1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 2 * All rights reserved. 3 * 4 * This package is an SSL implementation written 5 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 7 * 8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 14 * 15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 16 * the code are not to be removed. 17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 18 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 21 * 22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 24 * are met: 25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 31 * must display the following acknowledgement: 32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 33 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 39 * 40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 50 * SUCH DAMAGE. 51 * 52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 54 * copied and put under another distribution licence 55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 56 */ 57 /* ==================================================================== 58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 59 * 60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 62 * are met: 63 * 64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 66 * 67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 70 * distribution. 71 * 72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 73 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 76 * 77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 80 * openssl-core (at) openssl.org. 81 * 82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 85 * 86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 87 * acknowledgment: 88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 90 * 91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 103 * ==================================================================== 104 * 105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 106 * (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 107 * Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). */ 108 109 #include <stdio.h> 110 #include <stdlib.h> 111 #include <assert.h> 112 113 #include <openssl/bytestring.h> 114 #include <openssl/evp.h> 115 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 116 #include <openssl/mem.h> 117 #include <openssl/obj.h> 118 #include <openssl/rand.h> 119 120 #include "ssl_locl.h" 121 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, 122 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 123 SSL_SESSION **psess); 124 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s); 125 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); 126 127 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ 128 tls1_enc, 129 tls1_mac, 130 tls1_setup_key_block, 131 tls1_generate_master_secret, 132 tls1_change_cipher_state, 133 tls1_final_finish_mac, 134 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 135 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 136 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 137 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 138 tls1_alert_code, 139 tls1_export_keying_material, 140 0, 141 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 142 ssl3_set_handshake_header, 143 ssl3_handshake_write 144 }; 145 146 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={ 147 tls1_enc, 148 tls1_mac, 149 tls1_setup_key_block, 150 tls1_generate_master_secret, 151 tls1_change_cipher_state, 152 tls1_final_finish_mac, 153 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 154 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 155 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 156 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 157 tls1_alert_code, 158 tls1_export_keying_material, 159 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV, 160 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 161 ssl3_set_handshake_header, 162 ssl3_handshake_write 163 }; 164 165 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={ 166 tls1_enc, 167 tls1_mac, 168 tls1_setup_key_block, 169 tls1_generate_master_secret, 170 tls1_change_cipher_state, 171 tls1_final_finish_mac, 172 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 173 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 174 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 175 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 176 tls1_alert_code, 177 tls1_export_keying_material, 178 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF 179 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS, 180 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 181 ssl3_set_handshake_header, 182 ssl3_handshake_write 183 }; 184 185 static int compare_uint16_t(const void *p1, const void *p2) 186 { 187 uint16_t u1 = *((const uint16_t*)p1); 188 uint16_t u2 = *((const uint16_t*)p2); 189 if (u1 < u2) 190 { 191 return -1; 192 } 193 else if (u1 > u2) 194 { 195 return 1; 196 } 197 else 198 { 199 return 0; 200 } 201 } 202 203 /* Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be more 204 * than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello. This 205 * function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those 206 * out. */ 207 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const CBS *cbs) 208 { 209 CBS extensions = *cbs; 210 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0; 211 uint16_t *extension_types = NULL; 212 int ret = 0; 213 214 /* First pass: count the extensions. */ 215 while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0) 216 { 217 uint16_t type; 218 CBS extension; 219 220 if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) || 221 !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) 222 { 223 goto done; 224 } 225 226 num_extensions++; 227 } 228 229 if (num_extensions == 0) 230 { 231 return 1; 232 } 233 234 extension_types = (uint16_t*)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_extensions); 235 if (extension_types == NULL) 236 { 237 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_check_duplicate_extensions, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 238 goto done; 239 } 240 241 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */ 242 extensions = *cbs; 243 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) 244 { 245 CBS extension; 246 247 if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) || 248 !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) 249 { 250 /* This should not happen. */ 251 goto done; 252 } 253 } 254 assert(CBS_len(&extensions) == 0); 255 256 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */ 257 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(uint16_t), compare_uint16_t); 258 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) 259 { 260 if (extension_types[i-1] == extension_types[i]) 261 { 262 goto done; 263 } 264 } 265 266 ret = 1; 267 done: 268 if (extension_types) 269 OPENSSL_free(extension_types); 270 return ret; 271 } 272 273 char ssl_early_callback_init(struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx) 274 { 275 CBS client_hello, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods, extensions; 276 277 CBS_init(&client_hello, ctx->client_hello, ctx->client_hello_len); 278 279 /* Skip client version. */ 280 if (!CBS_skip(&client_hello, 2)) 281 return 0; 282 283 /* Skip client nonce. */ 284 if (!CBS_skip(&client_hello, 32)) 285 return 0; 286 287 /* Extract session_id. */ 288 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id)) 289 return 0; 290 ctx->session_id = CBS_data(&session_id); 291 ctx->session_id_len = CBS_len(&session_id); 292 293 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ 294 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ctx->ssl)) 295 { 296 CBS cookie; 297 298 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie)) 299 return 0; 300 } 301 302 /* Extract cipher_suites. */ 303 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) || 304 CBS_len(&cipher_suites) < 2 || 305 (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) & 1) != 0) 306 return 0; 307 ctx->cipher_suites = CBS_data(&cipher_suites); 308 ctx->cipher_suites_len = CBS_len(&cipher_suites); 309 310 /* Extract compression_methods. */ 311 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) || 312 CBS_len(&compression_methods) < 1) 313 return 0; 314 ctx->compression_methods = CBS_data(&compression_methods); 315 ctx->compression_methods_len = CBS_len(&compression_methods); 316 317 /* If the ClientHello ends here then it's valid, but doesn't have any 318 * extensions. (E.g. SSLv3.) */ 319 if (CBS_len(&client_hello) == 0) 320 { 321 ctx->extensions = NULL; 322 ctx->extensions_len = 0; 323 return 1; 324 } 325 326 /* Extract extensions and check it is valid. */ 327 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &extensions) || 328 !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions) || 329 CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0) 330 return 0; 331 ctx->extensions = CBS_data(&extensions); 332 ctx->extensions_len = CBS_len(&extensions); 333 334 return 1; 335 } 336 337 char 338 SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx, 339 uint16_t extension_type, 340 const unsigned char **out_data, 341 size_t *out_len) 342 { 343 CBS extensions; 344 345 CBS_init(&extensions, ctx->extensions, ctx->extensions_len); 346 347 while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) 348 { 349 uint16_t type; 350 CBS extension; 351 352 /* Decode the next extension. */ 353 if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) || 354 !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) 355 return 0; 356 357 if (type == extension_type) 358 { 359 *out_data = CBS_data(&extension); 360 *out_len = CBS_len(&extension); 361 return 1; 362 } 363 } 364 365 return 0; 366 } 367 368 369 static const int nid_list[] = 370 { 371 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 372 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 373 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 374 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 375 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 376 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 377 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 378 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 379 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 380 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 381 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 382 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 383 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 384 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 385 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 386 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 387 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 388 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 389 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 390 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 391 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 392 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 393 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 394 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 395 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 396 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 397 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 398 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 399 }; 400 401 static const uint8_t ecformats_default[] = 402 { 403 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed, 404 }; 405 406 static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = 407 { 408 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 409 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 410 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 411 }; 412 413 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(uint16_t curve_id) 414 { 415 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ 416 if (curve_id < 1 || curve_id > sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])) 417 return OBJ_undef; 418 return nid_list[curve_id-1]; 419 } 420 421 uint16_t tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) 422 { 423 size_t i; 424 for (i = 0; i < sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++) 425 { 426 /* nid_list[i] stores the NID corresponding to curve ID i+1. */ 427 if (nid == nid_list[i]) 428 return i + 1; 429 } 430 /* Use 0 for non-existent curve ID. Note: this assumes that curve ID 0 431 * will never be allocated. */ 432 return 0; 433 } 434 435 /* tls1_get_curvelist sets |*out_curve_ids| and |*out_curve_ids_len| to the list 436 * of allowed curve IDs. If |get_client_curves| is non-zero, return the client 437 * curve list. Otherwise, return the preferred list. */ 438 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int get_client_curves, 439 const uint16_t **out_curve_ids, size_t *out_curve_ids_len) 440 { 441 if (get_client_curves) 442 { 443 *out_curve_ids = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 444 *out_curve_ids_len = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 445 return; 446 } 447 448 *out_curve_ids = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 449 *out_curve_ids_len = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 450 if (!*out_curve_ids) 451 { 452 *out_curve_ids = eccurves_default; 453 *out_curve_ids_len = sizeof(eccurves_default) / sizeof(eccurves_default[0]); 454 } 455 } 456 457 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, uint16_t *out_curve_id) 458 { 459 uint8_t curve_type; 460 uint16_t curve_id; 461 const uint16_t *curves; 462 size_t curves_len, i; 463 464 /* Only support named curves. */ 465 if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &curve_type) || 466 curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || 467 !CBS_get_u16(cbs, &curve_id)) 468 return 0; 469 470 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len); 471 for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) 472 { 473 if (curve_id == curves[i]) 474 { 475 *out_curve_id = curve_id; 476 return 1; 477 } 478 } 479 return 0; 480 } 481 482 int tls1_get_shared_curve(SSL *s) 483 { 484 const uint16_t *pref, *supp; 485 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j; 486 487 /* Can't do anything on client side */ 488 if (s->server == 0) 489 return NID_undef; 490 491 /* Return first preference shared curve */ 492 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), 493 &supp, &supplen); 494 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), 495 &pref, &preflen); 496 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++) 497 { 498 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++) 499 { 500 if (pref[i] == supp[j]) 501 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(pref[i]); 502 } 503 } 504 return NID_undef; 505 } 506 507 /* NOTE: tls1_ec_curve_id2nid and tls1_set_curves assume that 508 * 509 * (a) 0 is not a valid curve ID. 510 * 511 * (b) The largest curve ID is 31. 512 * 513 * Those implementations must be revised before adding support for curve IDs 514 * that break these assumptions. */ 515 OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT( 516 (sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])) < 32, small_curve_ids); 517 518 int tls1_set_curves(uint16_t **out_curve_ids, size_t *out_curve_ids_len, 519 const int *curves, size_t ncurves) 520 { 521 uint16_t *curve_ids; 522 size_t i; 523 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works 524 * while curve ids < 32 525 */ 526 uint32_t dup_list = 0; 527 curve_ids = (uint16_t*)OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(uint16_t)); 528 if (!curve_ids) 529 return 0; 530 for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) 531 { 532 uint32_t idmask; 533 uint16_t id; 534 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]); 535 idmask = ((uint32_t)1) << id; 536 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) 537 { 538 OPENSSL_free(curve_ids); 539 return 0; 540 } 541 dup_list |= idmask; 542 curve_ids[i] = id; 543 } 544 if (*out_curve_ids) 545 OPENSSL_free(*out_curve_ids); 546 *out_curve_ids = curve_ids; 547 *out_curve_ids_len = ncurves; 548 return 1; 549 } 550 551 /* tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key sets |*out_curve_id| and |*out_comp_id| to the 552 * TLS curve ID and point format, respectively, for |ec|. It returns one on 553 * success and zero on failure. */ 554 static int tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(uint16_t *out_curve_id, uint8_t *out_comp_id, EC_KEY *ec) 555 { 556 int nid; 557 uint16_t id; 558 const EC_GROUP *grp; 559 if (!ec) 560 return 0; 561 562 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); 563 if (!grp) 564 return 0; 565 566 /* Determine curve ID */ 567 nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); 568 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid); 569 if (!id) 570 return 0; 571 572 /* Set the named curve ID. Arbitrary explicit curves are not 573 * supported. */ 574 *out_curve_id = id; 575 576 if (out_comp_id) 577 { 578 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) 579 return 0; 580 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) 581 *out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 582 else 583 *out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 584 } 585 return 1; 586 } 587 588 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */ 589 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, 590 const uint16_t *curve_id, const uint8_t *comp_id) 591 { 592 const uint16_t *curves; 593 size_t curves_len, i; 594 int j; 595 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything 596 * is supported (see RFC4492). 597 */ 598 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) 599 { 600 uint8_t *p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 601 size_t plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 602 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++) 603 { 604 if (*comp_id == p[i]) 605 break; 606 } 607 if (i == plen) 608 return 0; 609 } 610 if (!curve_id) 611 return 1; 612 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */ 613 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) 614 { 615 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &curves, &curves_len); 616 for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) 617 { 618 if (curves[i] == *curve_id) 619 break; 620 } 621 if (i == curves_len) 622 return 0; 623 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */ 624 if (!s->server) 625 return 1; 626 } 627 return 1; 628 } 629 630 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats, 631 size_t *pformatslen) 632 { 633 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise 634 * use default */ 635 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) 636 { 637 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 638 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 639 } 640 else 641 { 642 *pformats = ecformats_default; 643 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default); 644 } 645 } 646 647 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks 648 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression. 649 */ 650 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) 651 { 652 uint8_t comp_id; 653 uint16_t curve_id; 654 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 655 int rv; 656 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); 657 if (!pkey) 658 return 0; 659 /* If not EC nothing to do */ 660 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) 661 { 662 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 663 return 1; 664 } 665 rv = tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec); 666 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 667 if (!rv) 668 return 0; 669 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a 670 * supported curves extension. 671 */ 672 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? &curve_id : NULL, &comp_id); 673 } 674 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */ 675 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) 676 { 677 uint16_t curve_id; 678 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp; 679 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 680 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */ 681 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) 682 return 1; 683 #endif 684 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) 685 { 686 /* Need a shared curve */ 687 return tls1_get_shared_curve(s) != NID_undef; 688 } 689 if (!ec) 690 { 691 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) 692 return 1; 693 else 694 return 0; 695 } 696 if (!tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, NULL, ec)) 697 return 0; 698 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */ 699 #if 0 700 return 1; 701 #else 702 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, &curve_id, NULL); 703 #endif 704 } 705 706 707 708 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this 709 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. 710 */ 711 712 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, 713 714 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, 715 716 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ 717 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ 718 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 719 720 static const uint8_t tls12_sigalgs[] = { 721 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) 722 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 723 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 724 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) 725 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) 726 }; 727 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs) 728 { 729 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */ 730 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) 731 { 732 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs; 733 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen; 734 } 735 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) 736 { 737 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs; 738 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen; 739 } 740 else 741 { 742 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs; 743 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 744 } 745 } 746 747 /* tls12_check_peer_sigalg parses a SignatureAndHashAlgorithm out of 748 * |cbs|. It checks it is consistent with |s|'s sent supported 749 * signature algorithms and, if so, writes the relevant digest into 750 * |*out_md| and returns 1. Otherwise it returns 0 and writes an alert 751 * into |*out_alert|. 752 */ 753 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **out_md, int *out_alert, 754 SSL *s, CBS *cbs, EVP_PKEY *pkey) 755 { 756 const unsigned char *sent_sigs; 757 size_t sent_sigslen, i; 758 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); 759 uint8_t hash, signature; 760 /* Should never happen */ 761 if (sigalg == -1) 762 { 763 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 764 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 765 return 0; 766 } 767 if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &hash) || 768 !CBS_get_u8(cbs, &signature)) 769 { 770 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); 771 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 772 return 0; 773 } 774 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ 775 if (sigalg != signature) 776 { 777 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 778 *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 779 return 0; 780 } 781 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 782 { 783 uint16_t curve_id; 784 uint8_t comp_id; 785 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */ 786 if (!tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec)) 787 { 788 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 789 return 0; 790 } 791 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, &curve_id, &comp_id)) 792 { 793 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); 794 *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 795 return 0; 796 } 797 } 798 799 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */ 800 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs); 801 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2) 802 { 803 if (hash == sent_sigs[0] && signature == sent_sigs[1]) 804 break; 805 } 806 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */ 807 if (i == sent_sigslen && (hash != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) 808 { 809 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 810 *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 811 return 0; 812 } 813 *out_md = tls12_get_hash(hash); 814 if (*out_md == NULL) 815 { 816 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 817 *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 818 return 0; 819 } 820 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they 821 * wish. 822 */ 823 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert) 824 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *out_md; 825 return 1; 826 } 827 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled 828 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature 829 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific 830 * session and not global settings. 831 * 832 */ 833 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) 834 { 835 CERT *c = s->cert; 836 const unsigned char *sigalgs; 837 size_t i, sigalgslen; 838 int have_rsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0; 839 c->mask_a = 0; 840 c->mask_k = 0; 841 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */ 842 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) 843 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; 844 else 845 c->mask_ssl = 0; 846 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support 847 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just 848 * TLS 1.2. 849 */ 850 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs); 851 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) 852 { 853 switch(sigalgs[1]) 854 { 855 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 856 have_rsa = 1; 857 break; 858 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 859 have_ecdsa = 1; 860 break; 861 } 862 } 863 /* Disable auth if we don't include any appropriate signature 864 * algorithms. 865 */ 866 if (!have_rsa) 867 { 868 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; 869 } 870 if (!have_ecdsa) 871 { 872 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; 873 } 874 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ 875 if (!s->psk_client_callback) 876 { 877 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; 878 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; 879 } 880 c->valid = 1; 881 } 882 883 /* header_len is the length of the ClientHello header written so far, used to 884 * compute padding. It does not include the record header. Pass 0 if no padding 885 * is to be done. */ 886 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, size_t header_len) 887 { 888 int extdatalen=0; 889 unsigned char *ret = buf; 890 unsigned char *orig = buf; 891 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ 892 int using_ecc = 0; 893 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 894 { 895 int i; 896 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; 897 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); 898 899 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) 900 { 901 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); 902 903 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; 904 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; 905 if ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) 906 { 907 using_ecc = 1; 908 break; 909 } 910 } 911 } 912 913 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ 914 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION 915 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 916 return orig; 917 918 ret+=2; 919 920 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 921 922 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 923 { 924 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ 925 unsigned long size_str; 926 long lenmax; 927 928 /* check for enough space. 929 4 for the servername type and entension length 930 2 for servernamelist length 931 1 for the hostname type 932 2 for hostname length 933 + hostname length 934 */ 935 936 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 937 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 938 return NULL; 939 940 /* extension type and length */ 941 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 942 s2n(size_str+5,ret); 943 944 /* length of servername list */ 945 s2n(size_str+3,ret); 946 947 /* hostname type, length and hostname */ 948 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; 949 s2n(size_str,ret); 950 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); 951 ret+=size_str; 952 } 953 954 /* Add RI if renegotiating */ 955 if (s->renegotiate) 956 { 957 int el; 958 959 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 960 { 961 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 962 return NULL; 963 } 964 965 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 966 967 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 968 s2n(el,ret); 969 970 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 971 { 972 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 973 return NULL; 974 } 975 976 ret += el; 977 } 978 979 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 980 { 981 int ticklen; 982 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) 983 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; 984 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 985 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) 986 { 987 s->session->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup( 988 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, 989 s->tlsext_session_ticket->length); 990 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) 991 return NULL; 992 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; 993 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; 994 } 995 else 996 ticklen = 0; 997 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 998 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) 999 goto skip_ext; 1000 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len 1001 * rest for ticket 1002 */ 1003 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL; 1004 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 1005 s2n(ticklen,ret); 1006 if (ticklen) 1007 { 1008 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); 1009 ret += ticklen; 1010 } 1011 } 1012 skip_ext: 1013 1014 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 1015 { 1016 size_t salglen; 1017 const unsigned char *salg; 1018 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg); 1019 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6) 1020 return NULL; 1021 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret); 1022 s2n(salglen + 2, ret); 1023 s2n(salglen, ret); 1024 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen); 1025 ret += salglen; 1026 } 1027 1028 if (s->ocsp_stapling_enabled) 1029 { 1030 /* The status_request extension is excessively extensible at 1031 * every layer. On the client, only support requesting OCSP 1032 * responses with an empty responder_id_list and no 1033 * extensions. */ 1034 if (limit - ret - 4 - 1 - 2 - 2 < 0) return NULL; 1035 1036 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 1037 s2n(1 + 2 + 2, ret); 1038 /* status_type */ 1039 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; 1040 /* responder_id_list - empty */ 1041 s2n(0, ret); 1042 /* request_extensions - empty */ 1043 s2n(0, ret); 1044 } 1045 1046 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) 1047 { 1048 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its 1049 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */ 1050 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) 1051 return NULL; 1052 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); 1053 s2n(0,ret); 1054 } 1055 1056 if (s->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) 1057 { 1058 /* The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support for 1059 * certificate timestamps. */ 1060 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) 1061 return NULL; 1062 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp,ret); 1063 s2n(0,ret); 1064 } 1065 1066 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) 1067 { 1068 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len) 1069 return NULL; 1070 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret); 1071 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret); 1072 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret); 1073 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, 1074 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len); 1075 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len; 1076 } 1077 1078 if (s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled) 1079 { 1080 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its 1081 * support for Channel ID. */ 1082 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) 1083 return NULL; 1084 if (s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new) 1085 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new,ret); 1086 else 1087 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret); 1088 s2n(0,ret); 1089 } 1090 1091 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) 1092 { 1093 int el; 1094 1095 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 1096 1097 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 1098 1099 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); 1100 s2n(el,ret); 1101 1102 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 1103 { 1104 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1105 return NULL; 1106 } 1107 ret += el; 1108 } 1109 1110 if (using_ecc) 1111 { 1112 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ 1113 long lenmax; 1114 const uint8_t *formats; 1115 const uint16_t *curves; 1116 size_t formats_len, curves_len, i; 1117 1118 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &formats, &formats_len); 1119 1120 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 1121 if (formats_len > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL; 1122 if (formats_len > 255) 1123 { 1124 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1125 return NULL; 1126 } 1127 1128 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 1129 s2n(formats_len + 1,ret); 1130 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)formats_len; 1131 memcpy(ret, formats, formats_len); 1132 ret+=formats_len; 1133 1134 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ 1135 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len); 1136 1137 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; 1138 if ((curves_len * 2) > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL; 1139 if ((curves_len * 2) > 65532) 1140 { 1141 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1142 return NULL; 1143 } 1144 1145 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret); 1146 s2n((curves_len * 2) + 2, ret); 1147 1148 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for 1149 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes. 1150 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html 1151 * resolves this to two bytes. 1152 */ 1153 s2n(curves_len * 2, ret); 1154 for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) 1155 { 1156 s2n(curves[i], ret); 1157 } 1158 } 1159 1160 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding 1161 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. 1162 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 1163 * 1164 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing 1165 * extensions it MUST always appear last. */ 1166 if (header_len > 0) 1167 { 1168 header_len += ret - orig; 1169 if (header_len > 0xff && header_len < 0x200) 1170 { 1171 size_t padding_len = 0x200 - header_len; 1172 /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always 1173 * include least one byte of data if including the 1174 * extension. WebSphere Application Server 7.0 is 1175 * intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. */ 1176 if (padding_len >= 4 + 1) 1177 padding_len -= 4; 1178 else 1179 padding_len = 1; 1180 if (limit - ret - 4 - (long)padding_len < 0) 1181 return NULL; 1182 1183 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); 1184 s2n(padding_len, ret); 1185 memset(ret, 0, padding_len); 1186 ret += padding_len; 1187 } 1188 } 1189 #endif 1190 1191 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0) 1192 return orig; 1193 1194 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 1195 return ret; 1196 } 1197 1198 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit) 1199 { 1200 int extdatalen=0; 1201 unsigned char *orig = buf; 1202 unsigned char *ret = buf; 1203 int next_proto_neg_seen; 1204 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1205 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1206 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); 1207 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); 1208 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ 1209 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 1210 return orig; 1211 1212 ret+=2; 1213 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 1214 1215 if (!s->hit && s->should_ack_sni && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 1216 { 1217 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 1218 1219 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 1220 s2n(0,ret); 1221 } 1222 1223 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding) 1224 { 1225 int el; 1226 1227 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 1228 { 1229 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1230 return NULL; 1231 } 1232 1233 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 1234 1235 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 1236 s2n(el,ret); 1237 1238 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 1239 { 1240 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1241 return NULL; 1242 } 1243 1244 ret += el; 1245 } 1246 1247 if (using_ecc) 1248 { 1249 const unsigned char *plist; 1250 size_t plistlen; 1251 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ 1252 long lenmax; 1253 1254 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); 1255 1256 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 1257 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL; 1258 if (plistlen > 255) 1259 { 1260 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1261 return NULL; 1262 } 1263 1264 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 1265 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret); 1266 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen; 1267 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen); 1268 ret+=plistlen; 1269 1270 } 1271 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */ 1272 1273 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected 1274 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 1275 { 1276 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 1277 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 1278 s2n(0,ret); 1279 } 1280 1281 if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) 1282 { 1283 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 1284 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret); 1285 s2n(0,ret); 1286 } 1287 1288 if(s->srtp_profile) 1289 { 1290 int el; 1291 1292 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 1293 1294 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 1295 1296 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); 1297 s2n(el,ret); 1298 1299 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 1300 { 1301 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1302 return NULL; 1303 } 1304 ret+=el; 1305 } 1306 1307 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; 1308 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1309 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) 1310 { 1311 const unsigned char *npa; 1312 unsigned int npalen; 1313 int r; 1314 1315 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); 1316 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) 1317 { 1318 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL; 1319 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); 1320 s2n(npalen,ret); 1321 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); 1322 ret += npalen; 1323 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1324 } 1325 } 1326 1327 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) 1328 { 1329 const uint8_t *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected; 1330 size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; 1331 1332 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0) 1333 return NULL; 1334 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret); 1335 s2n(3 + len,ret); 1336 s2n(1 + len,ret); 1337 *ret++ = len; 1338 memcpy(ret, selected, len); 1339 ret += len; 1340 } 1341 1342 /* If the client advertised support for Channel ID, and we have it 1343 * enabled, then we want to echo it back. */ 1344 if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) 1345 { 1346 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) 1347 return NULL; 1348 if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) 1349 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new,ret); 1350 else 1351 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret); 1352 s2n(0,ret); 1353 } 1354 1355 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2) == 0) 1356 return orig; 1357 1358 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 1359 return ret; 1360 } 1361 1362 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a 1363 * ClientHello. 1364 * cbs: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length. 1365 * out_alert: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a zero 1366 * return. 1367 * 1368 * returns: 1 on success. */ 1369 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) 1370 { 1371 CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name_list_copy; 1372 const unsigned char *selected; 1373 unsigned char selected_len; 1374 int r; 1375 1376 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL) 1377 return 1; 1378 1379 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &protocol_name_list) || 1380 CBS_len(cbs) != 0 || 1381 CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) < 2) 1382 goto parse_error; 1383 1384 /* Validate the protocol list. */ 1385 protocol_name_list_copy = protocol_name_list; 1386 while (CBS_len(&protocol_name_list_copy) > 0) 1387 { 1388 CBS protocol_name; 1389 1390 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list_copy, &protocol_name)) 1391 goto parse_error; 1392 } 1393 1394 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, 1395 CBS_data(&protocol_name_list), CBS_len(&protocol_name_list), 1396 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); 1397 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 1398 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) 1399 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 1400 s->s3->alpn_selected = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len); 1401 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) 1402 { 1403 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1404 return 0; 1405 } 1406 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; 1407 } 1408 return 1; 1409 1410 parse_error: 1411 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1412 return 0; 1413 } 1414 1415 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) 1416 { 1417 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 1418 CBS extensions; 1419 size_t i; 1420 1421 s->should_ack_sni = 0; 1422 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1423 s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0; 1424 1425 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) 1426 { 1427 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 1428 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; 1429 } 1430 1431 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ 1432 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) 1433 { 1434 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs); 1435 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL; 1436 } 1437 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */ 1438 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) 1439 { 1440 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs); 1441 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL; 1442 } 1443 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ 1444 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) 1445 { 1446 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL; 1447 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0; 1448 } 1449 1450 /* There may be no extensions. */ 1451 if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0) 1452 { 1453 goto ri_check; 1454 } 1455 1456 /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */ 1457 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) || 1458 !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) 1459 { 1460 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1461 return 0; 1462 } 1463 1464 while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) 1465 { 1466 uint16_t type; 1467 CBS extension; 1468 1469 /* Decode the next extension. */ 1470 if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) || 1471 !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) 1472 { 1473 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1474 return 0; 1475 } 1476 1477 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1478 { 1479 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, (unsigned char*)CBS_data(&extension), 1480 CBS_len(&extension), s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1481 } 1482 1483 /* The servername extension is treated as follows: 1484 1485 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 1486 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 1487 in which case an fatal alert is generated. 1488 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 1489 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 1490 to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 1491 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 1492 it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 1493 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 1494 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 1495 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 1496 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 1497 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 1498 the value of the Host: field. 1499 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 1500 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, 1501 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. 1502 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 1503 1504 */ 1505 1506 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1507 { 1508 CBS server_name_list; 1509 char have_seen_host_name = 0; 1510 1511 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &server_name_list) || 1512 CBS_len(&server_name_list) < 1 || 1513 CBS_len(&extension) != 0) 1514 { 1515 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1516 return 0; 1517 } 1518 1519 /* Decode each ServerName in the extension. */ 1520 while (CBS_len(&server_name_list) > 0) 1521 { 1522 uint8_t name_type; 1523 CBS host_name; 1524 1525 /* Decode the NameType. */ 1526 if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_name_list, &name_type)) 1527 { 1528 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1529 return 0; 1530 } 1531 1532 /* Only host_name is supported. */ 1533 if (name_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) 1534 continue; 1535 1536 if (have_seen_host_name) 1537 { 1538 /* The ServerNameList MUST NOT contain 1539 * more than one name of the same 1540 * name_type. */ 1541 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1542 return 0; 1543 } 1544 1545 have_seen_host_name = 1; 1546 1547 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &host_name) || 1548 CBS_len(&host_name) < 1) 1549 { 1550 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1551 return 0; 1552 } 1553 1554 if (CBS_len(&host_name) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name || 1555 CBS_contains_zero_byte(&host_name)) 1556 { 1557 *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1558 return 0; 1559 } 1560 1561 if (!s->hit) 1562 { 1563 assert(s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL); 1564 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) 1565 { 1566 /* This should be impossible. */ 1567 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1568 return 0; 1569 } 1570 1571 /* Copy the hostname as a string. */ 1572 if (!CBS_strdup(&host_name, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) 1573 { 1574 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1575 return 0; 1576 } 1577 1578 s->should_ack_sni = 1; 1579 } 1580 } 1581 } 1582 1583 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) 1584 { 1585 CBS ec_point_format_list; 1586 1587 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) || 1588 CBS_len(&extension) != 0) 1589 { 1590 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1591 return 0; 1592 } 1593 1594 if (!s->hit) 1595 { 1596 if (!CBS_stow(&ec_point_format_list, 1597 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, 1598 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) 1599 { 1600 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1601 return 0; 1602 } 1603 } 1604 } 1605 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) 1606 { 1607 CBS elliptic_curve_list; 1608 size_t i, num_curves; 1609 1610 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list) || 1611 CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 || 1612 (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) & 1) != 0 || 1613 CBS_len(&extension) != 0) 1614 { 1615 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1616 return 0; 1617 } 1618 1619 if (!s->hit) 1620 { 1621 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) 1622 { 1623 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); 1624 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1625 } 1626 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = 1627 (uint16_t*)OPENSSL_malloc(CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list)); 1628 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL) 1629 { 1630 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1631 return 0; 1632 } 1633 num_curves = CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) / 2; 1634 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++) 1635 { 1636 if (!CBS_get_u16(&elliptic_curve_list, 1637 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[i])) 1638 { 1639 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1640 return 0; 1641 } 1642 } 1643 if (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) != 0) 1644 { 1645 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1646 return 0; 1647 } 1648 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = num_curves; 1649 } 1650 } 1651 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1652 { 1653 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1654 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, CBS_data(&extension), CBS_len(&extension), s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1655 { 1656 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1657 return 0; 1658 } 1659 } 1660 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 1661 { 1662 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) 1663 return 0; 1664 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1665 } 1666 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) 1667 { 1668 CBS supported_signature_algorithms; 1669 1670 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &supported_signature_algorithms) || 1671 CBS_len(&extension) != 0) 1672 { 1673 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1674 return 0; 1675 } 1676 1677 /* Ensure the signature algorithms are non-empty. It 1678 * contains a list of SignatureAndHashAlgorithms 1679 * which are two bytes each. */ 1680 if (CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) == 0 || 1681 (CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) % 2) != 0) 1682 { 1683 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1684 return 0; 1685 } 1686 1687 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, &supported_signature_algorithms)) 1688 { 1689 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1690 return 0; 1691 } 1692 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal 1693 * error. 1694 */ 1695 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs) 1696 { 1697 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS); 1698 *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1699 return 0; 1700 } 1701 } 1702 1703 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1704 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 && 1705 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) 1706 { 1707 /* The extension must be empty. */ 1708 if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) 1709 { 1710 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1711 return 0; 1712 } 1713 1714 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a 1715 * renegotiation. 1716 * 1717 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we 1718 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on 1719 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when 1720 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an 1721 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing 1722 * anything like that, but this might change). 1723 1724 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake 1725 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > 1726 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen 1727 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new 1728 * Finished message could have been computed.) */ 1729 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1730 } 1731 1732 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation && 1733 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && 1734 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) 1735 { 1736 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, out_alert)) 1737 return 0; 1738 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ 1739 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1740 } 1741 1742 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id && 1743 s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled) 1744 { 1745 /* The extension must be empty. */ 1746 if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) 1747 { 1748 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1749 return 0; 1750 } 1751 1752 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1; 1753 } 1754 1755 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new && 1756 s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled) 1757 { 1758 /* The extension must be empty. */ 1759 if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) 1760 { 1761 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1762 return 0; 1763 } 1764 1765 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1; 1766 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1; 1767 } 1768 1769 1770 /* session ticket processed earlier */ 1771 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) 1772 { 1773 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) 1774 return 0; 1775 } 1776 } 1777 1778 ri_check: 1779 1780 /* Need RI if renegotiating */ 1781 1782 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && 1783 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1784 { 1785 *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1786 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1787 return 0; 1788 } 1789 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */ 1790 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs) 1791 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert); 1792 1793 return 1; 1794 } 1795 1796 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) 1797 { 1798 int alert = -1; 1799 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0) 1800 { 1801 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); 1802 return 0; 1803 } 1804 1805 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) 1806 { 1807 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1808 return 0; 1809 } 1810 return 1; 1811 } 1812 1813 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No 1814 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill 1815 * the length of the block. */ 1816 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(const CBS *cbs) 1817 { 1818 CBS copy = *cbs; 1819 1820 while (CBS_len(©) != 0) 1821 { 1822 CBS proto; 1823 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(©, &proto) || 1824 CBS_len(&proto) == 0) 1825 { 1826 return 0; 1827 } 1828 } 1829 return 1; 1830 } 1831 1832 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) 1833 { 1834 int tlsext_servername = 0; 1835 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 1836 CBS extensions; 1837 1838 /* TODO(davidben): Move all of these to some per-handshake state that 1839 * gets systematically reset on a new handshake; perhaps allocate it 1840 * fresh each time so it's not even kept around post-handshake. */ 1841 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1842 1843 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 1844 s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0; 1845 1846 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) 1847 { 1848 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 1849 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; 1850 } 1851 1852 /* There may be no extensions. */ 1853 if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0) 1854 { 1855 goto ri_check; 1856 } 1857 1858 /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */ 1859 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) || 1860 !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) 1861 { 1862 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1863 return 0; 1864 } 1865 1866 while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) 1867 { 1868 uint16_t type; 1869 CBS extension; 1870 1871 /* Decode the next extension. */ 1872 if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) || 1873 !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) 1874 { 1875 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1876 return 0; 1877 } 1878 1879 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1880 { 1881 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, (unsigned char*)CBS_data(&extension), 1882 CBS_len(&extension), s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1883 } 1884 1885 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1886 { 1887 /* The extension must be empty. */ 1888 if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) 1889 { 1890 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1891 return 0; 1892 } 1893 /* We must have sent it in ClientHello. */ 1894 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL) 1895 { 1896 *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1897 return 0; 1898 } 1899 tlsext_servername = 1; 1900 } 1901 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) 1902 { 1903 CBS ec_point_format_list; 1904 1905 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) || 1906 CBS_len(&extension) != 0) 1907 { 1908 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1909 return 0; 1910 } 1911 1912 if (!s->hit) 1913 { 1914 if (!CBS_stow(&ec_point_format_list, 1915 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, 1916 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) 1917 { 1918 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1919 return 0; 1920 } 1921 } 1922 } 1923 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1924 { 1925 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1926 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, CBS_data(&extension), CBS_len(&extension), 1927 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1928 { 1929 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1930 return 0; 1931 } 1932 1933 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || CBS_len(&extension) > 0) 1934 { 1935 *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1936 return 0; 1937 } 1938 1939 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1940 } 1941 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) 1942 { 1943 /* The extension MUST be empty and may only sent if 1944 * we've requested a status request message. */ 1945 if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) 1946 { 1947 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1948 return 0; 1949 } 1950 if (!s->ocsp_stapling_enabled) 1951 { 1952 *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1953 return 0; 1954 } 1955 /* Set a flag to expect a CertificateStatus message */ 1956 s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 1; 1957 } 1958 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 1959 unsigned char *selected; 1960 unsigned char selected_len; 1961 1962 /* We must have requested it. */ 1963 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) 1964 { 1965 *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1966 return 0; 1967 } 1968 1969 /* The data must be valid. */ 1970 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&extension)) 1971 { 1972 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1973 return 0; 1974 } 1975 1976 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, 1977 CBS_data(&extension), CBS_len(&extension), 1978 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) 1979 { 1980 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1981 return 0; 1982 } 1983 1984 s->next_proto_negotiated = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len); 1985 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) 1986 { 1987 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1988 return 0; 1989 } 1990 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; 1991 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1992 } 1993 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) 1994 { 1995 CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name; 1996 1997 /* We must have requested it. */ 1998 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) 1999 { 2000 *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2001 return 0; 2002 } 2003 2004 /* The extension data consists of a ProtocolNameList 2005 * which must have exactly one ProtocolName. Each of 2006 * these is length-prefixed. */ 2007 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &protocol_name_list) || 2008 CBS_len(&extension) != 0 || 2009 !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list, &protocol_name) || 2010 CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) != 0) 2011 { 2012 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2013 return 0; 2014 } 2015 2016 if (!CBS_stow(&protocol_name, 2017 &s->s3->alpn_selected, 2018 &s->s3->alpn_selected_len)) 2019 { 2020 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2021 return 0; 2022 } 2023 } 2024 2025 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) 2026 { 2027 if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) 2028 { 2029 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2030 return 0; 2031 } 2032 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1; 2033 } 2034 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new) 2035 { 2036 if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) 2037 { 2038 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2039 return 0; 2040 } 2041 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1; 2042 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1; 2043 } 2044 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) 2045 { 2046 if (CBS_len(&extension) == 0) 2047 { 2048 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2049 return 0; 2050 } 2051 2052 /* Session resumption uses the original session information. */ 2053 if (!s->hit) 2054 { 2055 if (!CBS_stow(&extension, 2056 &s->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list, 2057 &s->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length)) 2058 { 2059 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2060 return 0; 2061 } 2062 } 2063 } 2064 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 2065 { 2066 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) 2067 return 0; 2068 renegotiate_seen = 1; 2069 } 2070 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) 2071 { 2072 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) 2073 return 0; 2074 } 2075 } 2076 2077 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) 2078 { 2079 if (s->tlsext_hostname) 2080 { 2081 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) 2082 { 2083 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); 2084 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) 2085 { 2086 *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2087 return 0; 2088 } 2089 } 2090 else 2091 { 2092 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2093 return 0; 2094 } 2095 } 2096 } 2097 2098 ri_check: 2099 2100 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to 2101 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server 2102 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an 2103 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server 2104 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI 2105 * absence on initial connect only. 2106 */ 2107 if (!renegotiate_seen 2108 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) 2109 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 2110 { 2111 *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2112 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 2113 return 0; 2114 } 2115 2116 return 1; 2117 } 2118 2119 2120 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 2121 { 2122 return 1; 2123 } 2124 2125 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 2126 { 2127 return 1; 2128 } 2129 2130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 2131 { 2132 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 2133 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2134 2135 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in 2136 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 2137 */ 2138 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in 2139 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 2140 */ 2141 2142 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2143 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2144 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2145 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2146 2147 switch (ret) 2148 { 2149 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2150 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2151 return -1; 2152 2153 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 2154 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 2155 return 1; 2156 2157 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2158 s->should_ack_sni = 0; 2159 return 1; 2160 2161 default: 2162 return 1; 2163 } 2164 } 2165 2166 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 2167 { 2168 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 2169 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2170 2171 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 2172 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension 2173 * it must contain uncompressed. 2174 */ 2175 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2176 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2177 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 2178 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 2179 ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 2180 { 2181 /* we are using an ECC cipher */ 2182 size_t i; 2183 unsigned char *list; 2184 int found_uncompressed = 0; 2185 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 2186 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 2187 { 2188 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) 2189 { 2190 found_uncompressed = 1; 2191 break; 2192 } 2193 } 2194 if (!found_uncompressed) 2195 { 2196 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 2197 return -1; 2198 } 2199 } 2200 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 2201 2202 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2203 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2204 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2205 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2206 2207 switch (ret) 2208 { 2209 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2210 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2211 return -1; 2212 2213 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 2214 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 2215 return 1; 2216 2217 default: 2218 return 1; 2219 } 2220 } 2221 2222 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) 2223 { 2224 int alert = -1; 2225 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION) 2226 return 1; 2227 2228 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0) 2229 { 2230 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); 2231 return 0; 2232 } 2233 2234 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) 2235 { 2236 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 2237 return 0; 2238 } 2239 2240 return 1; 2241 } 2242 2243 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the 2244 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle 2245 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. 2246 * 2247 * ctx: contains the early callback context, which is the result of a 2248 * shallow parse of the ClientHello. 2249 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2250 * point to the resulting session. 2251 * 2252 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key 2253 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will 2254 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. 2255 * 2256 * Returns: 2257 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2258 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). 2259 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports 2260 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. 2261 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but 2262 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. 2263 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. 2264 * 2265 * Side effects: 2266 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue 2267 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support 2268 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have 2269 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if 2270 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. 2271 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. 2272 */ 2273 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx, 2274 SSL_SESSION **ret) 2275 { 2276 *ret = NULL; 2277 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 2278 const unsigned char *data; 2279 size_t len; 2280 int r; 2281 2282 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present 2283 * to permit stateful resumption. 2284 */ 2285 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 2286 return 0; 2287 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) && !ctx->extensions) 2288 return 0; 2289 if (!SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get( 2290 ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, &data, &len)) 2291 { 2292 return 0; 2293 } 2294 if (len == 0) 2295 { 2296 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't 2297 * currently have one. */ 2298 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2299 return 1; 2300 } 2301 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) 2302 { 2303 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be 2304 * decrypted rather than generating the session 2305 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated 2306 * handshake based on external mechanism to 2307 * calculate the master secret later. */ 2308 return 2; 2309 } 2310 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, data, len, ctx->session_id, 2311 ctx->session_id_len, ret); 2312 switch (r) 2313 { 2314 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ 2315 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2316 return 2; 2317 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ 2318 return r; 2319 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ 2320 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2321 return 3; 2322 default: /* fatal error */ 2323 return -1; 2324 } 2325 } 2326 2327 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. 2328 * 2329 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. 2330 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. 2331 * sess_id: points at the session ID. 2332 * sesslen: the length of the session ID. 2333 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2334 * point to the resulting session. 2335 * 2336 * Returns: 2337 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2338 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. 2339 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. 2340 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. 2341 */ 2342 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, 2343 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 2344 SSL_SESSION **psess) 2345 { 2346 SSL_SESSION *sess; 2347 unsigned char *sdec; 2348 const unsigned char *p; 2349 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; 2350 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 2351 HMAC_CTX hctx; 2352 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 2353 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 2354 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ 2355 if (eticklen < 48) 2356 return 2; 2357 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ 2358 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 2359 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 2360 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 2361 { 2362 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; 2363 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, 2364 &ctx, &hctx, 0); 2365 if (rv < 0) 2366 return -1; 2367 if (rv == 0) 2368 return 2; 2369 if (rv == 2) 2370 renew_ticket = 1; 2371 } 2372 else 2373 { 2374 /* Check key name matches */ 2375 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) 2376 return 2; 2377 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 2378 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 2379 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 2380 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); 2381 } 2382 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and 2383 * integrity checks on ticket. 2384 */ 2385 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); 2386 if (mlen < 0) 2387 { 2388 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2389 return -1; 2390 } 2391 eticklen -= mlen; 2392 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ 2393 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); 2394 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); 2395 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2396 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) 2397 return 2; 2398 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ 2399 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ 2400 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2401 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2402 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); 2403 if (!sdec) 2404 { 2405 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2406 return -1; 2407 } 2408 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); 2409 if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) 2410 { 2411 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2412 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 2413 return 2; 2414 } 2415 slen += mlen; 2416 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2417 p = sdec; 2418 2419 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); 2420 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 2421 if (sess) 2422 { 2423 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to 2424 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to 2425 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero 2426 * as required by standard. 2427 */ 2428 if (sesslen) 2429 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); 2430 sess->session_id_length = sesslen; 2431 *psess = sess; 2432 if (renew_ticket) 2433 return 4; 2434 else 2435 return 3; 2436 } 2437 ERR_clear_error(); 2438 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new 2439 * ticket. */ 2440 return 2; 2441 } 2442 2443 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ 2444 2445 typedef struct 2446 { 2447 int nid; 2448 int id; 2449 } tls12_lookup; 2450 2451 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { 2452 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, 2453 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, 2454 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, 2455 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, 2456 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, 2457 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} 2458 }; 2459 2460 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { 2461 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, 2462 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} 2463 }; 2464 2465 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2466 { 2467 size_t i; 2468 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) 2469 { 2470 if (table[i].nid == nid) 2471 return table[i].id; 2472 } 2473 return -1; 2474 } 2475 2476 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2477 { 2478 size_t i; 2479 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) 2480 { 2481 if ((table[i].id) == id) 2482 return table[i].nid; 2483 } 2484 return NID_undef; 2485 } 2486 2487 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) 2488 { 2489 int sig_id, md_id; 2490 if (!md) 2491 return 0; 2492 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, 2493 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2494 if (md_id == -1) 2495 return 0; 2496 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); 2497 if (sig_id == -1) 2498 return 0; 2499 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; 2500 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; 2501 return 1; 2502 } 2503 2504 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) 2505 { 2506 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, 2507 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2508 } 2509 2510 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) 2511 { 2512 switch(hash_alg) 2513 { 2514 case TLSEXT_hash_md5: 2515 return EVP_md5(); 2516 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: 2517 return EVP_sha1(); 2518 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: 2519 return EVP_sha224(); 2520 2521 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: 2522 return EVP_sha256(); 2523 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: 2524 return EVP_sha384(); 2525 2526 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: 2527 return EVP_sha512(); 2528 default: 2529 return NULL; 2530 2531 } 2532 } 2533 2534 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) 2535 { 2536 switch(sig_alg) 2537 { 2538 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 2539 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; 2540 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 2541 return SSL_PKEY_ECC; 2542 } 2543 return -1; 2544 } 2545 2546 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */ 2547 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, 2548 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data) 2549 { 2550 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0; 2551 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid) 2552 return; 2553 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) 2554 { 2555 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, 2556 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2557 if (phash_nid) 2558 *phash_nid = hash_nid; 2559 } 2560 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) 2561 { 2562 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, 2563 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2564 if (psign_nid) 2565 *psign_nid = sign_nid; 2566 } 2567 if (psignhash_nid) 2568 { 2569 if (sign_nid && hash_nid) 2570 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, 2571 hash_nid, sign_nid); 2572 else 2573 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef; 2574 } 2575 } 2576 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */ 2577 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig, 2578 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen, 2579 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen) 2580 { 2581 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp; 2582 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0; 2583 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2) 2584 { 2585 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */ 2586 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL) 2587 continue; 2588 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1) 2589 continue; 2590 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2) 2591 { 2592 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) 2593 { 2594 nmatch++; 2595 if (shsig) 2596 { 2597 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0]; 2598 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1]; 2599 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid, 2600 &shsig->sign_nid, 2601 &shsig->signandhash_nid, 2602 ptmp); 2603 shsig++; 2604 } 2605 break; 2606 } 2607 } 2608 } 2609 return nmatch; 2610 } 2611 2612 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */ 2613 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) 2614 { 2615 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf; 2616 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen; 2617 size_t nmatch; 2618 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL; 2619 CERT *c = s->cert; 2620 if (c->shared_sigalgs) 2621 { 2622 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); 2623 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL; 2624 } 2625 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */ 2626 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs) 2627 { 2628 conf = c->client_sigalgs; 2629 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen; 2630 } 2631 else if (c->conf_sigalgs) 2632 { 2633 conf = c->conf_sigalgs; 2634 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen; 2635 } 2636 else 2637 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf); 2638 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) 2639 { 2640 pref = conf; 2641 preflen = conflen; 2642 allow = c->peer_sigalgs; 2643 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen; 2644 } 2645 else 2646 { 2647 allow = conf; 2648 allowlen = conflen; 2649 pref = c->peer_sigalgs; 2650 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen; 2651 } 2652 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); 2653 if (!nmatch) 2654 return 1; 2655 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS)); 2656 if (!salgs) 2657 return 0; 2658 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); 2659 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs; 2660 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch; 2661 return 1; 2662 } 2663 2664 2665 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */ 2666 2667 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const CBS *sigalgs) 2668 { 2669 int idx; 2670 size_t i; 2671 const EVP_MD *md; 2672 CERT *c = s->cert; 2673 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr; 2674 2675 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */ 2676 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 2677 return 1; 2678 /* Length must be even */ 2679 if (CBS_len(sigalgs) % 2 != 0) 2680 return 0; 2681 /* Should never happen */ 2682 if (!c) 2683 return 0; 2684 2685 if (!CBS_stow(sigalgs, &c->peer_sigalgs, &c->peer_sigalgslen)) 2686 return 0; 2687 2688 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s); 2689 2690 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 2691 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) 2692 { 2693 /* Use first set signature preference to force message 2694 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences. 2695 */ 2696 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL; 2697 if (s->server) 2698 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs; 2699 else 2700 sigs = c->client_sigalgs; 2701 if (sigs) 2702 { 2703 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]); 2704 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]); 2705 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 2706 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 2707 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) 2708 { 2709 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 2710 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 2711 } 2712 } 2713 } 2714 #endif 2715 2716 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs; 2717 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) 2718 { 2719 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign); 2720 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) 2721 { 2722 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash); 2723 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 2724 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 2725 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) 2726 { 2727 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 2728 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 2729 } 2730 } 2731 2732 } 2733 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't 2734 * use the certificate for signing. 2735 */ 2736 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) 2737 { 2738 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is 2739 * not supported it stays as NULL. 2740 */ 2741 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) 2742 { 2743 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2744 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2745 } 2746 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) 2747 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2748 } 2749 return 1; 2750 } 2751 2752 2753 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, 2754 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, 2755 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) 2756 { 2757 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs; 2758 if (psig == NULL) 2759 return 0; 2760 if (idx >= 0) 2761 { 2762 idx <<= 1; 2763 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen) 2764 return 0; 2765 psig += idx; 2766 if (rhash) 2767 *rhash = psig[0]; 2768 if (rsig) 2769 *rsig = psig[1]; 2770 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig); 2771 } 2772 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2; 2773 } 2774 2775 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, 2776 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, 2777 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) 2778 { 2779 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs; 2780 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) 2781 return 0; 2782 shsigalgs += idx; 2783 if (phash) 2784 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid; 2785 if (psign) 2786 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid; 2787 if (psignhash) 2788 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid; 2789 if (rsig) 2790 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign; 2791 if (rhash) 2792 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash; 2793 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; 2794 } 2795 2796 /* tls1_channel_id_hash calculates the signed data for a Channel ID on the given 2797 * SSL connection and writes it to |md|. */ 2798 int 2799 tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *md, SSL *s) 2800 { 2801 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 2802 unsigned char temp_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 2803 unsigned temp_digest_len; 2804 int i; 2805 static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature"; 2806 2807 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 2808 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 2809 return 0; 2810 2811 EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic)); 2812 2813 if (s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) 2814 { 2815 static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption"; 2816 EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kResumptionMagic, 2817 sizeof(kResumptionMagic)); 2818 if (s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) 2819 return 0; 2820 EVP_DigestUpdate(md, s->session->original_handshake_hash, 2821 s->session->original_handshake_hash_len); 2822 } 2823 2824 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 2825 for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) 2826 { 2827 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL) 2828 continue; 2829 EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]); 2830 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, temp_digest, &temp_digest_len); 2831 EVP_DigestUpdate(md, temp_digest, temp_digest_len); 2832 } 2833 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2834 2835 return 1; 2836 } 2837 2838 /* tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake 2839 * hashes in |s->session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that data. */ 2840 int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s) 2841 { 2842 int digest_len; 2843 /* This function should never be called for a resumed session because 2844 * the handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original, 2845 * full handshake. */ 2846 if (s->hit) 2847 return -1; 2848 /* It only makes sense to call this function if Channel IDs have been 2849 * negotiated. */ 2850 if (!s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) 2851 return -1; 2852 2853 digest_len = tls1_handshake_digest( 2854 s, s->session->original_handshake_hash, 2855 sizeof(s->session->original_handshake_hash)); 2856 if (digest_len < 0) 2857 return -1; 2858 2859 s->session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len; 2860 2861 return 1; 2862 } 2863 2864 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client) 2865 { 2866 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr; 2867 int rhash, rsign; 2868 size_t i; 2869 if (salglen & 1) 2870 return 0; 2871 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen); 2872 if (sigalgs == NULL) 2873 return 0; 2874 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2) 2875 { 2876 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, 2877 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2878 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, 2879 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2880 2881 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1) 2882 goto err; 2883 *sptr++ = rhash; 2884 *sptr++ = rsign; 2885 } 2886 2887 if (client) 2888 { 2889 if (c->client_sigalgs) 2890 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); 2891 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs; 2892 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen; 2893 } 2894 else 2895 { 2896 if (c->conf_sigalgs) 2897 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); 2898 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs; 2899 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen; 2900 } 2901 2902 return 1; 2903 2904 err: 2905 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs); 2906 return 0; 2907 } 2908 2909 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid) 2910 { 2911 int sig_nid; 2912 size_t i; 2913 if (default_nid == -1) 2914 return 1; 2915 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); 2916 if (default_nid) 2917 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0; 2918 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) 2919 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) 2920 return 1; 2921 return 0; 2922 } 2923 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */ 2924 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x) 2925 { 2926 X509_NAME *nm; 2927 int i; 2928 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 2929 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) 2930 { 2931 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i))) 2932 return 1; 2933 } 2934 return 0; 2935 } 2936 2937 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is 2938 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to 2939 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the 2940 * server to check chains before attempting to use them. 2941 */ 2942 2943 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */ 2944 2945 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \ 2946 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM) 2947 /* Strict mode flags */ 2948 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \ 2949 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \ 2950 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) 2951 2952 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, 2953 int idx) 2954 { 2955 int i; 2956 int rv = 0; 2957 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode; 2958 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL; 2959 CERT *c = s->cert; 2960 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */ 2961 if (idx != -1) 2962 { 2963 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */ 2964 if (idx == -2) 2965 { 2966 cpk = c->key; 2967 idx = cpk - c->pkeys; 2968 } 2969 else 2970 cpk = c->pkeys + idx; 2971 x = cpk->x509; 2972 pk = cpk->privatekey; 2973 chain = cpk->chain; 2974 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT; 2975 /* If no cert or key, forget it */ 2976 if (!x || !pk) 2977 goto end; 2978 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 2979 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */ 2980 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) 2981 { 2982 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN; 2983 cpk->valid_flags = rv; 2984 return rv; 2985 } 2986 #endif 2987 } 2988 else 2989 { 2990 if (!x || !pk) 2991 goto end; 2992 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk); 2993 if (idx == -1) 2994 goto end; 2995 cpk = c->pkeys + idx; 2996 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT) 2997 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS; 2998 else 2999 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS; 3000 strict_mode = 1; 3001 } 3002 3003 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with 3004 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later 3005 * and strict mode. 3006 */ 3007 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) 3008 { 3009 int default_nid; 3010 unsigned char rsign = 0; 3011 if (c->peer_sigalgs) 3012 default_nid = 0; 3013 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */ 3014 else 3015 { 3016 switch(idx) 3017 { 3018 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC: 3019 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN: 3020 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa; 3021 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption; 3022 break; 3023 3024 case SSL_PKEY_ECC: 3025 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa; 3026 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1; 3027 break; 3028 3029 default: 3030 default_nid = -1; 3031 break; 3032 } 3033 } 3034 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we 3035 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support 3036 * sha1. 3037 */ 3038 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) 3039 { 3040 size_t j; 3041 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs; 3042 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) 3043 { 3044 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign) 3045 break; 3046 } 3047 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) 3048 { 3049 if (check_flags) 3050 goto skip_sigs; 3051 else 3052 goto end; 3053 } 3054 } 3055 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */ 3056 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) 3057 { 3058 if (!check_flags) goto end; 3059 } 3060 else 3061 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE; 3062 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; 3063 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 3064 { 3065 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), 3066 default_nid)) 3067 { 3068 if (check_flags) 3069 { 3070 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; 3071 break; 3072 } 3073 else 3074 goto end; 3075 } 3076 } 3077 } 3078 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */ 3079 else if(check_flags) 3080 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; 3081 skip_sigs: 3082 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */ 3083 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2)) 3084 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM; 3085 else if (!check_flags) 3086 goto end; 3087 if (!s->server) 3088 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; 3089 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */ 3090 else if (strict_mode) 3091 { 3092 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; 3093 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 3094 { 3095 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 3096 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) 3097 { 3098 if (check_flags) 3099 { 3100 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; 3101 break; 3102 } 3103 else 3104 goto end; 3105 } 3106 } 3107 } 3108 if (!s->server && strict_mode) 3109 { 3110 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn; 3111 uint8_t check_type = 0; 3112 switch (pk->type) 3113 { 3114 case EVP_PKEY_RSA: 3115 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN; 3116 break; 3117 case EVP_PKEY_EC: 3118 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN; 3119 break; 3120 } 3121 if (check_type) 3122 { 3123 if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_types && 3124 memchr(s->s3->tmp.certificate_types, check_type, s->s3->tmp.num_certificate_types)) 3125 { 3126 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; 3127 } 3128 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags) 3129 goto end; 3130 } 3131 else 3132 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; 3133 3134 3135 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names; 3136 3137 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn)) 3138 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; 3139 3140 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) 3141 { 3142 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x)) 3143 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; 3144 } 3145 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) 3146 { 3147 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 3148 { 3149 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 3150 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) 3151 { 3152 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; 3153 break; 3154 } 3155 } 3156 } 3157 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) 3158 goto end; 3159 } 3160 else 3161 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; 3162 3163 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags) 3164 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID; 3165 3166 end: 3167 3168 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 3169 { 3170 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN) 3171 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN; 3172 else if (cpk->digest) 3173 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN; 3174 } 3175 else 3176 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3177 3178 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant 3179 * if the chain is invalid. 3180 */ 3181 if (!check_flags) 3182 { 3183 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) 3184 cpk->valid_flags = rv; 3185 else 3186 { 3187 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */ 3188 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3189 return 0; 3190 } 3191 } 3192 return rv; 3193 } 3194 3195 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */ 3196 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s) 3197 { 3198 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC); 3199 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN); 3200 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC); 3201 } 3202 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */ 3203 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 3204 { 3205 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1); 3206 } 3207 3208
