1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core (at) openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 /* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124 /* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 153 154 #include <stdio.h> 155 #include "ssl_locl.h" 156 #include "kssl_lcl.h" 157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" 158 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 159 #include <openssl/rand.h> 160 #include <openssl/objects.h> 161 #include <openssl/ec.h> 162 #include <openssl/ecdsa.h> 163 #include <openssl/evp.h> 164 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 165 #include <openssl/sha.h> 166 #include <openssl/x509.h> 167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 168 #include <openssl/dh.h> 169 #endif 170 #include <openssl/bn.h> 171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 172 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 173 #endif 174 #include <openssl/md5.h> 175 176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 177 178 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 179 { 180 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 181 return(SSLv3_server_method()); 182 else 183 return(NULL); 184 } 185 186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 187 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) 188 { 189 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; 190 191 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 192 193 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && 194 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) 195 { 196 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) 197 { 198 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, 199 we do so if There is no srp login name */ 200 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; 201 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 202 } 203 else 204 { 205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al); 206 } 207 } 208 return ret; 209 } 210 #endif 211 212 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 213 ssl3_accept, 214 ssl_undefined_function, 215 ssl3_get_server_method) 216 217 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 218 { 219 BUF_MEM *buf; 220 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); 221 unsigned long alg_a; 222 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; 223 int ret= -1; 224 int new_state,state,skip=0; 225 226 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); 227 ERR_clear_error(); 228 clear_sys_error(); 229 230 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 231 cb=s->info_callback; 232 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 233 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 234 235 /* init things to blank */ 236 s->in_handshake++; 237 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 238 239 if (s->cert == NULL) 240 { 241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 242 return(-1); 243 } 244 245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 246 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we 247 * already got and don't await it anymore, because 248 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway. 249 */ 250 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) 251 { 252 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 253 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 254 } 255 #endif 256 257 for (;;) 258 { 259 state=s->state; 260 261 switch (s->state) 262 { 263 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 264 s->renegotiate=1; 265 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 266 267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 268 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 269 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 270 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 271 272 s->server=1; 273 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); 274 275 if ((s->version>>8) != 3) 276 { 277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 278 return -1; 279 } 280 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 281 282 if (s->init_buf == NULL) 283 { 284 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) 285 { 286 ret= -1; 287 goto end; 288 } 289 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) 290 { 291 ret= -1; 292 goto end; 293 } 294 s->init_buf=buf; 295 } 296 297 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) 298 { 299 ret= -1; 300 goto end; 301 } 302 303 s->init_num=0; 304 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 305 306 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) 307 { 308 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that 309 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 310 */ 311 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } 312 313 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 314 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 315 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 316 } 317 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && 318 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 319 { 320 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with 321 * client that doesn't support secure 322 * renegotiation. 323 */ 324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 325 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 326 ret = -1; 327 goto end; 328 } 329 else 330 { 331 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, 332 * we will just send a HelloRequest */ 333 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 335 } 336 break; 337 338 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 339 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 340 341 s->shutdown=0; 342 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 343 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 344 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 345 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 346 s->init_num=0; 347 348 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 349 break; 350 351 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 352 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 353 break; 354 355 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 356 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 357 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 358 359 s->shutdown=0; 360 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) 361 { 362 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 363 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 364 } 365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 366 { 367 int al; 368 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0) 369 { 370 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */ 371 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 372 goto end; 373 } 374 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) 375 { 376 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 377 /* This is not really an error but the only means to 378 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */ 379 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) 380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 381 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 382 ret= -1; 383 goto end; 384 } 385 } 386 #endif 387 388 s->renegotiate = 2; 389 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 390 s->init_num=0; 391 break; 392 393 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 394 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 395 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 396 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 398 if (s->hit) 399 { 400 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 401 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 402 else 403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 404 } 405 #else 406 if (s->hit) 407 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 408 #endif 409 else 410 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 411 s->init_num=0; 412 break; 413 414 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 415 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 416 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 417 /* non-RSA PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ 418 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP)) 419 /* Among PSK ciphersuites only RSA_PSK uses server certificate */ 420 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK && 421 !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA))) 422 { 423 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 424 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 426 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 427 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 428 else 429 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 430 } 431 else 432 { 433 skip = 1; 434 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 435 } 436 #else 437 } 438 else 439 skip=1; 440 441 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 442 #endif 443 s->init_num=0; 444 break; 445 446 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 447 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 448 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 449 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 450 451 /* clear this, it may get reset by 452 * send_server_key_exchange */ 453 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) 454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 455 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) 456 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 457 ) 458 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key 459 * even when forbidden by protocol specs 460 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to 461 * be able to handle this) */ 462 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 463 else 464 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; 465 466 467 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or 468 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate 469 * 470 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints 471 * 472 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange 473 * message only if the cipher suite is either 474 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the 475 * server certificate contains the server's 476 * public key for key exchange. 477 */ 478 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp 479 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if either: 480 * - PSK identity hint is provided, or 481 * - the key exchange is kEECDH. 482 */ 483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 484 || ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || s->session->psk_identity_hint)) 485 #endif 486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 487 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ 488 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 489 #endif 490 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH)) 491 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 492 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 493 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 494 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 495 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 496 ) 497 ) 498 ) 499 ) 500 { 501 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 502 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 503 } 504 else 505 skip=1; 506 507 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 508 s->init_num=0; 509 break; 510 511 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 512 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 513 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 514 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 515 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, 516 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ 517 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 518 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 519 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites 520 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts 521 * and in RFC 2246): */ 522 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && 523 /* ... except when the application insists on verification 524 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ 525 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 526 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ 527 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || 528 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ 529 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) 530 /* With normal PSK Certificates and 531 * Certificate Requests are omitted */ 532 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) 533 { 534 /* no cert request */ 535 skip=1; 536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; 537 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 538 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 539 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 540 return -1; 541 } 542 else 543 { 544 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; 545 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 546 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 547 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 548 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 549 #else 550 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 551 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 552 #endif 553 s->init_num=0; 554 } 555 break; 556 557 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 558 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 559 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); 560 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 561 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 562 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 563 s->init_num=0; 564 break; 565 566 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 567 568 /* This code originally checked to see if 569 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO 570 * and then flushed. This caused problems 571 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed 572 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue 573 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING 574 * still exist. So instead we just flush 575 * unconditionally. 576 */ 577 578 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; 579 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) 580 { 581 ret= -1; 582 goto end; 583 } 584 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 585 586 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; 587 break; 588 589 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 590 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 591 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ 592 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); 593 if (ret <= 0) 594 goto end; 595 if (ret == 2) 596 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; 597 else { 598 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 599 { 600 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 601 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 602 } 603 s->init_num=0; 604 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 605 } 606 break; 607 608 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 609 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 610 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 611 if (ret <= 0) 612 goto end; 613 if (ret == 2) 614 { 615 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when 616 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in 617 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify 618 * message is not sent. 619 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when 620 * the client uses its key from the certificate 621 * for key exchange. 622 */ 623 s->init_num = 0; 624 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT; 625 } 626 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 627 { 628 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 629 s->init_num=0; 630 if (!s->session->peer) 631 break; 632 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer 633 * at this point and digest cached records. 634 */ 635 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) 636 { 637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 638 return -1; 639 } 640 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 641 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 642 return -1; 643 } 644 else 645 { 646 int offset=0; 647 int dgst_num; 648 649 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 650 s->init_num=0; 651 652 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is 653 * a client cert, it can be verified 654 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify 655 * should be generalized. But it is next step 656 */ 657 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 658 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 659 return -1; 660 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++) 661 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) 662 { 663 int dgst_size; 664 665 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset])); 666 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); 667 if (dgst_size < 0) 668 { 669 ret = -1; 670 goto end; 671 } 672 offset+=dgst_size; 673 } 674 } 675 break; 676 677 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 678 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 679 680 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 681 /* we should decide if we expected this one */ 682 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 683 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 684 685 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT; 686 s->init_num=0; 687 break; 688 689 case SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT: { 690 char next_proto_neg = 0; 691 char channel_id = 0; 692 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) 693 # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 694 next_proto_neg = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; 695 # endif 696 channel_id = s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid; 697 #endif 698 699 if (next_proto_neg) 700 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 701 else if (channel_id) 702 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A; 703 else 704 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 705 break; 706 } 707 708 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 709 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: 710 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: 711 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s); 712 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 713 s->init_num = 0; 714 if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) 715 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A; 716 else 717 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 718 break; 719 #endif 720 721 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) 722 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A: 723 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B: 724 ret=ssl3_get_channel_id(s); 725 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 726 s->init_num = 0; 727 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 728 break; 729 #endif 730 731 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 732 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 733 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 734 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 735 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 736 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 737 if (s->hit) 738 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 740 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 741 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 742 #endif 743 else 744 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 745 /* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then 746 * record the hashshake hashes in |s->session| in case 747 * we need them to verify a ChannelID signature on a 748 * resumption of this session in the future. */ 749 if (!s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) 750 { 751 ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s); 752 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 753 } 754 s->init_num=0; 755 break; 756 757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 758 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 759 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 760 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 761 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 762 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 763 s->init_num=0; 764 break; 765 766 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 767 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 768 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 769 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 770 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 771 s->init_num=0; 772 break; 773 774 #endif 775 776 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 777 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 778 779 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 780 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) 781 { ret= -1; goto end; } 782 783 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 784 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 785 786 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 787 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 788 s->init_num=0; 789 790 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 791 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 792 { 793 ret= -1; 794 goto end; 795 } 796 797 break; 798 799 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 800 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 801 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, 802 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 803 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 804 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 805 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 806 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 807 if (s->hit) 808 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT; 809 else 810 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; 811 s->init_num=0; 812 break; 813 814 case SSL_ST_OK: 815 /* clean a few things up */ 816 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 817 818 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 819 s->init_buf=NULL; 820 821 /* remove buffering on output */ 822 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 823 824 s->init_num=0; 825 826 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ 827 { 828 s->renegotiate=0; 829 s->new_session=0; 830 831 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 832 833 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 834 /* s->server=1; */ 835 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; 836 837 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); 838 } 839 840 ret = 1; 841 goto end; 842 /* break; */ 843 844 default: 845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 846 ret= -1; 847 goto end; 848 /* break; */ 849 } 850 851 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) 852 { 853 if (s->debug) 854 { 855 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 856 goto end; 857 } 858 859 860 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) 861 { 862 new_state=s->state; 863 s->state=state; 864 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); 865 s->state=new_state; 866 } 867 } 868 skip=0; 869 } 870 end: 871 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 872 873 s->in_handshake--; 874 if (cb != NULL) 875 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); 876 return(ret); 877 } 878 879 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 880 { 881 unsigned char *p; 882 883 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) 884 { 885 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 886 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 887 *(p++)=0; 888 *(p++)=0; 889 *(p++)=0; 890 891 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 892 /* number of bytes to write */ 893 s->init_num=4; 894 s->init_off=0; 895 } 896 897 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 898 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 899 } 900 901 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) 902 { 903 int ok; 904 long n; 905 906 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, 907 * so permit appropriate message length */ 908 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 909 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 910 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 911 -1, 912 s->max_cert_list, 913 &ok); 914 if (!ok) return((int)n); 915 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 916 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) 917 { 918 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per 919 * negotiation. */ 920 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) 921 { 922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); 923 return -1; 924 } 925 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, 926 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */ 927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 928 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 929 { 930 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 931 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 932 } 933 #endif 934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 935 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) 936 { 937 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 938 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 939 } 940 #endif 941 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 942 return 2; 943 } 944 return 1; 945 } 946 947 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 948 { 949 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1; 950 unsigned int cookie_len; 951 long n; 952 unsigned long id; 953 unsigned char *p,*d,*q; 954 SSL_CIPHER *c; 955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 956 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL; 957 #endif 958 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; 959 960 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. 961 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, 962 * This down switching should be handled by a different method. 963 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with 964 * TLSv1. 965 */ 966 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A 967 ) 968 { 969 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 970 } 971 s->first_packet=1; 972 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 973 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 974 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 975 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 976 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, 977 &ok); 978 979 if (!ok) return((int)n); 980 s->first_packet=0; 981 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 982 983 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header 984 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ 985 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; 986 p+=2; 987 988 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || 989 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) 990 { 991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 992 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 993 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) 994 { 995 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ 996 s->version = s->client_version; 997 } 998 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 999 goto f_err; 1000 } 1001 1002 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't 1003 * contain one, just return since we do not want to 1004 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... 1005 */ 1006 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) 1007 { 1008 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; 1009 1010 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1011 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); 1012 1013 if (cookie_length == 0) 1014 return 1; 1015 } 1016 1017 /* load the client random */ 1018 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1019 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1020 1021 /* get the session-id */ 1022 j= *(p++); 1023 1024 s->hit=0; 1025 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation. 1026 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests 1027 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather 1028 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security 1029 * won't even compile against older library versions). 1030 * 1031 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request 1032 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers, 1033 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 1034 * setting will be ignored. 1035 */ 1036 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) 1037 { 1038 if (!s->session_creation_enabled) 1039 { 1040 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED); 1042 goto err; 1043 } 1044 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 1045 goto err; 1046 } 1047 else 1048 { 1049 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); 1050 if (i == 1) 1051 { /* previous session */ 1052 s->hit=1; 1053 } 1054 else if (i == -1) 1055 goto err; 1056 else /* i == 0 */ 1057 { 1058 if (!s->session_creation_enabled) 1059 { 1060 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED); 1062 goto err; 1063 } 1064 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 1065 goto err; 1066 } 1067 } 1068 1069 p+=j; 1070 1071 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 1072 { 1073 /* cookie stuff */ 1074 cookie_len = *(p++); 1075 1076 /* 1077 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 1078 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 1079 * does not cause an overflow. 1080 */ 1081 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) 1082 { 1083 /* too much data */ 1084 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1086 goto f_err; 1087 } 1088 1089 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 1090 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 1091 cookie_len > 0) 1092 { 1093 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 1094 1095 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) 1096 { 1097 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 1098 cookie_len) == 0) 1099 { 1100 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1102 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1103 goto f_err; 1104 } 1105 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 1106 } 1107 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 1108 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */ 1109 { 1110 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1112 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1113 goto f_err; 1114 } 1115 1116 ret = 2; 1117 } 1118 1119 p += cookie_len; 1120 } 1121 1122 n2s(p,i); 1123 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) 1124 { 1125 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ 1126 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 1128 goto f_err; 1129 } 1130 if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) 1131 { 1132 /* not enough data */ 1133 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1135 goto f_err; 1136 } 1137 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers)) 1138 == NULL)) 1139 { 1140 goto err; 1141 } 1142 p+=i; 1143 1144 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 1145 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) 1146 { 1147 j=0; 1148 id=s->session->cipher->id; 1149 1150 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1151 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers)); 1152 #endif 1153 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) 1154 { 1155 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i); 1156 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1157 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 1158 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 1159 #endif 1160 if (c->id == id) 1161 { 1162 j=1; 1163 break; 1164 } 1165 } 1166 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade 1167 * attack: CVE-2010-4180. 1168 */ 1169 #if 0 1170 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) 1171 { 1172 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may 1173 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to 1174 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server 1175 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not 1176 * enabled, though. */ 1177 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 1178 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) 1179 { 1180 s->session->cipher = c; 1181 j = 1; 1182 } 1183 } 1184 #endif 1185 if (j == 0) 1186 { 1187 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher 1188 * list if we are asked to reuse it */ 1189 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1191 goto f_err; 1192 } 1193 } 1194 1195 /* compression */ 1196 i= *(p++); 1197 if ((p+i) > (d+n)) 1198 { 1199 /* not enough data */ 1200 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1202 goto f_err; 1203 } 1204 q=p; 1205 for (j=0; j<i; j++) 1206 { 1207 if (p[j] == 0) break; 1208 } 1209 1210 p+=i; 1211 if (j >= i) 1212 { 1213 /* no compress */ 1214 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1216 goto f_err; 1217 } 1218 1219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1220 /* TLS extensions*/ 1221 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) 1222 { 1223 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) 1224 { 1225 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ 1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1227 goto f_err; 1228 } 1229 } 1230 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1232 goto err; 1233 } 1234 1235 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this 1236 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate 1237 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow 1238 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */ 1239 { 1240 unsigned char *pos; 1241 pos=s->s3->server_random; 1242 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) 1243 { 1244 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1245 goto f_err; 1246 } 1247 } 1248 1249 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) 1250 { 1251 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; 1252 1253 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1254 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, 1255 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) 1256 { 1257 s->hit=1; 1258 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; 1259 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK; 1260 1261 ciphers=NULL; 1262 1263 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1264 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1265 if (pref_cipher == NULL) 1266 { 1267 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1269 goto f_err; 1270 } 1271 1272 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher; 1273 1274 if (s->cipher_list) 1275 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1276 1277 if (s->cipher_list_by_id) 1278 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1279 1280 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1281 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1282 } 1283 } 1284 #endif 1285 1286 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1287 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 1288 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ 1289 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; 1290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1291 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1292 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) 1293 { 1294 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1295 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1296 /* Can't disable compression */ 1297 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) 1298 { 1299 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1301 goto f_err; 1302 } 1303 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 1304 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) 1305 { 1306 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); 1307 if (comp_id == comp->id) 1308 { 1309 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; 1310 break; 1311 } 1312 } 1313 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1314 { 1315 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1317 goto f_err; 1318 } 1319 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 1320 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) 1321 { 1322 if (q[m] == comp_id) 1323 break; 1324 } 1325 if (m >= i) 1326 { 1327 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 1329 goto f_err; 1330 } 1331 } 1332 else if (s->hit) 1333 comp = NULL; 1334 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) 1335 { /* See if we have a match */ 1336 int m,nn,o,v,done=0; 1337 1338 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1339 for (m=0; m<nn; m++) 1340 { 1341 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); 1342 v=comp->id; 1343 for (o=0; o<i; o++) 1344 { 1345 if (v == q[o]) 1346 { 1347 done=1; 1348 break; 1349 } 1350 } 1351 if (done) break; 1352 } 1353 if (done) 1354 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; 1355 else 1356 comp=NULL; 1357 } 1358 #else 1359 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 1360 * using compression. 1361 */ 1362 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) 1363 { 1364 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1366 goto f_err; 1367 } 1368 #endif 1369 1370 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must 1371 * pick a cipher */ 1372 1373 if (!s->hit) 1374 { 1375 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1376 s->session->compress_meth=0; 1377 #else 1378 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id; 1379 #endif 1380 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 1381 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1382 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; 1383 if (ciphers == NULL) 1384 { 1385 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); 1387 goto f_err; 1388 } 1389 ciphers=NULL; 1390 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers, 1391 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1392 1393 if (c == NULL) 1394 { 1395 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1397 goto f_err; 1398 } 1399 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; 1400 } 1401 else 1402 { 1403 /* Session-id reuse */ 1404 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 1405 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1406 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL; 1407 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL; 1408 1409 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 1410 { 1411 sk=s->session->ciphers; 1412 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) 1413 { 1414 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); 1415 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) 1416 nc=c; 1417 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 1418 ec=c; 1419 } 1420 if (nc != NULL) 1421 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc; 1422 else if (ec != NULL) 1423 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec; 1424 else 1425 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1426 } 1427 else 1428 #endif 1429 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1430 } 1431 1432 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) 1433 { 1434 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 1435 { 1436 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1437 goto f_err; 1438 } 1439 } 1440 1441 /* we now have the following setup. 1442 * client_random 1443 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1444 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1445 * compression - basically ignored right now 1446 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1447 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1448 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1449 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1450 */ 1451 1452 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1453 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) 1454 { 1455 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) 1456 { 1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1458 goto err; 1459 } 1460 } 1461 1462 if (ret < 0) ret=1; 1463 if (0) 1464 { 1465 f_err: 1466 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1467 } 1468 err: 1469 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1470 return(ret); 1471 } 1472 1473 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1474 { 1475 unsigned char *buf; 1476 unsigned char *p,*d; 1477 int i,sl; 1478 unsigned long l; 1479 1480 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1481 { 1482 /* We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order 1483 * to avoid a known attack while we fix ChannelID itself. */ 1484 if (s->s3 && 1485 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid && 1486 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kEECDH) == 0) 1487 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; 1488 1489 /* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't 1490 * support ChannelID then we didn't record the original 1491 * handshake hashes in the session and so cannot resume with 1492 * ChannelIDs. */ 1493 if (s->hit && 1494 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new && 1495 s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) 1496 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; 1497 1498 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1499 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1500 p=s->s3->server_random; 1501 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) 1502 return -1; 1503 #endif 1504 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1505 d=p= &(buf[4]); 1506 1507 *(p++)=s->version>>8; 1508 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; 1509 1510 /* Random stuff */ 1511 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1512 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1513 1514 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send 1515 * back in the server hello: 1516 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 1517 * we send back the old session ID. 1518 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 1519 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 1520 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 1521 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 1522 * session ID. 1523 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 1524 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 1525 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 1526 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 1527 * to send back. 1528 */ 1529 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1530 && !s->hit) 1531 s->session->session_id_length=0; 1532 1533 sl=s->session->session_id_length; 1534 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) 1535 { 1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1537 return -1; 1538 } 1539 *(p++)=sl; 1540 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); 1541 p+=sl; 1542 1543 /* put the cipher */ 1544 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); 1545 p+=i; 1546 1547 /* put the compression method */ 1548 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1549 *(p++)=0; 1550 #else 1551 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1552 *(p++)=0; 1553 else 1554 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1555 #endif 1556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1557 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) 1558 { 1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 1560 return -1; 1561 } 1562 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1563 { 1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1565 return -1; 1566 } 1567 #endif 1568 /* do the header */ 1569 l=(p-d); 1570 d=buf; 1571 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1572 l2n3(l,d); 1573 1574 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; 1575 /* number of bytes to write */ 1576 s->init_num=p-buf; 1577 s->init_off=0; 1578 } 1579 1580 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1581 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1582 } 1583 1584 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1585 { 1586 unsigned char *p; 1587 1588 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) 1589 { 1590 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1591 1592 /* do the header */ 1593 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1594 *(p++)=0; 1595 *(p++)=0; 1596 *(p++)=0; 1597 1598 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1599 /* number of bytes to write */ 1600 s->init_num=4; 1601 s->init_off=0; 1602 } 1603 1604 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1605 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1606 } 1607 1608 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1609 { 1610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1611 unsigned char *q; 1612 int j,num; 1613 RSA *rsa; 1614 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1615 unsigned int u; 1616 #endif 1617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1618 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; 1619 #endif 1620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1621 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; 1622 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1623 int encodedlen = 0; 1624 int curve_id = 0; 1625 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1626 #endif 1627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1628 const char* psk_identity_hint; 1629 size_t psk_identity_hint_len; 1630 #endif 1631 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1632 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1633 unsigned char *p,*d; 1634 int al,i; 1635 unsigned long alg_k; 1636 unsigned long alg_a; 1637 int n; 1638 CERT *cert; 1639 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1640 int nr[4],kn; 1641 BUF_MEM *buf; 1642 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1643 1644 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1645 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) 1646 { 1647 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1648 alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1649 cert=s->cert; 1650 1651 buf=s->init_buf; 1652 1653 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; 1654 n=0; 1655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1656 if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) 1657 { 1658 /* size for PSK identity hint */ 1659 psk_identity_hint = s->session->psk_identity_hint; 1660 if (psk_identity_hint) 1661 psk_identity_hint_len = strlen(psk_identity_hint); 1662 else 1663 psk_identity_hint_len = 0; 1664 n+=2+psk_identity_hint_len; 1665 } 1666 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1668 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 1669 { 1670 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; 1671 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1672 { 1673 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1674 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1675 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1676 if(rsa == NULL) 1677 { 1678 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1680 goto f_err; 1681 } 1682 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1683 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; 1684 } 1685 if (rsa == NULL) 1686 { 1687 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1689 goto f_err; 1690 } 1691 r[0]=rsa->n; 1692 r[1]=rsa->e; 1693 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 1694 } 1695 #endif 1696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1697 else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) 1698 { 1699 dhp=cert->dh_tmp; 1700 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1701 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1702 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1703 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1704 if (dhp == NULL) 1705 { 1706 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1708 goto f_err; 1709 } 1710 1711 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 1712 { 1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1714 goto err; 1715 } 1716 1717 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) 1718 { 1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1720 goto err; 1721 } 1722 1723 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; 1724 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || 1725 dhp->priv_key == NULL || 1726 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) 1727 { 1728 if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) 1729 { 1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1731 ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1732 goto err; 1733 } 1734 } 1735 else 1736 { 1737 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); 1738 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); 1739 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || 1740 (dh->priv_key == NULL)) 1741 { 1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1743 goto err; 1744 } 1745 } 1746 r[0]=dh->p; 1747 r[1]=dh->g; 1748 r[2]=dh->pub_key; 1749 } 1750 #endif 1751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1752 else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 1753 { 1754 const EC_GROUP *group; 1755 1756 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; 1757 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1758 { 1759 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1760 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1761 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1762 } 1763 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1764 { 1765 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1767 goto f_err; 1768 } 1769 1770 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) 1771 { 1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1773 goto err; 1774 } 1775 1776 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1777 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1778 { 1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1780 goto err; 1781 } 1782 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) 1783 { 1784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1785 goto err; 1786 } 1787 1788 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; 1789 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1790 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1791 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) 1792 { 1793 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) 1794 { 1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1796 goto err; 1797 } 1798 } 1799 1800 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1801 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1802 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) 1803 { 1804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1805 goto err; 1806 } 1807 1808 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1809 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 1810 { 1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1812 goto err; 1813 } 1814 1815 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH 1816 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 1817 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. 1818 */ 1819 if ((curve_id = 1820 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1821 == 0) 1822 { 1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1824 goto err; 1825 } 1826 1827 /* Encode the public key. 1828 * First check the size of encoding and 1829 * allocate memory accordingly. 1830 */ 1831 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1832 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1833 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1834 NULL, 0, NULL); 1835 1836 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1837 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 1838 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1839 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) 1840 { 1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1842 goto err; 1843 } 1844 1845 1846 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1847 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1848 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1849 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1850 1851 if (encodedlen == 0) 1852 { 1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1854 goto err; 1855 } 1856 1857 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; 1858 1859 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 1860 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1861 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes 1862 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1863 * structure. 1864 */ 1865 n += 4 + encodedlen; 1866 1867 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message 1868 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs 1869 */ 1870 r[0]=NULL; 1871 r[1]=NULL; 1872 r[2]=NULL; 1873 r[3]=NULL; 1874 } 1875 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1877 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 1878 { 1879 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || 1880 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || 1881 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || 1882 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) 1883 { 1884 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); 1885 goto err; 1886 } 1887 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N; 1888 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g; 1889 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s; 1890 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B; 1891 } 1892 #endif 1893 else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) 1894 { 1895 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1897 goto f_err; 1898 } 1899 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) 1900 { 1901 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1903 if ((i == 2) && (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)) 1904 n+=1+nr[i]; 1905 else 1906 #endif 1907 n+=2+nr[i]; 1908 } 1909 1910 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) 1911 /* Among PSK ciphersuites only RSA uses a certificate */ 1912 && !((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && !(alg_k & SSL_kRSA))) 1913 { 1914 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md)) 1915 == NULL) 1916 { 1917 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1918 goto f_err; 1919 } 1920 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1921 } 1922 else 1923 { 1924 pkey=NULL; 1925 kn=0; 1926 } 1927 1928 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn)) 1929 { 1930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); 1931 goto err; 1932 } 1933 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1934 p= &(d[4]); 1935 1936 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) 1937 { 1938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1939 if ((i == 2) && (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)) 1940 { 1941 *p = nr[i]; 1942 p++; 1943 } 1944 else 1945 #endif 1946 s2n(nr[i],p); 1947 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); 1948 p+=nr[i]; 1949 } 1950 1951 /* Note: ECDHE PSK ciphersuites use SSL_kEECDH and SSL_aPSK. 1952 * When one of them is used, the server key exchange record needs to have both 1953 * the psk_identity_hint and the ServerECDHParams. */ 1954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1955 if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) 1956 { 1957 /* copy PSK identity hint (if provided) */ 1958 s2n(psk_identity_hint_len, p); 1959 if (psk_identity_hint_len > 0) 1960 { 1961 memcpy(p, psk_identity_hint, psk_identity_hint_len); 1962 p+=psk_identity_hint_len; 1963 } 1964 } 1965 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1966 1967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1968 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 1969 { 1970 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. 1971 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: 1972 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 1973 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by 1974 * the actual encoded point itself 1975 */ 1976 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1977 p += 1; 1978 *p = 0; 1979 p += 1; 1980 *p = curve_id; 1981 p += 1; 1982 *p = encodedlen; 1983 p += 1; 1984 memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 1985 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 1986 encodedlen); 1987 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1988 encodedPoint = NULL; 1989 p += encodedlen; 1990 } 1991 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1992 1993 /* not anonymous */ 1994 if (pkey != NULL) 1995 { 1996 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) 1997 * and p points to the space at the end. */ 1998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1999 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA 2000 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) 2001 { 2002 q=md_buf; 2003 j=0; 2004 for (num=2; num > 0; num--) 2005 { 2006 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, 2007 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 2008 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) 2009 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); 2010 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 2011 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 2012 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 2013 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, 2014 (unsigned int *)&i); 2015 q+=i; 2016 j+=i; 2017 } 2018 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 2019 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) 2020 { 2021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA); 2022 goto err; 2023 } 2024 s2n(u,p); 2025 n+=u+2; 2026 } 2027 else 2028 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 2029 if (md) 2030 { 2031 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature 2032 * algorithm */ 2033 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 2034 { 2035 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) 2036 { 2037 /* Should never happen */ 2038 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2040 goto f_err; 2041 } 2042 p+=2; 2043 } 2044 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG 2045 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", 2046 EVP_MD_name(md)); 2047 #endif 2048 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); 2049 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 2050 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 2051 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 2052 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), 2053 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) 2054 { 2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP); 2056 goto err; 2057 } 2058 s2n(i,p); 2059 n+=i+2; 2060 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 2061 n+= 2; 2062 } 2063 else 2064 { 2065 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 2066 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 2068 goto f_err; 2069 } 2070 } 2071 2072 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 2073 l2n3(n,d); 2074 2075 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 2076 * it off */ 2077 s->init_num=n+4; 2078 s->init_off=0; 2079 } 2080 2081 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 2082 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2083 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2084 f_err: 2085 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2086 err: 2087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2088 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2089 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2090 #endif 2091 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2092 return(-1); 2093 } 2094 2095 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 2096 { 2097 unsigned char *p,*d; 2098 int i,j,nl,off,n; 2099 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; 2100 X509_NAME *name; 2101 BUF_MEM *buf; 2102 2103 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) 2104 { 2105 buf=s->init_buf; 2106 2107 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); 2108 2109 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 2110 p++; 2111 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); 2112 d[0]=n; 2113 p+=n; 2114 n++; 2115 2116 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 2117 { 2118 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2); 2119 s2n(nl, p); 2120 p += nl + 2; 2121 n += nl + 2; 2122 } 2123 2124 off=n; 2125 p+=2; 2126 n+=2; 2127 2128 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 2129 nl=0; 2130 if (sk != NULL) 2131 { 2132 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) 2133 { 2134 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); 2135 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL); 2136 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2)) 2137 { 2138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2139 goto err; 2140 } 2141 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]); 2142 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) 2143 { 2144 s2n(j,p); 2145 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 2146 n+=2+j; 2147 nl+=2+j; 2148 } 2149 else 2150 { 2151 d=p; 2152 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 2153 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; 2154 n+=j; 2155 nl+=j; 2156 } 2157 } 2158 } 2159 /* else no CA names */ 2160 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]); 2161 s2n(nl,p); 2162 2163 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; 2164 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 2165 l2n3(n,d); 2166 2167 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 2168 * it off */ 2169 2170 s->init_num=n+4; 2171 s->init_off=0; 2172 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 2173 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) 2174 { 2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2176 goto err; 2177 } 2178 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 2179 2180 /* do the header */ 2181 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 2182 *(p++)=0; 2183 *(p++)=0; 2184 *(p++)=0; 2185 s->init_num += 4; 2186 #endif 2187 2188 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 2189 } 2190 2191 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 2192 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2193 err: 2194 return(-1); 2195 } 2196 2197 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 2198 { 2199 int i,al,ok; 2200 long n; 2201 unsigned long alg_k; 2202 unsigned long alg_a; 2203 unsigned char *p; 2204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2205 RSA *rsa=NULL; 2206 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 2207 #endif 2208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2209 BIGNUM *pub=NULL; 2210 DH *dh_srvr; 2211 #endif 2212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2213 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 2214 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2215 2216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2217 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 2218 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 2219 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 2220 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 2221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2222 unsigned int psk_len = 0; 2223 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; 2224 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 2225 #endif 2226 2227 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2228 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 2229 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 2230 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2231 2048, /* ??? */ 2232 &ok); 2233 2234 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2235 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2236 2237 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2238 alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2239 2240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2241 if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) 2242 { 2243 unsigned char *t = NULL; 2244 unsigned char pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; 2245 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0; 2246 int psk_err = 1; 2247 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; 2248 2249 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2250 2251 n2s(p, i); 2252 if (n != i+2 && !(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)) 2253 { 2254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2255 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2256 goto psk_err; 2257 } 2258 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) 2259 { 2260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2261 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2262 goto psk_err; 2263 } 2264 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) 2265 { 2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2267 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2268 goto psk_err; 2269 } 2270 2271 /* Create guaranteed NUL-terminated identity 2272 * string for the callback */ 2273 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); 2274 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i); 2275 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, psk, sizeof(psk)); 2276 2277 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) 2278 { 2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2280 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2281 goto psk_err; 2282 } 2283 else if (psk_len == 0) 2284 { 2285 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */ 2286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2287 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2288 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 2289 goto psk_err; 2290 } 2291 if (!(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)) 2292 { 2293 /* Create the shared secret now if we're not using ECDHE-PSK.*/ 2294 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len; 2295 t = pre_ms; 2296 s2n(psk_len, t); 2297 memset(t, 0, psk_len); 2298 t+=psk_len; 2299 s2n(psk_len, t); 2300 memcpy(t, psk, psk_len); 2301 2302 s->session->master_key_length= 2303 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2304 s->session->master_key, pre_ms, pre_ms_len); 2305 } 2306 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) 2307 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); 2308 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(tmp_id); 2309 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1); 2310 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) 2311 { 2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2313 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2314 goto psk_err; 2315 } 2316 2317 p += i; 2318 n -= (i + 2); 2319 psk_err = 0; 2320 psk_err: 2321 OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, sizeof(pre_ms)); 2322 if (psk_err != 0) 2323 goto f_err; 2324 } 2325 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 2326 if (0) {} 2327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2328 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 2329 { 2330 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 2331 int decrypt_len; 2332 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; 2333 2334 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 2335 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) 2336 { 2337 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 2338 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp; 2339 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should 2340 * be sent already */ 2341 if (rsa == NULL) 2342 { 2343 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 2345 goto f_err; 2346 2347 } 2348 } 2349 else 2350 { 2351 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 2352 if ( (pkey == NULL) || 2353 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || 2354 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) 2355 { 2356 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2358 goto f_err; 2359 } 2360 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; 2361 } 2362 2363 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ 2364 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 2365 { 2366 n2s(p,i); 2367 if (n != i+2) 2368 { 2369 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) 2370 { 2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2372 goto err; 2373 } 2374 else 2375 p-=2; 2376 } 2377 else 2378 n=i; 2379 } 2380 2381 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because 2382 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see 2383 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of 2384 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the 2385 * case that the decrypt fails. See 2386 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ 2387 2388 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */ 2389 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, 2390 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) 2391 goto err; 2392 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 2393 ERR_clear_error(); 2394 2395 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. 2396 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */ 2397 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 2398 2399 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct 2400 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. 2401 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 2402 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version 2403 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks 2404 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other 2405 * decryption error. */ 2406 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8)); 2407 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff)); 2408 2409 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as 2410 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks 2411 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for 2412 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the 2413 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not 2414 * support the requested protocol version. If 2415 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ 2416 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) 2417 { 2418 unsigned char workaround_good; 2419 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8)); 2420 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff)); 2421 version_good |= workaround_good; 2422 } 2423 2424 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good 2425 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */ 2426 decrypt_good &= version_good; 2427 2428 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using 2429 * decrypt_good_mask. */ 2430 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++) 2431 { 2432 p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i], 2433 rand_premaster_secret[i]); 2434 } 2435 2436 s->session->master_key_length= 2437 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2438 s->session->master_key, 2439 p,i); 2440 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 2441 } 2442 #endif 2443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2444 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) 2445 { 2446 n2s(p,i); 2447 if (n != i+2) 2448 { 2449 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) 2450 { 2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2452 goto err; 2453 } 2454 else 2455 { 2456 p-=2; 2457 i=(int)n; 2458 } 2459 } 2460 2461 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */ 2462 { 2463 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); 2465 goto f_err; 2466 } 2467 else 2468 { 2469 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) 2470 { 2471 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2473 goto f_err; 2474 } 2475 else 2476 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; 2477 } 2478 2479 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL); 2480 if (pub == NULL) 2481 { 2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB); 2483 goto err; 2484 } 2485 2486 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr); 2487 2488 if (i <= 0) 2489 { 2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 2491 BN_clear_free(pub); 2492 goto err; 2493 } 2494 2495 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 2496 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; 2497 2498 BN_clear_free(pub); 2499 pub=NULL; 2500 s->session->master_key_length= 2501 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2502 s->session->master_key,p,i); 2503 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 2504 } 2505 #endif 2506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2507 else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) 2508 { 2509 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 2510 krb5_data enc_ticket; 2511 krb5_data authenticator; 2512 krb5_data enc_pms; 2513 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 2514 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 2515 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 2516 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2517 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 2518 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 2519 int padl, outl; 2520 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 2521 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 2522 2523 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 2524 2525 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 2526 2527 n2s(p,i); 2528 enc_ticket.length = i; 2529 2530 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) 2531 { 2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2533 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2534 goto err; 2535 } 2536 2537 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 2538 p+=enc_ticket.length; 2539 2540 n2s(p,i); 2541 authenticator.length = i; 2542 2543 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) 2544 { 2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2546 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2547 goto err; 2548 } 2549 2550 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 2551 p+=authenticator.length; 2552 2553 n2s(p,i); 2554 enc_pms.length = i; 2555 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 2556 p+=enc_pms.length; 2557 2558 /* Note that the length is checked again below, 2559 ** after decryption 2560 */ 2561 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) 2562 { 2563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2564 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2565 goto err; 2566 } 2567 2568 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 2569 enc_pms.length + 6)) 2570 { 2571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2572 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2573 goto err; 2574 } 2575 2576 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 2577 &kssl_err)) != 0) 2578 { 2579 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2580 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 2581 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2582 if (kssl_err.text) 2583 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2584 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2586 kssl_err.reason); 2587 goto err; 2588 } 2589 2590 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, 2591 ** but will return authtime == 0. 2592 */ 2593 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 2594 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) 2595 { 2596 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2597 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 2598 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2599 if (kssl_err.text) 2600 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2601 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2603 kssl_err.reason); 2604 goto err; 2605 } 2606 2607 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) 2608 { 2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 2610 goto err; 2611 } 2612 2613 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2614 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 2615 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2616 2617 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 2618 if (enc == NULL) 2619 goto err; 2620 2621 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 2622 2623 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv)) 2624 { 2625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2626 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2627 goto err; 2628 } 2629 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl, 2630 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 2631 { 2632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2633 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2634 goto err; 2635 } 2636 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2637 { 2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2639 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2640 goto err; 2641 } 2642 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl)) 2643 { 2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2645 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2646 goto err; 2647 } 2648 outl += padl; 2649 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2650 { 2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2652 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2653 goto err; 2654 } 2655 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 2656 { 2657 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2658 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2659 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2660 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of 2661 * the protocol version. 2662 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2663 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher) 2664 */ 2665 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) 2666 { 2667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2668 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2669 goto err; 2670 } 2671 } 2672 2673 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2674 2675 s->session->master_key_length= 2676 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2677 s->session->master_key, pms, outl); 2678 2679 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) 2680 { 2681 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2682 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 2683 { 2684 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2685 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len); 2686 } 2687 } 2688 2689 2690 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2691 ** but it caused problems for apache. 2692 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2693 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2694 */ 2695 } 2696 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2698 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) 2699 { 2700 int ret = 1; 2701 int field_size = 0; 2702 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2703 const EC_GROUP *group; 2704 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2706 unsigned char *pre_ms; 2707 unsigned int pre_ms_len; 2708 unsigned char *t; 2709 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 2710 2711 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2712 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 2713 { 2714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2715 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2716 goto err; 2717 } 2718 2719 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2720 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) 2721 { 2722 /* use the certificate */ 2723 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2724 } 2725 else 2726 { 2727 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when 2728 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. 2729 */ 2730 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2731 } 2732 2733 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2734 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2735 2736 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2737 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) 2738 { 2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2740 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2741 goto err; 2742 } 2743 2744 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2745 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) 2746 { 2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2748 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2749 goto err; 2750 } 2751 2752 if (n == 0L) 2753 { 2754 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2755 2756 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 2757 { 2758 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2760 goto f_err; 2761 } 2762 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2763 == NULL) || 2764 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) 2765 { 2766 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client 2767 * authentication using ECDH certificates 2768 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is 2769 * never executed. When that support is 2770 * added, we ought to ensure the key 2771 * received in the certificate is 2772 * authorized for key agreement. 2773 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that 2774 * the two ECDH shares are for the same 2775 * group. 2776 */ 2777 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2779 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2780 goto f_err; 2781 } 2782 2783 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2784 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0) 2785 { 2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2787 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2788 goto err; 2789 } 2790 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2791 } 2792 else 2793 { 2794 /* Get client's public key from encoded point 2795 * in the ClientKeyExchange message. 2796 */ 2797 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) 2798 { 2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2800 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2801 goto err; 2802 } 2803 2804 /* Get encoded point length */ 2805 i = *p; 2806 p += 1; 2807 if (n != 1 + i) 2808 { 2809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2810 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2811 goto err; 2812 } 2813 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 2814 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) 2815 { 2816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2817 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2818 goto err; 2819 } 2820 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer 2821 * currently, so set it to the start 2822 */ 2823 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2824 } 2825 2826 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2827 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2828 if (field_size <= 0) 2829 { 2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2831 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2832 goto err; 2833 } 2834 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); 2835 if (i <= 0) 2836 { 2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2838 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2839 goto err; 2840 } 2841 2842 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2843 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2844 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2845 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2846 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 2847 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 2848 2849 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2850 /* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5489 */ 2851 if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && psk_len != 0) 2852 { 2853 pre_ms_len = 2+i+2+psk_len; 2854 pre_ms = OPENSSL_malloc(pre_ms_len); 2855 if (pre_ms == NULL) 2856 { 2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2858 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2859 goto err; 2860 } 2861 memset(pre_ms, 0, pre_ms_len); 2862 t = pre_ms; 2863 s2n(i, t); 2864 memcpy(t, p, i); 2865 t += i; 2866 s2n(psk_len, t); 2867 memcpy(t, psk, psk_len); 2868 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \ 2869 -> generate_master_secret(s, 2870 s->session->master_key, pre_ms, pre_ms_len); 2871 OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, pre_ms_len); 2872 OPENSSL_free(pre_ms); 2873 } 2874 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 2875 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aPSK)) 2876 { 2877 /* Compute the master secret */ 2878 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \ 2879 -> generate_master_secret(s, 2880 s->session->master_key, p, i); 2881 } 2882 2883 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2884 } 2885 #endif 2886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2887 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 2888 { 2889 int param_len; 2890 2891 n2s(p,i); 2892 param_len=i+2; 2893 if (param_len > n) 2894 { 2895 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); 2897 goto f_err; 2898 } 2899 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) 2900 { 2901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2902 goto err; 2903 } 2904 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) 2905 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 2906 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 2907 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) 2908 { 2909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2910 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2911 goto err; 2912 } 2913 2914 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0) 2915 { 2916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2917 goto err; 2918 } 2919 2920 p+=i; 2921 } 2922 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ 2923 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) 2924 { 2925 int ret = 0; 2926 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 2927 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 2928 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; 2929 size_t outlen=32, inlen; 2930 unsigned long alg_a; 2931 int Ttag, Tclass; 2932 long Tlen; 2933 2934 /* Get our certificate private key*/ 2935 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2936 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 2937 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; 2938 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 2939 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 2940 2941 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL); 2942 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); 2943 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 2944 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 2945 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use 2946 * a client certificate for authorization only. */ 2947 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2948 if (client_pub_pkey) 2949 { 2950 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 2951 ERR_clear_error(); 2952 } 2953 /* Decrypt session key */ 2954 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || 2955 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || 2956 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) 2957 { 2958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2959 goto gerr; 2960 } 2961 start = p; 2962 inlen = Tlen; 2963 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0) 2964 { 2965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2966 goto gerr; 2967 } 2968 /* Generate master secret */ 2969 s->session->master_key_length= 2970 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2971 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32); 2972 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2973 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2974 ret = 2; 2975 else 2976 ret = 1; 2977 gerr: 2978 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2979 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2980 if (ret) 2981 return ret; 2982 else 2983 goto err; 2984 } 2985 else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) 2986 { 2987 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2989 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2990 goto f_err; 2991 } 2992 2993 return(1); 2994 f_err: 2995 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2996 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) 2997 err: 2998 #endif 2999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 3000 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 3001 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 3002 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 3003 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 3004 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 3005 #endif 3006 return(-1); 3007 } 3008 3009 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 3010 { 3011 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 3012 unsigned char *p; 3013 int al,ok,ret=0; 3014 long n; 3015 int type=0,i,j; 3016 X509 *peer; 3017 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 3018 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; 3019 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); 3020 3021 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3022 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 3023 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 3024 -1, 3025 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, 3026 &ok); 3027 3028 if (!ok) return((int)n); 3029 3030 if (s->session->peer != NULL) 3031 { 3032 peer=s->session->peer; 3033 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); 3034 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); 3035 } 3036 else 3037 { 3038 peer=NULL; 3039 pkey=NULL; 3040 } 3041 3042 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) 3043 { 3044 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 3045 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 3046 { 3047 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); 3049 goto f_err; 3050 } 3051 ret=1; 3052 goto end; 3053 } 3054 3055 if (peer == NULL) 3056 { 3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); 3058 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3059 goto f_err; 3060 } 3061 3062 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 3063 { 3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 3065 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 3066 goto f_err; 3067 } 3068 3069 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 3070 { 3071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 3072 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3073 goto f_err; 3074 } 3075 3076 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 3077 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3078 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ 3079 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare 3080 * signature without length field */ 3081 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 3082 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) 3083 { 3084 i=64; 3085 } 3086 else 3087 { 3088 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 3089 { 3090 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); 3091 /* Should never happen */ 3092 if (sigalg == -1) 3093 { 3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3095 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3096 goto f_err; 3097 } 3098 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ 3099 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) 3100 { 3101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 3102 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3103 goto f_err; 3104 } 3105 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); 3106 if (md == NULL) 3107 { 3108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 3109 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3110 goto f_err; 3111 } 3112 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3113 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 3114 #endif 3115 p += 2; 3116 n -= 2; 3117 } 3118 n2s(p,i); 3119 n-=2; 3120 if (i > n) 3121 { 3122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3123 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3124 goto f_err; 3125 } 3126 } 3127 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 3128 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) 3129 { 3130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 3131 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3132 goto f_err; 3133 } 3134 3135 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 3136 { 3137 long hdatalen = 0; 3138 void *hdata; 3139 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 3140 if (hdatalen <= 0) 3141 { 3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3143 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3144 goto f_err; 3145 } 3146 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3147 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", 3148 EVP_MD_name(md)); 3149 #endif 3150 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) 3151 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) 3152 { 3153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3154 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3155 goto f_err; 3156 } 3157 3158 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0) 3159 { 3160 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 3162 goto f_err; 3163 } 3164 } 3165 else 3166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3167 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) 3168 { 3169 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3170 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 3171 pkey->pkey.rsa); 3172 if (i < 0) 3173 { 3174 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 3176 goto f_err; 3177 } 3178 if (i == 0) 3179 { 3180 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 3182 goto f_err; 3183 } 3184 } 3185 else 3186 #endif 3187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3188 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) 3189 { 3190 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3191 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3192 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); 3193 if (j <= 0) 3194 { 3195 /* bad signature */ 3196 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 3198 goto f_err; 3199 } 3200 } 3201 else 3202 #endif 3203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3204 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 3205 { 3206 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3207 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3208 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); 3209 if (j <= 0) 3210 { 3211 /* bad signature */ 3212 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 3214 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3215 goto f_err; 3216 } 3217 } 3218 else 3219 #endif 3220 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) 3221 { unsigned char signature[64]; 3222 int idx; 3223 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL); 3224 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); 3225 if (i!=64) { 3226 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i); 3227 } 3228 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) { 3229 signature[63-idx]=p[idx]; 3230 } 3231 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32); 3232 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3233 if (j<=0) 3234 { 3235 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 3237 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3238 goto f_err; 3239 } 3240 } 3241 else 3242 { 3243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3244 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 3245 goto f_err; 3246 } 3247 3248 3249 ret=1; 3250 if (0) 3251 { 3252 f_err: 3253 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 3254 } 3255 end: 3256 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 3257 { 3258 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); 3259 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; 3260 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 3261 } 3262 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); 3263 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 3264 return(ret); 3265 } 3266 3267 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 3268 { 3269 int i,ok,al,ret= -1; 3270 X509 *x=NULL; 3271 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; 3272 const unsigned char *p,*q; 3273 unsigned char *d; 3274 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; 3275 3276 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3277 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 3278 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 3279 -1, 3280 s->max_cert_list, 3281 &ok); 3282 3283 if (!ok) return((int)n); 3284 3285 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) 3286 { 3287 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3288 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 3289 { 3290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3291 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3292 goto f_err; 3293 } 3294 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ 3295 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 3296 { 3297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 3298 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3299 goto f_err; 3300 } 3301 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 3302 return(1); 3303 } 3304 3305 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) 3306 { 3307 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 3309 goto f_err; 3310 } 3311 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3312 3313 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) 3314 { 3315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3316 goto err; 3317 } 3318 3319 n2l3(p,llen); 3320 if (llen+3 != n) 3321 { 3322 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3324 goto f_err; 3325 } 3326 for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) 3327 { 3328 n2l3(p,l); 3329 if ((l+nc+3) > llen) 3330 { 3331 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3333 goto f_err; 3334 } 3335 3336 q=p; 3337 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l); 3338 if (x == NULL) 3339 { 3340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 3341 goto err; 3342 } 3343 if (p != (q+l)) 3344 { 3345 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3347 goto f_err; 3348 } 3349 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) 3350 { 3351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3352 goto err; 3353 } 3354 x=NULL; 3355 nc+=l+3; 3356 } 3357 3358 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) 3359 { 3360 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 3361 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) 3362 { 3363 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 3365 goto f_err; 3366 } 3367 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 3368 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3369 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 3370 { 3371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3372 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3373 goto f_err; 3374 } 3375 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 3376 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 3377 { 3378 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3379 goto f_err; 3380 } 3381 } 3382 else 3383 { 3384 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); 3385 if (i <= 0) 3386 { 3387 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 3388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 3389 goto f_err; 3390 } 3391 } 3392 3393 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 3394 X509_free(s->session->peer); 3395 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); 3396 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 3397 3398 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL 3399 * when we arrive here. */ 3400 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 3401 { 3402 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 3403 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 3404 { 3405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3406 goto err; 3407 } 3408 } 3409 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 3410 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 3411 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; 3412 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the 3413 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ 3414 3415 sk=NULL; 3416 3417 ret=1; 3418 if (0) 3419 { 3420 f_err: 3421 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 3422 } 3423 err: 3424 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); 3425 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); 3426 return(ret); 3427 } 3428 3429 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 3430 { 3431 unsigned long l; 3432 X509 *x; 3433 3434 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) 3435 { 3436 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); 3437 if (x == NULL) 3438 { 3439 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 3440 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || 3441 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) 3442 { 3443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3444 return(0); 3445 } 3446 } 3447 3448 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x); 3449 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 3450 s->init_num=(int)l; 3451 s->init_off=0; 3452 } 3453 3454 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 3455 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3456 } 3457 3458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 3459 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ 3460 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 3461 { 3462 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) 3463 { 3464 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; 3465 const unsigned char *const_p; 3466 int len, slen_full, slen; 3467 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3468 unsigned int hlen; 3469 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3470 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3471 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3472 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3473 unsigned char key_name[16]; 3474 3475 /* get session encoding length */ 3476 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3477 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is 3478 * too long 3479 */ 3480 if (slen_full > 0xFF00) 3481 return -1; 3482 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); 3483 if (!senc) 3484 return -1; 3485 p = senc; 3486 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); 3487 3488 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */ 3489 const_p = senc; 3490 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 3491 if (sess == NULL) 3492 { 3493 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3494 return -1; 3495 } 3496 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ 3497 3498 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 3499 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */ 3500 { 3501 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3502 return -1; 3503 } 3504 p = senc; 3505 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); 3506 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3507 3508 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3509 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length 3510 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 3511 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 3512 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 3513 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 3514 */ 3515 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 3516 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + 3517 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 3518 return -1; 3519 3520 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3521 /* do the header */ 3522 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; 3523 /* Skip message length for now */ 3524 p += 3; 3525 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3526 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3527 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present 3528 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values 3529 * from parent ctx. 3530 */ 3531 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 3532 { 3533 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, 3534 &hctx, 1) < 0) 3535 { 3536 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3537 return -1; 3538 } 3539 } 3540 else 3541 { 3542 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); 3543 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3544 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); 3545 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3546 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 3547 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 3548 } 3549 3550 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): 3551 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity), 3552 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long 3553 * as their sessions. */ 3554 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); 3555 3556 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 3557 p += 2; 3558 /* Output key name */ 3559 macstart = p; 3560 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 3561 p += 16; 3562 /* output IV */ 3563 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 3564 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3565 /* Encrypt session data */ 3566 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); 3567 p += len; 3568 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); 3569 p += len; 3570 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3571 3572 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); 3573 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); 3574 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3575 3576 p += hlen; 3577 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 3578 /* Total length */ 3579 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3580 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; 3581 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ 3582 p += 4; 3583 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ 3584 3585 /* number of bytes to write */ 3586 s->init_num= len; 3587 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 3588 s->init_off=0; 3589 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3590 } 3591 3592 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 3593 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3594 } 3595 3596 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 3597 { 3598 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) 3599 { 3600 unsigned char *p; 3601 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3602 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + 3603 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 3604 * + (ocsp response) 3605 */ 3606 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) 3607 return -1; 3608 3609 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3610 3611 /* do the header */ 3612 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 3613 /* message length */ 3614 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); 3615 /* status type */ 3616 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; 3617 /* length of OCSP response */ 3618 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 3619 /* actual response */ 3620 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 3621 /* number of bytes to write */ 3622 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; 3623 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 3624 s->init_off = 0; 3625 } 3626 3627 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 3628 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3629 } 3630 3631 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 3632 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It 3633 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */ 3634 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) 3635 { 3636 int ok; 3637 int proto_len, padding_len; 3638 long n; 3639 const unsigned char *p; 3640 3641 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the 3642 * extension in their ClientHello */ 3643 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 3644 { 3645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); 3646 return -1; 3647 } 3648 3649 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3650 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, 3651 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, 3652 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 3653 514, /* See the payload format below */ 3654 &ok); 3655 3656 if (!ok) 3657 return((int)n); 3658 3659 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received 3660 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset 3661 * by ssl3_get_finished). */ 3662 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 3663 { 3664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); 3665 return -1; 3666 } 3667 3668 if (n < 2) 3669 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ 3670 3671 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3672 3673 /* The payload looks like: 3674 * uint8 proto_len; 3675 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; 3676 * uint8 padding_len; 3677 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; 3678 */ 3679 proto_len = p[0]; 3680 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) 3681 return 0; 3682 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; 3683 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) 3684 return 0; 3685 3686 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); 3687 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) 3688 { 3689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3690 return 0; 3691 } 3692 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); 3693 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; 3694 3695 return 1; 3696 } 3697 # endif 3698 3699 /* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */ 3700 int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *s) 3701 { 3702 int ret = -1, ok; 3703 long n; 3704 const unsigned char *p; 3705 unsigned short extension_type, extension_len; 3706 EC_GROUP* p256 = NULL; 3707 EC_KEY* key = NULL; 3708 EC_POINT* point = NULL; 3709 ECDSA_SIG sig; 3710 BIGNUM x, y; 3711 unsigned short expected_extension_type; 3712 3713 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A && s->init_num == 0) 3714 { 3715 /* The first time that we're called we take the current 3716 * handshake hash and store it. */ 3717 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 3718 unsigned int len; 3719 3720 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 3721 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL); 3722 if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s)) 3723 return -1; 3724 len = sizeof(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id); 3725 EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, &len); 3726 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 3727 } 3728 3729 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3730 SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A, 3731 SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B, 3732 SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, 3733 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, 3734 &ok); 3735 3736 if (!ok) 3737 return((int)n); 3738 3739 ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char*)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4); 3740 3741 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received 3742 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset 3743 * by ssl3_get_finished). */ 3744 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 3745 { 3746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS); 3747 return -1; 3748 } 3749 3750 if (n != 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE) 3751 { 3752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE); 3753 return -1; 3754 } 3755 3756 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3757 3758 /* The payload looks like: 3759 * uint16 extension_type 3760 * uint16 extension_len; 3761 * uint8 x[32]; 3762 * uint8 y[32]; 3763 * uint8 r[32]; 3764 * uint8 s[32]; 3765 */ 3766 n2s(p, extension_type); 3767 n2s(p, extension_len); 3768 3769 expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id; 3770 if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) 3771 expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new; 3772 3773 if (extension_type != expected_extension_type || 3774 extension_len != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE) 3775 { 3776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE); 3777 return -1; 3778 } 3779 3780 p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); 3781 if (!p256) 3782 { 3783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT); 3784 return -1; 3785 } 3786 3787 BN_init(&x); 3788 BN_init(&y); 3789 sig.r = BN_new(); 3790 sig.s = BN_new(); 3791 3792 if (BN_bin2bn(p + 0, 32, &x) == NULL || 3793 BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL || 3794 BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL || 3795 BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL) 3796 goto err; 3797 3798 point = EC_POINT_new(p256); 3799 if (!point || 3800 !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL)) 3801 goto err; 3802 3803 key = EC_KEY_new(); 3804 if (!key || 3805 !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) || 3806 !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point)) 3807 goto err; 3808 3809 /* We stored the handshake hash in |tlsext_channel_id| the first time 3810 * that we were called. */ 3811 switch (ECDSA_do_verify(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &sig, key)) { 3812 case 1: 3813 break; 3814 case 0: 3815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID); 3816 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; 3817 goto err; 3818 default: 3819 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; 3820 goto err; 3821 } 3822 3823 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64); 3824 ret = 1; 3825 3826 err: 3827 BN_free(&x); 3828 BN_free(&y); 3829 BN_free(sig.r); 3830 BN_free(sig.s); 3831 if (key) 3832 EC_KEY_free(key); 3833 if (point) 3834 EC_POINT_free(point); 3835 if (p256) 3836 EC_GROUP_free(p256); 3837 return ret; 3838 } 3839 #endif 3840
