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      1 page.title=Gatekeeper
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     19 <div id="qv-wrapper">
     20   <div id="qv">
     21     <h2>In this document</h2>
     22     <ol id="auto-toc">
     23     </ol>
     24   </div>
     25 </div>
     26 
     27 <h2 id=overview>Overview</h2>
     28 
     29 <p>The Gatekeeper subsystem performs device pattern/password authentication in a
     30 Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Gatekeeper enrolls and verifies passwords
     31 via an HMAC with a hardware-backed secret key. Additionally, Gatekeeper
     32 throttles consecutive failed verification attempts and must refuse to service
     33 requests based on a given timeout and a given number of consecutive failed
     34 attempts.</p>
     35 
     36 <p>When users verify their passwords, Gatekeeper uses the TEE-derived shared
     37 secret to sign an authentication attestation to
     38 send to the <a href="{@docRoot}security/keystore/index.html">hardware-backed Keystore</a>. That is, a
     39 Gatekeeper attestation notifies Keystore that authentication-bound keys (for
     40 example, keys that apps have created) can be released for use by apps.</p>
     41 
     42 <h2 id=architecture>Architecture</h2>
     43 
     44 <p>Gatekeeper involves three main components:</p>
     45 
     46 <ul>
     47   <li><strong>gatekeeperd (Gatekeeper daemon)</strong>.
     48   A C++ binder service containing platform-independent logic and corresponding
     49 to the <code>GateKeeperService</code> Java interface.
     50   <li><strong>Gatekeeper Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL)</strong>.
     51   The HAL interface in <code>hardware/libhardware/include/hardware/gatekeeper.h</code>,
     52   and the implementing module.
     53   <li><strong>Gatekeeper (TEE)</strong>.
     54   The TEE counterpart of <code>gatekeeperd</code>. A TEE-based implementation of Gatekeeper.
     55 </ul>
     56 
     57 <p>To implement Gatekeeper:</p>
     58 
     59 <ul>
     60   <li>Implement the Gatekeeper HAL, specifically the functions in <code>gatekeeper.h</code>
     61   (<code>hardware/libhardware/include/hardware/gatekeeper.h</code>).
     62   See <a href="#hal_implementation">HAL Implementation</a>.
     63   <li>Implement the TEE-specific Gatekeeper component, in part based on the following
     64 header file: <code>system/gatekeeper/include/gatekeeper/gatekeeper.h</code>. This
     65 header file includes pure virtual functions for creating and accessing
     66 keys, as well as for computing signatures.
     67 See <a href="#trusty_and_other_implementations">Trusty and other implementations</a>.
     68 </ul>
     69 
     70 <p>As shown in the following diagram, the <code>LockSettingsService</code> makes a request (via
     71 Binder) that reaches the <code>gatekeeperd</code> daemon in the Android OS.
     72 The <code>gatekeeperd</code>
     73 daemon makes a request that reaches its counterpart (Gatekeeper) in the TEE.</p>
     74 
     75 <img src="../images/gatekeeper-flow.png" alt="Gatekeeper flow" id="figure1" />
     76 <p class="img-caption"><strong>Figure 1.</strong> High-level data flow for authentication by GateKeeper</p>
     77 
     78 <p>The <code>gatekeeperd</code> daemon gives the Android framework APIs access to the HAL, and
     79 participates in reporting device <a href="index.html">authentications</a> to Keystore.
     80 The <code>gatekeeperd</code> daemon runs in its own process, separate from the system
     81 server.</p>
     82 
     83 <h2 id=hal_implementation>HAL Implementation</h2>
     84 
     85 <p>The <code>gatekeeperd</code> daemon uses the HAL to interact
     86 with the <code>gatekeeperd</code> daemon's TEE
     87 counterpart for password authentication. The HAL implementation must be able to
     88 sign (enroll) and verify blobs. All implementations are expected to adhere to
     89 the standard format for the authentication token (AuthToken) generated on each
     90 successful password verification. The contents and semantics of the AuthToken
     91 are described in <a href="index.html">Authentication</a>.</p>
     92 
     93 <p>Specifically, an implementation of the <code>gatekeeper.h</code> header file (in the
     94 <code>hardware/libhardware/include/hardware</code> folder) needs to implement the
     95 <code>enroll</code> and <code>verify</code> functions.</p>
     96 
     97 <p>The <code>enroll</code> function takes a password blob, signs it, and returns the signature
     98 as a handle. The returned blob (from a call to <code>enroll</code>) must have the structure
     99 shown in <code>system/gatekeeper/include/gatekeeper/password_handle.h</code>.</p>
    100 
    101 <p>The <code>verify</code> function needs to compare the signature produced
    102 by the provided password and
    103 ensure that it matches the enrolled password handle.</p>
    104 
    105 <p>The key used to enroll and verify must never change, and should be re-derivable
    106 at every device boot.</p>
    107 
    108 <h2 id=trusty_and_other_implementations>Trusty and other implementations</h2>
    109 
    110 <p>The <a href="{@docRoot}security/trusty/index.html">Trusty</a> operating system is
    111 Google's open source trusted OS for TEE
    112 environments. Trusty contains an approved implementation of GateKeeper. However,
    113 <strong>any TEE OS</strong> can be used for the implementation of Gatekeeper.
    114 The TEE <strong>must</strong> have access to a hardware-backed key as well as a secure,
    115 monotonic clock <strong>that ticks in suspend</strong>.</p>
    116 
    117 <p>Trusty uses an internal IPC system to communicate a shared secret directly
    118 between Keymaster and the Trusty implementation of Gatekeeper ("Trusty
    119 Gatekeeper"). This shared secret is used for signing AuthTokens that will be
    120 sent to Keystore, providing attestations of password verification. Trusty
    121 Gatekeeper requests the key from Keymaster for each use and does not persist
    122 or cache the value. Implementations are free to share this secret in any way
    123 that does not compromise security.</p>
    124 
    125 <p>The HMAC key, used to enroll and verify passwords, is derived and kept solely
    126 in GateKeeper.</p>
    127 
    128 <p>The Android tree provides a generic C++ implementation of GateKeeper, requiring
    129 only the addition of device-specific routines to be complete. To implement a
    130 TEE Gatekeeper with device-specific code for your TEE, please refer to the
    131 functions and comments in the following file:</p>
    132 <pre>
    133 system/gatekeeper/include/gatekeeper/gatekeeper.h
    134 </pre>
    135 
    136 <p>For the TEE GateKeeper, the primary responsibilities of a compliant
    137 implementation are:</p>
    138 
    139 <ul>
    140   <li>Adherence to the Gatekeeper HAL
    141   <li>Returned AuthTokens must be formatted according to the AuthToken specification
    142 (described in <a href="index.html">Authentication</a>)
    143   <li>The TEE Gatekeeper must be able to share an HMAC key with Keymaster, either by
    144 requesting the key through a TEE IPC on demand or maintaining a valid cache of
    145 the value at all times
    146 </ul>
    147 
    148 <h2 id=user_sids>User SIDs</h2>
    149 
    150 <p>A User Secure ID (User SID) is the TEE representation of a user.
    151 The User SID has no strong connection to an Android user ID.</p>
    152 
    153 <p>A User SID is generated with a cryptographic
    154 PRNG whenever a user enrolls a new password without providing a previous one.
    155 This is known as an "untrusted" re-enroll.
    156 A "trusted" re-enroll occurs when a user provides a valid, previous password.
    157 In this case, the User SID is migrated to the new password handle,
    158 conserving the keys that were bound to it.
    159 The Android framework does not allow for an "untrusted" re-enroll under regular circumstances.</p>
    160 
    161 <p>The User SID is HMAC'ed along with the password in the password handle when the
    162 password is enrolled.</p>
    163 
    164 <p>User SIDs are written into the AuthToken returned by the <code>verify</code>
    165 function and associated to all authentication-bound Keystore keys. For
    166 information about the AuthToken format and Keystore, see
    167 <a href="index.html">Authentication</a>.
    168 Since an untrusted call to the <code>enroll</code> function
    169 will change the User SID, the call will render the keys bound to that password useless.</p>
    170 
    171 <p>Attackers can change the password for the device if they control the Android
    172 OS, but they will destroy root-protected, sensitive keys in the process.</p>
    173 
    174 <h2 id=request_throttling>Request throttling</h2>
    175 
    176 <p>GateKeeper must be able to securely throttle brute-force attempts on a user
    177 credential. As shown in the <code>gatekeeper.h</code>
    178 file (in <code>hardware/libhardware/include/hardware</code>),
    179 the HAL provides for returning a timeout in milliseconds. The timeout
    180 informs the client not to call GateKeeper again until after the timeout has
    181 elapsed. GateKeeper should not service requests if there is a pending timeout.</p>
    182 
    183 <p>GateKeeper must write a failure counter before verifying a user password. If
    184 the password verification succeeds, the failure counter should be cleared. This
    185 prevents attacks that prevent throttling by disabling the embedded MMC (eMMC)
    186 after issuing a <code>verify</code> call. The <code>enroll</code> function also verifies
    187 the user password (if provided) and so must be throttled in the same way.</p>
    188 
    189 <p>If supported by the device, it is highly recommended that the failure counter
    190 be written to secure storage. If the device does not support
    191 file-based encryption, or if secure storage is too slow, implementations may
    192 use RPMB directly.</p>
    193 
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