1 ### 2 ### A domain for further sandboxing privileged apps. 3 ### 4 5 typeattribute priv_app coredomain; 6 app_domain(priv_app) 7 8 # Access the network. 9 net_domain(priv_app) 10 # Access bluetooth. 11 bluetooth_domain(priv_app) 12 13 # Allow the allocation and use of ptys 14 # Used by: https://play.privileged.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm 15 create_pty(priv_app) 16 17 # webview crash handling depends on self ptrace (b/27697529, b/20150694, b/19277529#comment7) 18 allow priv_app self:process ptrace; 19 20 # Some apps ship with shared libraries that they write out 21 # to their sandbox directory and then dlopen(). 22 allow priv_app app_data_file:file execute; 23 24 allow priv_app audioserver_service:service_manager find; 25 allow priv_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find; 26 allow priv_app drmserver_service:service_manager find; 27 allow priv_app mediacodec_service:service_manager find; 28 allow priv_app mediametrics_service:service_manager find; 29 allow priv_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find; 30 allow priv_app mediacasserver_service:service_manager find; 31 allow priv_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find; 32 allow priv_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find; 33 allow priv_app nfc_service:service_manager find; 34 allow priv_app oem_lock_service:service_manager find; 35 allow priv_app radio_service:service_manager find; 36 allow priv_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find; 37 allow priv_app app_api_service:service_manager find; 38 allow priv_app system_api_service:service_manager find; 39 allow priv_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find; 40 allow priv_app recovery_service:service_manager find; 41 42 # Write to /cache. 43 allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms; 44 allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file create_file_perms; 45 # /cache is a symlink to /data/cache on some devices. Allow reading the link. 46 allow priv_app cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms; 47 48 # Write to /data/ota_package for OTA packages. 49 allow priv_app ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms; 50 allow priv_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms; 51 52 # Access to /data/media. 53 allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms; 54 allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms; 55 56 # Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when 57 # running "adb install foo.apk". 58 allow priv_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms; 59 allow priv_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; 60 61 # Allow verifier to access staged apks. 62 allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms; 63 allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms; 64 65 # b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt 66 allow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms; 67 68 # Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored 69 # in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all 70 # data stored in that directory to process them one by one. 71 userdebug_or_eng(` 72 allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms; 73 allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; 74 ') 75 76 # For AppFuse. 77 allow priv_app vold:fd use; 78 allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write }; 79 80 # /sys and /proc access 81 r_dir_file(priv_app, sysfs_type) 82 r_dir_file(priv_app, proc) 83 r_dir_file(priv_app, rootfs) 84 85 # Allow GMS core to open kernel config for OTA matching through libvintf 86 allow priv_app config_gz:file { open read getattr }; 87 88 # access the mac address 89 allowxperm priv_app self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCGIFHWADDR; 90 91 # Allow GMS core to communicate with update_engine for A/B update. 92 binder_call(priv_app, update_engine) 93 allow priv_app update_engine_service:service_manager find; 94 95 # Allow GMS core to communicate with dumpsys storaged. 96 binder_call(priv_app, storaged) 97 allow priv_app storaged_service:service_manager find; 98 99 # Allow Phone to read/write cached ringtones (opened by system). 100 allow priv_app ringtone_file:file { getattr read write }; 101 102 # Access to /data/preloads 103 allow priv_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms; 104 allow priv_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; 105 allow priv_app preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms; 106 allow priv_app preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms; 107 108 # TODO: revert this as part of fixing 33574909 109 # android.process.media uses /dev/mtp_usb 110 allow priv_app mtp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; 111 112 # TODO: revert this as part of fixing 33574909 113 # MtpServer uses /dev/usb-ffs/mtp 114 allow priv_app functionfs:dir search; 115 allow priv_app functionfs:file rw_file_perms; 116 117 # TODO: revert this as part of fixing 33574909 118 # Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon 119 # TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider 120 allow priv_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir search; 121 122 # Allow privileged apps (e.g. GMS core) to generate unique hardware IDs 123 allow priv_app keystore:keystore_key gen_unique_id; 124 125 read_runtime_log_tags(priv_app) 126 127 ### 128 ### neverallow rules 129 ### 130 131 # Receive or send uevent messages. 132 neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *; 133 134 # Receive or send generic netlink messages 135 neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_socket *; 136 137 # Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security 138 # best practice to ensure these files aren't readable. 139 neverallow priv_app debugfs:file read; 140 141 # Do not allow privileged apps to register services. 142 # Only trusted components of Android should be registering 143 # services. 144 neverallow priv_app service_manager_type:service_manager add; 145 146 # Do not allow privileged apps to connect to the property service 147 # or set properties. b/10243159 148 neverallow priv_app property_socket:sock_file write; 149 neverallow priv_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto; 150 neverallow priv_app property_type:property_service set; 151 152 # Do not allow priv_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject. 153 # This would undermine the per-user isolation model being 154 # enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls 155 # constraints. As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow 156 # on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork 157 # permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should 158 # never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject) 159 # and priv_app is allowed fork permission to itself. 160 neverallow priv_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork; 161 162 # Do not allow priv_app to hard link to any files. 163 # In particular, if priv_app links to other app data 164 # files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion 165 # of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security 166 # bugs, so we want to ensure priv_app never has this 167 # capability. 168 neverallow priv_app file_type:file link; 169