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      1 # only HALs responsible for network hardware should have privileged
      2 # network capabilities
      3 neverallow {
      4   halserverdomain
      5   -hal_bluetooth_server
      6   -hal_wifi_server
      7   -hal_wifi_supplicant_server
      8   -rild
      9 } self:capability { net_admin net_raw };
     10 
     11 # Unless a HAL's job is to communicate over the network, or control network
     12 # hardware, it should not be using network sockets.
     13 neverallow {
     14   halserverdomain
     15   -hal_tetheroffload_server
     16   -hal_wifi_server
     17   -hal_wifi_supplicant_server
     18   -rild
     19 } domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
     20 neverallow hal_tetheroffload_server unlabeled:service_manager list; #TODO: b/62658302
     21 
     22 ###
     23 # HALs are defined as an attribute and so a given domain could hypothetically
     24 # have multiple HALs in it (or even all of them) with the subsequent policy of
     25 # the domain comprised of the union of all the HALs.
     26 #
     27 # This is a problem because
     28 # 1) Security sensitive components should only be accessed by specific HALs.
     29 # 2) hwbinder_call and the restrictions it provides cannot be reasoned about in
     30 #    the platform.
     31 # 3) The platform cannot reason about defense in depth if there are
     32 #    monolithic domains etc.
     33 #
     34 # As an example, hal_keymaster and hal_gatekeeper can access the TEE and while
     35 # its OK for them to share a process its not OK with them to share processes
     36 # with other hals.
     37 #
     38 # The following neverallow rules, in conjuntion with CTS tests, assert that
     39 # these security principles are adhered to.
     40 #
     41 # Do not allow a hal to exec another process without a domain transition.
     42 # TODO remove exemptions.
     43 neverallow {
     44   halserverdomain
     45   -hal_dumpstate_server
     46   -rild
     47 } { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
     48 # Do not allow a process other than init to transition into a HAL domain.
     49 neverallow { domain -init } halserverdomain:process transition;
     50 # Only allow transitioning to a domain by running its executable. Do not
     51 # allow transitioning into a HAL domain by use of seclabel in an
     52 # init.*.rc script.
     53 neverallow * halserverdomain:process dyntransition;
     54