| /system/keymaster/ng/include/ |
| keystore_hidl_support.h | 107 static_assert(1 /* version size */ + sizeof(token.challenge) + sizeof(token.userId) +
117 pos = copy_bytes_to_iterator(token.challenge, pos);
|
| /frameworks/base/services/tests/servicestests/src/com/android/server/locksettings/ |
| LockSettingsServiceTests.java | 114 // clear auth token and wait for verify challenge from primary user to re-generate it.
141 // Clear unified challenge
169 // clear auth token and make sure verify challenge from primary user does not regenerate it.
211 final long challenge = 54321; local
212 VerifyCredentialResponse response = mService.verifyCredential(credential, type, challenge,
233 incorrectType, challenge, userId).getResponseCode());
236 type, challenge, userId).getResponseCode());
|
| /system/gatekeeper/ |
| gatekeeper.cpp | 153 user_id, authenticator_id, request.challenge);
225 uint64_t challenge) {
232 token->challenge = challenge;
|
| /system/gatekeeper/include/gatekeeper/ |
| gatekeeper.h | 180 secure_id_t user_id, secure_id_t authenticator_id, uint64_t challenge);
|
| /device/generic/goldfish/fingerprint/ |
| fingerprint.c | 82 uint64_t challenge; member in struct:qemu_fingerprint_device_t
322 if (hat->challenge == dev->challenge) {
335 if (hat->challenge != dev->challenge && !(hat->authenticator_type & HW_AUTH_FINGERPRINT)) {
362 uint64_t challenge = 0; local
365 // The challenge will typically be a cryptographically-secure key
368 challenge = get_64bit_rand();
371 qdev->challenge = challenge;
[all...] |
| /device/linaro/bootloader/edk2/AppPkg/Applications/Python/Python-2.7.2/Demo/pdist/ |
| server.py | 125 challenge = self._generate_challenge()
126 conn.send("%d\n" % challenge)
139 if not self._compare_challenge_response(challenge, response):
144 print "Response matches challenge. Go ahead!"
|
| client.py | 140 challenge = string.atoi(string.strip(line))
141 response = self._encode_challenge(challenge)
|
| /external/nist-sip/java/gov/nist/javax/sip/header/ |
| AuthenticationHeader.java | 143 * @param challenge --
144 * the challenge from which the parameters are extracted.
146 public void setChallenge(Challenge challenge) {
147 this.scheme = challenge.scheme;
148 super.parameters = challenge.authParams;
162 * Sets the scheme of the challenge information for this
166 * the new string value that identifies the challenge information
174 * Returns the scheme of the challenge information for this
177 * @return the string value of the challenge information
[all...] |
| /external/ppp/pppd/plugins/radius/ |
| radius.c | 79 unsigned char *challenge,
88 unsigned char *challenge,
322 * id -- the ID byte in the challenge
324 * challenge -- the challenge string we sent (length in first byte)
336 unsigned char *challenge, unsigned char *response,
352 challenge_len = *challenge++;
369 error("RADIUS: Challenge type %u unsupported", digest->code);
395 * add the challenge and response fields
399 /* CHAP-Challenge and CHAP-Password *
[all...] |
| /external/python/cpython2/Demo/pdist/ |
| server.py | 125 challenge = self._generate_challenge()
126 conn.send("%d\n" % challenge)
139 if not self._compare_challenge_response(challenge, response):
144 print "Response matches challenge. Go ahead!"
|
| client.py | 140 challenge = string.atoi(string.strip(line))
141 response = self._encode_challenge(challenge)
|
| /packages/apps/Settings/src/com/android/settings/fingerprint/ |
| FingerprintEnrollFindSensor.java | 209 long challenge = Utils.getFingerprintManagerOrNull(this).preEnroll(); local
215 null, null, challenge);
219 null, null, challenge, mUserId);
|
| /system/keymaster/km_openssl/ |
| soft_keymaster_enforcement.cpp | 188 response.token.challenge = request.challenge;
194 toBlob(response.token.challenge),
|
| /frameworks/opt/net/wifi/service/java/com/android/server/wifi/util/ |
| TelephonyUtil.java | 354 for (String challenge : requestData) {
355 if (challenge == null || challenge.isEmpty()) {
358 Log.d(TAG, "RAND = " + challenge);
362 rand = parseHex(challenge);
364 Log.e(TAG, "malformed challenge");
427 // EAP-AKA/AKA': data[] contains rand & authn couple for the single challenge
456 Log.e(TAG, "malformed challenge");
459 Log.e(TAG, "malformed challenge");
|
| /external/curl/tests/python_dependencies/impacket/ |
| ntlm.py | 340 ('challenge','8s'),
408 def __init__(self, username = '', password = '', challenge = '', lmhash = '', nthash = '', flags = 0):
428 self['lanman'] = get_ntlmv1_response(lmhash, challenge)
429 self['ntlm'] = get_ntlmv1_response(nthash, challenge)
433 self['lanman']=get_ntlmv1_response(lmhash, challenge)
434 self['ntlm']=get_ntlmv1_response(nthash, challenge) # This is not used for LM_KEY nor NTLM_KEY
551 def ntlmssp_DES_encrypt(key, challenge):
552 answer = __DES_block(key[:7], challenge)
553 answer += __DES_block(key[7:14], challenge)
554 answer += __DES_block(key[14:], challenge)
[all...] |
| /external/wpa_supplicant_8/src/eap_server/ |
| eap_server_ttls.c | 274 "EAP-TTLS: CHAP-Challenge (CHAP)",
288 "EAP-TTLS: MS-CHAP-Challenge",
334 return eap_server_tls_derive_key(sm, &data->ssl, "ttls challenge",
556 const u8 *challenge,
563 if (challenge == NULL || password == NULL ||
567 "(challenge len %lu password len %lu)",
586 "challenge from TLS data");
591 if (os_memcmp_const(challenge, chal, EAP_TTLS_CHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN)
594 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS/CHAP: Challenge mismatch");
601 /* MD5(Ident + Password + Challenge) */
[all...] |
| eap.h | 156 const u8 *challenge, const u8 *response);
|
| /system/keymaster/include/keymaster/ |
| android_keymaster_messages.h | 817 challenge = other.challenge;
829 uint64_t challenge{};
[all...] |
| /packages/apps/Dialer/java/com/android/voicemail/impl/mail/store/imap/ |
| DigestMd5Utils.java | 73 public Data(ImapStore imapStore, MailTransport transport, Map<String, String> challenge) {
76 realm = challenge.getOrDefault(DIGEST_REALM, "");
77 nonce = challenge.get(DIGEST_NONCE);
224 throw new MessagingException("nonce missing from server DIGEST-MD5 challenge");
|
| /system/security/keystore/ |
| auth_token_table.cpp | 137 entries_, [&](Entry& e) { return e.token().challenge == op_handle && !e.completed(); });
202 auto found = find_if(entries_, [&](Entry& e) { return e.token().challenge == op_handle; });
213 operation_completed_(token_.challenge == 0) {}
|
| /external/boringssl/src/ssl/ |
| s3_both.cc | 318 CBS cipher_specs, session_id, challenge; local
326 !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) ||
335 // The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or left-pad with
337 size_t rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge);
343 OPENSSL_memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge),
|
| /hardware/interfaces/keymaster/4.0/ |
| types.hal | 360 * challenge field. Otherwise the IKeymasterDevice must returrn
635 * Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is used to deliver a "challenge" value to the attestKey() method,
641 ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE = TagType:BYTES | 708, /* Used to provide challenge in attestation */
[all...] |
| /system/core/gatekeeperd/ |
| gatekeeperd.cpp | 245 virtual int verifyChallenge(uint32_t uid, uint64_t challenge,
273 Return<void> hwRes = hw_device->verify(uid, challenge, curPwdHandle, enteredPwd,
298 ret = soft_dev.verify(uid, challenge,
309 ret = soft_device->verify(uid, challenge,
|
| /external/python/cpython3/Lib/ |
| smtplib.py | 613 data = authobject(challenge)
615 It will be called to process the server's challenge response; the
616 challenge argument it is passed will be a bytes. It should return
625 # than None when challenge is None, then they do. See issue #15014.
633 # If server responds with a challenge, send the response.
635 challenge = base64.decodebytes(resp)
637 authobject(challenge).encode('ascii'), eol='')
643 def auth_cram_md5(self, challenge=None):
647 if challenge is None:
650 self.password.encode('ascii'), challenge, 'md5').hexdigest(
[all...] |
| /frameworks/base/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/recoverablekeystore/ |
| KeySyncUtils.java | 187 * @param challenge The challenge issued by the server.
199 byte[] challenge,
205 /*header=*/ concat(RECOVERY_CLAIM_HEADER, vaultParams, challenge),
|
