1 ### 2 ### A domain for further sandboxing privileged apps. 3 ### 4 type priv_app, domain, domain_deprecated; 5 app_domain(priv_app) 6 # Access the network. 7 net_domain(priv_app) 8 # Access bluetooth. 9 bluetooth_domain(priv_app) 10 11 # webview crash handling depends on self ptrace (b/27697529, b/20150694, b/19277529#comment7) 12 allow priv_app self:process ptrace; 13 14 # Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out 15 # to their sandbox directory and then execute. 16 allow priv_app app_data_file:file rx_file_perms; 17 18 # android.process.media uses /dev/mtp_usb 19 allow priv_app mtp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; 20 21 # Allow the allocation and use of ptys 22 # Used by: https://play.privileged.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm 23 create_pty(priv_app) 24 25 allow priv_app audioserver_service:service_manager find; 26 allow priv_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find; 27 allow priv_app drmserver_service:service_manager find; 28 allow priv_app mediacodec_service:service_manager find; 29 allow priv_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find; 30 allow priv_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find; 31 allow priv_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find; 32 allow priv_app nfc_service:service_manager find; 33 allow priv_app radio_service:service_manager find; 34 allow priv_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find; 35 allow priv_app app_api_service:service_manager find; 36 allow priv_app system_api_service:service_manager find; 37 allow priv_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find; 38 allow priv_app recovery_service:service_manager find; 39 40 # Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon 41 # TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider 42 allow priv_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir search; 43 44 # Write to /cache. 45 allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms; 46 allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file create_file_perms; 47 48 # Write to /data/ota_package for OTA packages. 49 allow priv_app ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms; 50 allow priv_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms; 51 52 # Access to /data/media. 53 allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms; 54 allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms; 55 56 # Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when 57 # running "adb install foo.apk". 58 allow priv_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms; 59 allow priv_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; 60 61 # Allow verifier to access staged apks. 62 allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms; 63 allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms; 64 65 # b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt 66 allow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms; 67 68 # Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored 69 # in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all 70 # data stored in that directory to process them one by one. 71 userdebug_or_eng(` 72 allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms; 73 allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; 74 ') 75 76 # Allow GMS core to scan executables on the system partition 77 allow priv_app exec_type:file { getattr read open }; 78 79 # For AppFuse. 80 allow priv_app vold:fd use; 81 allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write }; 82 allow priv_app app_fuse_file:dir rw_dir_perms; 83 allow priv_app app_fuse_file:file rw_file_perms; 84 85 # /sys access 86 allow priv_app sysfs_zram:dir search; 87 allow priv_app sysfs_zram:file r_file_perms; 88 89 # access the mac address 90 allowxperm priv_app self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCGIFHWADDR; 91 92 # Allow GMS core to communicate with update_engine for A/B update. 93 binder_call(priv_app, update_engine) 94 allow priv_app update_engine_service:service_manager find; 95 96 # Allow Phone to read/write cached ringtones (opened by system). 97 allow priv_app ringtone_file:file { getattr read write }; 98 99 # Access to /data/preloads 100 allow priv_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms; 101 allow priv_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; 102 103 ### 104 ### neverallow rules 105 ### 106 107 # Receive or send uevent messages. 108 neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *; 109 110 # Receive or send generic netlink messages 111 neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_socket *; 112 113 # Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security 114 # best practice to ensure these files aren't readable. 115 neverallow priv_app debugfs:file read; 116 117 # Do not allow privileged apps to register services. 118 # Only trusted components of Android should be registering 119 # services. 120 neverallow priv_app service_manager_type:service_manager add; 121 122 # Do not allow privileged apps to connect to the property service 123 # or set properties. b/10243159 124 neverallow priv_app property_socket:sock_file write; 125 neverallow priv_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto; 126 neverallow priv_app property_type:property_service set; 127 128 # Do not allow priv_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject. 129 # This would undermine the per-user isolation model being 130 # enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls 131 # constraints. As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow 132 # on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork 133 # permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should 134 # never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject) 135 # and priv_app is allowed fork permission to itself. 136 neverallow priv_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork; 137 138 # Do not allow priv_app to hard link to any files. 139 # In particular, if priv_app links to other app data 140 # files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion 141 # of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security 142 # bugs, so we want to ensure priv_app never has this 143 # capability. 144 neverallow priv_app file_type:file link; 145
