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      1 /*
      2  * Copyright (C) 2014 The Android Open Source Project
      3  *
      4  * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
      5  * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
      6  * You may obtain a copy of the License at
      7  *
      8  *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
      9  *
     10  * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
     11  * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
     12  * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
     13  * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
     14  * limitations under the License.
     15  */
     16 
     17 #define LOG_TAG "keystore"
     18 
     19 #include "keymaster_enforcement.h"
     20 
     21 #include <assert.h>
     22 #include <inttypes.h>
     23 #include <limits.h>
     24 #include <string.h>
     25 
     26 #include <openssl/evp.h>
     27 
     28 #include <cutils/log.h>
     29 #include <hardware/hw_auth_token.h>
     30 #include <list>
     31 
     32 #include <keystore/keystore_hidl_support.h>
     33 
     34 namespace keystore {
     35 
     36 class AccessTimeMap {
     37   public:
     38     explicit AccessTimeMap(uint32_t max_size) : max_size_(max_size) {}
     39 
     40     /* If the key is found, returns true and fills \p last_access_time.  If not found returns
     41      * false. */
     42     bool LastKeyAccessTime(km_id_t keyid, uint32_t* last_access_time) const;
     43 
     44     /* Updates the last key access time with the currentTime parameter.  Adds the key if
     45      * needed, returning false if key cannot be added because list is full. */
     46     bool UpdateKeyAccessTime(km_id_t keyid, uint32_t current_time, uint32_t timeout);
     47 
     48   private:
     49     struct AccessTime {
     50         km_id_t keyid;
     51         uint32_t access_time;
     52         uint32_t timeout;
     53     };
     54     std::list<AccessTime> last_access_list_;
     55     const uint32_t max_size_;
     56 };
     57 
     58 class AccessCountMap {
     59   public:
     60     explicit AccessCountMap(uint32_t max_size) : max_size_(max_size) {}
     61 
     62     /* If the key is found, returns true and fills \p count.  If not found returns
     63      * false. */
     64     bool KeyAccessCount(km_id_t keyid, uint32_t* count) const;
     65 
     66     /* Increments key access count, adding an entry if the key has never been used.  Returns
     67      * false if the list has reached maximum size. */
     68     bool IncrementKeyAccessCount(km_id_t keyid);
     69 
     70   private:
     71     struct AccessCount {
     72         km_id_t keyid;
     73         uint64_t access_count;
     74     };
     75     std::list<AccessCount> access_count_list_;
     76     const uint32_t max_size_;
     77 };
     78 
     79 bool is_public_key_algorithm(const AuthorizationSet& auth_set) {
     80     auto algorithm = auth_set.GetTagValue(TAG_ALGORITHM);
     81     return algorithm.isOk() &&
     82            (algorithm.value() == Algorithm::RSA || algorithm.value() == Algorithm::EC);
     83 }
     84 
     85 static ErrorCode authorized_purpose(const KeyPurpose purpose, const AuthorizationSet& auth_set) {
     86     switch (purpose) {
     87     case KeyPurpose::VERIFY:
     88     case KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT:
     89     case KeyPurpose::SIGN:
     90     case KeyPurpose::DECRYPT:
     91         if (auth_set.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, purpose)) return ErrorCode::OK;
     92         return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE;
     93 
     94     default:
     95         return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE;
     96     }
     97 }
     98 
     99 inline bool is_origination_purpose(KeyPurpose purpose) {
    100     return purpose == KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT || purpose == KeyPurpose::SIGN;
    101 }
    102 
    103 inline bool is_usage_purpose(KeyPurpose purpose) {
    104     return purpose == KeyPurpose::DECRYPT || purpose == KeyPurpose::VERIFY;
    105 }
    106 
    107 KeymasterEnforcement::KeymasterEnforcement(uint32_t max_access_time_map_size,
    108                                            uint32_t max_access_count_map_size)
    109     : access_time_map_(new (std::nothrow) AccessTimeMap(max_access_time_map_size)),
    110       access_count_map_(new (std::nothrow) AccessCountMap(max_access_count_map_size)) {}
    111 
    112 KeymasterEnforcement::~KeymasterEnforcement() {
    113     delete access_time_map_;
    114     delete access_count_map_;
    115 }
    116 
    117 ErrorCode KeymasterEnforcement::AuthorizeOperation(const KeyPurpose purpose, const km_id_t keyid,
    118                                                    const AuthorizationSet& auth_set,
    119                                                    const AuthorizationSet& operation_params,
    120                                                    const HardwareAuthToken& auth_token,
    121                                                    uint64_t op_handle, bool is_begin_operation) {
    122     if (is_public_key_algorithm(auth_set)) {
    123         switch (purpose) {
    124         case KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT:
    125         case KeyPurpose::VERIFY:
    126             /* Public key operations are always authorized. */
    127             return ErrorCode::OK;
    128 
    129         case KeyPurpose::DECRYPT:
    130         case KeyPurpose::SIGN:
    131             break;
    132 
    133         case KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY:
    134             return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE;
    135         };
    136     };
    137 
    138     if (is_begin_operation)
    139         return AuthorizeBegin(purpose, keyid, auth_set, operation_params, auth_token);
    140     else
    141         return AuthorizeUpdateOrFinish(auth_set, auth_token, op_handle);
    142 }
    143 
    144 // For update and finish the only thing to check is user authentication, and then only if it's not
    145 // timeout-based.
    146 ErrorCode KeymasterEnforcement::AuthorizeUpdateOrFinish(const AuthorizationSet& auth_set,
    147                                                         const HardwareAuthToken& auth_token,
    148                                                         uint64_t op_handle) {
    149     int auth_type_index = -1;
    150     for (size_t pos = 0; pos < auth_set.size(); ++pos) {
    151         switch (auth_set[pos].tag) {
    152         case Tag::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED:
    153         case Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT:
    154             // If no auth is required or if auth is timeout-based, we have nothing to check.
    155             return ErrorCode::OK;
    156 
    157         case Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE:
    158             auth_type_index = pos;
    159             break;
    160 
    161         default:
    162             break;
    163         }
    164     }
    165 
    166     // Note that at this point we should be able to assume that authentication is required, because
    167     // authentication is required if KM_TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED is absent.  However, there are legacy
    168     // keys which have no authentication-related tags, so we assume that absence is equivalent to
    169     // presence of KM_TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED.
    170     //
    171     // So, if we found KM_TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE or if we find KM_TAG_USER_SECURE_ID then authentication
    172     // is required.  If we find neither, then we assume authentication is not required and return
    173     // success.
    174     bool authentication_required = (auth_type_index != -1);
    175     for (auto& param : auth_set) {
    176         auto user_secure_id = authorizationValue(TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, param);
    177         if (user_secure_id.isOk()) {
    178             authentication_required = true;
    179             int auth_timeout_index = -1;
    180             if (auth_token.mac.size() &&
    181                 AuthTokenMatches(auth_set, auth_token, user_secure_id.value(), auth_type_index,
    182                                  auth_timeout_index, op_handle, false /* is_begin_operation */))
    183                 return ErrorCode::OK;
    184         }
    185     }
    186 
    187     if (authentication_required) return ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED;
    188 
    189     return ErrorCode::OK;
    190 }
    191 
    192 ErrorCode KeymasterEnforcement::AuthorizeBegin(const KeyPurpose purpose, const km_id_t keyid,
    193                                                const AuthorizationSet& auth_set,
    194                                                const AuthorizationSet& operation_params,
    195                                                NullOr<const HardwareAuthToken&> auth_token) {
    196     // Find some entries that may be needed to handle KM_TAG_USER_SECURE_ID
    197     int auth_timeout_index = -1;
    198     int auth_type_index = -1;
    199     int no_auth_required_index = -1;
    200     for (size_t pos = 0; pos < auth_set.size(); ++pos) {
    201         switch (auth_set[pos].tag) {
    202         case Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT:
    203             auth_timeout_index = pos;
    204             break;
    205         case Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE:
    206             auth_type_index = pos;
    207             break;
    208         case Tag::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED:
    209             no_auth_required_index = pos;
    210             break;
    211         default:
    212             break;
    213         }
    214     }
    215 
    216     ErrorCode error = authorized_purpose(purpose, auth_set);
    217     if (error != ErrorCode::OK) return error;
    218 
    219     // If successful, and if key has a min time between ops, this will be set to the time limit
    220     uint32_t min_ops_timeout = UINT32_MAX;
    221 
    222     bool update_access_count = false;
    223     bool caller_nonce_authorized_by_key = false;
    224     bool authentication_required = false;
    225     bool auth_token_matched = false;
    226     bool unlocked_device_required = false;
    227     int32_t user_id = -1;
    228 
    229     for (auto& param : auth_set) {
    230 
    231         // KM_TAG_PADDING_OLD and KM_TAG_DIGEST_OLD aren't actually members of the enum, so we can't
    232         // switch on them.  There's nothing to validate for them, though, so just ignore them.
    233         if (int32_t(param.tag) == KM_TAG_PADDING_OLD || int32_t(param.tag) == KM_TAG_DIGEST_OLD)
    234             continue;
    235 
    236         switch (param.tag) {
    237 
    238         case Tag::ACTIVE_DATETIME: {
    239             auto date = authorizationValue(TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, param);
    240             if (date.isOk() && !activation_date_valid(date.value()))
    241                 return ErrorCode::KEY_NOT_YET_VALID;
    242             break;
    243         }
    244         case Tag::ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME: {
    245             auto date = authorizationValue(TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, param);
    246             if (is_origination_purpose(purpose) && date.isOk() &&
    247                 expiration_date_passed(date.value()))
    248                 return ErrorCode::KEY_EXPIRED;
    249             break;
    250         }
    251         case Tag::USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME: {
    252             auto date = authorizationValue(TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, param);
    253             if (is_usage_purpose(purpose) && date.isOk() && expiration_date_passed(date.value()))
    254                 return ErrorCode::KEY_EXPIRED;
    255             break;
    256         }
    257         case Tag::MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS: {
    258             auto min_ops_timeout = authorizationValue(TAG_MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS, param);
    259             if (min_ops_timeout.isOk() && !MinTimeBetweenOpsPassed(min_ops_timeout.value(), keyid))
    260                 return ErrorCode::KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
    261             break;
    262         }
    263         case Tag::MAX_USES_PER_BOOT: {
    264             auto max_users = authorizationValue(TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT, param);
    265             update_access_count = true;
    266             if (max_users.isOk() && !MaxUsesPerBootNotExceeded(keyid, max_users.value()))
    267                 return ErrorCode::KEY_MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED;
    268             break;
    269         }
    270         case Tag::USER_SECURE_ID:
    271             if (no_auth_required_index != -1) {
    272                 // Key has both KM_TAG_USER_SECURE_ID and KM_TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED
    273                 return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB;
    274             }
    275 
    276             if (auth_timeout_index != -1) {
    277                 auto secure_id = authorizationValue(TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, param);
    278                 authentication_required = true;
    279                 if (secure_id.isOk() && auth_token.isOk() &&
    280                     AuthTokenMatches(auth_set, auth_token.value(), secure_id.value(),
    281                                      auth_type_index, auth_timeout_index, 0 /* op_handle */,
    282                                      true /* is_begin_operation */))
    283                     auth_token_matched = true;
    284             }
    285             break;
    286 
    287         case Tag::USER_ID:
    288             user_id = authorizationValue(TAG_USER_ID, param).value();
    289             break;
    290 
    291         case Tag::CALLER_NONCE:
    292             caller_nonce_authorized_by_key = true;
    293             break;
    294 
    295         case Tag::UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED:
    296             unlocked_device_required = true;
    297             break;
    298 
    299         /* Tags should never be in key auths. */
    300         case Tag::INVALID:
    301         case Tag::ROOT_OF_TRUST:
    302         case Tag::APPLICATION_DATA:
    303         case Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE:
    304         case Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID:
    305         case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND:
    306         case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE:
    307         case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT:
    308         case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL:
    309         case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI:
    310         case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID:
    311         case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER:
    312         case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL:
    313             return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB;
    314 
    315         /* Tags used for cryptographic parameters in keygen.  Nothing to enforce. */
    316         case Tag::PURPOSE:
    317         case Tag::ALGORITHM:
    318         case Tag::KEY_SIZE:
    319         case Tag::BLOCK_MODE:
    320         case Tag::DIGEST:
    321         case Tag::MAC_LENGTH:
    322         case Tag::PADDING:
    323         case Tag::NONCE:
    324         case Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH:
    325         case Tag::EC_CURVE:
    326 
    327         /* Tags not used for operations. */
    328         case Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS:
    329 
    330         /* Algorithm specific parameters not used for access control. */
    331         case Tag::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT:
    332 
    333         /* Informational tags. */
    334         case Tag::CREATION_DATETIME:
    335         case Tag::ORIGIN:
    336         case Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE:
    337 
    338         /* Tags handled when KM_TAG_USER_SECURE_ID is handled */
    339         case Tag::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED:
    340         case Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE:
    341         case Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT:
    342 
    343         /* Tag to provide data to operations. */
    344         case Tag::ASSOCIATED_DATA:
    345 
    346         /* Tags that are implicitly verified by secure side */
    347         case Tag::APPLICATION_ID:
    348         case Tag::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL:
    349         case Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL:
    350         case Tag::OS_VERSION:
    351         case Tag::TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED:
    352         case Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL:
    353 
    354         /* TODO(swillden): Handle these */
    355         case Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID:
    356         case Tag::UNIQUE_ID:
    357         case Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION:
    358         case Tag::ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY:
    359         case Tag::HARDWARE_TYPE:
    360         case Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED:
    361         case Tag::CONFIRMATION_TOKEN:
    362             break;
    363 
    364         case Tag::BOOTLOADER_ONLY:
    365             return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB;
    366         }
    367     }
    368 
    369     if (unlocked_device_required && is_device_locked(user_id)) {
    370         switch (purpose) {
    371         case KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT:
    372         case KeyPurpose::VERIFY:
    373             /* These are okay */
    374             break;
    375         case KeyPurpose::DECRYPT:
    376         case KeyPurpose::SIGN:
    377         case KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY:
    378             return ErrorCode::DEVICE_LOCKED;
    379         };
    380     }
    381 
    382     if (authentication_required && !auth_token_matched) {
    383         ALOGE("Auth required but no matching auth token found");
    384         return ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED;
    385     }
    386 
    387     if (!caller_nonce_authorized_by_key && is_origination_purpose(purpose) &&
    388         operation_params.Contains(Tag::NONCE))
    389         return ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED;
    390 
    391     if (min_ops_timeout != UINT32_MAX) {
    392         if (!access_time_map_) {
    393             ALOGE("Rate-limited keys table not allocated.  Rate-limited keys disabled");
    394             return ErrorCode::MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
    395         }
    396 
    397         if (!access_time_map_->UpdateKeyAccessTime(keyid, get_current_time(), min_ops_timeout)) {
    398             ALOGE("Rate-limited keys table full.  Entries will time out.");
    399             return ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS;
    400         }
    401     }
    402 
    403     if (update_access_count) {
    404         if (!access_count_map_) {
    405             ALOGE("Usage-count limited keys tabel not allocated.  Count-limited keys disabled");
    406             return ErrorCode::MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
    407         }
    408 
    409         if (!access_count_map_->IncrementKeyAccessCount(keyid)) {
    410             ALOGE("Usage count-limited keys table full, until reboot.");
    411             return ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS;
    412         }
    413     }
    414 
    415     return ErrorCode::OK;
    416 }
    417 
    418 class EvpMdCtx {
    419   public:
    420     EvpMdCtx() { EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_); }
    421     ~EvpMdCtx() { EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_); }
    422 
    423     EVP_MD_CTX* get() { return &ctx_; }
    424 
    425   private:
    426     EVP_MD_CTX ctx_;
    427 };
    428 
    429 /* static */
    430 bool KeymasterEnforcement::CreateKeyId(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& key_blob, km_id_t* keyid) {
    431     EvpMdCtx ctx;
    432 
    433     uint8_t hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
    434     unsigned int hash_len;
    435     if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_sha256(), nullptr /* ENGINE */) &&
    436         EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), &key_blob[0], key_blob.size()) &&
    437         EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx.get(), hash, &hash_len)) {
    438         assert(hash_len >= sizeof(*keyid));
    439         memcpy(keyid, hash, sizeof(*keyid));
    440         return true;
    441     }
    442 
    443     return false;
    444 }
    445 
    446 bool KeymasterEnforcement::MinTimeBetweenOpsPassed(uint32_t min_time_between, const km_id_t keyid) {
    447     if (!access_time_map_) return false;
    448 
    449     uint32_t last_access_time;
    450     if (!access_time_map_->LastKeyAccessTime(keyid, &last_access_time)) return true;
    451     return min_time_between <= static_cast<int64_t>(get_current_time()) - last_access_time;
    452 }
    453 
    454 bool KeymasterEnforcement::MaxUsesPerBootNotExceeded(const km_id_t keyid, uint32_t max_uses) {
    455     if (!access_count_map_) return false;
    456 
    457     uint32_t key_access_count;
    458     if (!access_count_map_->KeyAccessCount(keyid, &key_access_count)) return true;
    459     return key_access_count < max_uses;
    460 }
    461 
    462 template <typename IntType, uint32_t byteOrder> struct choose_hton;
    463 
    464 template <typename IntType> struct choose_hton<IntType, __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__> {
    465     inline static IntType hton(const IntType& value) {
    466         IntType result = 0;
    467         const unsigned char* inbytes = reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(&value);
    468         unsigned char* outbytes = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(&result);
    469         for (int i = sizeof(IntType) - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
    470             *(outbytes++) = inbytes[i];
    471         }
    472         return result;
    473     }
    474 };
    475 
    476 template <typename IntType> struct choose_hton<IntType, __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__> {
    477     inline static IntType hton(const IntType& value) { return value; }
    478 };
    479 
    480 template <typename IntType> inline IntType hton(const IntType& value) {
    481     return choose_hton<IntType, __BYTE_ORDER__>::hton(value);
    482 }
    483 
    484 template <typename IntType> inline IntType ntoh(const IntType& value) {
    485     // same operation and hton
    486     return choose_hton<IntType, __BYTE_ORDER__>::hton(value);
    487 }
    488 
    489 bool KeymasterEnforcement::AuthTokenMatches(const AuthorizationSet& auth_set,
    490                                             const HardwareAuthToken& auth_token,
    491                                             const uint64_t user_secure_id,
    492                                             const int auth_type_index, const int auth_timeout_index,
    493                                             const uint64_t op_handle,
    494                                             bool is_begin_operation) const {
    495     assert(auth_type_index < static_cast<int>(auth_set.size()));
    496     assert(auth_timeout_index < static_cast<int>(auth_set.size()));
    497 
    498     if (!ValidateTokenSignature(auth_token)) {
    499         ALOGE("Auth token signature invalid");
    500         return false;
    501     }
    502 
    503     if (auth_timeout_index == -1 && op_handle && op_handle != auth_token.challenge) {
    504         ALOGE("Auth token has the challenge %" PRIu64 ", need %" PRIu64, auth_token.challenge,
    505               op_handle);
    506         return false;
    507     }
    508 
    509     if (user_secure_id != auth_token.userId && user_secure_id != auth_token.authenticatorId) {
    510         ALOGI("Auth token SIDs %" PRIu64 " and %" PRIu64 " do not match key SID %" PRIu64,
    511               auth_token.userId, auth_token.authenticatorId, user_secure_id);
    512         return false;
    513     }
    514 
    515     if (auth_type_index < 0 || auth_type_index > static_cast<int>(auth_set.size())) {
    516         ALOGE("Auth required but no auth type found");
    517         return false;
    518     }
    519 
    520     assert(auth_set[auth_type_index].tag == TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE);
    521     auto key_auth_type_mask = authorizationValue(TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, auth_set[auth_type_index]);
    522     if (!key_auth_type_mask.isOk()) return false;
    523 
    524     if ((uint32_t(key_auth_type_mask.value()) & auth_token.authenticatorType) == 0) {
    525         ALOGE("Key requires match of auth type mask 0%uo, but token contained 0%uo",
    526               key_auth_type_mask.value(), auth_token.authenticatorType);
    527         return false;
    528     }
    529 
    530     if (auth_timeout_index != -1 && is_begin_operation) {
    531         assert(auth_set[auth_timeout_index].tag == TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT);
    532         auto auth_token_timeout =
    533             authorizationValue(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, auth_set[auth_timeout_index]);
    534         if (!auth_token_timeout.isOk()) return false;
    535 
    536         if (auth_token_timed_out(auth_token, auth_token_timeout.value())) {
    537             ALOGE("Auth token has timed out");
    538             return false;
    539         }
    540     }
    541 
    542     // Survived the whole gauntlet.  We have authentage!
    543     return true;
    544 }
    545 
    546 bool AccessTimeMap::LastKeyAccessTime(km_id_t keyid, uint32_t* last_access_time) const {
    547     for (auto& entry : last_access_list_)
    548         if (entry.keyid == keyid) {
    549             *last_access_time = entry.access_time;
    550             return true;
    551         }
    552     return false;
    553 }
    554 
    555 bool AccessTimeMap::UpdateKeyAccessTime(km_id_t keyid, uint32_t current_time, uint32_t timeout) {
    556     for (auto iter = last_access_list_.begin(); iter != last_access_list_.end();) {
    557         if (iter->keyid == keyid) {
    558             iter->access_time = current_time;
    559             return true;
    560         }
    561 
    562         // Expire entry if possible.
    563         assert(current_time >= iter->access_time);
    564         if (current_time - iter->access_time >= iter->timeout)
    565             iter = last_access_list_.erase(iter);
    566         else
    567             ++iter;
    568     }
    569 
    570     if (last_access_list_.size() >= max_size_) return false;
    571 
    572     AccessTime new_entry;
    573     new_entry.keyid = keyid;
    574     new_entry.access_time = current_time;
    575     new_entry.timeout = timeout;
    576     last_access_list_.push_front(new_entry);
    577     return true;
    578 }
    579 
    580 bool AccessCountMap::KeyAccessCount(km_id_t keyid, uint32_t* count) const {
    581     for (auto& entry : access_count_list_)
    582         if (entry.keyid == keyid) {
    583             *count = entry.access_count;
    584             return true;
    585         }
    586     return false;
    587 }
    588 
    589 bool AccessCountMap::IncrementKeyAccessCount(km_id_t keyid) {
    590     for (auto& entry : access_count_list_)
    591         if (entry.keyid == keyid) {
    592             // Note that the 'if' below will always be true because KM_TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT is a
    593             // uint32_t, and as soon as entry.access_count reaches the specified maximum value
    594             // operation requests will be rejected and access_count won't be incremented any more.
    595             // And, besides, UINT64_MAX is huge.  But we ensure that it doesn't wrap anyway, out of
    596             // an abundance of caution.
    597             if (entry.access_count < UINT64_MAX) ++entry.access_count;
    598             return true;
    599         }
    600 
    601     if (access_count_list_.size() >= max_size_) return false;
    602 
    603     AccessCount new_entry;
    604     new_entry.keyid = keyid;
    605     new_entry.access_count = 1;
    606     access_count_list_.push_front(new_entry);
    607     return true;
    608 }
    609 }; /* namespace keystore */
    610