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      1 // Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
      2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
      3 // found in the LICENSE file.
      4 
      5 #include <fcntl.h>
      6 #include <stddef.h>
      7 #include <stdio.h>
      8 #include <stdlib.h>
      9 #include <string.h>
     10 #include <sys/stat.h>
     11 #include <sys/types.h>
     12 
     13 #include <algorithm>
     14 #include <limits>
     15 #include <memory>
     16 
     17 #include "base/files/file_util.h"
     18 #include "base/logging.h"
     19 #include "base/memory/free_deleter.h"
     20 #include "build/build_config.h"
     21 #include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
     22 
     23 #if defined(OS_POSIX)
     24 #include <sys/mman.h>
     25 #include <unistd.h>
     26 #endif
     27 
     28 using std::nothrow;
     29 using std::numeric_limits;
     30 
     31 namespace {
     32 
     33 // This function acts as a compiler optimization barrier. We use it to
     34 // prevent the compiler from making an expression a compile-time constant.
     35 // We also use it so that the compiler doesn't discard certain return values
     36 // as something we don't need (see the comment with calloc below).
     37 template <typename Type>
     38 NOINLINE Type HideValueFromCompiler(volatile Type value) {
     39 #if defined(__GNUC__)
     40   // In a GCC compatible compiler (GCC or Clang), make this compiler barrier
     41   // more robust than merely using "volatile".
     42   __asm__ volatile ("" : "+r" (value));
     43 #endif  // __GNUC__
     44   return value;
     45 }
     46 
     47 // Tcmalloc and Windows allocator shim support setting malloc limits.
     48 // - NO_TCMALLOC (should be defined if compiled with use_allocator!="tcmalloc")
     49 // - ADDRESS_SANITIZER and SYZYASAN because they have their own memory allocator
     50 // - IOS does not use tcmalloc
     51 // - OS_MACOSX does not use tcmalloc
     52 // - Windows allocator shim defines ALLOCATOR_SHIM
     53 #if (!defined(NO_TCMALLOC) || defined(ALLOCATOR_SHIM)) &&                     \
     54     !defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER) && !defined(OS_IOS) && !defined(OS_MACOSX) && \
     55     !defined(SYZYASAN)
     56 #define MALLOC_OVERFLOW_TEST(function) function
     57 #else
     58 #define MALLOC_OVERFLOW_TEST(function) DISABLED_##function
     59 #endif
     60 
     61 #if defined(OS_LINUX) && defined(__x86_64__)
     62 // Detect runtime TCMalloc bypasses.
     63 bool IsTcMallocBypassed() {
     64   // This should detect a TCMalloc bypass from Valgrind.
     65   char* g_slice = getenv("G_SLICE");
     66   if (g_slice && !strcmp(g_slice, "always-malloc"))
     67     return true;
     68   return false;
     69 }
     70 #endif
     71 
     72 // There are platforms where these tests are known to fail. We would like to
     73 // be able to easily check the status on the bots, but marking tests as
     74 // FAILS_ is too clunky.
     75 void OverflowTestsSoftExpectTrue(bool overflow_detected) {
     76   if (!overflow_detected) {
     77 #if defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_MACOSX)
     78     // Sadly, on Linux, Android, and OSX we don't have a good story yet. Don't
     79     // fail the test, but report.
     80     printf("Platform has overflow: %s\n",
     81            !overflow_detected ? "yes." : "no.");
     82 #else
     83     // Otherwise, fail the test. (Note: EXPECT are ok in subfunctions, ASSERT
     84     // aren't).
     85     EXPECT_TRUE(overflow_detected);
     86 #endif
     87   }
     88 }
     89 
     90 #if defined(OS_IOS) || defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_LINUX)
     91 #define MAYBE_NewOverflow DISABLED_NewOverflow
     92 #else
     93 #define MAYBE_NewOverflow NewOverflow
     94 #endif
     95 // Test array[TooBig][X] and array[X][TooBig] allocations for int overflows.
     96 // IOS doesn't honor nothrow, so disable the test there.
     97 // Crashes on Windows Dbg builds, disable there as well.
     98 // Disabled on Linux because failing Linux Valgrind bot, and Valgrind exclusions
     99 // are not currently read. See http://crbug.com/582398
    100 TEST(SecurityTest, MAYBE_NewOverflow) {
    101   const size_t kArraySize = 4096;
    102   // We want something "dynamic" here, so that the compiler doesn't
    103   // immediately reject crazy arrays.
    104   const size_t kDynamicArraySize = HideValueFromCompiler(kArraySize);
    105   // numeric_limits are still not constexpr until we switch to C++11, so we
    106   // use an ugly cast.
    107   const size_t kMaxSizeT = ~static_cast<size_t>(0);
    108   ASSERT_EQ(numeric_limits<size_t>::max(), kMaxSizeT);
    109   const size_t kArraySize2 = kMaxSizeT / kArraySize + 10;
    110   const size_t kDynamicArraySize2 = HideValueFromCompiler(kArraySize2);
    111   {
    112     std::unique_ptr<char[][kArraySize]> array_pointer(
    113         new (nothrow) char[kDynamicArraySize2][kArraySize]);
    114     OverflowTestsSoftExpectTrue(!array_pointer);
    115   }
    116   // On windows, the compiler prevents static array sizes of more than
    117   // 0x7fffffff (error C2148).
    118 #if defined(OS_WIN) && defined(ARCH_CPU_64_BITS)
    119   ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(kDynamicArraySize);
    120 #else
    121   {
    122     std::unique_ptr<char[][kArraySize2]> array_pointer(
    123         new (nothrow) char[kDynamicArraySize][kArraySize2]);
    124     OverflowTestsSoftExpectTrue(!array_pointer);
    125   }
    126 #endif  // !defined(OS_WIN) || !defined(ARCH_CPU_64_BITS)
    127 }
    128 
    129 #if defined(OS_LINUX) && defined(__x86_64__)
    130 // Check if ptr1 and ptr2 are separated by less than size chars.
    131 bool ArePointersToSameArea(void* ptr1, void* ptr2, size_t size) {
    132   ptrdiff_t ptr_diff = reinterpret_cast<char*>(std::max(ptr1, ptr2)) -
    133                        reinterpret_cast<char*>(std::min(ptr1, ptr2));
    134   return static_cast<size_t>(ptr_diff) <= size;
    135 }
    136 
    137 // Check if TCMalloc uses an underlying random memory allocator.
    138 TEST(SecurityTest, MALLOC_OVERFLOW_TEST(RandomMemoryAllocations)) {
    139   if (IsTcMallocBypassed())
    140     return;
    141   size_t kPageSize = 4096;  // We support x86_64 only.
    142   // Check that malloc() returns an address that is neither the kernel's
    143   // un-hinted mmap area, nor the current brk() area. The first malloc() may
    144   // not be at a random address because TCMalloc will first exhaust any memory
    145   // that it has allocated early on, before starting the sophisticated
    146   // allocators.
    147   void* default_mmap_heap_address =
    148       mmap(0, kPageSize, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
    149            MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
    150   ASSERT_NE(default_mmap_heap_address,
    151             static_cast<void*>(MAP_FAILED));
    152   ASSERT_EQ(munmap(default_mmap_heap_address, kPageSize), 0);
    153   void* brk_heap_address = sbrk(0);
    154   ASSERT_NE(brk_heap_address, reinterpret_cast<void*>(-1));
    155   ASSERT_TRUE(brk_heap_address != NULL);
    156   // 1 MB should get us past what TCMalloc pre-allocated before initializing
    157   // the sophisticated allocators.
    158   size_t kAllocSize = 1<<20;
    159   std::unique_ptr<char, base::FreeDeleter> ptr(
    160       static_cast<char*>(malloc(kAllocSize)));
    161   ASSERT_TRUE(ptr != NULL);
    162   // If two pointers are separated by less than 512MB, they are considered
    163   // to be in the same area.
    164   // Our random pointer could be anywhere within 0x3fffffffffff (46bits),
    165   // and we are checking that it's not withing 1GB (30 bits) from two
    166   // addresses (brk and mmap heap). We have roughly one chance out of
    167   // 2^15 to flake.
    168   const size_t kAreaRadius = 1<<29;
    169   bool in_default_mmap_heap = ArePointersToSameArea(
    170       ptr.get(), default_mmap_heap_address, kAreaRadius);
    171   EXPECT_FALSE(in_default_mmap_heap);
    172 
    173   bool in_default_brk_heap = ArePointersToSameArea(
    174       ptr.get(), brk_heap_address, kAreaRadius);
    175   EXPECT_FALSE(in_default_brk_heap);
    176 
    177   // In the implementation, we always mask our random addresses with
    178   // kRandomMask, so we use it as an additional detection mechanism.
    179   const uintptr_t kRandomMask = 0x3fffffffffffULL;
    180   bool impossible_random_address =
    181       reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(ptr.get()) & ~kRandomMask;
    182   EXPECT_FALSE(impossible_random_address);
    183 }
    184 
    185 #endif  // defined(OS_LINUX) && defined(__x86_64__)
    186 
    187 }  // namespace
    188