return; 483 484 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain->rgpChain[0]; 485 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* const element = first_chain->rgpElement; 486 487 const DWORD num_elements = first_chain->cElement; 488 for (DWORD i = 0; i < num_elements; i++) { 489 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[i]->pCertContext; 490 491 base::StringPiece der_bytes( 492 reinterpret_cast<const char*>(cert->pbCertEncoded), 493 cert->cbCertEncoded); 494 base::StringPiece spki_bytes; 495 if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der_bytes, &spki_bytes)) 496 continue; 497 498 HashValue sha1(HASH_VALUE_SHA1); 499 base::SHA1HashBytes(reinterpret_cast<const uint8*>(spki_bytes.data()), 500 spki_bytes.size(), sha1.data()); 501 hashes->push_back(sha1); 502 503 HashValue sha256(HASH_VALUE_SHA256); 504 crypto::SHA256HashString(spki_bytes, sha256.data(), crypto::kSHA256Length); 505 hashes->push_back(sha256); 506 } 507 } 508 509 // Returns true if the certificate is an extended-validation certificate. 510 // 511 // This function checks the certificatePolicies extensions of the 512 // certificates in the certificate chain according to Section 7 (pp. 11-12) 513 // of the EV Certificate Guidelines Version 1.0 at 514 // http://cabforum.org/EV_Certificate_Guidelines.pdf. 515 bool CheckEV(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context, 516 bool rev_checking_enabled, 517 const char* policy_oid) { 518 DCHECK_NE(static_cast<DWORD>(0), chain_context->cChain); 519 // If the cert doesn't match any of the policies, the 520 // CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE bit (0x10) in 521 // chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus is set. 522 DWORD error_status = chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus; 523 524 if (!rev_checking_enabled) { 525 // If online revocation checking is disabled then we will have still 526 // requested that the revocation cache be checked. However, that will often 527 // cause the following two error bits to be set. These error bits mean that 528 // the local OCSP/CRL is stale or missing entries for these certificates. 529 // Since they are expected, we mask them away. 530 error_status &= ~(CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION | 531 CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN); 532 } 533 if (!chain_context->cChain || error_status != CERT_TRUST_NO_ERROR) 534 return false; 535 536 // Check the end certificate simple chain (chain_context->rgpChain[0]). 537 // If the end certificate's certificatePolicies extension contains the 538 // EV policy OID of the root CA, return true. 539 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = chain_context->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement; 540 int num_elements = chain_context->rgpChain[0]->cElement; 541 if (num_elements < 2) 542 return false; 543 544 // Look up the EV policy OID of the root CA. 545 PCCERT_CONTEXT root_cert = element[num_elements - 1]->pCertContext; 546 SHA1HashValue fingerprint = 547 X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint(root_cert); 548 EVRootCAMetadata* metadata = EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(); 549 return metadata->HasEVPolicyOID(fingerprint, policy_oid); 550 } 551 552 } // namespace 553 554 CertVerifyProcWin::CertVerifyProcWin() {} 555 556 CertVerifyProcWin::~CertVerifyProcWin() {} 557 558 bool CertVerifyProcWin::SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() const { 559 return false; 560 } 561 562 int CertVerifyProcWin::VerifyInternal( 563 X509Certificate* cert, 564 const std::string& hostname, 565 int flags, 566 CRLSet* crl_set, 567 const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors, 568 CertVerifyResult* verify_result) { 569 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert_handle = cert->os_cert_handle(); 570 if (!cert_handle) 571 return ERR_UNEXPECTED; 572 573 // Build and validate certificate chain. 574 CERT_CHAIN_PARA chain_para; 575 memset(&chain_para, 0, sizeof(chain_para)); 576 chain_para.cbSize = sizeof(chain_para); 577 // ExtendedKeyUsage. 578 // We still need to request szOID_SERVER_GATED_CRYPTO and szOID_SGC_NETSCAPE 579 // today because some certificate chains need them. IE also requests these 580 // two usages. 581 static const LPCSTR usage[] = { 582 szOID_PKIX_KP_SERVER_AUTH, 583 szOID_SERVER_GATED_CRYPTO, 584 szOID_SGC_NETSCAPE 585 }; 586 chain_para.RequestedUsage.dwType = USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_OR; 587 chain_para.RequestedUsage.Usage.cUsageIdentifier = arraysize(usage); 588 chain_para.RequestedUsage.Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier = 589 const_cast<LPSTR*>(usage); 590 591 // Get the certificatePolicies extension of the certificate. 592 scoped_ptr<CERT_POLICIES_INFO, base::FreeDeleter> policies_info; 593 LPSTR ev_policy_oid = NULL; 594 if (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT) { 595 GetCertPoliciesInfo(cert_handle, &policies_info); 596 if (policies_info.get()) { 597 EVRootCAMetadata* metadata = EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(); 598 for (DWORD i = 0; i < policies_info->cPolicyInfo; ++i) { 599 LPSTR policy_oid = policies_info->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier; 600 if (metadata->IsEVPolicyOID(policy_oid)) { 601 ev_policy_oid = policy_oid; 602 chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.dwType = USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND; 603 chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier = 1; 604 chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier = 605 &ev_policy_oid; 606 break; 607 } 608 } 609 } 610 } 611 612 // We can set CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS to get more chains. 613 DWORD chain_flags = CERT_CHAIN_CACHE_END_CERT | 614 CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT; 615 bool rev_checking_enabled = 616 (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED); 617 618 if (rev_checking_enabled) { 619 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED; 620 } else { 621 chain_flags |= CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY; 622 } 623 624 // For non-test scenarios, use the default HCERTCHAINENGINE, NULL, which 625 // corresponds to HCCE_CURRENT_USER and is is initialized as needed by 626 // crypt32. However, when testing, it is necessary to create a new 627 // HCERTCHAINENGINE and use that instead. This is because each 628 // HCERTCHAINENGINE maintains a cache of information about certificates 629 // encountered, and each test run may modify the trust status of a 630 // certificate. 631 ScopedHCERTCHAINENGINE chain_engine(NULL); 632 if (TestRootCerts::HasInstance()) 633 chain_engine.reset(TestRootCerts::GetInstance()->GetChainEngine()); 634 635 ScopedPCCERT_CONTEXT cert_list(cert->CreateOSCertChainForCert()); 636 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context; 637 // IE passes a non-NULL pTime argument that specifies the current system 638 // time. IE passes CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT as the 639 // chain_flags argument. 640 if (!CertGetCertificateChain( 641 chain_engine, 642 cert_list.get(), 643 NULL, // current system time 644 cert_list->hCertStore, 645 &chain_para, 646 chain_flags, 647 NULL, // reserved 648 &chain_context)) { 649 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; 650 return MapSecurityError(GetLastError()); 651 } 652 653 CRLSetResult crl_set_result = kCRLSetUnknown; 654 if (crl_set) 655 crl_set_result = CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(chain_context, crl_set); 656 657 if (crl_set_result == kCRLSetRevoked) { 658 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED; 659 } else if (crl_set_result == kCRLSetUnknown && 660 (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY) && 661 !rev_checking_enabled && 662 ev_policy_oid != NULL) { 663 // We don't have fresh information about this chain from the CRLSet and 664 // it's probably an EV certificate. Retry with online revocation checking. 665 rev_checking_enabled = true; 666 chain_flags &= ~CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY; 667 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED; 668 669 CertFreeCertificateChain(chain_context); 670 if (!CertGetCertificateChain( 671 chain_engine, 672 cert_list.get(), 673 NULL, // current system time 674 cert_list->hCertStore, 675 &chain_para, 676 chain_flags, 677 NULL, // reserved 678 &chain_context)) { 679 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; 680 return MapSecurityError(GetLastError()); 681 } 682 } 683 684 if (chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & 685 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE) { 686 ev_policy_oid = NULL; 687 chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier = 0; 688 chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier = NULL; 689 CertFreeCertificateChain(chain_context); 690 if (!CertGetCertificateChain( 691 chain_engine, 692 cert_list.get(), 693 NULL, // current system time 694 cert_list->hCertStore, 695 &chain_para, 696 chain_flags, 697 NULL, // reserved 698 &chain_context)) { 699 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; 700 return MapSecurityError(GetLastError()); 701 } 702 } 703 704 CertVerifyResult temp_verify_result = *verify_result; 705 GetCertChainInfo(chain_context, verify_result); 706 if (!verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root && 707 (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS)) { 708 *verify_result = temp_verify_result; 709 710 rev_checking_enabled = true; 711 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED; 712 chain_flags &= ~CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY; 713 714 CertFreeCertificateChain(chain_context); 715 if (!CertGetCertificateChain( 716 chain_engine, 717 cert_list.get(), 718 NULL, // current system time 719 cert_list->hCertStore, 720 &chain_para, 721 chain_flags, 722 NULL, // reserved 723 &chain_context)) { 724 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; 725 return MapSecurityError(GetLastError()); 726 } 727 GetCertChainInfo(chain_context, verify_result); 728 729 if (chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & 730 CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION) { 731 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED; 732 } 733 } 734 735 ScopedPCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT scoped_chain_context(chain_context); 736 737 verify_result->cert_status |= MapCertChainErrorStatusToCertStatus( 738 chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus); 739 740 // Flag certificates that have a Subject common name with a NULL character. 741 if (CertSubjectCommonNameHasNull(cert_handle)) 742 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; 743 744 std::wstring wstr_hostname = base::ASCIIToWide(hostname); 745 746 SSL_EXTRA_CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA extra_policy_para; 747 memset(&extra_policy_para, 0, sizeof(extra_policy_para)); 748 extra_policy_para.cbSize = sizeof(extra_policy_para); 749 extra_policy_para.dwAuthType = AUTHTYPE_SERVER; 750 // Certificate name validation happens separately, later, using an internal 751 // routine that has better support for RFC 6125 name matching. 752 extra_policy_para.fdwChecks = 753 0x00001000; // SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_CN_INVALID 754 extra_policy_para.pwszServerName = 755 const_cast<wchar_t*>(wstr_hostname.c_str()); 756 757 CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA policy_para; 758 memset(&policy_para, 0, sizeof(policy_para)); 759 policy_para.cbSize = sizeof(policy_para); 760 policy_para.dwFlags = 0; 761 policy_para.pvExtraPolicyPara = &extra_policy_para; 762 763 CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS policy_status; 764 memset(&policy_status, 0, sizeof(policy_status)); 765 policy_status.cbSize = sizeof(policy_status); 766 767 if (!CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy( 768 CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL, 769 chain_context, 770 &policy_para, 771 &policy_status)) { 772 return MapSecurityError(GetLastError()); 773 } 774 775 if (policy_status.dwError) { 776 verify_result->cert_status |= MapNetErrorToCertStatus( 777 MapSecurityError(policy_status.dwError)); 778 } 779 780 // TODO(wtc): Suppress CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM for now to be 781 // compatible with WinHTTP, which doesn't report this error (bug 3004). 782 verify_result->cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM; 783 784 // Perform hostname verification independent of 785 // CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy. 786 if (!cert->VerifyNameMatch(hostname, 787 &verify_result->common_name_fallback_used)) { 788 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID; 789 } 790 791 if (!rev_checking_enabled) { 792 // If we didn't do online revocation checking then Windows will report 793 // CERT_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION unless it had cached OCSP or CRL 794 // information for every certificate. We only want to put up revoked 795 // statuses from the offline checks so we squash this error. 796 verify_result->cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION; 797 } 798 799 AppendPublicKeyHashes(chain_context, &verify_result->public_key_hashes); 800 verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root = IsIssuedByKnownRoot(chain_context); 801 802 if (IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status)) 803 return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); 804 805 if (ev_policy_oid && 806 CheckEV(chain_context, rev_checking_enabled, ev_policy_oid)) { 807 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_IS_EV; 808 } 809 return OK; 810 } 811 812 } // namespace net 813
