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      1 /* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.62 2017/01/30 01:03:00 djm Exp $ */
      2 /*
      3  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
      4  *
      5  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
      6  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
      7  * are met:
      8  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
      9  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
     10  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
     11  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
     12  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
     13  *
     14  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
     15  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
     16  * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
     17  * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
     18  * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
     19  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
     20  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
     21  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
     22  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
     23  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
     24  */
     25 
     26 #include "includes.h"
     27 
     28 #include <sys/types.h>
     29 #include <sys/stat.h>
     30 #include <sys/wait.h>
     31 
     32 #include <errno.h>
     33 #include <fcntl.h>
     34 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
     35 # include <paths.h>
     36 #endif
     37 #include <pwd.h>
     38 #include <signal.h>
     39 #include <stdio.h>
     40 #include <stdarg.h>
     41 #include <string.h>
     42 #include <time.h>
     43 #include <unistd.h>
     44 #include <limits.h>
     45 
     46 #include "xmalloc.h"
     47 #include "ssh.h"
     48 #include "ssh2.h"
     49 #include "packet.h"
     50 #include "buffer.h"
     51 #include "log.h"
     52 #include "misc.h"
     53 #include "servconf.h"
     54 #include "compat.h"
     55 #include "key.h"
     56 #include "hostfile.h"
     57 #include "auth.h"
     58 #include "pathnames.h"
     59 #include "uidswap.h"
     60 #include "auth-options.h"
     61 #include "canohost.h"
     62 #ifdef GSSAPI
     63 #include "ssh-gss.h"
     64 #endif
     65 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
     66 #include "authfile.h"
     67 #include "match.h"
     68 #include "ssherr.h"
     69 #include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */
     70 #include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */
     71 
     72 /* import */
     73 extern ServerOptions options;
     74 extern u_char *session_id2;
     75 extern u_int session_id2_len;
     76 
     77 static int
     78 userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
     79 {
     80 	Buffer b;
     81 	Key *key = NULL;
     82 	char *pkalg, *userstyle, *fp = NULL;
     83 	u_char *pkblob, *sig;
     84 	u_int alen, blen, slen;
     85 	int have_sig, pktype;
     86 	int authenticated = 0;
     87 
     88 	if (!authctxt->valid) {
     89 		debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
     90 		return 0;
     91 	}
     92 	have_sig = packet_get_char();
     93 	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
     94 		debug2("%s: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH", __func__);
     95 		/* no explicit pkalg given */
     96 		pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
     97 		buffer_init(&b);
     98 		buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
     99 		/* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */
    100 		pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
    101 		buffer_free(&b);
    102 	} else {
    103 		pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
    104 		pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
    105 	}
    106 	pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
    107 	if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
    108 		/* this is perfectly legal */
    109 		logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
    110 		    __func__, pkalg);
    111 		goto done;
    112 	}
    113 	key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
    114 	if (key == NULL) {
    115 		error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg);
    116 		goto done;
    117 	}
    118 	if (key->type != pktype) {
    119 		error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key "
    120 		    "(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype);
    121 		goto done;
    122 	}
    123 	if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
    124 	    (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
    125 		logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe "
    126 		    "signature scheme");
    127 		goto done;
    128 	}
    129 	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
    130 	if (auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
    131 		logit("refusing previously-used %s key", key_type(key));
    132 		goto done;
    133 	}
    134 	if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
    135 	    options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) {
    136 		logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
    137 		    __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
    138 		goto done;
    139 	}
    140 
    141 	if (have_sig) {
    142 		debug3("%s: have signature for %s %s",
    143 		    __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp);
    144 		sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
    145 		packet_check_eom();
    146 		buffer_init(&b);
    147 		if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
    148 			buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
    149 		} else {
    150 			buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
    151 		}
    152 		/* reconstruct packet */
    153 		buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
    154 		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
    155 		    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
    156 		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
    157 		buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle);
    158 		free(userstyle);
    159 		buffer_put_cstring(&b,
    160 		    datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
    161 		    "ssh-userauth" :
    162 		    authctxt->service);
    163 		if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
    164 			buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
    165 		} else {
    166 			buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
    167 			buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
    168 			buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
    169 		}
    170 		buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
    171 #ifdef DEBUG_PK
    172 		buffer_dump(&b);
    173 #endif
    174 		pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
    175 
    176 		/* test for correct signature */
    177 		authenticated = 0;
    178 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) &&
    179 		    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
    180 		    buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
    181 			authenticated = 1;
    182 			/* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */
    183 			auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
    184 			key = NULL; /* Don't free below */
    185 		}
    186 		buffer_free(&b);
    187 		free(sig);
    188 	} else {
    189 		debug("%s: test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable for %s %s",
    190 		    __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp);
    191 		packet_check_eom();
    192 
    193 		/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
    194 		/*
    195 		 * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
    196 		 * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
    197 		 * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
    198 		 * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
    199 		 * issue? -markus
    200 		 */
    201 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 0))) {
    202 			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
    203 			packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
    204 			packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
    205 			packet_send();
    206 			packet_write_wait();
    207 			authctxt->postponed = 1;
    208 		}
    209 	}
    210 	if (authenticated != 1)
    211 		auth_clear_options();
    212 done:
    213 	debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg);
    214 	if (key != NULL)
    215 		key_free(key);
    216 	free(pkalg);
    217 	free(pkblob);
    218 	free(fp);
    219 	return authenticated;
    220 }
    221 
    222 void
    223 pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
    224 {
    225 	char *fp, *extra;
    226 	va_list ap;
    227 	int i;
    228 
    229 	extra = NULL;
    230 	if (fmt != NULL) {
    231 		va_start(ap, fmt);
    232 		i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap);
    233 		va_end(ap);
    234 		if (i < 0 || extra == NULL)
    235 			fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
    236 	}
    237 
    238 	if (key_is_cert(key)) {
    239 		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
    240 		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
    241 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s",
    242 		    key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
    243 		    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
    244 		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
    245 		    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
    246 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
    247 		free(fp);
    248 	} else {
    249 		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
    250 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
    251 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key),
    252 		    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
    253 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
    254 		free(fp);
    255 	}
    256 	free(extra);
    257 }
    258 
    259 /*
    260  * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic
    261  * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector
    262  * and its members.
    263  */
    264 static int
    265 split_argv(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp)
    266 {
    267 	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
    268 	int argc = 0, quote, i, j;
    269 	char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv));
    270 
    271 	*argvp = NULL;
    272 	*argcp = 0;
    273 
    274 	for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
    275 		/* Skip leading whitespace */
    276 		if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')
    277 			continue;
    278 
    279 		/* Start of a token */
    280 		quote = 0;
    281 		if (s[i] == '\\' &&
    282 		    (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\'))
    283 			i++;
    284 		else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"')
    285 			quote = s[i++];
    286 
    287 		argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv));
    288 		arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1);
    289 		argv[argc] = NULL;
    290 
    291 		/* Copy the token in, removing escapes */
    292 		for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
    293 			if (s[i] == '\\') {
    294 				if (s[i + 1] == '\'' ||
    295 				    s[i + 1] == '\"' ||
    296 				    s[i + 1] == '\\') {
    297 					i++; /* Skip '\' */
    298 					arg[j++] = s[i];
    299 				} else {
    300 					/* Unrecognised escape */
    301 					arg[j++] = s[i];
    302 				}
    303 			} else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t'))
    304 				break; /* done */
    305 			else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote)
    306 				break; /* done */
    307 			else
    308 				arg[j++] = s[i];
    309 		}
    310 		if (s[i] == '\0') {
    311 			if (quote != 0) {
    312 				/* Ran out of string looking for close quote */
    313 				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
    314 				goto out;
    315 			}
    316 			break;
    317 		}
    318 	}
    319 	/* Success */
    320 	*argcp = argc;
    321 	*argvp = argv;
    322 	argc = 0;
    323 	argv = NULL;
    324 	r = 0;
    325  out:
    326 	if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) {
    327 		for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
    328 			free(argv[i]);
    329 		free(argv);
    330 	}
    331 	return r;
    332 }
    333 
    334 /*
    335  * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as
    336  * necessary. Caller must free returned string.
    337  */
    338 static char *
    339 assemble_argv(int argc, char **argv)
    340 {
    341 	int i, j, ws, r;
    342 	char c, *ret;
    343 	struct sshbuf *buf, *arg;
    344 
    345 	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
    346 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
    347 
    348 	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
    349 		ws = 0;
    350 		sshbuf_reset(arg);
    351 		for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) {
    352 			r = 0;
    353 			c = argv[i][j];
    354 			switch (c) {
    355 			case ' ':
    356 			case '\t':
    357 				ws = 1;
    358 				r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
    359 				break;
    360 			case '\\':
    361 			case '\'':
    362 			case '"':
    363 				if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0)
    364 					break;
    365 				/* FALLTHROUGH */
    366 			default:
    367 				r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
    368 				break;
    369 			}
    370 			if (r != 0)
    371 				fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s",
    372 				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
    373 		}
    374 		if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) ||
    375 		    (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) ||
    376 		    (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 ||
    377 		    (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0))
    378 			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
    379 	}
    380 	if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL)
    381 		fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__);
    382 	memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
    383 	ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0';
    384 	sshbuf_free(buf);
    385 	sshbuf_free(arg);
    386 	return ret;
    387 }
    388 
    389 /*
    390  * Runs command in a subprocess. Returns pid on success and a FILE* to the
    391  * subprocess' stdout or 0 on failure.
    392  * NB. "command" is only used for logging.
    393  */
    394 static pid_t
    395 subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
    396     int ac, char **av, FILE **child)
    397 {
    398 	FILE *f;
    399 	struct stat st;
    400 	int devnull, p[2], i;
    401 	pid_t pid;
    402 	char *cp, errmsg[512];
    403 	u_int envsize;
    404 	char **child_env;
    405 
    406 	*child = NULL;
    407 
    408 	debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s", __func__,
    409 	    tag, command, pw->pw_name);
    410 
    411 	/* Verify the path exists and is safe-ish to execute */
    412 	if (*av[0] != '/') {
    413 		error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
    414 		return 0;
    415 	}
    416 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
    417 	if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) {
    418 		error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
    419 		    av[0], strerror(errno));
    420 		restore_uid();
    421 		return 0;
    422 	}
    423 	if (auth_secure_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0,
    424 	    errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
    425 		error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg);
    426 		restore_uid();
    427 		return 0;
    428 	}
    429 
    430 	/*
    431 	 * Run the command; stderr is left in place, stdout is the
    432 	 * authorized_keys output.
    433 	 */
    434 	if (pipe(p) != 0) {
    435 		error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
    436 		restore_uid();
    437 		return 0;
    438 	}
    439 
    440 	/*
    441 	 * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
    442 	 * run cleanup_exit() code.
    443 	 */
    444 	restore_uid();
    445 
    446 	switch ((pid = fork())) {
    447 	case -1: /* error */
    448 		error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
    449 		close(p[0]);
    450 		close(p[1]);
    451 		return 0;
    452 	case 0: /* child */
    453 		/* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
    454 		envsize = 5;
    455 		child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize);
    456 		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
    457 		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
    458 		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
    459 		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
    460 		if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
    461 			child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp);
    462 
    463 		for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
    464 			signal(i, SIG_DFL);
    465 
    466 		if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
    467 			error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
    468 			    strerror(errno));
    469 			_exit(1);
    470 		}
    471 		/* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
    472 		if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
    473 		    dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
    474 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
    475 			_exit(1);
    476 		}
    477 		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
    478 
    479 		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
    480 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
    481 			error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
    482 			    strerror(errno));
    483 			_exit(1);
    484 		}
    485 		if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
    486 			error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
    487 			    strerror(errno));
    488 			_exit(1);
    489 		}
    490 		/* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
    491 		if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
    492 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
    493 			_exit(1);
    494 		}
    495 
    496 		execve(av[0], av, child_env);
    497 		error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
    498 		_exit(127);
    499 	default: /* parent */
    500 		break;
    501 	}
    502 
    503 	close(p[1]);
    504 	if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
    505 		error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
    506 		close(p[0]);
    507 		/* Don't leave zombie child */
    508 		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
    509 		while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
    510 			;
    511 		return 0;
    512 	}
    513 	/* Success */
    514 	debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid);
    515 	*child = f;
    516 	return pid;
    517 }
    518 
    519 /* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */
    520 static int
    521 exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd)
    522 {
    523 	int status;
    524 
    525 	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
    526 		if (errno != EINTR) {
    527 			error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
    528 			return -1;
    529 		}
    530 	}
    531 	if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
    532 		error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status));
    533 		return -1;
    534 	} else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
    535 		error("%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status));
    536 		return -1;
    537 	}
    538 	return 0;
    539 }
    540 
    541 static int
    542 match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
    543 {
    544 	char *result;
    545 	u_int i;
    546 
    547 	/* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
    548 
    549 	for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
    550 		if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
    551 		    principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
    552 			debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
    553 			    result);
    554 			free(result);
    555 			return 1;
    556 		}
    557 	}
    558 	return 0;
    559 }
    560 
    561 static int
    562 process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
    563     const struct sshkey_cert *cert)
    564 {
    565 	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;
    566 	u_long linenum = 0;
    567 	u_int i, found_principal = 0;
    568 
    569 	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
    570 		/* Always consume entire input */
    571 		if (found_principal)
    572 			continue;
    573 		/* Skip leading whitespace. */
    574 		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
    575 			;
    576 		/* Skip blank and comment lines. */
    577 		if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL)
    578 			*ep = '\0';
    579 		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n')
    580 			continue;
    581 		/* Trim trailing whitespace. */
    582 		ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
    583 		while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
    584 			*ep-- = '\0';
    585 		/*
    586 		 * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
    587 		 * key options.
    588 		 */
    589 		line_opts = NULL;
    590 		if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
    591 		    (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
    592 			for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
    593 				;
    594 			line_opts = cp;
    595 			cp = ep;
    596 		}
    597 		for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
    598 			if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
    599 				debug3("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
    600 				    file == NULL ? "(command)" : file,
    601 				    linenum, cert->principals[i]);
    602 				if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
    603 				    file, linenum) != 1)
    604 					continue;
    605 				found_principal = 1;
    606 				continue;
    607 			}
    608 		}
    609 	}
    610 	return found_principal;
    611 }
    612 
    613 static int
    614 match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
    615 {
    616 	FILE *f;
    617 	int success;
    618 
    619 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
    620 	debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
    621 	if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
    622 		restore_uid();
    623 		return 0;
    624 	}
    625 	success = process_principals(f, file, pw, cert);
    626 	fclose(f);
    627 	restore_uid();
    628 	return success;
    629 }
    630 
    631 /*
    632  * Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command.
    633  * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise.
    634  */
    635 static int
    636 match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key)
    637 {
    638 	const struct sshkey_cert *cert = key->cert;
    639 	FILE *f = NULL;
    640 	int r, ok, found_principal = 0;
    641 	struct passwd *pw;
    642 	int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0;
    643 	pid_t pid;
    644 	char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
    645 	char *ca_fp = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *catext = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
    646 	char serial_s[16];
    647 	void (*osigchld)(int);
    648 
    649 	if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL)
    650 		return 0;
    651 	if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) {
    652 		error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, "
    653 		    "skipping");
    654 		return 0;
    655 	}
    656 
    657 	/*
    658 	 * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
    659 	 * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
    660 	 */
    661 	osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
    662 
    663 	/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
    664 	username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user,
    665 	    "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
    666 	pw = getpwnam(username);
    667 	if (pw == NULL) {
    668 		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
    669 		    username, strerror(errno));
    670 		goto out;
    671 	}
    672 
    673 	/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
    674 	if (split_argv(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
    675 		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains "
    676 		    "invalid quotes", command);
    677 		goto out;
    678 	}
    679 	if (ac == 0) {
    680 		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
    681 		    command);
    682 		goto out;
    683 	}
    684 	if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key,
    685 	    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
    686 		error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
    687 		goto out;
    688 	}
    689 	if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
    690 	    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
    691 		error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
    692 		goto out;
    693 	}
    694 	if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(cert->signature_key, &catext)) != 0) {
    695 		error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
    696 		goto out;
    697 	}
    698 	if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
    699 		error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
    700 		goto out;
    701 	}
    702 	snprintf(serial_s, sizeof(serial_s), "%llu",
    703 	    (unsigned long long)cert->serial);
    704 	for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
    705 		tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
    706 		    "u", user_pw->pw_name,
    707 		    "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
    708 		    "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
    709 		    "T", sshkey_ssh_name(cert->signature_key),
    710 		    "f", key_fp,
    711 		    "F", ca_fp,
    712 		    "k", keytext,
    713 		    "K", catext,
    714 		    "i", cert->key_id,
    715 		    "s", serial_s,
    716 		    (char *)NULL);
    717 		if (tmp == NULL)
    718 			fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
    719 		free(av[i]);
    720 		av[i] = tmp;
    721 	}
    722 	/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
    723 	command = assemble_argv(ac, av);
    724 
    725 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", pw, command,
    726 	    ac, av, &f)) == 0)
    727 		goto out;
    728 
    729 	uid_swapped = 1;
    730 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
    731 
    732 	ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, cert);
    733 
    734 	fclose(f);
    735 	f = NULL;
    736 
    737 	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command) != 0)
    738 		goto out;
    739 
    740 	/* Read completed successfully */
    741 	found_principal = ok;
    742  out:
    743 	if (f != NULL)
    744 		fclose(f);
    745 	signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
    746 	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
    747 		free(av[i]);
    748 	free(av);
    749 	if (uid_swapped)
    750 		restore_uid();
    751 	free(command);
    752 	free(username);
    753 	free(ca_fp);
    754 	free(key_fp);
    755 	free(catext);
    756 	free(keytext);
    757 	return found_principal;
    758 }
    759 /*
    760  * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
    761  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
    762  */
    763 static int
    764 check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
    765 {
    766 	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
    767 	int found_key = 0;
    768 	u_long linenum = 0;
    769 	Key *found;
    770 
    771 	found_key = 0;
    772 
    773 	found = NULL;
    774 	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
    775 		char *cp, *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
    776 		const char *reason = NULL;
    777 
    778 		/* Always consume entrire file */
    779 		if (found_key)
    780 			continue;
    781 		if (found != NULL)
    782 			key_free(found);
    783 		found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
    784 		auth_clear_options();
    785 
    786 		/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
    787 		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
    788 			;
    789 		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
    790 			continue;
    791 
    792 		if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
    793 			/* no key?  check if there are options for this key */
    794 			int quoted = 0;
    795 			debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
    796 			key_options = cp;
    797 			for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
    798 				if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
    799 					cp++;	/* Skip both */
    800 				else if (*cp == '"')
    801 					quoted = !quoted;
    802 			}
    803 			/* Skip remaining whitespace. */
    804 			for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
    805 				;
    806 			if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
    807 				debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
    808 				/* still no key?  advance to next line*/
    809 				continue;
    810 			}
    811 		}
    812 		if (key_is_cert(key)) {
    813 			if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
    814 				continue;
    815 			if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
    816 			    linenum) != 1)
    817 				continue;
    818 			if (!key_is_cert_authority)
    819 				continue;
    820 			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
    821 			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
    822 				continue;
    823 			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
    824 			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
    825 			/*
    826 			 * If the user has specified a list of principals as
    827 			 * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
    828 			 * their username in the certificate principals list.
    829 			 */
    830 			if (authorized_principals != NULL &&
    831 			    !match_principals_option(authorized_principals,
    832 			    key->cert)) {
    833 				reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
    834 				    "authorized principal";
    835  fail_reason:
    836 				free(fp);
    837 				error("%s", reason);
    838 				auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
    839 				continue;
    840 			}
    841 			if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
    842 			    authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
    843 			    &reason) != 0)
    844 				goto fail_reason;
    845 			if (auth_cert_options(key, pw, &reason) != 0)
    846 				goto fail_reason;
    847 			verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) "
    848 			    "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
    849 			    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
    850 			    key_type(found), fp, file);
    851 			free(fp);
    852 			found_key = 1;
    853 			break;
    854 		} else if (key_equal(found, key)) {
    855 			if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
    856 			    linenum) != 1)
    857 				continue;
    858 			if (key_is_cert_authority)
    859 				continue;
    860 			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
    861 			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
    862 				continue;
    863 			debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
    864 			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
    865 			free(fp);
    866 			found_key = 1;
    867 			continue;
    868 		}
    869 	}
    870 	if (found != NULL)
    871 		key_free(found);
    872 	if (!found_key)
    873 		debug2("key not found");
    874 	return found_key;
    875 }
    876 
    877 /* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */
    878 static int
    879 user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
    880 {
    881 	char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
    882 	const char *reason;
    883 	int ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals;
    884 
    885 	if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
    886 		return 0;
    887 
    888 	if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
    889 	    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
    890 		return 0;
    891 
    892 	if (sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
    893 	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0) != 0) {
    894 		debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
    895 		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
    896 		    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
    897 		goto out;
    898 	}
    899 	/*
    900 	 * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate
    901 	 * principals against the names in that file rather than matching
    902 	 * against the username.
    903 	 */
    904 	if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
    905 		if (match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert))
    906 			found_principal = 1;
    907 	}
    908 	/* Try querying command if specified */
    909 	if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key))
    910 		found_principal = 1;
    911 	/* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */
    912 	use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL ||
    913             options.authorized_principals_command != NULL;
    914 	if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) {
    915 		reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
    916  fail_reason:
    917 		error("%s", reason);
    918 		auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
    919 		goto out;
    920 	}
    921 	if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
    922 	    use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
    923 		goto fail_reason;
    924 	if (auth_cert_options(key, pw, &reason) != 0)
    925 		goto fail_reason;
    926 
    927 	verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by "
    928 	    "%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
    929 	    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
    930 	    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
    931 	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
    932 	ret = 1;
    933 
    934  out:
    935 	free(principals_file);
    936 	free(ca_fp);
    937 	return ret;
    938 }
    939 
    940 /*
    941  * Checks whether key is allowed in file.
    942  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
    943  */
    944 static int
    945 user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
    946 {
    947 	FILE *f;
    948 	int found_key = 0;
    949 
    950 	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
    951 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
    952 
    953 	debug("trying public key file %s", file);
    954 	if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
    955 		found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw);
    956 		fclose(f);
    957 	}
    958 
    959 	restore_uid();
    960 	return found_key;
    961 }
    962 
    963 /*
    964  * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
    965  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
    966  */
    967 static int
    968 user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
    969 {
    970 	FILE *f = NULL;
    971 	int r, ok, found_key = 0;
    972 	struct passwd *pw;
    973 	int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0;
    974 	pid_t pid;
    975 	char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
    976 	char *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
    977 	void (*osigchld)(int);
    978 
    979 	if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL)
    980 		return 0;
    981 	if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
    982 		error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
    983 		return 0;
    984 	}
    985 
    986 	/*
    987 	 * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
    988 	 * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
    989 	 */
    990 	osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
    991 
    992 	/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
    993 	username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
    994 	    "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
    995 	pw = getpwnam(username);
    996 	if (pw == NULL) {
    997 		error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
    998 		    username, strerror(errno));
    999 		goto out;
   1000 	}
   1001 
   1002 	/* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */
   1003 	if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
   1004 	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
   1005 		error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
   1006 		goto out;
   1007 	}
   1008 	if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
   1009 		error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
   1010 		goto out;
   1011 	}
   1012 
   1013 	/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
   1014 	if (split_argv(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
   1015 		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes",
   1016 		    command);
   1017 		goto out;
   1018 	}
   1019 	if (ac == 0) {
   1020 		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
   1021 		    command);
   1022 		goto out;
   1023 	}
   1024 	for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
   1025 		tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
   1026 		    "u", user_pw->pw_name,
   1027 		    "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
   1028 		    "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
   1029 		    "f", key_fp,
   1030 		    "k", keytext,
   1031 		    (char *)NULL);
   1032 		if (tmp == NULL)
   1033 			fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
   1034 		free(av[i]);
   1035 		av[i] = tmp;
   1036 	}
   1037 	/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
   1038 	command = assemble_argv(ac, av);
   1039 
   1040 	/*
   1041 	 * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments
   1042 	 * then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the
   1043 	 * target username as a single argument.
   1044 	 */
   1045 	if (ac == 1) {
   1046 		av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av));
   1047 		av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name);
   1048 		av[2] = NULL;
   1049 		/* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */
   1050 		free(command);
   1051 		xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
   1052 	}
   1053 
   1054 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command,
   1055 	    ac, av, &f)) == 0)
   1056 		goto out;
   1057 
   1058 	uid_swapped = 1;
   1059 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
   1060 
   1061 	ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
   1062 
   1063 	fclose(f);
   1064 	f = NULL;
   1065 
   1066 	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command) != 0)
   1067 		goto out;
   1068 
   1069 	/* Read completed successfully */
   1070 	found_key = ok;
   1071  out:
   1072 	if (f != NULL)
   1073 		fclose(f);
   1074 	signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
   1075 	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
   1076 		free(av[i]);
   1077 	free(av);
   1078 	if (uid_swapped)
   1079 		restore_uid();
   1080 	free(command);
   1081 	free(username);
   1082 	free(key_fp);
   1083 	free(keytext);
   1084 	return found_key;
   1085 }
   1086 
   1087 /*
   1088  * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
   1089  */
   1090 int
   1091 user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int auth_attempt)
   1092 {
   1093 	u_int success, i;
   1094 	char *file;
   1095 
   1096 	if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
   1097 		return 0;
   1098 	if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
   1099 		return 0;
   1100 
   1101 	success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key);
   1102 	if (success)
   1103 		return success;
   1104 
   1105 	success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key);
   1106 	if (success > 0)
   1107 		return success;
   1108 
   1109 	for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
   1110 
   1111 		if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
   1112 			continue;
   1113 		file = expand_authorized_keys(
   1114 		    options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
   1115 
   1116 		success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
   1117 		free(file);
   1118 	}
   1119 
   1120 	return success;
   1121 }
   1122 
   1123 /* Records a public key in the list of previously-successful keys */
   1124 void
   1125 auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key)
   1126 {
   1127 	struct sshkey **tmp;
   1128 
   1129 	if (authctxt->nprev_userkeys >= INT_MAX ||
   1130 	    (tmp = reallocarray(authctxt->prev_userkeys,
   1131 	    authctxt->nprev_userkeys + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL)
   1132 		fatal("%s: reallocarray failed", __func__);
   1133 	authctxt->prev_userkeys = tmp;
   1134 	authctxt->prev_userkeys[authctxt->nprev_userkeys] = key;
   1135 	authctxt->nprev_userkeys++;
   1136 }
   1137 
   1138 /* Checks whether a key has already been used successfully for authentication */
   1139 int
   1140 auth2_userkey_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key)
   1141 {
   1142 	u_int i;
   1143 
   1144 	for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_userkeys; i++) {
   1145 		if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_userkeys[i])) {
   1146 			return 1;
   1147 		}
   1148 	}
   1149 	return 0;
   1150 }
   1151 
   1152 Authmethod method_pubkey = {
   1153 	"publickey",
   1154 	userauth_pubkey,
   1155 	&options.pubkey_authentication
   1156 };
   1157